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PREFACE.

The purpose which the writer had in mind in the prepar-

ation of this monograph, was to furnish to the practitioner

a more extended presentation of the law relating to expert

testimony, than is afforded in the treatises on evidence.

It seemed desirable that the law on this important subject

should be set forth with more of detail than it has been

found practicable to do in the general treatises of the law

of evidence. The cases relating to expert testimony are so

numerous and so diversified in character, that any attempt

to bring them all together, and give to them that con-

sideration which they merit in a work devoted to the

· PREFACE.

general subject of evidence, would seem to be out of the

question. Moreover, within the last few years, many and

important cases on this subject have been decided by the

courts, which have not yet found their way into the larger

treatises on evidence. It was for the purpose of supplying

this evident want that this work was undertaken.
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1. The Term "Expert" Defined. Strictly speaking,

an "expert" in any science, art or trade, is one who, by

practice or -observation, has become experienced therein.

He has been defined as "a person of skill;" 1 as "a

skillful or experienced person ; a person having skill, ex-

perience, or peculiar knowledge on certain subjects, or in

certain professions; a scientific witness." 2 "An expert"

said Mr. Justice FOLGEB, "is one instructed by experience,

1 Rochester v. Chester, 3 X. H. 349, 365.

2 Heald v. Thing, 45 Me. 392, 394.
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2 EXPERT TESTIMONY,

and to become one, requires a course of previous habit and

practice, or of study, so as to be familiar with the subject." 1

"All persons, I think," said Mr. Justice MAULE, "who

practice a business or profession which requires them to

possess a certain knowledge of the matter in hand, are ex-

perts so far as expertness is required." 2 And this language

has been adopted by the court in Virginia. 3 In New Hamp-

shire, we find Mr. Justice DOE declaring: "An expert

must have made the subject upon which he gives his opinion,

a matter of particular study, practice or observation, and

he must have particular special knowledge on the subject." 4

While Mr. Chief Justice AMES, of Ehode Island, says :

"Knowledge of any kind, gained for and in the course of

one's business as pertaining thereto, is precisely that which

entitles one to be considered an expert, so as to render his

opinion, founded on such knowledge, admissible in evi-

dence." 5 "An expert," says the court in Vermont, through

Mr. Justice EOYCE, " is defined to be a person that possesses

peculiar skill and knowledge upon the subject matter that he

is required to give an opinion upon." 6 As defined by Mr. Chief
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Justice SHAW in Massachusetts, an "expert is a person of

large experience in any particular department of art, business

or science." 7 As stated by Mr. Justice KEDFIELD in his edi-

tion of Greenleaf's Evidence, "The term 'expert' seems to

imply both superior knowledge and practical experience in

the art or profession ; but generally, nothing more is re-

quired to entitle one to give testimony as an expert, than

that he has been educated in the particular art or profes-

sion." 8 For persons are presumed to understand questions

pertaining to their own profession or business. 9 As the

1 Nelson v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 453, 460.

2 Vander Donckt v. Thellusson, 8 Man. G. & S. (65 Eng. C. L.) 812.

3 Bird v. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt. 800.

4 Jones v. Tucker, 41 1ST. H. 546.

5 Buffum v. Harris, 5 E. I. 250.

6 State v. Phair, 48 Vt. 366, 377,

7 Dickenson v. Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546, 555.

8 1 Greenl. Evid., 440.

9 Jones v. White, 11 Humph. 268. And see State v. Clark, 15 S. C.

(N. s.) 403, 408.

and to become one, requires a course· of previous habit and
practice, or of study, so as to be familiar with the subject." 1
"All persons, I think," said Mr. Justice MAULE, "who
practice a business or profession which requires them to
possess a certain knowledge of the matter in hand, are experts so far as expertness is required." 2 And this language
has been adopted by the court in Virginia. 3 In New Hampshire, we find ~fr. Justice DoE declaring: ''An expert
must have made th~ subject upon which he gives his opinion,
a matter of particular study, practice or observation, and
be must have particular special knowledge on the subject." 4
While Mr. Chief Justice AMEs, of Rh<?de Island, says:
"Knowledge of any kind, gained for and in the course of
one's business as pertaining thereto, is precisely that which
entitles one to be considered an expert, so as to render his
opinion, founded on such knowledge, admissible in evidence. "5 "An expert," says the court in Vermont, through
Mr. Justice ROYCE, "is defined to be a person that possesses
peculiar skill and knowledge upon the subject matter that he
is required to give an opinion upon." 6 As defined by Mr. Chief
Justice SHAw in Massachusetts, an "expert is a person of
large experience in any particular department of art, business
or science." 7 As stated by Mr. Justice REDFIELD in his edition of Greenleaf's Evidence, "The term 'expert' seems to
imply both superior knowledge and practical experience in
the art or profession; but generally, nothing more is required to entitle one to give testimony as an expert, than
that he has been educated in the particular art or profession." 8 For persons are presumed to understand questions
pertaining to their own profession or business. 9 As the
1

Nelson v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 453, 460.
Vander Donckt v. Thellusson, 8 Man. G. & S. (65 Eng. C. L.) 812.
3 Bird v. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt. 800.
4 Jones v. Tucker, 41 N. H. 546.
5 Buffum v. Harris, 5 R. I. 250.
6 State v. Ph!l.ir, 48 Vt. 366, 377,
7 Dickenson v. Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546, 555.
s 1 Greenl. Evid., § 440.
9 .Jones v. White, 11 Humph. 268.
And see Stnte v. Clark, 15 S. C.
(N. S.) 403, 408.
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opinions of experts may rest either on their personal knowl-

edge, or on facts testified of by other witnesses, 1 it is error to

assume, as is done in one case, 2 that an expert is one who

simply testifies from premises furnished by the testimony

of other witnesses. In a matter of science, no individual

can be considered an expert who does not thoroughly under-

stand the sciences involved. 8

2. The Practice of Admitting Expert Testimony an

Ancient One. The practice of admitting the evidence of

witnesses, who have become qualified by study and experi-

ence to express opinions upon questions of science and art,

is by no means peculiar to modern times. By the Roman

law, persons who were artis periti could be summoned by

thejudex at his discretion, in order to inform himself as to

physical laws or phenomena. 4 And the celebrated criminal

code framed by the Emperor Charles the Fifth, at Ratisbon

in 1532, contained a formal enactment requiring the opinion

of medical experts to be taken in all cases where death was

supposed to have been occasioned by violent means. 6 In

IGOb', Henry the Fourth, of France, in giving letters patent
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to his first physician, conferred on him the power of

appointing two surgeons in every city or important town,

whose duty it should exclusively be to examine all wounded

or murdered men, and report thereon. And in 1692, by

an order of the Council of State, it was ordained that physi-

cians should be associated with them. 6 While in England

one of the early records shows, 7 that on an appeal of

mayhem, the defendant prayed the court to see the wound

for the purpose of determining whether there had been a

maiming or not, but the court did not know how to decide,

1 Snow v. Boston etc. K. R. Co., 65 Me. 230, 232; Lessee of Forbes v.

Caruthers, 3 Yeates, 527; Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117, 124, 125.

* Travis v. Brown, 43 Penn. St. 9, 13, 14.

3 Allen v. Hunter, 6 McLean, 303, 310.

4 L. 8, 1, x. 1 ; L. 3, 4, xi. 6; L. 3, Cod. fin. reg.,iii. 39. Endemau,

243.

5 See 2 Beck's Med. Juris. 896.

6 Fodere, Introduction, Vol. I, p. 32.

? 28 Ass. pi. 5.
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as the wound was new ; and thereupon the defendant took

issue, and prayed the court that the mayhem might be

examined. A writ was accordingly sent to the sheriff to

cause to come, medicos chirurgicos de melioribus, London,

ad informandum dominum regem et curiam de his, qua Us

ex parte domini regis injungerentur. And, in 1553, Mr.

Justice Saunders is reported as saying: "If matters arise

in our law which concern other sciences or faculties, we

commonly apply for the aid of that science or faculty which

it concerns, which is an honourable and commendable thing

in our law, for thereby it appears that we don't despise all

other sciences but our own, but we approve of them, and

encourage them as things worthy of commendation." 1

Instances are recorded in the Year Books, where the courts

received the opinions of witnesses learned in the sciences

and arts. 2

3. Opinion Evidence X on-Professional Witnesses.

The rule admitting the testimony of experts is ex-

ceptional, 3 for no principle of the law is better settled than

that the opinions of witnesses are, in general, inadmissible
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in evidence. 4 They must state facts, and not opinions

1 Buckley v. Kice, 1 Plowden. 125.

2 9 H. 7,16; 7H. 6, 11.

Ellingwood v. Bragg, 52 N. H. 488; Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117, 125.

Continental Ins. Co. v. Delpench, 82 Penn. St. ^225; Frost v. Blanch -

ard, 97 Mass. 155; Hames v. Brownlee, 63 Ala. 277; Fitzgerald v. Hay-

vvard, 50 Mo. 516; Holden v. Robinson Co., 65 Me. 216; Thomas v.

State, 40 Texas, 38; Lawrence v. Hudson, 59 Tenn. 671; Benedict v.

City of Fon du Lac, 44 Wis. 495; Cummins v. State, 58 Ala. 387; Lewis

Y. Brown, 41 Me. 448; Scaggs v. Baltimore, etc. R. R. Co., 10 Md. 268;

Higgins v. Carlton, 28 Md. 115; Hayes v. Wells, 34 Md. 513; Babcock

T. Middlesex Savings Bank, 28 Conn. 306; McKnight v. State, 6 Tex. Ct.

as the wound was uew; and thereupon the defendant t ook
issue, and prayed the court that the mayhem might be
examined . A writ was accordingly sent to the sheriff t o
cause to come, medicos chfrurgicos de rnelioribus , London ,
ad inforrnandurn dorninurn regern et curiarn de liis , qua lis
ex parte doniini 'regis injungerentu1·. Aud , in 1553, Mr.
Justice Saunders -is reported as saying : "If matters a.rise
in our law which concern other sciences or faculties , we
commonly apply for the aid of that science or faculty whicp.
it concerns , which is au honourable and commendable thing
in our law, for thereby it appears that we don't despise all
other sciences but our own, but we approve of them, and
encourage them as things worthy · of commendation .'' 1
Instances are recorded in the Year Books, wher_e the courts
Teceived the opinions of witnesses learned iu the sciences
t
•
and arts .2
§ 3. Opinion Evidence ·- Non-Professional Witnesses.
-The rule admitting the testimony of experts is ex.ceptional ,3 for no principle of the law is better settled than
that the ·opinions of witnesses are, in general, inadmissible
in evidence .4 They must state facts , and not opinions

of App. 162; Seibles v. Blackwell, 1 McM. (S. C.) 57; Dawson v. Cal-

laway, 18 Ga. 573; Hawkins v. State, 25 Ga. 207; Central Railroad, etc.

v. Kelly, 58 Ga. 107; Rochester v. Chester, 3 N. H. 364; Patterson v.

Colebrook, 9 Foster (X. H.) 94; Daniels v. Mosher, 2 Mich. 183; Griffin

v. Town of Willow, 43 Wis. 509; Wood v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co., 40

"Wis. 582; Montgomery v. Town of Scott, 34 Wis. 338; Hollimau v.

Cabanne, 43 Mo. 568; Bailey v. Pool, 13 Ired. (N. C.) 406; New Albany

etc. R. R. Co. v. Huff, 19 Ind. 315; Robinson v. Fitchburg, etc. R. R.

R. Co., 7 Gray (Mass.) 92; Forbes v. Caruthers, 3 Yeates, 527; Merritt

v. Seaman, 6 H. Y. 168; Berckman v. Berckman, 16 N. J. Eq. 122

Buckley v. Rice, 1 Plowden: 125.
9 H . 7, 16; 7 H . 6, 11.
-a Ellingwood v. Bragg, 52 N . H. 488; Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117, 125.
•Continental Ins. Co. v. Delpench, 82 Penn. St. 225; Fro"t v. Blanch:.ard, 97 Mass. 155; Hames v. Brownlee, 63 Ala. 277; Fitzo-erald v. Hay-\vanl, 50 Mo . 516; Holden v. Robinson Co., 65 Me. 216; Thomas v.
State, 40 Texas, 36; Lawrence v. Hudson, 59 'l'enn. 671; Benedict v .
• Wis. 495; Cummins v. Stn.te, 58 Ala. 3 7; Lewis
·c ity of Fon clu Lac, 44
-v. Brown, 41 Me. 448; Scaggs v. Baltimore, etc. R.R. Co., 10 Md. 26 ;
Higgins v. Carlton, 28 Md . 115; Hayes; v. Well , 34 Md. 513; Babcock
v . Middlesex Savings Bank, 28 Conn . 306; :ilfoKnight v. State, 6 Tex. Ct.
<Of App. 162; Seibles v. Blackwell, 1 Mc~1. (:"' . C.) 57; Daw on v. Callaway, 18 Ga. 573; Hawkins v. State, 25 Ga. 207; Central Railroad, etc.
v . Kelly, 58 Ga. 107; Rochester v. Chester, 3 N . H. 364; Patterson v.
•Colebrook, 9 Fo ter (N. H .) 94; Daniels v. Mosher, 2 Mieh. 1 3; Griffin
v. Town of Willow, 43 "\Vis. 509; Wood v. Chicago, etc. R . R. Co., 40
Wis. 582; Montgomery v. Town of Scott, 34 Wis. 338; Hollimau v.
()a.banne, 43 Mo. 568; Bailey v. Pool. 13 I.red. (N. C.) 406; New Albany
-etc. R.R. Co. v. Huff, 19 Ind. 315; Robinson v; Fitchburg, etc. R . R .
.R. Co ., 7 Gray (Mass.) 92; Forbes v. Caruthers, 3 Yeates, 527 ; Merritt
v . Seaman, 6 N. Y. 16 ; Berckman v. Berckman, 16 N . J . Eq. 122
1
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deduced from the facts ; for it is the peculiar province <5f

the jury to determine upon the inferences which are to be

drawn from the facts. But to this general rule there are

well recognized exceptions. Experience has demonstrated

the difficulty which exists in certain cases, of stating the

facts in detail to the jury in such a manner, that they shall

produce the same impression upon the minds of the jury-*

men that they have legitimately produced upon the minds

of the witnesses. 1 So that from the very necessities of the

case, it is sometimes found essential that the opinions of

ordinary witnesses should be received, as otherwise it

would be impossible to arrive at any accurate conclusion as

to the facts involved. Hence the opinions of witnesses,

possessing no peculiar qualifications, have been received as

to the identity of persons whom they have seen, or things

which they have observed, 2 as well as to duration, distance,

dimension, velocity, etc. 3 And a witness, without being an

expert, may be asked whether a person appeared sober, or

intoxicated at the time he saw him,* and that without it

being shown that the witness had any previous knowledge
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of the habits and conduct of such person. 6 And it does

not seem to be necessary that a person should be an expert

in order to make his opinion admissible as to the character

of certain liquor, as to whether it was gin or not. 6 The

Corlis v. Little, 13 X. J. Law, 232; Massachusetts Life Ins. Co. v.Eshel-

man, 30 Ohio St. 647; Turner v. Cook, 36 Ind. 129; Shepard v. Pratt, 16

Kan. 209; Koons v. St. Louis & Iron Mountain R. R. Co., 65 Mo. 592;

Mascheck v. St. Louis R. R. Co., 1 Mo. App. 600; Gasseuheimer v.

State, 52 Ala. 314; McAdory v. State, 59 Ala. 92 : Houston, etc. R. R. Co.

Y. Smith. 52 Tex. 178.

1 See Sydleman v. Beckwith, 43 Conn. 9.

* King v. X. Y. Central, etc. R. R. Co., 72 X. Y. 607; Woodward v.

State, 4 Baxter (Tenn.) 322; Turner v. McFee, 61, Ala. 468; Beverly v.

Williams, 4 Dev. & Batt. (NT. C.) 236. In Commonwealth v. Williams,

105 Mass. 62, there was identification of a burglar by his voice.

8 State v. Folwell, 14 Ivans. 105; Eastman v. Amoskeag Manuf. Co., 44

N. H. 143.

4 State v. Huxford, 47 Iowa, 16; People v. Eastwood, 14 N. Y. 562;

s. c., 3 Parker Cr. Cas. 25; Stacy v. Portland Publishing Co. 68 Me. 279.

5 Castner v. Sliker, 33 N. J. Law. 95; s. c., Ibid. 507.

s Commonwealth v. Timothy, 8 Gray (Mass.) 480. See also State v.

Miller, 53 Iowa, 84.

6 EXPERT TESTIMONY.

opinions of witnesses have been received, that certain per-

EXPERT TESTIMONY.
sons appeared attached to each other, 1 or that a person

appeared to be sad, 2 or was of a certain age, 3 or seemed to

be suffering and looked bad, 4 or was eccentric, 5 or was of a

certain nationality. 6 So the opinions of ordinary witnesses

have been admitted in evidence, that a horse appeared well

and free from disease ; 7 that a horse was safe and kind, 8 or

that he had a sulky disposition, 9 and that a heap of stones

in a highway was an object calculated to frighten horses of

ordinary gentleness. 10 And a witness possessing no special

qualifications has been permitted to express an opinion

that certain shoes which he had seen appeared as if they

had recently been washed, 11 and even that certain hairs were

human, 12 and also that certain footprints corresponded with

certain boots, 13 and that a certain wagon made certain tracks, 14

and that the sound of a wagon seemed to come from a cer-

tain point. 15 The opinion of a witness has been received

that a certain estate was solvent. 16

4. Opinion Evidence Non-Professional Witnesses

Subject Continued. But the opinions of non-professional
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witnesses are never received, where the inquiry is into a

1 Trelawney v. Colman, 2 Starkie R. 168; McKee v. Nelson, 4 Cowen

(N. Y.) 355; Pelarnourges v. Clark, 9 Iowa, 1, 17. See too, Evans v.

People, 12 Mich. 27, 35; Blake v. People, 73 N. Y. 586.

2 Culver v. Dwight, 6 Gray (Mass.) 444.

3 Foltz v. State, 33 Ind. 215; Morse v. State, 6 Conn. 9; DeWitt v.

Baily, 17 1ST. Y. 344; Benson v. McFadden, 50 Ind. 431; Kansas Pacific

R. R. Co. v. Miller, 2 Col. 442.

4 South, etc. Railroad Co. v. McLendon, 63 Ala. 266.

5 Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 215.

6 Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. v. Miller, 2 Col. 442.

i Spear v. Richardson, 34 N. H. 428.

opinions of witnesses have been received, that certain persons appeared attached to each other ,1 or that a person
appeared to be sad, 2 or was of a certain age ,3 or seemed to
. be suffering and looked bad, 4 or was eccentric, 5 or was of a
certain nationality. 6 So the opinions of ordinary witnesses
have been admitted in evidence, that a horse appeared well
, and free from disease; 7 that a horse was safe and kind, 8 or
that he had a sulky disposition, 9 and th::it a heap of stones
in a highway was an object calculated to frighten horses of
ordinary gentleness. 10 And a witness possessing no special
qualifications has been permitted to express· an opinion
that certain shoes which he had seen appeared as if they
had recently been wasbed, 11 and even that certain hairs were
human, 12 and also that certain footprints corresponded with
certain boots, 13 and that a certain wagon made certain tracks, 14
and that the sound of a wagon seemed to come from a certain point. 15 The opinion of a witness has been received
that' a certain estate was solvent. 16

•

§ 4. Opinion Evidence-Non-Professional Witnesses-

8 Sydleman v. Beckwith, 43 Conn. 9.

9 Whittier v. Franklin, 46 N. H. 23.

10 Clinton v. Howard, 42 Conn. 294.

Subject Continued.- But the opinions of non-professional

witnesses are never received, where the inquiry is into a

Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122.

M Commonwealth Y. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412.

18 Commonwealth v. Pope, 103 Mass. 440; State v. Morris, 84 X. C. 756;

State v. Reitz, 83 X . C. 634.

14 State v. Folwell, 14 Kans. 105.

is State v. Shinborn, 46 X. H. 497.

16 Reed v. Timmins, 52 Texas, 84.

1 Trelawney v. Colman, 2 Starkie R. 168; McKee v. Nelson, 4 Cowen
(N. Y.) 355; Pelamourges v. Clai·k, 9 Iowa, 1, 17. See too, Evans v.
People, 12 Mich. 27, 35; Blake v. People, 73 N. Y. 586.
2 Culver v. Dwight, 6 Gray (Mass.) 444.
s Foltz v. State, 33 Ind. 215; Morse v. State, 6 Conn. 9; De Witt v.
Baily, 17 N. Y. 344; Benson v. M<'Fadden, 50 Ind. 431; Kansas Pacific
R. R. Co. v. Miller, 2 Col. 4-12.
4 South, etc. Railroad Co. v. McLendon, 63 Ala. 266.
6 Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 215.
6 Kansas Pacific R.R. Co. v. Miller, 2 Col. 44:J.
1 Spear v. Richardson, 34 N. H. 428.
8 Sydleman v. Beckwith, 43 Conn. 9.
9 Whittier v. Franklin, 46 N. H. 23.
10 Clinton v. Howard, 42 Conn. 294.
11 Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122.
12 Commonwealth T. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412.
is Commonwealth v. Pope, 103 Mass. 440; State v. Morris, SJ N. O. 756;
State v. Reitz, 83 N. C. 63-1.
H State v. Folwell, 14 Kans. 105.
15 State v. Shin born, 46 N. H. 497.
16 Reed v. Timmins, 52 Texas, 84.
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subject matter, the nature of which requires some peculiar

habit, study, or scientific knowledge to enable one to under-

stand i-t and to form a correct judgment thereon. 1 This

principle is more fully considered hereafter. It is, how-

ever, to be observed that in the case of non-professional

witnesses, it is absolutely essential that they should have

had the means of personal observation, and should have

acquired a personal knowledge of the facts, as distinguished

from a knowledge acquired from the testimony of others.*

For no one but an expert can give testimony based on the

testimony of others. 8 The Supreme Court of Massa-

chusetts, in speaking of the admissibility of the opinions of

non-professional witnesses, has laid down the law as fol-

lows : "The competency of this evidence rests upon two

iiecessarj r conditions : first, that the subject matter to

which the testimony relates cannot be reproduced or

described to the jury precisely as it appeared to the witness

at the time ; and second, that the facts upon which the

witness is called to express his opinion, are such as men in

general are capable of comprehending and understanding.
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When these conditions have been complied with or ful-

filled in a given case, the court must then pass upon the

question, whether the witness had the opportunity and means

of inquiry, and was careful and intelligent in his observa-

tion and examination. It is not the mere qualification of

the witness, but the extent and thoroughness of his exami-

nation into the specific facts to which the inquiry relates,

iind the general character of those facts, as affording to

one, having his opportunity to judge, the requisite means

to form an opinion. The same rule applies to this class of

testimony, as to the testimony of experts, whether the ex-

pert is competent by his study or business, and whether he

has qualified himself to testify, or had proper opportunity

to examine, are preliminary questions for the court." 4

1 Linn v. Sigsbee, 67 111. 75.

8 Eyerman v. Sheehan, 52 Mo. 221 ; Sydlencan v. Beckwith, 43 Conn. 9.

3 Paige v. Hazard, 5 Hill (X. Y.) 604; Hook v. Stovall, 30 Ga. 418.

* Commonwealth v. Stitrtivant, 117 Mass. 122, 137.
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While the general rule requires the witness first to state the

facts upon which his opinion is based, 1 yet this is not always

the case. For instance, in questions relating to identity of

persons, the identification may be by the mere expression

of the countenance, which cannot be described. And the

witness may be correct although unable to describe a single

feature, or to give the color of the hair, or of the eyes, or

the particulars of the dress. 2

5. Opinion Evidence When Expert Testimony i&

Admissible. The rule is, that the opinions of experts

or skilled witnesses are admissible in evidence in those

cases in which the matter of inquiry is such, that inex-

perienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of form-

ing a correct judgment upon it, for the reason that the

subject matter so far partakes of the nature of a sci-

ence, art or trade, as to require a previous habit, or expe-

rience, or study in it, in order to acquire a knowledge

of it. When the question involved does not lie within the

range of common experience, or common knowledge, but

requires special experience, or special knowledge, then the
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opinions of witnesses skilled in the particular science, art

or trade to which the question relates, are admissible in

evidence. 3 "It is not because a man has a reputation for

1 See 61, and cases cited in note at end of that section.

2 See Sydlernan v. Beckwith, 43 Conn. 9, 13.

3 Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Douglas, (26 Eng. C. L. 63) 175; Chaurand v.

Angersteiu, Peake X. P. C. 61 ; Campbell v. Ricards, 5 Barn. & Ad.

840 ; Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15, 38 ; City of Chicago v. McGiven, 78 111. 347 ;

City of Parsons v. Lindsay, 26 Kans. 426, 432 ; Monroe v. Lattin, 25 Kans.

351; Roberts v. Commissioners of Brown county, 21 Kaus. 248; Crom-

well v. Western Reserve Bank, 3 Ohio St. 406; Cleveland etc. R. R. Co.

v. Ball, 5 Ohio St. 568, 573; Page v. Parker, 40 X. H. 59; Jones v.

Tucker, 41 X. H. 546; Sowers v. Dukes, 8 Minn. 23; Cole v. Clark, 3

Wis. 323 ; Cottrill v. Myrick, 12 Me. 222, 231 ; Humphries v. Johnson,

20 Iiid. 190; Dillard v. State, 58 Miss. 368; Wagner v. Jacob, 26 Mo.

530; Xewmark v. Liverpool etc. Ins. Co., 30 Mo. 165; Whitmore v.

While the general rule requires the witness first to state the
facts upon which his opinion is based,1 yet this is nut always
the case . For in~tance, in questions relating to identity of
persons, the identification may be by the mere expression
of the countenance, which cannot be described. And the
witness may be correct although unable to describe a single .
feature, or to give the color of the hair, or of the eyes, or
the particulars of the dress. 2
§ 5. Opinion Evidence - When Expert Testimony is
Admissible.-The rule is, that the opinions of experts
or skilled witnesses are admissible in evidence in those
cases in which the matter of inquiry is sucll, that
inex1
perienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of form ing a correct judgment upon it, for tlrn reason that the
subject matter so far partakes of the nature of a science, art or trade, as to require a previous habit, or experience, or study in it, in order to acquire a knowledge
of it. When the question involved does · not lie within the
range of common experience, or common knowledge, but
requires special experience, or special knowledge, tb~n the
opinions of witnesses skilled in the particular science, art
or trad~ to · which the question relates, are admissible in
evidence. 3 "It is not because a man bas a reputation for

Bowman, 4 G. Greene, (Iowa,) 148; Pelamourges v. Clark, 9 Iowa, 1,13;

Bearss v. Copley, 10 X. Y. 95; Robertson v. Stark, 15 X. H. 109, 113;

Xorman v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136, 162; Lincoln v. Saratoga etc. R. R. Co.,

23 Wend. 425, 432; Terpenning v. The Corn Exchange Ins Co., 43 X.Y.

279, 282; Evansville R. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 10 Ind. 120; Mish v.

1

See § 61, and cases cited in note at end of that section.
See Sydleman v. Beckwith, 43 Conn. 9, 13.
3 Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Dougl:is, (26 Eng. C. L. 63) 175; Chaurancl v.
Angerstein, Peake N. P. C. 61; Campbell v. Ricards, 5 Barn. & Ad.
840; Davis v. State, 38 Md.15, 38; City of Chica.gov. McGiven, 78 Ill. 347;
City of Parsons v. Lindsay, 26 Kans. 426, 432; Monroe v. Lattin, 25 Kans.
351; Roberts v. CommiRsioners of Brown county, 21 Kans. 248; Cromwell v. Western Reserve Bank, 3 Ohio St. 406; Cleveland etc. R.R. Co ..
v. Ball, 5 Dhio St. §68, 573; Page v. Parker, 40 N. H. 59; Jones v.
Tucker, 41 N. H. 546; Sowers v. Dukes, 8 Minn. 23; Cole v. Clark, 3
Wis. 323; Cottrill v. Myrick, 12 Me. 222, 231; Humphries v. Johnson,
20 Ind. 190; Dillard v. State, 58 Miss. 368; Wagner v. Jacob, 26 Mo.
530; :Newmark v. Liverpool etc .. Ins. Co., 80 Mo. 165; Whitmore ·v.
Bowman, 4 G. Greene, (Iowa,) 148; Pelamourges v. Clark, 9 Iowa, 1, 13;
Bearss v. Copley, 10 N . Y.95; Robertsonv.Stark,15N.H.109,113;
Norman v. )Yells, 17 Wend. 136, 162; Lincoln v. Saratoga etc. R.R. Co.,
23 Wend. 425, 432; 'l'erpenning v. The Corn Exchange Ins Co., 43 N. Y.
279, 282; Evansville R. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 10 Ind. 120; Mish v.
2
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sagacity, and judgment, and power of reasoning," as Mr.

Chief Justice SHAW has said, " that his opinion is admissi-

ble ; if so, such men might be called in all cases, to advise

the jury, and it would change the mode of trial. But it is

because a man's professional pursuits, his peculiar skill and

knowledge in some department of science, not common to

men in general, enable him to draw an inference, where

men of common experience, after all the facts proved,

would be left in doubt." 1 And the rule admitting the

opinions of experts in such cases, is founded on necessity, 2

for juries are not selected with any view to their knowledge

of a particular science, art or trade, requiring a course of

previous study, experience and preparation. 3 It, therefore,

becomes matter of necessity, when questions arise which do

not lie within the ordinary information of men in general,

but fall rather within the limits of some art or science, that

juries should have the benefit to be derived from the opin-

ions of witnesses possessing peculiar skill in the particular

departments of knowledge to which such questions relate.

So that it may be said that the foundation on which expert
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testimony rests, is the supposed superior knowledge or

experience of the expert in relation to the subject matter

upon which he is permitted to give an opinion as evidence. 4

And it has been said that it is because all persons have not

the leisure or capacity to master the principles of art or

Wood, 34 Penn. St. 451, 453; Snow v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 65 Me. 230;

Tebbetts v. Haskins, 16 Me. 283, 287; Forbes v. Caruthers, 3 Yeates,

(Penn.) 527 ; Hastings v. Steamer Uncle Sam, 10 Cal. 341 ; Kline v. K.

C., St. J. etc. R. R. Co., 50 Iowa, 656; Hamilton v. Des Moines Valley

R. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 31; Bills v. Ottuimva, 35 Iowa, 107; Higgins v.

Carlton, 28 Md. 115; Marshall v. Columbian etc. Ins. Co., 7 Foster, (N.

H.) 157; Hill v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 2 Mich. 476, 481 ; Milwaukee etc. R.

R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 473; Lester v. Pitsford, 7 Vt. 158; Cav-

endish v. Troy, 41 Vt. 99, 108; Rochester etc. R. R. Co. v. Endlong, 10

How. Pr. 289, 291; Slater v. Wilcox, 57 Barb. 604, 608; Taylor v. Town

of Monroe, 43 Conn. 36, 43; State v. Clark, 15 S. C. (K. s.) 403, 408.

1 New England Glass Co. v. Lovell, 7 Cush. 319.

2 State v. Clark, 12 Ired. (1ST. C.) Law, 152, 153; City of Chicago v.

McGiven, 78 111. 347.

3 Hartford Protection Ins. Co. v. Harmer, 2 Ohio St. 452, 457.

4 Clark v. Rockland Water Power Co., 52 Me. 63, 77.
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science ; that those who are specially skilled in either, are
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allowed to give their opinions in evidence. 1

6. AVhen Expert Testimony is Admissible The

Subject Continued. The Supreme Court of New Hamp-

shire, in declaring under what circumstances the testimony

of experts may be properly received in evidence, has

classified the cases under three heads, and declares that

experts may give their opinions :

1. Upon questions of science, skill or trade, or others of

like kind.

2. When the subject matter of inquiry is such, that inex-

perienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming

a correct judgment upon it, without such assistance.

3. When the subject matter of investigation so far par-

takes of the nature of a science, as to require a course of

previous habit or study, in order to the attainment of a

knowledge of it. 2

And a very satisfactory statement of the law upon this

point, is to be found in a recent decision of the Supreme

ourt of Iowa, and is as follows : "It is often very difficult to
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determine in regard to what particular matters and points

witnesses may give testimony by way of opinion. It is

doubtful whether all the cases can be harmonized, or

brought within any general rule or principle. The most

comprehensive and accurate rule upon the subject, we believe

to be as follows : That the opinion of witnesses possessing

peculiar skill is admissible whenever the subject matter of

inquiry is such, that inexperienced persons are not likely to

prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it, with-

out such assistance ; in other words, when it so far partakes

of the nature of a science, as to require a course of previous

habit or study in order to the attainment of a knowledge of

it, and that the opinions of witnesses cannot be received

when the inquiry is into a subject matter, the nature of

which is not such as to require any particular habits of

1 Atchison etc. R. R. Co. v. United States, 15 Ct. of Claims. 140.

2 Jones v. Tucker, 41 X. H. 546.

science; that those who are specially skilled m either, are
.allowed to give their opinions in evidence. 1
§ 6. When Expert Testimony is Admissible - The
ubject Continued. -The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in declaring under what circumstances the testimony
-of experts may be properly received in evidence, has
classified the cases under three heads, and declares that
<txperts may give their opinions :
1. Upon questions of science, skill or trade, or others of
like kind.
2. When the subject matter of inquiry is such, that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming
a correct judgment upon it, without such assistance.
3. vVhen · the subject matter of investigation so far partakes of the nature of a. science, as to require a course of
previous habit or study, in order to the ·attainment of a
knowledge of it.~
And a very satisfactory statement of the law upon this
point, is to be found in a recent deci ion of the Supreme
{)ourt of Iowa, and is as follows: ''It is often very difficult to
determine in regard to what particular matters and points
witnesses may give testimony by way of opinion. It is
·doubtful whether all the case. can be harmonized, or
brought within any general rule or principle. The most
comprehensive and accurate rule upon the subject, we believe
to be as follows: That the opinion of witnesses possessing
peculiar skill is admi sible whenever the subject matter of
inquiry is such, that inexperienced persons are not likely to
prove capable of forming a <"\Orrect judgment upon it, with<mt such assistance; irr other words, when it so far partakes
-0f the nature of a science, as to require a course of previous
habit or study iu order ·to the attainment of a knowledge of
it, and that the opinions of witnesses cannot be received
when the inquiry i ~ into a subject matter, the nature of
which is not such as to require any particular habits of
1

Atchi on etc. R. R. Co. v. United S tate , 15 Ct. of Claims: 1-10.
v. Tucker, 41 N. H. 546.

~Jon e
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study in order to qualify a man to understand it. If the

relations of facts and their probable results can be

determined without especial skill or study, the facts

themselves must be given in evidence, and the conclu-

sions or inferences must be drawn by the jury." l

In a late case in Minnesota, it is said that the opinion

of a witness possessing peculiar skill, is admissible when-

ever the subject of inquiry is such that inexperienced

persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a cor-

rect judgment upon it without such assistance. 2 While

in New York it is said that "the opinions of experts

are only admissible, when it appears from the nature of

their avocations, or from their testimony concerning their

experience, that the matter inquired about involves some

degree of science or skill which they have made use of, so

that from experience, they are fitted to answer the question

propounded with more accuracy than others who may not

have been called upon to employ science, or exercise skill

on the subject." 8 And it is laid down that upon all ques-

tions, except those, the knowledge of which is presumed to
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be alike common to all men, whatever may have been their

education or employment, the opinion of persons skilled in

the particular subject to which the question relates, is admis-

sible. 4 "The true test," says the Supreme Court of Con-

necticut, " of the admissibility of such testimony, is not

whether the subject matter is common or uncommon, or

whether many persons or few have some knowledge of the

matter ; but it is whether the witnesses offered as experts,

have any peculiar knowledge or experience, not common to

the world, which renders their opinions, founded on such

knowledge or experience, any aid to the court or to the jury

in determining the questions at issue." 5

J Muklowncy v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 472.

s Kipner v. Biebl, (Sup. Ct. of Minn.) Alb. Law J., Sept. 3d, 1881.

Clark v. Bruce, 19 Hun, 274, 276.

< Rochester etc. R. R. Co. v. Endlong, 10 How. Pr. 2S9, 291.

3 Taylor v. Town of Monroe, 43 Conn. 36, 44.
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7. Meaning of the Terms "Science" and "Art." It

is sometimes laid down in a general way, that the opinions

of experts are admissible only when the subject matter of

inquiry relates to some "science" or " art." It is to be

observed, however, that these words include all subjects on

which a course of special study or experience is necessary

to the formation of an opinion, 1 and that it is not necessary

" that a specialty to enable one of its practitioners to be

examined as an expert, should involve abstruse scientific

conditions." 2 "Art, in its legal significance, embraces

every operation of human intelligence, whereby something

is produced outside of nature ; and the term ' science ' in-

cludes all human knowledge which has been generalized,

and systematized, and has obtained method, relations and

the forms of law." 3 So that, although it is generally laid

down that the opinions of experts are limited to matters of

science, art or skill, yet this limitation is not to be applied

in any rigid or narrow sense. 4 And every business or em-

ployment, which has a particular class devoted to its pursuit,

is said to be an art or trade, within the meaning of the rule.*
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As has been said in the Irish Exchequer Chamber by Pigot,

C. B., "the subjects to which this kind of evidence is

applicable, are not confined to classed and specified pro-

fessions. It is applicable wherever peculiar skill and

judgment, applied to a particular subject, are required to

explain results, or trace them to their causes." 6

8. Expert Testimony When Inadmissible. When-

ever the subject matter of inquiry is of such a character

that it may be presumed to lie " within the common experi-

ence of all men of common education, moving in ordinary

1 Stephen's Dig. of Law of Evid., Art. 49, p. 104.

2 Story v. Maclay, 3 Mon. (Ky.) 480. 483.

3 Atchison etc. R. R. Co. v. United States, 15 Ct. of Claims, 140, per

Davis J.

4 Clifford v. Richardson. 18 Vt. 620, 627; Stnrgis v. Knapp, 33 Vt.

486, 531.

5 Rochester etc. R. R. Co. v. Endlong, 10 How. Pr. 289, 291 ; and Taylor

v. Town of Monroe, 43 Conn. 36, 43.

6 1 Irish R. (Com. L.) 211, 218.

§ 7. 1'1eaning of the Terms "Science" and "Art."-It
is sometimes laid down in a general way, that the opinions
of experts are admissible only when the subject matter of
inquiry relates to some " science" or " art." It is to be
observed, however, that these words include all subjects on
which a course of special study ot· experience is necessary
to the formation of an opinion,1 and that it is not necessary
'' that a specialty to enable one of its practitioners to be
examined as an expert, should involve abstru e scientific
conditions." 2 "Art, in its legal significance, embraces
every operation of human intelligence, whereby something
is produced outside of nature; and the term ' science' includes all human knowledge which has been generalized,
and systematized, and has obtained method, relations and
the forms of law." 3 So that, although it is generally laid
down that the opinions of experts are limited to matters of
science, art or skill, yet this limitation is not to be applied
in any rigid or narrow sense .4 And every business or emp1oyment, which has a particular class devoted to its pursuit,
is said to be an art or trade, within the mea11ing of the rule.f>
As has been said in the Irish Exchequer Chamber by Pigot,
C. B., "the subjects to which this kind of evidence is
applicable, are not confined to classed and specified professions. It is applicable wherever peculiar skill and
judgment, applied to a particular subject, are required to
explain resul~s, or trace them to their causes." 6
§ 8. Expert Testimony - When Inadmissible.- Whenever the subject matter of inquiry is of such a character
that it may be presumed to lie " within the common experience of all men of common education, moving in ordinary
I

1

Stephen· Dig. of L nw of Evid., Art. 49, p . 104:.
Story v. Maclay, 3 Mon . (Ky.) 480, 483.
3 Atchison etc. R.R. Co. v. U.aited States, 15 Ct. of Claims, 140, per
Davi J.
4 Clifford v. Riehn.rdson: 1
Vt. 620, 627; Stnrgis v. Knapp, 33 Vt.
486, 531.
6 Rochester etc. R.R. Co. v. Budlong, 10 How. Pr. 2 9 291; and Taylor
v. Town of Monroe, 43 Conn. 36, 43 .
6 1 Irish R. (Com. L.) 211, 21 .
2

ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY. 13

walks of life," the rule is that the opinions of experts are

inadmissible, as the jury are supposed in all such matters

to be entirely competent to draw the necessary inferences

from the facts testified of by the witnesses. 1 The testimony

of experts is inadmissible upon a matter concerning which,

with the same knowledge of the facts, the opinion of any

one else would have as much weight. It is only admissible

when the facts to be determined are obscure, and can only

be made clear by and through the opinions of persons

skilled in relation to the subject matter of inquiry.'-' " If

the jury can be put in possession of all the facilities for

forming a correct opinion that the witness had, they must

come to their conclusions unembarrassed by the opinions of

others." 3 "It is only where the matter inquired of lies

within the range of the peculiar skill and experience of the

witness, and is one of which the ordinary knowledge and ex-

perience of mankind does not enable them to see what

inferences should be drawn from the facts, that the witness

may supply opinions as their guide." 4 So that the testi-

mony of experts is inadmissible in regard to matters upon
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which one individual can form a judgment as well as

another, both having equal knowledge of the circumstances. 5

As expressed in a recent case, the opinions of witnesses,

though experts, are not admissible as to matters which do

not so far partake of the nature of a science as to require a

course of previous habit or study in order to an attainment

of a knowledge of them. 6 While there is no doubt as to

1 New England Glass Co. v. Lovell, 7 Gush. (Mass.) 319; Shatter v.

Evans, 53 Cal. 32; City of Chicago v. McGiven, 78 111. 347; Xaughton v.

Stagg, 4 Mo. App. 271 ; Cook v. State, 24 N. J. Law, 843, 852; Dillard

v. State, 58 Miss. 368; Gavick v. Pacific R. R. Co., 49 Mo. 274; Concord

Railroad Co. v. Greely, 3 Foster (N. H.) 237, 243 ; Nashville, etc. R. R.

Co. Y. Carroll, 53 Tenn. 347; Linn v. Sigsbee, 67 111. 75; Veerhusen v.

Chicago, etc. R. R. Co., 53 Wis. 689, 694; White v. Ballon, 8 Allen, 408;

Hovey v. Sawyer, 5 Allen, 554; Perkins v. Augusta, etc. Banking Co..

10 Gray, 312; Clark v. Fisher, 1 Paige, Ch. 171 ; s. c., 19 Am. Decis. 402.

* Western Ins. Co. v. Tobin, 32 Ohio St. 77, 96.

3 Dillard v. State, 58 Miss. 368, 388.

4 Kennedy v. People, 39 X. Y. 245.

5 Hart v. Hudson River Bridge Co., 84 X. Y. 56, 60, 61.

6 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Coulan, 101 111.
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the general rule, it is often found exceedingly difficult to

determine whether the facts to be examined are to be con-

sidered as beyond the range of ordinary intelligence. It

is, therefore, not surprising to find the courts declaring that

" the decisions are by no means clear or satisfactory upon

the distinctions ' ' between the facts that lie within the range

of common experience and ordinary intelligence, and those

that lie beyond them. And that " the principles on which

the authorities rest are more consistent than the attempts

to apply them." l

In illustration of the general principle that the opinion*

of experts will not be received as to facts within the com-

mon experience of men, we shall notice the following cases.

It has been held that the opinion of one whose occupation was

the braking and switching of cars, was inadmissible on the

question of whether it would be prudent for a man to stand

any other way than flatwise in making a coupling of cars, and

whether it was considered safe or unsafe among brakemen to-

stand facing the draft iron while making the coupling. 3 ' That

a railroad expert could not be asked whether the time which
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a railroad train stopped at a station was sufficient to enable

passengers to get off. 3 That a railroad conductor could not

be asked whether a person would have been thrown from

the cars, if, at the time of the cars striking, he had been

holding on to the brakes, and exercising ordinary care and

prudence in his own protection and preservation. 4 That an

experienced railroad man could not be asked the following

question : " Suppose there was a man standing by the side of

a switch that night, and holding a lantern, such as you have

described, a foot or two from the ground, how far away

from the target could the man see the top of the target, or

any part of the target above the lantern ? " 5

1 Evans v. People, 12 Mich. 27.

Belair v. The C. & N. W. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 667; Muldowney v. Illinois

Cent. R. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 472.

s Keller v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 2 Abbott (Ct. of App.) 480.

4 Gavisk T. Pacific R. R., 49 Mo. 274.

Weane v. K. & i). M. R. Co., 45 Iowa, 246.

the general rule, it is often found excbedingly difficult t<>
determine whether the facts to be examined are to be considered as beyond the range of ordinary intelligence. It
is, therefore, not surprising to find the courts declaring that
'' the decisions are by no means clear or satisfactory upon
the distinctions '' between the facts that lie within the rangeof common. experience and ordinary intelligence, and those
that lie beyond them. And that '' the principle3 on which
the authorities rest are more consistent than the attempts.
' to apply them." 1
In illustration of the general principle that the opinion&
of experts will not be received as to facts within the common experience of men, we shall notice the following cases~
It has been held that the opinion of one whose occupation was
the braking and switching of cars, was inadmissible on thequestion of whether it would be prudent for a man to stand
any other way than flatwise in making a coupling of cars, and
whether it was considered safe or unsafe among brakemen to.
stand facing the draft iron while making the coupling.~- That
a railroad expert could not be asked whether the time which
a railroad train stopped at a station was sufficient to enablepa~sengers to get off .3 That a railroad conductor could not
be asked whether a person would have been thrown from
the cars, if, at the time of the cars striking, he had been
holding on to the brakes, and exercising ordinary care and
prudence in his own protection and preservation.' That an
experienced railroad man could not be asked the following
question : '' Suppose there was a man standing by the side of
a switch that night, and holding a lantern, such as you have
described, a foot or two from the ground, how far away
from the target could the man see the iop of the target, or
any part of the target above the lantern!' '' 15
Evans v. People, 12 Mich. 27.
z Belair v. 1'he C. & N. W. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 667; Muldowney v. Illinoi
Cent. R.R. Co., 36 Iowa, 472.
3 Keller v. N. Y. Central R.R. Co., 2 Abbott (Ct. of App.) 480.
4 Gavisk v. Pacific R.R., 49 Mo. 274.
5 Weane v. K. & D. M. R. Co., 45 Iowa 246.
I
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9. Expert Testimony When Inadmissible The

Subject Continued. That a medical expert who had testi-

fied as to the injury of the plaintiff's -fingers being very se-

vere that the fingers were badly mashed that the mid-

dle finger was, quite stiff, and forefinger permanently stiff

could not answer the following questions :

" I will ask you to state to what extent the injury im-

pairs the usefulness of that hand for any skilled occupation r

or any occupation requiring a quick and ready use of the

hand?"

" State the degree to which the usefulness of that hand

would be impaired for skilled labor, requiring a quick and

ready use of the fingers, such as coupling and braking cars

on the railroad? " l

That a physician could not testify as to the possibility of

a rape having been committed in a particular manner, de-

scribed by the prosecutrix. " No peculiar knowledge of

the human system was necessary to answer it. It was a

mere question of relative strength or mechanical possi-

bility, which an athlete or a mechanic could have answered
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as well as a physician, and every man upon the jury as well

as either." 2

That brokers and bankers could not be asked whether

brokers and bankers would discount a note of the appear-

ance of the one in question, without a wilful failure to

inquire into the circumstances under which it was obtained

the note was written on tracing paper. 3

That detectives could not express an opinion as to whether

it was possible to commit a robbery in the manner charged. 4

That a surveyor could not express an opinion as an expert as

to where the highest part of a hill was. 6 That an innkeeper

1 Kline v. The K. C., St. J. & C. B. K. Co., 50 Iowa, 656.

2 Cook v. State, 24 X. J. Law, 843.

3 Rowlaud v. Fowler, 37 Conn. 348.

4 People v. Morrigan, 29 Mich. 1. "If experts were allowable on

questions of criminal science, the professors and practitioners of that

science would naturally be the experts needed."

5 Hovey v. Sawyer, 5 Allen (Mass.), 554.
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could not express an opinion as to whether it was safe for

ii guest to keep his money in a locked trunk. 1

That firemen, long connected with a city fire department

to whom had been presented a plan of the buildings, with a

statement of the distances between them, the materials of

which they were constructed, the direction of the wind, the

state of the weather, and the fact that no water was used

on the fire could not be asked whether or not in their

opinion the dwelling house and connected bui dings would

take fire from the barn ; whether or not it was a common

occurrence for fire to be communicated from leeward to

windward across a space greater than twenty-six feet ;

whether or not, in their experience, large wooden buildings

or large fires made their own currents, frequently eddying

against the prevailing wind.' 2

10. Expert Testimony When Inadmissible The

Subject Continued. That an expert accustomed to the use

of fire-arms could not be asked whether a certain piece of

paper had been used as wadding, and as such shot from a

loaded gun. 3 That the question whether the deceased,
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seated at or near a window, through which he was shot, could

have seen and recognized the person on the outside who in-

flicted the wound, was not one of skill or science, and that,

therefore, experiments made by others, and the results

thereof, and opinions founded thereon, were inadmissible. 4

It has been held that the testimony of experts was in-

competent to.show whether the placing of wet staves upon

the outside of an arch, in which a fire was kindled, was a

safe and prudent method of drying them. 6

1 Taylor v. Monnot, 4 Duer (N. Y.) 116.

2 State v. Watson, 65 Me. 74.

Manke v. People 24 Hun (N. Y.), 316; s. c.. 78 N. Y. 611. The court

said it could have been determined by a jury from a description of the

facts touching the appearance of the paper when found, such as the

manner in which it was folded, whether it appeared to have been par-

tially burned, whether it bore upon its creases traces of powder stains,

etc.

4 Jones v. State, 71 Ind. 66.

s White v. Ballon, 8 Allen, 408.

~ould

not express au .op11110n as to whether it was safe f or
a guest to keep his money in a lucked trunk .1
That .firemen, long connected with a city fire department-to whom had been presented .a plan of the buildings, with a
statement of the distances between them, the materials of
which they were constructed, the direction of the wind, the
state of the weather, and the fact that no wate~· was used
-0n the fire - could not he asked whether or not in their
-0pinion the dwelling house and connected buLdings would
take fire from the barn; whether or not it was a common
-0ccurreuce for fire to be communicated from leeward to
windward across a space greater than twenty-six feet;
whether or not, in their experience, large wooden buildings
-0r -large. fires made their ow:n currents, frequently eddying
against the prevailing wind . 2
§ 10. Expert Testimony -When Inadmissible - The
Subject Continued.-That an expert accustomed to the use
-0f fire-arms could not be asked whether a certain piece of
paper bad beeu used as wadding, and as such shot from a
load.e d gun.a That the question whether the deceased,
seated. at or near a window, through which he was shot, could
have seen and recognized the person on the outside who inflicted the wound, was not one of skill or science, and that,
~herefore, experiments made by others, and the results
thereof, and opinions founded thereon, were inadmissible. 4
It has been held that the testimony of experts was incompetent to.show whether the placing of wet staves upon
the outside of an arch, iu which a fire was kindled, was a
safe and prudent method of drying them.1i
Taylor v. Monnot, 4 Duer (N . Y.) 116.
State v. Watson, 65 1e. 74.
a Manke v. People 24 Hun (N. Y.), 316; s. c.~ 78N. Y. 611. The court
said it could have been determined by a jury from a description of the
facts touching the appearance of the p aper when found uch as the
manner in which it was folded, whether it appeared to have been partially burned, whether·it bore upon its creases traces of powder stains,
etc.
4 Jones v. State, 71 Ind. 66.
s White v. Ballou, 8 Allen, 408.
1
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That the opinion of a person experienced in clearing land

by fire was inadmissible, as to the probability that a fire set

under the circumstances described by the witnesses, would

have spread to the adjoining land. 1 But the opinion of a

person experienced in prairie fires has been received in an-

swer to the question : " How many feet in width in plowing

do you think would be* necessary to stop a fire on stubble

land ? " 2 The court held that it was not a matter of com-

mon knowledge, as to how far a fire in the stubble might be

carried in the air or might "jump." The jury could not

be presumed as well able to form an opinion as could a wit-

ness who had had actual experience in such matters. And

in a case lately decided in New York it has been decided

that a witness experienced in clearing land, could express

an opinion as an expert as to whether a fire was set at a

proper time. "A man who had never cleared up land, or

worked a farm, might be unable to determine whether the

time was proper for burning, even after he had been in-

formed of all the facts." 3

It has been held that the question of what is the proximate
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cause of an injury is not a question of science, or of legal

knowledge, -but is a fact to be determined by a jury from

surrounding circumstances. 4 * Whether glass placed in a side-

walk to afford light to the area below is unsafe, by reason of

the too great smoothness or slipperiness of its surface, is not

u question of science or skill such as to render the opinions

of witnesses admissible. 5 So it has been said that whether

a street crossing is unsafe and dangerous is not a question

of science or skill, upon which it is proper to receive the

opinions of witnesses. 6 On the other hand, it has been held

that professional road builders may be examined as experts

1 Higgins v. De\vey, 107 Mass. 494. And see Fraser v. Tupper, 29 Vt.

409.

2 Kippner v. Biebl (Sup. Ct. of Mian.), Alb. Law J., Sept. 3, 1881.

3 Ferguson v. Hubbell, 26 Hun, 250.

Milwaukee, etc. R. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S, 469.

5 City of Chicago v. McGiven, 78 111. 347.

4 City of Parsons v. Lindsay, 26 Kan. 426, 432.

(2;
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as to the safety of a road, and the necessity of a railing

along an elevated part of the road. "If this case," say

the court, " falls pretty near the line, we think it is clearly

on that side of the line that permits expert testimony."

In Wisconsin it is said that " possibly there might be cases-

in which the opinions of experts might be admissible upon

matters going to the sufficiency of a" highway. Generally r

however, it is a pure question of fact, not of science or

skill." 2

It is evident, therefore, that to make the opinions of ex-

perts admissible in evidence it is necessary :

First. That the subject matter of inquiry should be within

the range of the peculiar skill and experience of the witness.

And, Second. That it should be one of which the ordinary

knowledge and experience of mankind does not enable then*

to see what inferences should be drawn from the facts.

If either of these two requisites are wanting, the subject

of inquiry is not such as to admit of the introduction of ex-

pert testimony. 3 And all the cases recognize the rule that

it is for the court to determine whether the subject matter

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 20:00 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t71v5cx5m
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

is one of science, art or trade, or whether it is a matter of

common experience. 4

11. Iiiadmissibility of Opinions Founded on a Theory

of Morals or Ethics. The opinion of a witness, not

founded on science, but as a theory of morals or ethics, is

inadmissible in evidence, whether given by professional or

unprofessional witnesses. Hence, where the question was

whether a man who had committed suicide was sane or

insane, the opinion of a physician that no sane man would

commit suicide in a Christian country, was held inadmissible,

as being founded, not on the phenomena of mind, but

rather on a theory of morals, religion and .a future state."

1 Taylor v. Town of Monroe, 43 Conn. 36. 44.

2 Benedict v. City of Fond du Lac, 44 AVis. 496. And see Oleson v..

Tolford, 37 Wis. 327; Montgomery v. Scott, 34 Wis. 338.

3 Manke v. People, 24 Hun (X. Y.), 416; s. c., 78 N. Y. 611.

4 Dillard v. State, 58 Miss. 368, 388.

* St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Graves, C Bush, (Ky.) 290.

as to the afety of a rond, and the ne e ity of a r .. ilinoalong an elevated part of the road. "If this ca e," "ay
the court, ''falls pretty nea.r the line, we think it is clearly
on that ide of the line that permit expert te timony . ' 1
In vVisconsin it is aid that '' possibly there might e ca e
in which the opinions of experts might be admi ible upon
matters going to the ufficieucy of a highway.
nerally,.
however, it is a pure que tion of fact not of . . cience 01~
skill." 2
It is evident, therefore, that to make the opinion of experts admissible in evidence it is necessary:
First. That the ubject matter of inquiry "hould be within
the range of the peculiar skill and experience of the witne " r
And, Second. That it hould be one of which the ordinary
knowledge and experience of mankind doe not enable them
to see what inferences should be dra" n from the facts.
If either of these two requisites are wanting, the ubject
of inquiry is not such as to admit of the introduction of expert testimony .3 And all the cases recognize the rule that
it is for the court to determine whether the ubj ect matter
is one of science, art or trade, or whether it is a matter of
common experience. 4
•
§ 11. Inadmissibility of Opinions Founded on a Theor
of :iuorals or Ethics. -The opinion of a ' itne'"' ", not
founded on science, but as a theory of morals or ethic"', i .
inadmissible in evidence, whether given by professional or
unprofessional witnesses . Hence, ' here the question wa
whether a man who had committed suicide was ane or
insane, the opin~on of a physician that no sane man would
commit suicide in a Christian country, wa held inadmi" ible ,
as being founded, not on the phenomena. of mind, but
rather on a theory of morals, religion and ,a future ate .1"
1

Taylor v. To"·n of )fonroe 43 Conn. 36, 44.
Benedict v. City of Fond dn Lac, 44 Wi . 496. And ~ ee 0 e on
Tolford, 37 Wis. 327; ~Iontgomery v. Scott, 34 Wi . 33 .
3 Manke v. People, 24 Run (N. Y.), 416;
. c., 7 N. Y. 611.
4 Dillard v. State 5 Mi
• 36 , 3 .
Q St. Loui
Mutual Life In . Co. v. Gravee, G Bush, (Ky.) 290.
2
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And the opinions of medical practitioners are inadmissible

on the question whether a physician has honorably and

faithfully discharged his duty to his medical brethren. 1

12. Inadmissibility of Opinions on Abstract Questions

of Science, not Belated to the Facts in Issue. The

opinions of professional witnesses cannot be asked upon

mere abstract questions of science, having no proper relation

to the facts upon which the jury are to pass. The opinion

of an expert, to be admissible, must always be predicated

upon, and relate to the facts disclosed by the evidence in

the case. 2

13. Inadmissibility of Opinions Based on Speculative

Data. The rule is, that the opinions of experts are not

admissible when based on merely speculative data. 3 On a

trial for murder, where the question was asked whether the

deceased was not addicted to the excessive use of snuff and

violent fits of passion, the evidence being desired as a basis

for the introduction of expert testimony, to prove that such

habits and temperament indicated the probable presence of

a condition from which sudden death might well have
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resulted, without reference to the blow given by the pris-

oner, it was held that such expert testimony could not be

received, as no evidence had been introduced, and none

offered, to prove that the deceased was in a violent fit of

passion, or had taken an overdose of snuff at the time the

blow was struck. The court ruled the testimony inadmis-

sible, as being speculative in its nature.* And where it did

not appear that the medical witness had been present at the

post mortem examination, or that he had any knowledge of

the case, or the kind, or extent of the examination needed,

the court refused to allow him to answer the following

question : " For the purpose of arriving at a correct con-

clusion iu the case of the death of a person, where you don't

know to your own satisfaction what caused the death, how

1 Ramaclge v. Ryan, 9 Bing. 333.

2 Champ v. Commonwealth, 2 Met. (Ky.) 18.

3 Cooper v. State, 23 Texas, 336, 337.

4 Ebos v. State, 34 Ark. 520.

EXPERT TESTIMONY.
SO EXPERT TESTIMONY.

;long a time should two men give to a post mortem examina-

tion? And would four hours be sufficient?" 1 So an

engineer has not been permitted to express an opinion as to

the original purpose in view, in building a wall which had

been standing between twenty or thirty years. 2 The Su-

preme Court of Mississippi has held it to be incompetent to

show by the testimony of professional persons, in impeach-

ment of the mother's testimony, in a prosecution for

bastardy, that it was highly improbable that impregnation

could be produced by the first act of coition. 3 Such testi-

mony was said to be too uncertain, indefinite, and hypo-

thetical to form the basis of judicial action. " The courts,

in our opinion," it is said, " have gone quite far enough in

subjecting the life, liberty and property of the citizen to

the mere speculative opinions of men claiming to be experts

in matters of science, whose confidence, in many cases, bears

a direct similitude and ratio to their ignorance. We are not

-disposed to extend this doctrine into the field of hypotheti-

cal conjecture and probability, and to give certainty as evi-

dence, to that which, in its very nature, must be wholly
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uncertain and unsatisfactory ; dependent on circumstances

and conditions entirely secret, hidden and unknown, as

facts, and without a knowledge of which, neither science

nor experience, however great, could afford us the remotest

information."

14. Inadmissibility of the Testimony of Experts who

have made Ex Parte Investigations. It is important in

many cases that notice should be given to the opposing in-

terest of the intention to have experts make an investiga-

tion of the facts involved. For instance, if it is proposed

to make an examination of blood on clothing, or of the

stomach of a deceased person in cases of alleged poisoning,

there are strong reasons why such an examination should

be undertaken after notice has been given, in order that the

adverse interest might be properly represented at such, an

1 State v. Pike, 65 Me. ill.

2 Sinnott v. Mullin, 82 Penn. St. 342.

3 Anonymous, 37 Miss. 54.

1long a time should two men give to a post mortem· examinati ion? And would four hours be sufficient? '' 1 So an
·engineer has not been permitted to express an opinion as to
·the original purpose in view, in building a wall which had
1'been standiHg between twenty or thirty years. 2 The Su·"preme Court of Mississippi has held it to be incompetent to
, how by the testimony of professional persons, in impeachment of the mother's testimony, in a prosecution for
r bastardy' that it was highly improbable that impregnation
could be produced by the first act of coition. 3 Such testimony was said to be too uncertain, indefinite, and hypothetical to form the basis of jqdicial action. " The courts,
· in our opinion," it is said, "have gone quite far enough in
: subjecting the life, liberty and property of the citizen to
--the mere speculative opinions of men claiming to be expm·ts
-. in matters of science, whose confidence, in many cases, bears
.a direct similitude and ratio to their ignorance. We are not
·disposed to extend this doctrine into the fiel~ of hyp0theti-cal conjecture and probability, and to give certainty as evi<lence, to that which, in its very nature, must be wholly
uncertain and unsatisfactory ; dependent on circumstances
and conditions entirely secret, hidden and unknown, as
facts, and without a knowledge of which, neither science
nor experience, ~owever great, could afford us the remotest
information.''
§ 14. Inadmissibility of the Testimony of Experts who
have made Ex Parte Investigations.- It is important iu
many cases that notice should be given to the opposing interest of the intention to have experts make an investigation of the facts involved. For instance, if it is proposed
to make an examination of blood on clothing, or of the
stomach of a deceased person in cases of alleged poisoning,
there are strong reasons why such an examination should
he undertaken after notice has been given, in order that the
adverse interest might be properly represented at such_ an
1

2
3

State v. Pike, 65 Me. 111.
Sinnott v. Mullin, 82 Pe1111. St. 3±2.
.Anonymous, 37 Mis . 54.
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examination. And it has been laid down that there can be

no question that when the matter comes fairly up, such ex-

aminations, when taken flagrantly ex parte, at a time when

there could readily have been notice to the opposite side,

will be ruled out as inadmissible. 1 The principle does not

apply, however, to investigations conducted by a public offi-

cer immediately after the commission of a crime, for the

public action of such a functionary is said to be adequate

notice to all parties that the proceeding is taking place.

Neither does the principle apply in those cases in which the

investigation or examination could not be enhanced in accu-

racy or authoritativeness by being preceded by notice. 2

When a post mortem examination of a deceased person is

made, the admissibility of the testimony of the physicians

who made it, does not at all depend on the thoroughness of

the examination which they made. 3 In the case cited, the

question was whether death had been caused by internal

disease or external violence. And the physicians were

allowed to express an opinion thereon, although their exam-

ination had not been sufficiently thorough to enable them to
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state that no other cause existed than the one they assigned,

to which the death could be attributed.

1 2 Wharton & Stelle's Medical Jurisprudence, Pt. II., 124G.

2 Ibid., 1247.

8 State v. Porter, 34 Iowa, 131, 134.
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CHAPTER II.

THE COMPETENCY OF EXPERT WITNESSES.

SECTION.

15. The Competency of Expert Witnesses must First be Shown.

16. Their Competency a Question for the Court".

17. Whether a Witness Possesses the Qualifications of an Expert, is a

Question of Fact.

18. Preliminary Examination of the Expert.

19. ^o exact Test for Determining Amount of Experience Expert

should Possess.

CHAPTER II.

20. Competency of Experts whose Knowledge is derived from Study.

21. Competency of Experts whose Knowledge is derived from Study

The Subject Continued.

22. Competency sometimes dependent on whether the Expert has

THE COMPETENCY OF EXPERT WITNESSE

Heard the Testimony.

23. Competency of Experts in Particular Cases.

15. The Competency of Expert Witnesses must First

be Shown. If the subject matter of inquiry is such that

the opinion of an expert may be properly received in evi-

dence, then the question arises, when the witness is offered
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as an expert, whether he possesses the requisite qualifica-

tions to entitle him to testify in that character. And that

he possesses such qualifications, peculiar skill and experi-

ence in the particular department of inquiry, must appear

in evidence before he can properly be asked to express any

opinion in the case. 1 " That an expert must have special

and peculiar knowledge or skill, is as definite a rule as that

the search for a lost paper, or subscribing witness, must be

1 Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Springfield & Northwestern R. R.Co.,

67 lil. 142; Heald v. Thing, 45 Me. 392; State v. Secrest, 80 N. C. 450;

Washington v. Cole, 6 Ala. 212; Tullis v. Kidd, 12 Ala. 648; State v.

Ward, 29 Vt. 225, 236; Tyler v. Todd, 36 Conn. 218, 221.

· ECTION.

15. The Competency of Expert Witnesses must First be Shown.
16. '.fheir Competency a Question for the Court.
17. Whether a Witness Possesses the Qualifications of an Expert, is a
Question of Fact.
1 . Preliminary Examination of the Expert.
19. No exact 'l'est for Determining Amount of Experience Expert
should Possess.
20. CompetPncy of Experts whose Knowledge is derived from Study.
21. Competency of Experts whose Knowledge is derived from Study
-The Subject. Continued.
22. Competency sometimes dependent on "vb.ether the Expert has
Heard the Testimony.
23. Competency of Experts in Particular Cases.

§ 15. The Competency of Expert Witnesses must First
be Shown. - I f the subject matter of i1\quiry is such that
the opinion ofan expert may be properly receiv~d in evidence, then the question arises, when the witness is offered
as an expert, whether he possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to testify in that character. And that
he possesses such qualifications, peculiar skill and experience in the ·particular department of inquiry, must appear
jn evidence before he can properly be asked to express any
opinion in the case. 1 " That an expert must have special
and peculiar knowledge or skil1, is as definite a rule as that
the search for a lost paper, or subscribing witness, must be
Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Springfield & Northwestern R.R. Co.,
67 Ill. 142 ; Heald v. 'f11ing, 45 Me. 392; State v. 8ecrest, 80 N. C. 450 ;
Washington v. Cole, 6 Ala. 212; Tullis v. Kidd, 12 Ala. 648; State v.
Ward, 29 Vt. 225, 236; Tyler v. 'rodd, 36 Conn. 218, 221.
1
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diligent and thorough." 1 Whether the witness has that

knowledge, is as much a question of fact to be determined

preliminary to the reception of his testimony, as the ques-

tion whether the search for a lost paper has been diligent

and thorough. And if his testimony is called for before his

qualifications have been shown, it has been held sufficient to

interpose the general objection, that the testimony is "illegal

and improper," without interposing the special objection

that his competency as an expert has not been shown. 2

1(5. Their Competency a Question for the Court.

The question whether the witness possesses the necessary

qualifications to render him competent to testify in the char-

acter of an expert, is a preliminary question addressed to

the court, which should be satisfied upon that point, by the

presentation of proper evidence. 3 The question must be

determined by the court, and cannot be referred by it to

the jury. 4 And in determining whether the witness is a

person of skill in the particular department, or subject

matter in which his opinion is desired, the rule is, that very

much is left to the discretion of the presiding judge, 5 and
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1 Jones v. Tucker, 41 X. II. 54G.

2 Brown v. Mohawk & Hudson II. R. R- Co., 1 Howard's Ct. of App.

<Jas., 52, 124.

3 Nelson v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 71 X. Y. 453, 460; Lincoln v. Inhab-

itants of Barre, 5 Cush. 591; Flynt v. Bodenhamer, 80 X. C. 205, 207;

Gulf City Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 52 Ala. 121 ; Forgery v. First Xational

Bank. 66 Ind. 123; Davis v. State, 35 Ind. 496; Boardrnan v. Woodman,

47 X. 11. 120, 135; Sorg v. First German Congregation, 63Penn. St. 156;

Reynolds v. Lounsbury, 6 Hill, (X. Y.) 534; Sikes v. Paine, 10 Ired.

(X. C.) Law, 282; State v. Secrest, 80 X. C. 450; Washington v. Cole, 6

Ala. 212; Tullis v. Kidd, 12 Ala. 648; Woodman v. Dana, 52 Me. 9, 13;

diligent and thorough.'' 1 \iVhether the witness has that
knowledge, is as much a question of fact to be determined
preliminary to the reception of his testimony, as the question whether the search for a. lo t paper has been diligent
and thorough. And if his te ~ timony is called for before his
·q ualifications have been shown, it has been held sufficient to
interpose the general objection, tha.t the testimony is "illegal
.a nd improper," without interpo!::iing the special objection
that his competency as an expert has not been shown. 2
§ 1 ti. Their Competency a Question for the Court.The question whether the witness possesses the necessary
qualifications to render him competent to testify in the character of an expert, is a preliminary question addressed to
the court, which should be satisfied upon that point, by the
presentation of proper evidence. 3 The question must be
determined by the court, and cannot be referred by it to
the jury .4 And in determining whether the witness is a
person of skill in the particular department, or subject
matter in which his opinion is desired, the rule is, that very
much is left to the discretion of the pre ·iding j udge, 5 and

Delaware etc. Steam Towboat Co. v. Starrs, 69 Penu. St. 36; Jones v<

Tucker, 41 X. H. 546; Snowden v. Idaho Quartz Mauuf. Co., 55 Cal.

450; McKwen v. Bigelow, 40 Mich. 217; State v. Ward, 29 Vt. 225, 236.

4 Fairbank v. Ilughson, 13 Reporter, 8. In this case the Supreme

Court of Calfornia reversed a judgment, because the trial court allowed

a book-keeper in a bank to testify, (having been offered as an expert in

handwriting,) with the remark, ' I shall hold it is for the jury to say

how much he knows about it. I will admit the testimony."

5 Hills v. Home Ins. Co., 129 Mass. 345; Chandler v. Jamaica Pond

Aqueduct, 125 Mass. 544, 551 ; Tucker v. Massachusetts Central R. R.

Co.. 118 Mass. 546; Lawrence v. Boston, 119 Mass. 126; Lawton v.

,Tone v. Tucker, 41 :N". H. 546.
Brown v. :ftioha,Yk &; Hudson R.R. R· Co., 1 Howarcl's Ct. of App .
.Cas., 52, 124.
3 Ne1 on v. Sun Mutual In . . Co., 7l :N". Y. 453, 460; Lincoln v. Inhabitant of Barre, 5 Cush. 591; Flynt v. Bodenhamer, 80 N. C. 205, 207;
Gnlf City Ins. Co. v. tephen , 52 Ala. 121; Forgery v. First National
Bank 1 66 Ind. 123; Davis v. State, 35 Ind. 496; Boardman v. ·w oodman,
4i X. H. 120 1 135; Sorg v. First German Congregation, 63 Penn. St. 156;
Rey nohls v. Lounsbury, 6 Hill, (:N. Y.) 534; Sike v. Paine, 10 Ired.
( ~. C.) I,aw, 282; State v. Secrest, SON. C. 450; Washington v. Cole, 6
Ala. 212; Tullis v. Kidd, 12 Ala. 648 ; Woodman v. Dana, 52 Me. 9, 13;'
Delaware etc. Steam Towboat Co. v. Starrs, 69 Penn. St. 36; Jones v.
Tucker, 41 :N. H. MG; Snowclen v. Idaho Qnartz Manuf. Co., 55 Cal.
4:>0; McEwen v. Bigelow, 40 Mich. 211 ; State v. Ward, 29 Vt. 225, 236.
4 Fairbank v. Hughson, 13 Reporter,
. In this case the Supreme
Court of Calfornia reversed a juclgment, because the trial court allowed
a book-keeper in a bank to testify, (having been offerecl as an expert in
handwri ting,) with the remark, '•I shall hold it is for the jury to ay
how much he kno,vs about it. I 'vill admit the testimony."
5 Hill v. Home Ins. Co., 129 Mass. 345; Chandler v. Jamaica Pond
Aque<luct, 12n Mas . .5-H, 551; Tucker v. Massachnsett Central R . R.
Co. 1 11 ~fa'>·- · 5±6; Lawrence v. Bo ton, 119 Ma s. 126; La"-ton v.
1
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his decision will not be overruled, except in a clear and

strong case. 1 An objection to the ruling of the court, upon

the sufficiency of the proof in such cases, must be made at

the time of the trial, as it cannot be raised in the first

instance in the court above. 2 And the decision of the trial

court, as to the qualifications of a witness introduced as an

expert, will be deemed conclusive in the court above, unless

the entire evidence upon that point is reported, and appeal's

to present a question of law. 3 If it appears that the

witnesses offered had any claim to the character of experts,

the court will not reverse on the ground that their experience

was not sufficiently special. 4

17. Whether a Witness Possesses the Qualifications

of an Expert is a Question of Fact. An examination of

the cases in which the courts have passed on the compe-

tency of experts, shows a lamentable confusion and mix-

ing up of matter of fact with matter of law, it has been

judicially commented on as leading to most unsatisfac-

tory results, and unnecessarily obscuring the true aspect

of the law on this subject by the diversity of practice
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which has prevailed in the judicial tribunals. The subject

of the competency of experts has been ably considered by

the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, and the principle

which should govern so clearly and succinctly laid down,

that much confusion will be avoided by keeping it clearly

in mind in such cases. The principle, although " a per-

fectly, clear, fixed, and certain condition of the law upon

the subject," has been lost sight of in many cases. As ex-

Chase, 108 Mass. 238, 241 ; Berg v. Spink, 24 Minn. 138. 139; Howard v.

Providence, 6 K. I. 516; Ardesco Oil Co. v. Gilson, 63 Penn. St. 146, 152;

Kipner v. Biebl, Sup. Ct. of Minn. (Alb. Law J., Sept. 3d, 1881) ; Sar'e

v. Arnold, 7 K. I. 586; Delaware etc. Steam Towboat Co. v. Starrs, 69

Penn. St. 36.

1 Sorg v. First German Congregation, 63 Penn. St. 156.

2 Hand v. Brookline, 126 Mass. 324.

3 Gossler v. Eagle Sugar Refinery, 103 Mass. 331, 335; Quinsigamond

Bank v. Hobbs, 11 Gray, 250, 258; Marcy v. Barnes, 16 Gray, 161 ; Sarle-

v. Arnold, 7 R. I. 586.

4 Delaware etc. Steam Towboat Co. v. Starrs, 69,Penn. St. 3<X

his decision will not be overruled, except in a clear and
strong case. 1 An objection to the ruling of the court, upon
the sufficiency of the proof in such cases, must be made at
the time of the trial, as it cannot be raised in the first
instance in the court above. 2 And the decision of the trial
court, as to the qualifications of a witness introduced as an
expert, will be deemed conclusive in the court above, unless
the entire evidence upon that point is reported, and appears
to present a question of law .3 If it appears that the
witneeses offered had any claim to the character of experts,
the court will not reverse on the ground that their experience
was not sufficiently special. 4
§ 1 7. Whether a 'Vitness Possesses the Qualification
of an Expert is a Question of Fact.-An examination of
the cases in which the courts have passed on the rompetency of experts, shows a lamentable confusion and mixing up of matter of fact with matter of law, it has been
judicially commented on as leading to most unsati -factory results, and unnecessarily ob ct1ring the true aspect
of the law on this subject by the diversity of 'practice
which has prevailed in the judicial tribunals. The subject
of the competency of experts has been ably considered by
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, and the principle
which should govern so clearly and succinctly laid down,.
th.a t much confusion will be avoided by keeping it clearly
in mind in such cases.
The principle, although " ·a perfectly, clear, fixed, and certain condition of the law upon
the subject," has been lost sight of in many cases. A . . ex0

Chase, 108 1\Iass. 238, 24:1; Berg v. Spink, 24: :Minn. 138. 139; H oward v.
Providence, 6 R. I. 516; Ardesco Oil Co. v. Gilson, 63 Penn. St.146, 152 ;.
ICipner v. Biebl, Sup. Ct. of Minn. (Alb. Law .T. , Sept. 3d, 1 1); arle
v. Arnold, 7 R. I. 586; Dela·w are etc. Steam Towboat Co. v. Starr 69.
Penn. St. 36.
1 Sorg v. First German Congregation, 63 Penn. St. 156.
2 Hand v. Brookline, 126 Mass. 324.
s Gossler v. Eagle Sugar Refinery, 103 :Mass. 331, 335; Qninsigamond
Bank v. Hobbs, 11 Gray, 250, 258; Marcy v. Barnes, 16 Gray, 161 · Sarle
v. Arnold, 7 R. I. 586.
•Delaware etc. Sten.m Towboat Co. v. Starr , 6 Penn. St. 31>.
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pressed by Mr. Justice DOE, the rule is as follows : " When

a witness is offered as an expert three questions necessarijy

arise: 1. Is the subject concerning which he is to testify,

one upon which the opinion of an expert can be received?

2. What are the qualifications necessary to entitle a witness

to testify as an expert? 3. Has the witness those qualifi-

cations? The first two questions are matters of law; the

third is matter of fact.

As to the third question, while it is settled, as matter of

law, what qualifications are requisite, the possession of those

qualifications is equally well settled to be a question of

fact, purely within the discretion of the judge before whom

the witness is offered. His decision concerning the matter

is not subject to revision. It would not be wise to adopt a

different rule. The ability or disability of a witness to tes-

tify, under the legal requirements for the admission of

opinion, is a matter most conveniently and satisfactorily de-

termined at the trial, upon personal examination of the wit-

ness. It can, indeed, be determined in no other way.' ' l

Or, as the Supreme Court of Vermont has expressed it,.
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" So long as the evidence of facts do not constitute or con-

clusively show the skill, and such skill is matter of fact to-

be inferred from such evidence or facts, the finding of the

court in that respect is not revisable as being error in

law." 2

18. Preliminary Examination of Expert. For the

purpose of determining the competency of the witness, a.

preliminary examination takes place, in which the wit-

ness may be asked to state his acquaintance with the

subject matter in reference to which his opinion is desired,,

and what he has done to qualify himself as an expert in

that particular department of inquiry. 3 The court is also-

at liberty to examine other witnesses as to whether he is

qualified to draw correct conclusions upon questions relat-

ing to the science or trade in relation to which he is to be-

1 Jones v. Tucker, 41 N. H. 547; Dole v. Johnson, 50 X. H. 452, 458.

2 Wright v. Williams' Estate, 47 Vt. 222, 233.

^Boardman v. Woodman, 47 X. H. 120, 135.

pressed by "Mr. Justice DoE, the rule is as follows: "When1
a ':Vitness is offered as an exiJert three questions necessarily
arise: 1. Is the subject concerning which he is to testify,
one upon which the opinion of an expert can be received?'
2. vVhat are the qualific"ations necessary to entitle a witness
to testify as an expert? 3. Has the witness those qualifications? The first two questions are matters of law ; the
third is matter of fact. * * *
As to the third question, while it is settled, as matter of
law, what qualifications areTequisite, the possession o~ those
qualifications is equally wen settled . to be a question of
fact, purely within the discretion of the judge before whom
the witness is offered. His decision concerning the matter·
is not subject to revision. It would not be wise to adopt a
different rule. The ability or disability of a witness to tes-·
tify, under the legal requirements for the admission of
opinion, is a matter most conveniently and satisfactorily determined at the trial, upon personal examination of the witness. It can, indeed, be determined in no other way. n 1
Or, as the Supreme Court of Vermont bas expressed it,.
'' So long as the evidence of facts do not constitute or conclm;ivel y show the skill, and such skill is matter of fact to·
be inferred from such evidence or facts, the finding of the
court in that respect is not revisable as being error in
law." 2
§ 18. Preliminary Examination of Expert.-For the·
purpose of determining the competency of the witness, a.
preliminary examination takes place, in which the witness may be asked to state his acquaintance with the·
subject matter in reference to which bis opinion is desired,.
and what he has done to qualify himself as an expert in
that particular department of inquiry .2 The court is also·
at liberty to examine other witnesses as to whether he is
qualified to draw correct conclusions upon questions relating to the science or trade in relation to which he is to be1

Jones v. Tucker, 41 N. H. 547; Dole v. Johnson, 50 N. H. 452, 45 .
Wright v. Williams' Estate, 47 Vt. 222, 233.
a"B
• ·woodman, 47 N. H. 120, 130.
• oardman v.
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-examined. 1 On this preliminary examination the court sim-

ply decides upon proof of the opportunities which the wit-

ness has had for acquiring special knowledge and experience

in the subject matter, that the jury may hear his opinion as

.a person of science and skill. 2 In passing upon the com-

petency of the witness, however, the fact should be borne

in mind that the law does not require that a witness skilled

in a particular art or trade, should be actually engaged in

its practice at the time of the trial. 3 So one who, at the

time he was offered as a witness was a student at law, has

been allowed to testify as an expert in the tanning business,

he having formerly been employed in that trade. 4 " There

was nothing in the change of employment, from tanning

hides to the study of the law, which would necessarily de-

prive him of the skill acquired in his original trade." But

it has been held no error to hold that a witness who had

not been engaged in the occupation of a plumber for twenty

years, could not testify as an expert in matters pertaining

to that trade. " This was a long time to be out of a busi-

ness," said the court, " that must have changed so greatly
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in that time, and we cannot say that the ruling was clearly

erroneous. The court must exercise a judicial discretion

regarding the reception of evidence purporting to be that

of experts ; and presumptively there must in a business

like this be much better expert evidence than that of a per-

son so long out of the business." 5 It is evident that in all

such cases the question of competency must depend largely

-on the nature of the trade or occupation, as well as on the

length of time since the witness abandoned it. It is also to

. ] Mendum v. Commonwealth, 6 Rand. 704, 710; Tullis v. Kidd, 12 Ala.

C48.

2 State v. Secrest, 80 X. C. 450, 457.

3 Vander Donckt Y. Thellusson, 8 Man. G. & S. (65 Eng. C. L.) 812.

" Whatever the line of business he now follows, if he was an expert be-

iore, he can hardly be said to be less so now," per Mr. Justice Maule.

.See, too, Roberts v. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613; Tullis v. Kidd, 12 Ala. 648,

.650.

4 Bearss v. Copley, 10 X. Y. 95.

5 McEwen v. Bigelow, 40 Mich. 217.

-€xamined. 1 On this preliminary examin!lition the court simply decides upon proof of the opportunities which the witness has had for acquiring special knowledge and experience
.in the subject matter, that the jury may hear his opinion as
.a person of science and skill. 2 In passing upon the competency of the witness, however, the fact should be borne
in mind that'the law does not require that a witness skilled
in a particular art or trade, should be actually engaged in
its practice at the time of the trial. 3 So one who, at the
time he was offered as a witness was a student at law, has
been allowed to tei:itify as an expert in the tanning business,
.he having formerly been employed in that trade. 4 "There
was nothing in the change of employment, from tanning
hides to the study of the law, which would necessarily deprive him of the skill acquired in his original trade.'' But
it has been held no error to hold that a witness who had
not heen engaged in the occupation of a plumber for bventy
_years, could not testify as an expert in matters pertaining
to that trade. ''This was a long time to be out of a business," said the court, " that mu ,t have changed so greatly
.i n that time, and we cannot say that the ruling was clearly
erroneou . The court must exercise a judicial discretion
regarding the reception of evidence purporting to be that
-of experts; and presumptively there mu t in a business
like this be much better expert evidence than that of a person so long out of the business." 5 It is evident that in all
.such cases the question of competency must depend largely
-0n the nature of the trade or occupation, as well as on the
length of time since the witness abandoned it. It is also to
1

Mendnm v. Commonwealth, 6 R!.tnd. 70!, 710; Tulli v. Kidd, 12 Ala .

.()Jg.
2

State v. Secre t, 80 N. C. 450, 457.

a Vander Donckt y. Thellu son, 8 Ma.n. G. & S. (65 Eng. C. L.) 812.

" ·w hatever the line of busine s he now follow if he was an expert beJore, he can hardly be sai<l to be less so now," per Mr. Justice Maule .
. ee, too, Roberts v. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613; Tullis v. Kidd, 12 Ala. 64 ,
.650.

•Bear

v. Copley, 10 N. Y. 95.
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be borne in mind on such preliminary examinations, that

while there are various grades of experts, it is not consid-

ered necessary that the witness should possess the highest

degree of skill to qualify him to testify in the character of

an expert. 1 But his peculiar skill, knowledge, or expe-

rience should have been acquired by him in some trade or

profession. 2

19. Xo Exact Test for Determining Amount of Expe-

rience Expert should Possess. "We iind no test laid

down," says the Supreme Court of Indiana, " by which we

can determine with mathematical precision, just how much

experience a witness must have had, how expert, in short,

he must bo, to render him competent to testify as an ex-

pert." 3 But it is for the court to decide within the limits

of a fair discretion whether the experience of the supposed

expert has been such as to make his opinions of any value. 4

Mere opportunities for special observation are not sufficient

to render a witness competent to testify as an expert. For

example, a painter by trade who had worked at his calling

for twenty years, and who swore that his experience as a
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painter had enabled him to judge of the quality and char-

acter of carpenter work and material, was held incompetent

to testify as an expert respecting the workmanlike manner

in which the carpenter and joiner work was done upon a

house on which he did the painting. 5 So a miller is not a

1 Yutes v. Yates. 76 X. U. 142, 149; Hyde v. Woolfolk, 1 Iowa, 159,

1GG; State v. Hinkle, 6 Iowa, 159, 166.

* Lincoln v. Inhabitants of Barre, 5 Cash. 591.

8 Forgery v. First National Bank, 66 Intl. 123, 125.

McEweu v. Bigelow. 40 Mich. 215, 217.

6 Kilbourne v. Jennings, 38 Iowa, 533. " A painter, in virtue of the

special knowledge and skill acquired in his employment of painting,"'

said the court, " could learn nothing of the proper mode of framing to-

gether materials for the construction of a building. Whatever knowl-

edge lie acquires respecting carpenter and joiner work, must be gained

from mere observation and attention. But any observant man, whose

attention has been specially directed to buildings in process of erection

and erected, could have equal means of knowledge, and could be equally

qualified to give an opinion. But the opinion of a witness is not to be

he ho me in mind on uch preliminary examinations, that
while there arc variou." g rades of experts , it is not cousid~ re d n e ce ~s ary that the witne ,
bould possess the highest
d egree of skill to qu:llify him to te ~ tify in the character of
.a n expert. 1 But hi " peculiar skill, knowledge , or expe·
l'ience : lrnuld have been acquired by him in some trade or
p rofe -. ion. 2
§ 19. :Xo Exact Test for Determining Amount of Experience Expert should Possess .- ' ' vYe find no test laid
-<low n," says the Supreme Court of Indiana , "by which we
·ca n determine with mathematical precision, ju t how much
.experience a. witnes. mu t have had, how expert, in ·hort ,
h e mu .. t b r , to render him competent to testify as an expert. " 3 But it is for the court to decide within the limits
of a fair di scretion 'vhether the experience of the supposed
e xper t ha been ·uch a to make his opinions of any value. 4
~1 ere opportunities for special observation are not sufficient
t o r ender a witness competent to t e tify as an expert. For
exam ple , a painter hy trade who had worked at his calling
fo r t wenty yea.rs , and who ~ wore that his experience as a
painter bad enabled him to judge of the quality and char.acter of carpenter work and material, wa held incompetent
to testify a " an expert re::;pecting the workmanlike manner
in which the carpenter an<l joiner work ·w as done upon a
h ouse on whi ch h e <lid the painting. 5
'o a miller is not a

received merely because he has had some experience, or greater oppor-

tunity >f observation than others, unless the experience relates to mat-

1

Yate,.; v. Y atc . . 76 .:N". ' . 142 1-!9 ; H y cl c \' . W oolfolk, 1 Iown., 159,
JGG; State Y. Hinkle, 6 lowa, 159, 106 .
l! l..ineoln v. Inh abita n t of Ba.n e, 5 C u. h . 391.
z Forgel'y v. Fi r t K n.ti onn.l B a nk , 66 Ind . 123, 125 .
· ~ lic:Ewen Y . Bi gelow. 40 )li ch. 21 5, 217.
6 Kiluourne Y. j en ning. , 38 l O\Ya , 533. " .\.. painter, in virt ue of the
pedal k no"·ledge a nd ~ k ill acq uired in bi emp loym ent of painting .,
i::aiu the co urt, ·• eoulcl lea rn 1!othing of t he proper m ode of framing to- aether mate ri als fo r th e con tru ction of a building. ·w hate ver kno\>vledge he Ul'(Jll il'ci:: re~pect in g ca rpe nter a nd joiner work, mu t be gained
from mere obsen a tion a nd atte n tion. But any ou erva.nt man, whose
atte ntio n has bee n pecially dil'ected to building.. in proce of erection
and er cted, co uld l.iave equal mean of knowl edge a nd could be equall y
qnalili t' d to g ive an opinio n. Bu t the opinion of a wi t ne is no t to be
received m e rely becan e h e h a had ome e:A.peli.ence , or grea ter opporun ity 11f ou ·e rvati on than ot hers, nnl e~ th e experie nce r elate to mat-
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competent witness to give an opinion as to the skillful ness

of work done on a mill, that the construction of its ma-

chinery was improper, although a millwright would be a com-

petent witness in such an inquiry. 1 And where the investi-

gation relates to the quality of iron, it has been held that a

witness must show himself to be skilled in the business of

manufacturing iron, and that " a clerk or book-keeper,,

although he may have been long employed in an iron

foundry, and may have seen the business, is not competent

to testify as an expert, unless he shows by his testimony

that he has given the subject of examining and testing iron

special attention and study, and has had experience in that

art. If it appears that he relies upon the decision of others,,

or upon the marks on the iron, he is not an expert." - ,

20. Competency of Experts whose Knowledge is de- I

rived from Study. A witness is not incompetent to testify

as an expert by reason of the fact that his special knowledge .

of the particular subject of inquiry, has not been derived ^_

from experience or actual observation, but from the reading 3 -

and study of standard authorities. We are not to under- -^>-
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staiid, however, that a person may qualify himself to ^

testify as an expert in a particular case, merely by devoting

himself to the study of authorities for the purposes of that

case, when such reading and study is not in the line of his-

special calling or profession, and is entered upon to enable

him to testify in the case. A lawyer would not be compe-

tent to express an opinion on a question of medical science,,

from information which he might acquire from reading med-

ical authorities bearing on such question. Neither would a

physician be qualified to express an opinion on a question of

ters of skill and science. It is true the witness in question could tell

whether a joint was a close or an open one. And any observant person,,

without special instruction or skill could do as much. But it is apparent

that, to admit as an expert every person who had availed himself of an

opportunity to observe a structure, and who had acquired a knowledge

as to the closeness of the joints, would overturn entirely the rule re-

specting expert testimony."

1 Walker v. Fields, 28 Ga. 237.

2 Pope v. Filley, 9 Fed. Rep. 65, 66.

competent witness to give an opinion as to the kill'fulnes ~
of work dmw on a mill, that the con. trnction of its machinery was improper, although a mil.lwright would be a competent witness in such a11 inquiry. 1 And where the investigation relates to the quality of iron, it has been held that a
witness must show himself to be skilled ii1 the business of
manufacturing iron, and that "a clerk or book-keeper,..
although he may have been long employed in an iron.
foundry, and may have seen the- bu i~ess, is not competent
to testify as an expert, unless he shows by his testimony
that he has given the subject of examining and testing iron
special attention and study, and has had experience in that
art. If it appears that he r~lies upon the decision of other ,.
or upon the marks on the iron, he is not an expert." 2
§ 20. Competency of Experts whose Knowledge is de-.
rived from Study.-A witness is not incompetent to testify
as ari expert by reason of the f act that his special knowledge
of the particular subject of inquiry, has not been deri' ed
from experience or actual observation, but from the reading
and study of standard authorities . " Te are not to understand, however, that a person may qualify him elf t Gtestify as an expert in a particular ca3e, merely by devoting
himself to the study of authorities .for the purpo es of that
case, when such reading and study is not in the line of hi&
special calling or profes ion, and is entered upon to enabl
him to testify in the case. A lawyer ·would not be competent to express an opinion on question of medical science,.
from information which he migh~ acquire from reading medical authorities bearing on such question. Neither would a
physicia11 be qualified to expre'"' s an opinion on a que tion of

a

ters of skill and science. It is t rue the witness in qne tion could teH
whether a joint was a close or an open one. And any ob ervant p er on ,.
without special instruction or kill could do a much. But it i apparen t
that, to admit as an expert every person who had availed him elf of at
opportunity to obser e a structure and who bad acquired a knowledge
as to the clo eness of the joint would overturn entirely the rule repecting expert testimony."
I Walker v. Fields, 28 Ga. 237.
2 Pope v. Filley 9 Fed. Rep. 65, 66.
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foreign law, from information which he might acquire by an

examination of legal authorities. While the opinion of either

would not be inadmissible on a question lying within the

domain of their particular department of science, merely

because such opinion was based on information acquired

from books. In the English case of (Jollier v. Simpson, 1

Mr. Chief Justice Tindal laid down the doctrine, that an

expert could be asked whether in the course of his reading

Jie had found so and so laid, down, and that his judgment

and the grounds of it could be founded in some degree on

books as a part of his general knowledge. And the

.authority of that case has been recognized and followed in

this country. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has

.held that a physician may state his knowledge of a particular

subject in medical science, although such knowledge was

not derived from experience or actual observation, but from

what he had learned merely from reading and studying

medical authorities; and that upon his cross-examination,

lie may be asked, whether in his general reading he has not

found particular theories laid down, conflicting with the
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theory he had advanced. 2 So, too, in North Carolina the

courts have said that medical witnesses, testifying as ex-

perts, are not to be confined to the expression of opinions

derived from their own observation and experience, but

may state opinions based on information derived from

books. 3 And in a case -recently decided in the Supreme

Court of Georgia, where an expert, who was a civil engineer,

stated the rules for the, construction of cuts and embank-

ments as such rules are found in standard works on

engineering, and added: "I give these rules solely from

what I recollect of the books. These rules are found in

Mahan, Gillespie and Gilmore, and many others." The

court held that " the expert was competent to testify.

Every expert derives much of his knowledge from books as

1 5 Carr & Payne, 73 (24 Eng. C. L. 219.)

2 State v. Wood, 53 N. H. 484.

3 Slate v. Ten-ill, 12 Rich. (X. C.) 321; Melvin v. Easier,! Jones

XN. C.) Law, 388.

iforeign law, from information which he might acquire by an
.examination of legal authorities. 'Vhile the opinion of either
would not be inadmissible on a question lying within the
·domain of their particular department of science, merely
because such opinion was based on information acquired
ifrom books. In the English case of Uollie1· v. Simpson,1
:Mr. Chief Justice Tindal laid down the doctrine, that an
-expert could be asked whether in the course of his reading
be had found so and so laid down, and that his judgment
.and the grounds of it could be founded in some degree on
Aud the
books as a part of his general knowledge.
.authority of that case has been recognized and followed in
this country. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has
.held that a physician may state his knowledge of a particular
-· -.J>
subject in medical Rcience, although such knowledge was
mot derived from experience or actual observation, but from
, what he had learned merely from reading and studying
.medical authorities; and that upon his cross-examination,
\ \ he may be asked, whether in his general reading he has not
found particular theories laid down, conflicting with the
theor.y he had advanced. 2 So, too, in North Carolina the
•Courts have said that medical witnesses, testifying as experts, are not to be confined to the expression of opinions
derived from their own observation and experience, but
may state opinions baRed on information derived from
books .3 And in a case -recently decided in the Supreme
·Court of Georgia, where an expert, who was a civil engineer,
stated the rules for the. construction of cuts and embankments as such rules are found in standard works on
·engineeriug, and added: "I give these rules solely from
what I recollect of the books. These rules are found in
~fahan, Gillespie and Gilmore, and many others .."
The
-court held that ''the expert was competent to testify.
Every expert derives much of his knowledge from books as
5 Carr & Payne, 73 (2-i Eng. U. L. 219.)
State v. Wood, 53 N. H. 48-!.
3 State v. Terrill, )2 Rich. (X. C.) 321; Melvin v. Easley, 1 Jones
{X . C. ) Law, 38 .
1
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well as from experience, and can give his opinion based

upon the knowledge acquired from both sources." 1

21. Competency of Experts whose Knowledge is de-

rived from Study The Subject Continued. In a case

decided in the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in 1870,

the law as to the qualifications of witnesses without practi-

cal experience, but who have devoted themselves to special

study and reading of authorities, was laid down by Mr..

Justice Foster with such force and clearnesss, as to warrant

its repetition in this connection, notwithstanding its length.

A Mr. Waite, as editor of a stock journal, who had read

extensively on the subject of " foot-rot," but who was with-

out practical experience as to the treatment of the disease,

had been called as an expert on the question whether the

" foot-rot " is ever a spontaneous disease, or is bred only

by contact. Mr. Justice Foster, speaking for the court,

said : " Mr. Waite had no skill whatever, 'no practical ex-

perience in the treatment of sheep for any disease ;' that he

must then have had special and peculiar knowledge ; that he

must have been really a man of science, in order to be qual-
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ified to give an opinion, would seem to be a settled and

definite rule of law. The extent of Mr. Waite ; s qualification

is thus described : As editor of a stock journal, he had

read extensively on the subject of foot-rot.' The object of

all testimony in courts is to place before the jury a knowl-

edge of facts pertaining to the case under consideration, and

it is a serious departure from this purpose ever to admit,

instead of actual knowledge, mere -opinion, however correct

it may probably be, and therefore, opinion, if admitted at

all, should be as nearly approximated as possible to the

actual knowledge of fact for which it is substituted ; and it

should always be required of an expert, that he should, at

least, be sufficiently acquainted with the subject matter of

his testimony to know what its laws are, and not merely to

conjecture or to have an idea about it. That is, he should

be really a man of science. The science, (especially in the

1 Central R. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 63 Ga. 173; s. c. I Am. & Eng. R. R.

Cases, 145.

well as from experience, and can give his opinion ba.. , ed
upon the knowledge acquired from both sources.' 1
§ 21. Competency of Experts whose Knowledge is derived from Stud~ -The Subject Continued. -In a case
decided in the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in 1870,
the law as to the qualifications of witnesses without practi-cal experience, hut who have devoted themselves to pecial
study and .reading of authorities, was laid down by lVIr ..
Justice Foster with such force and clearnesss , a to "·arrant
its repetition in this connection, notwithstanding its length ..
A l\fr. "\Vaite, as editor of a stock journal, who had read
extensively on the subject of "foot-rot," but who was with-·
out practical experience as to the treatment of the disease,
had been called as an expert on the question whether the
"foot-rot" is ever a spontaneous disease, or is bred only
by contact. Mr. Justice Foster, 8peaking for the court,_
said: "~Ir. vVaite had no skill whatever, 'no practical experience in the treatment of sheep for any disease;' that he
must then h9.ve had special and pecitlim: knowledge; that hemust have been really a man of science, in order to be qualified to give an opinion, would seem to be a settled and
definite rule of law. The extent of l\Ir. vVaite; s qualification
is thus described: 'As editor of a stock journal, he had
read extensively on the subject of foot-rot.' The 9bject of
all testimony in courts is to place before the jury a knowledge of facts pertaining to the case under consideration, and
it is a serious departure from this purpose ever to admit,
instead of actual knowledge, mere ·opinion,. however correct
it may probably be, and therefore, opinion, if admitted at
all, should be as nearly approximated as po'"'sible to the·
actual knowledge of fact for which it is substituted; and it
should always be required of an expert, that he should, at
least, be sufficiently acquainted with the subject matter or
his testimony to know what its laws are, and not merely to·
conjecture or to have an idea about it. That is, he should
be really a man of science. The science, (especially iu the~
1

Central R.R. Co.
145.

Ca~ es

~.Mitchell,

63 Ga. 173; s. c. 1 Am. & Eng. R.R ..
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absence of skill,) which an expert should be required to-

possess and employ on a given subject, implies that special

and peculiar knowledge acquired only by a course of obser-

vation and study, and the expenditure of time, labor and.

preparation, in a particular employment and calling of life.

The matter of our present consideration is of vast import-

ance. In the multiplication of interests connected with the

application of the laws of science, which are daily growing

more and more numerous and refined, it is hardly possible

to dispense with the aid of experts in determining the rights

of parties ;' but it is greatly to be feared that an unwise

generosity and liberality of construction have sometimes

permitted the admission of this kind of evidence to an extent

outside the bounds of discretion and safety, and that perhaps

a more scrupulous regard for and estimation of the great im-

portance of the office of an expert in the ascertainment of

truth, than has sometimes been exercised, has become neces-

sary, not only for the vindication of justice itself, but also for

strengthening the confidence of the public in its ministers

and instrumentalities.
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" We admit the .wisdom of the rule which, permitting a

man of genuine science to give as his opinion the results of

study and research into books of acknowledged authority,,

yet will not allow such books to be read in court to the jury.

The rule is founded partly in the delay which would thus be

occasioned to the business of courts, and partly in the idea

that it is safer, on the whole, to trust to the judgment of

learned men, acquired by study, observation and skill,

than to the imperfect deductions of jurors, hastily de-

rived from readings not familiar to them, unassisted by

study, examination and comparison of kindred subjects

(though we must confess that, in a particular case we

may have little doubt that a page from Youatt or Morrell

would be a safer guide for the jury than the opinion

of such a witness as Mr. Waite). But so long as the opin-

ions of the most distinguished and most learned authors in

the world, expressed through the direct and pure media of

their celebrated works, are thus excluded from the jury r

ab ence of skill,) which an expert should be required to,
possess and employ on a given subject, implies that special
and peculiar knowledge acquired only by a cour.~ e of ob crvation and study, and the expenditure of time, labor anti.
preparation, in a particular employment and calling of life.
The matter of our present con ideration i of va t importance. 'In the multiplication of intere~ ts connected with the
application of the law of science, which are daily growing·
more and more numerous and refined, it is hardly pos .. ible
to di pense with the aid of experts in determining the right
of parties ;' but it is greatly to be feared that an unwi e
genero ity and liberality of construction have ometimes
perm itted the admission of this kind of evidence to an extent
out. ide the bounds of discretion and safety, and that perhap
a more scrupulou regard for and estimation of the great importance of the office of an expert in the ascertainment of
truth, than has ometimes been exerci ed, ha become nece -·sary, not only for the vindication of justice itself, but al o for
trengthening the confidence of the public in its mini ·ters
and in trumentalitie .
" 'Ve admit the .wi dom of the rule which, permitting a
man of genuine science to give as bi ·· opinion the re ~ ult of
tudy and re earch into books of acknowledged authority,.
yet will not allow uch books to be read in court to the jury.
The rule i ~ founued partly in the delay which would thu be·
occa ioned to the busine of court , and partly in the idea
that it is afer, on the whole, to tru t to the judgment of'
learned men, acquired by tudy, ob ervation and ..:kill,
than. to the imperfect deductions of juror, ha ~ tily derived from readings not familiar to them, unas i ~ ted hy
~tudy, examination and cornpari on of kindred ..:ubje<:t..:
(though we mu t confe s that, in a particular ca . . e we •
may have little doubt that a page from Y ouatt or ::\lorrcll
would be a safer guide for the jury than the opinion
of such a witne s as l\1r. " aite). But o long a ~ the opinions of the mo t di .. tingui bed and mo.s t learned author ~ in.
the world, expres ed through the direct and pure rnedi'a of
their celebrated work , are thus excluded from the jury
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surely it can be neither wise nor prudent to admit opinions

uiisustained by the slightest experience or even observation,

"the deductions of readings at best scanty and superficial,

.-because not pertaining to the special study and business of

the reader. * * *

" Of course, it must be admitted that the testimony of

3uio wledge and opinion, obtained from mere reading, with-

out study, reflection, or observation, is no more than a rela-

tion by the witness of that which the policy of the law

-excludes, namely, the books themselves which the witness

Jias read.

" The limit of safety in this direction is reached, it would

seem, when we admit, as the practice in this State is, the

opinions of medical men, for instance, with regard to a dis-

ease which in actual practice they may not have treated,

but concerning which the science and skill of long experi-

ence in the affinities and analogies of the subject have pre-

pared them to speak with confidence, from a knowledge of

the rules and laws governing the special subject of in-

quiry. * *
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" And so the practice in this State permits the skilled prac-

titioner, who has made himself familiar with the science of

medicine or surgery by a long course of study and practical

experience with kindred subjects, to testify as an expert ;

;and common sense demands that such a man shall have re-

spect given to his opinion, though he may have had no prac-

tical experience in a particular case.

' ' But how is it in the case of this witness ? He was not a vet-

erinarian, nor any other kind of a physician or surgeon. 'He

had had no practical experience in the treatment of sheep,'

urely it cau be neither wise nor prudent to admit opinion
.urnmstained by the slightest experience or even ob ervation,
ithe deductions of readings at best scanty and superficial,
1because not pertaining to the special study and business of
the reader. * * *
" Of course, it must be admitted that the testimony of
}knowledge and opinion, obtained from mere reading, with-0ut study, reflection, or observation, is no more than a relation by the witness of that which the policy of the law /
·excludes , namely, the books themselves which the witness
Jias read.
,, ' The limit of safety in this direction is reached, it would
seem, when we admit, as the practice in this State is, the
·opinions of medical men, for instance, ·with regard to a dis-ease which in actual practice they may not have treated,
but concerning which the science and skill of long experi-ence in the affinities and analogies of the subject have prepared them to speak with confidence, from a knowledge of
tthe rules and laws governing the special subject of in-

nor of any person or thing ' for any disease.' He was the

editor of a newspaper, devoted, not to the special considera-

tion of this, nor even of kindred subjects, but embracing

the very large class of matters ordinarily included in a stock

journal. His newspaper was, probably, the ordinary col-

lection of miscellaneous literature and news items, concern-

ing all the diverse matters embraced within the range of

~ mry.

* * *

'' .And so the practice in this State permits the skilled praclt itioner, who has made himself familiar with the science of
medicine or surgery by a long course of study ~nd practical
·experience with kindred subjects; to testify as an expert;
:and common sense demands that such a man shall have re. ~pect given to his opinion, though he may have had no prac't·ical experience in a particular case.
-'' But how is it in the case of this witnes · ? He was not a vet·erinarian, nor any other kind o.f a phy ician or surgeon. 'He
had had no practical experience in the treatment of sheep,'
nor of any person or thing 'for any di ease.' He was the
.editor of a newspaper, devoted, not to the special consideration of this, nor even of kindred subjects, but embracing
the very large class of matters ordinarily included in a stock
journal. His newspaper was, probably, the ordinary collection of miscellaneous literature and news items, concerning all the diverse matters embraced within the range of
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such a production, its editor having and making no preten-

sion to veterinary skill and practice.

" It being evident, too, that in the line of his comprehen-

sive reading and study the subject of the diseases of animals

was by no means a specialty, the element of editorship has

in reality nothing to do with the party's qualifications.

'As an editor,' it is said ' he had read extensively on the

subject of foot-rot.' So, as a lawyer, prosecuting or defend-

ing a man charged with murder, I, who am not a doctor,,

may have read extensively on the subject of the effects of

strychnine and its manifestations after death, and, as the

result of my reading, I might well form the opinion that

enough of strychnine might be administered to cause death,

without a possibility that a medical man or chemist could

be able to detect it in the stomach or blood of the deceased ;

but, it is to be hoped, my opinion upon this subject would

not be allowed. And, as a lawyer, also, in the examination

of this case, I have, in fact, read extensively on the subject

of foot-rot, the books of Morrell, Youatt and Clock. * * *

" As the result of my reading, I should, perhaps, be in-
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clined to believe the disease is not contagious, but my opin-

ion is no more admissible than the books themselves of

these authors. They are men of acknowledged science and

skill. The witness in this case can have examined no better

authority. Why should his opinion, without practical skill

and experience, be received, and theirs rejected?

" In view of all these considerations, and of the evidence

reported by the case submitted to us, we are strongly of the

opinion that the witness, having confessedly no veterinary

skill nor practice, having also no professional education,

not being in any true sense a man of science, because not

instructed and prepared by a long course of habit of study

concerning the diseases of domestic animals, did not pos-

sess the legal qualifications of an expert." 1

22. Competency Sometimes Dependent on whether

the Expert has Heard the Testimony. An expert either

1 Dole v. Johnson, 50 N. H. 452, 455.

(3)

such a production, its editor having and making no pretension to veterinary skill and practice.
"It being evident, ioo, that in the line of his comprehensive reading and study the subject of the diseases of animals-was by no means a specialty, tbe element of editorship has
in reality nothing to do with the party's qualifications ..
'As an editor,' it is said 'he had read extensively on the·
subject of foot-rot.' So, as a lawyer, prosecuting or defending a man charged with murder, I, who am not a doctor,.
may have read extensively on the subject of the effects of
strychnine and its manifestations after death, and, as the
result of my reading, I might well form the opinion that
enough of strychnine might be administered to cause death,
without a possibility that a medical man or chemist could
be able to detect it in the s.tomach or blood of the deceased;
but, it is to be hoped, my opinion upon this subject wortld
not be allowed. And, as a lawyer, also, in the examination
of this case, .I have, in fact, read extensively on the subject
of foot-rot, the books of :Morrell, Youatt and Clock. * * *
"As the result of my reading, I should, perhaps, be inclined to believe the disease is not contagious, but my opinion is no more admissible than the books themselves of
these authors. They are men of acknowledged science and
skill. The witness in this case can have examined no better
authority. Why should his opinion, without practical skill
and experience, be received, and theirs rejected?
''In view of all these considerations, and of the evidence
reported by the case submitted to us, we are strongly of the
opinion that the witness, having confessedly no veterinary
skill nor practice, having also no professional education,
not being in any true sense a man of science, because not
instructed and prepared by a long course of habit of study
concerning the diseases of domestic animals, did not possess the legal qualifications of an expert.'' 1
§ 22. Competency Sometimes Dependent on whether
the Expert has Heard the Testimony.-An expert eith.er
1

Dole v. Johnson, 50 N. H. 452, 455.
(3)
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states general facts, which are the results of scientific

knowledge or general skill, or else he testifies to opinions. 1

If he testifies to opinions, his testimony is founded either on

personal knowledge of the facts, or else it is based on facts

shown by the testimony of others. 2 If his opinion is de-

sired on facts testified to by other witnesses, it should ap-

pear that he has reliable information or knowledge of what

those facts are. 3 But even in such cases it is not always

necessary that the witness should have been present, and

heard all the evidence. 4

It is sufficient if it appears that he has heard all the testi-

mony which is material to the subject of inquiry. 5 And he

should have heard the evidence as actually given, and not

as it appears on the minutes of the testimony as taken by

counsel. When an expert had not heard the evidence as

given on the trial, and counsel offered to read to him their

minutes of the testimony, it was held that this could not be

allowed. 6 Of course the necessity for the witness to have

heard the testimony does not exist if the whole of the evi-

dence is embraced in a hypothetical question submitted to
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Mm. 7

23. Competency of Experts in Particular Cases. \Ve

have thus confined our attention to the general principles

relating to the competency of experts, and have left the

consideration of the competency of experts in particular

cases to be considered in subsequent chapters. For instance,

the competency of physicians and surgeons to testify as ex-

1 Emerson v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 6 Allen, 146.

! Spear v. Richardson, 37 X. H. 23, 34; Livingston v. Commonwealth,

14 Gratt. (Va.) 592; Walker v. Fields, 28 Ga. 237.

*Heald v. Thing, 45 Me. 392; Lake r. People. 12 X. Y. 358; s. c., 1

Parker Cr. Cas. 495; People v. Thurston, 2 Parker Cr. Cas. 49.

* Miller v. Smith, 112 Mass, 470, 475.

states general facts, which are the re ults of scientific
knowledge or general skill, or el e he testifies to opinions. 1
If he testifies to opinions, his testimony is founded either on ·
personal knowledge of the fact", or else it is based on fact
shown by the testimony of others. 2 If hi opinion is desired on facts testified to by other witnes es it should appear that he has reliable information or knowledge of what
those facts are. 3 But even in such case it i not alway
neces. ary that the witness should have been present, and
heard all the evidence. 4
It is sufficient if it appears that he has heard all the te timony which i ~ material to the ubject of inquiry .5 And he
should have heard the evidence as actually given and not
as it ~ppears on the minute.., of the testimony as taken by
counsel. When an expert had not heard the evidence as
given on the trial, and counsel offered to read to him their
minutes of the testimony, it was held that this could not be
allowed. 6 Of couTse the necessity for the witne s to have
heard the testimony does not exist if the whole of the evidence is embraced in a hypothetical question submitted to

him.7

* Carpenter v. Blake, 2 Lans. (X. Y.) 206; State v. Medlicott, 9 Kans.

289; Rich v. Jones, S Cash. (Mass.) 337; Hand v. Brookliue, 126 (Mass.)

324; Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15, 40; State v. Hayden, 51 Vt. 296.

Thayer T. Davis, 38 Vt. 163.

7 See Webb v. State, 9 Texas Ct. of App. 490.

§ 23. Competency of Experts in Particular Ca e . -We
have thus confined our atte:itiou to the general prjnciple
relating to the competency of experts, and have left the
consideration of the competency of experts in ])articular
cases to be considered in subsequent chapter". For in tance,
the competency of phy -icians and surgeon to testify as exEmerson v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 6 Allen, 146.
Spear v. Richard on, 37N. H. 23, 34; Living~ ton v. Commonwealth
14 Gratt. (Va.) 592; Walker v. Field , 2 Ga. 237.
3 Heald v. Thing, 45 M~. 392; Lake v. People, 12 N. Y. 35 ; s. c., 1
Parker Cr. Oas. -!95; People v. Thurton, 2Parker Cr. Ca. 49.
•Miller v. mith, 112 Mas~, 470, 475.
5 Carpenter v . .Blake, 2 Lans. (N. Y.) 206; State v. Medlicott, 9 Kan .
2 '9; Rich v. Jone , S Cub. (Mass.) 337; Handv. :Brookline, 126 (Ma .)
324:; Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15, 40; tate v. Hayden, 51 Vt. 296.
'Thayer v. Davie, 3 Vt. 163.
7 See Webb v. State, 9 Texas Ct. of App. 490.
1
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perts, is considered in the chapter relating to expert testi-

mony in medicine, surgery and chemistry. So the qualifi-

tions of experts in handwriting have been considered in the
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chapter relating to expert testimony in handwriting.

pert", is cousidered in the chapter relating to expert te timony in medicine, urgery and chemistry. ·o the qualifition ~ of experts in handwriting have been con idered in the
chapter relating to expert te ~ timony in handwriting.
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CHAPTER III.

THE EXAMINATION OF EXPERT WITNESSES, AND THE

WEIGHT OF THEIR TESTIMONY.

SECTION.

24. Mode of Examination of Expert Witnesses.

25. The Hypothetical Question.

26. The Hypothetical Question The Subjet Continued.

27. When Questions need not be Hypothetical.

28. The Hypothetical Question on the Cross-examination.

29. Questions to Experts should not embrace Questions of Law.

30. Questions to Experts as to Particular Cases.

31. An Expert cannot be asked for an Opinion on Facts not Stated.

32. Latitude of Inquiry in the Examination of Experts.

CHAPTER III.

33. Some General Kules Governing the Examination of Witnesses.

34. Excluding Experts from the Court Room during the Examination

of Witnesses.

35. Right of the Court to Limit the Number of Expert Witnesses.

36. By whom Expert Witnesses are Selected.

THE EXAl\IINATION 01', EXPERT WITNESSES, AND THE

37. Weight of Expert Testimony a Question for the Jury.

38. Right of the Jury to Exercise an Independent Judgment.

WEIGHT OF THEIR TESTIMONY.
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39. Instructions to the Jury as to the Nature and Weight of Expert

Testimony.

40. Instructions to the Jury as to the Nature and Weight of Expert

Testimony The Subject Continued.

41. Instructions to the Jury as to the Nature and Weight of Expert

Testimony The Subject Continued.

42. The Value of Expert Testimony.

24. Mode of Examination of Expert Witnesses. It

being determined by the court, that the subject matter of

inquiry is one upon which the opinion of experts may prop-

erly be received in evidence, and that the witness introduced

possesses special skill in the subject matter of inquiry, the

SECTION.

24.
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28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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36.
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38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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Questions to Experts as to Particular Uases.
A.n Expert cannot be asked for an Opinion on Fact not Stated.
Latitude of Inquiry in the Examination of Experts.
Some General Rules Governing the Examination of Witnes es.
Excluding Experts from the Court Room during the Examination
of Witnesses.
Right of the Court to Limit the Number of Expert Witne ei::.
By whom Expert Witnesses are Selected.
Weight of Expert Testimony a Question for the Jury.
Right of the Jury to Exercise an Independept Judgment.
Instructions to the Jury as to the Nature and Weight of Expert
'l'estimony.
Instructions to the Jury as to the Nature and Weight of Expert
Testimony-The Subject Continued.
Instructions to the Jury as to the Nature and Weight of Expert
Testimony-The Subject Continued.
The Value of Expert Testimony.

§ 24. Mode of Examination of Expert Witnesses.-It
being determined by the court, that the subject matter of
inquiry is one upon which the opinion of experts may properly be received in evidence,. and that the witness introduced
possesses special skill in the subject matter of inqui1:y, the
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examination of the witness is next in order, and it becomes

important that such examination should proceed strictly in

accordance with the rules, which it has been found necessary

to establish in relation to the admission of expert testimony.

It is necessary in the examination of all such witnesses,

that questions should be so framed as not to call on the

witness for a critical review of the testimony given by the

other witnesses, compelling the expert to draw inferences

or conclusions of fact from the testimony, or to pass on

the credibility of the witnesses, 1 the general rule being

that an expert should not be asked a question in such a

manner as to cover the very question to be submitted to the

jury. 2 As expressed in one of the opinions, " a question

should not be so framed as to permit the witness to roam

through the evidence for himself, and gather the facts as he

may consider them to be proved, and then state his conclu-

sions concerning them." 3 And the language in another

case is as follows: "The questions to him must be so

shaped as to give him no occasion to mentally draw his own

conclusions from the whole evidence, or a part thereof, and
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from the conclusion so drawn, express his opinion, or to

decide as to the weight of evidence or the credibility of

witnesses ; and his answers must be such, as not to involve

J Jameson v. Drinkald, 12 Moore, 148; Guiterman v. LiTerpool etc.

Steamship Co., 83 N. Y. 358, 366; United States v. MeGloin, 1 Curtis C.

C. 1, 9; Buxton v. Somerset Potters Works, 121 Mass. 446; Reynolds v.

Robinson, 64 N. Y. 589; Phillips v. Starr, 26 Iowa, 351; Van Zandt v.

Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Ce., 55 N. Y. 179; Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 9;

Cincinnati etc. Mutual Ins. Co. v. May, 20 Ohio, 211, 224; Rush v.Megee,

36 Ind. 1. '-Le Medicin ne doit jamais donner un avis sur le difficult^

meme, que les juris ont a resoudre; par exemple, sur le point de savoir

si 1'accuse est irresponsable, niais simplement faire connaitre son opinion

sur T existence ou le degnS d'influence de certain faits." Dr. Mitter-

maier's Trait5 de la Procedure Criminelle.

2 Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Springfield & Northwestern R. R. Co.,

67 111. 142; Tingley v. Cowgill, 48 Mo. 294; Muldowney v. Illinois

Central R. R. Co., 39 Iowa, 615; Pelamourges v. Clark, 9 Iowa, 1. 16;

Hill v. Portland etc. R. R. Co., 55 Me. 444; Keller v. N. Y. Central R.

examination of the witness is next in order, and it becomes
important that such examination should proceed strictly in
accordance with the rules, which it has been found necessary
to establish in relation to the admission of expert testimony.
It is necessary in the examination of all such witnesses,
that questions should be so framed as not to call on the
witness for a critic~l review of the testimony given by the
other witnesses, compelling the expert to draw inferences
or conclusions . of fact from the testimony, or to pass on
the credibility of the witnesses,1 the general rule being
that an expert should not be a8ked a quegtion in such a
manner as to cover the very question to be submitted to the
jury .2 As expressed in one of the opinions, " a question
should not be so framed as to permit the witness to roam
through the evidence for himself, ttnd gather the facts as he
may consider them to be proved, and then state his conclusions concerning them." 3 And the langmige in another
case is as follows: ''The questio~s to him must be so
shaped as to give him no occasion to mentally draw his own
conclusions from the whole evidence, or a part thereof, and
from the conclusion so drawn, express his opinion, or to
decide as to the weight of evidence or the credibility of
witnesses ; and his answers must be such, as not to involve

R. Co., 2 Abbott's App. Decis. (X. Y.) 480, 490; Clark v. Detroit Loco-

motive Works, 32 Mich. 348.

8 Dolz v. Morris, 17 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 202.

1 Jameson v. Drinkald, 12 Moore, H S; Guiterman v. LiTerpool etc.
Steamship Co., 83 N. Y. 358, 366; United States v. McGloin, 1 Curtis C.
C . 1, 9; Buxton v: Somerset Putters Works, 121 Mass. 446; Reynolds v.
Robinson, 64 N. Y. 589; Phil1ips v. Starr, 26 Iowa, 351; Van Zandt v.
1.lutnal Benefit Life Ins. Ce ., 55 N. Y. 179; Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 9;
Cincinnati etc. Mutual Ins. Co. v . .May, 20 Qhio, 211, 224; Rush v. Megee,
36 Ind. I. '·Le Medioin ne doit jamais donner un avis sur le difficulte
meme, que les juris ont a resoudre; p ar exemple, &ur le point de savoir
si l' accnse est irresponsable, ruais simplement faire connaitre son opinion
sur r existence ou le degre d'inflnence de 'certain faits." Dr. Mittermaier's Traite de la Procedure Critninelle.
2 Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Springfield & NorthwesternR. R. Co.,
67 Ill. 142; '.I'ingley v. Cowgill, 48 Mo. 294; Muldowney v. Illinois
Central R. R. Co., 39 Iowa, 615; Pelamourges v. Clark, 9 Iowa, I. 16;
Hill v. Portland e.tc. R.R. Co., 55 Me; 444;. Keller v. N. Y. Central R.
R. Co., 2 Abbott's App. Decis. (N. Y.) 480, 490; Clark v. Detroit Locomotive Works, 32 Mich. 348.
z Dolz v. Morris, 17 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 202.
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any such conclusions so drawn, or any opinion of the expert,

as to the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the

witnesses." 1 "The object of all questions to experts,"

says the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, " should be to

obtain their opinion as to the matter of skill or science

which is in controversy, and at the same time to exclude

their opinions as to the effect of the evidence in establishing

controverted facts. Questions adapted to this end may be

in. a great variety of forms. If they require the witness to

draw a conclusion of fact, they should be excluded." 2 It

is not the duty of an expert to reconcile conflicting evi-

dence. 3 In illustration of this principle that an expert can-

not be asked an opinion which requires him to pass upon

the evidence, the following question may be cited as having

been held to be an improper one, for the reason that it

practically put the expert in the place of the jury : " From

the facts and circumstances stated by previous witnesses,

and from those testified to by still other witnesses, relating

to the homicide, and from defendant's conduct on the trial,

is it your opinion that the defendant was sane or insane
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when he committed the act?" 4 For the same reason an

engineer has not been allowed to answer the question

whether "the plaintiff in oiling that pulley, could have been

injured unless he was careless." 5 So it has been held im-

proper to ask : "In your opinion as a canal boatman, did

Mr. C. in any way omit or neglect to do anything which he

might have done to save his boat?" He could be asked

whether certain acts assumed to be proven were seamanlike

and proper, but he could not be allowed to express an

opinion as to what was or was not done as a matter of fact/'

And in an action against a physician for neglect and non-

attendance in a case of frost bite, it has been held that A

1 McMechen v. McMechen, 17 W. Va. 683, 694.

2 Hunt v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 8 Gray, 169.

3 Liming v. State, 1 Chandler, (Wis.) 178.

* State v. Felter, 25 Iowa, 67, 74.

5 Buxton v. Somerset Potters Works, 124 Mass. 446.

Carpenter v. Eastern Transportation Co., 71 N. Y. 574.

any such conclusions so drawn, or any opinion of the expert~
as to the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the
witnesses. " 1 " The. object of all questions to experts,',.
says the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, "should be to
obtain their opinion as to the matter of skill or science
which is in controversy, and at the same time to exclude
their opinions as to the effect of the evidence in establishing
controverted facts. Questions adapted to this end may be
in a great variety of forms. If they require. the witness to
draw a conclusion of fact, thty should be excluded. 2 It
is not the duty of an expert to reconcile C<?nflicting evidence.3 In illustration of this principle that an expert cannot be asked an opinion which requires him to pass upon
the evidence, the following question may be cited as having
been held to be an improper one, for the reason that it
practically put the exp~rt in the place of the jury: "From
the facts and circums.tances stated by previous witnesses,
and from those testified to by still other witnesses, relating·
to the homicide, and from defendant's conduct on the trial,
is it your opinion that the defendant was sane or insane
when he committed the act?'' 4 For the same reason an
engineer has not been allowed to answer the question
whether "the plaintiff in oiling that pulley, could have been
injured unless he was careless." b So it has been held improper to ask: "In your opinion as a canal boatman, did
~fr. C. in any way omit or neglect to do anything which he
might have done to save his boat?" He coul~ be asked
whether certain acts assumed to be proven were seamanlike
and proper,, but he could not be allowed to express an
opinion as to what was or was not done as a matter of fact. i;
And in au action against a physician for neglect and nonattendance iu a case of frost bite, it has been held that a
McMechen v. 1\Ic:Mecben 17 W. Va. 683 69-1.
Hunt v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 8 Gray, 169.
a Luning v. State, 1 Chandler, (Wis.) 178.
•State v. Felter, 25 Iowa, 67, 74.
:; Buxton v. Somerset Potters Works, 124 Mass. 446.
"Carpenter v. Eastern Transportation Co., 71 N. Y. 574.
i
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medical witness, to whom the evidence was read, could not

be asked : From the evidence before the court, to what do

you ascribe the loss of the plaintiff's fingers and toes? 1

25. The Hypothetical Question. As an expert is not

allowed to draw inferences or conclusions of fact from the

evidence, his opinion should be asked upon a hypothetical

statement of facts. 2 Mr. Chief Justice SHAW well stated

the law as follows: " In order to obtain the opinion of a

witness on matters not depending upon general knowledge,

but on facts not testified of by himself, one of two modes

is pursued : either the witness is present and hears all the

testimony, or the testimony is summed up in the question

put to him ; and in either case the question is put to him

hypothetically, whether, if certain facts testified of are true

he can form an opinion, and what that opinion is." 3

- Counsel in framing the hypothetical question, may base

it upon the hypothesis of the truth of all the evidence, or

on a hypothesis especially framed on certain facts assumed

to be proved for the purpose of the inquiry. 4 If framed on

the assumption of certain facts, counsel may assume the
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facts in accordance with his theory of them, it not being

essential that he should state the facts as they actually

exist. 3

" The claim is," says Chief Justice FOLGER, in the case

last cited, " that a hypothetical question may not be put to

1 Key v. Thompson, 2 Han nay, (X. B.) 224.

2 Strong v. Kean, 13 Irish Law R. 93; Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117, 124.

125; Spear v. Richardson, 37 X. II. 23; Teft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46;

Pidcock v. Potter. 68 Pa. St. 342 ; Woodbury v. Obear. 7 Gray (Mass.) ,

467; Williams v. Brown, 28 Ohio St. 547, 551; Moore v. State, 17 Ohio

St. 526; Jerry v.Townshend. 9 Md. 145; Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.

v. Thompson, 10 Md. 76; Walker v. Rogers, 24 Md. 237; Page v. State.

61 Ala. 16; Willey v. Portsmouth, 35 N. H. 303; Bishop v. Spining, 38

Ind. 143; Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wallace, 9; Ayers v. Water Commissioners.

29 X. Y. Sup. Ct. 297; Guiterman v. Liverpool, etc. Steamship Co., 83

X. Y. 358, 366; Hunt v. State, 9 Tex. Ct. of App. 166; Hoard v. Peck, 56

Barb. (X. Y.) 202; City of Decatnr v. Fisher, 63 111. 241.

3 Dickenson v. Fitchburg, 13 Gray, (Mass.) 546, 556.

< Gotlieb v. Hartman, 3 Col. 53.

5 Cowley v. People, 83 N. Y. 461.

medical witness, to whom the evidence was read, could not
be asked: From the evidence before the court, to what do
you ascribe the loss of the plaintiff's fingers and toes? 1
§ 25. The Hypothetical Question.- As an expert is not
allowed to draw inferences or conclusions of fact from the
evidence, his opinion should be asked upon a hypothetical
statement of facts. 2 Mr. Chief Justice SHAW well stated
the law as follows: ''In order to obtain the opinion of a
witness on matters not depending upon general knowledge,
but on facts not testified of l>y himself, one of two modes
is pursued: either the witness is present and hears all the
testimony, or the testimony is summed up in the question
put to him; and in either case the question is put to him
hypothetically, whether, if certain facts testified of are true
he can form an opinion, and what that opinion ilj." 3
r
Counsel in framing the hypothetical question, may base
it upon the hypothesis of the truth of all the evidence, or
on a hypothesis especially framed on certain facts assumed
to be proved for the purpose of the inquiry .4 If framed on
the assumption of certain facts, counsel may assume the
facts in accordance with his theory of them, it not being
essential that he should state the f acts as they actually
exist. 11
"The claim is ," says Chief Justice FOLGER, in the case
last cited, "that a hypothetical question may not be put to
Key v. Thompso n, 2 Hannay, (N. B.) 224.
Strong v. Kean, 13 frish Law R. 93; Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117, 124,
125; Spear v. Richardson, 3i N. II. 23; 'l'eft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46;
Pidcock v. Potter~ 68 Pa. St. 342; Woodbury v. Obear~ 7 Gray (Mass.),
467; Willia.ms v. Brown, 28 Ohio St. 547, 551; Moore v. State, 17 Ohio
St. 526; Jerry v. Town bend~ 9 Md. 145; Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.
v. 'l'hompson, 10 Md. 76; Walker v. Rogers, 24 Md. 237; Page v. State.
61Ala.16; Willey v. Portsmouth , 35 N. H. 303; Bishop v. Spining, 38
Ind. 143; Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wallace, 9; Ayers v. Water Commissioners,
29 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 297; Guiterman v. Liverpool, etc. Steamship Co., 83
N. Y. 358, 366; Hunt v. State, 9Tex. Ct. ofApp.166; Hoard v. Peck, 56
Barb. (N. Y.) 202; City of Decatur v. Fi her, 63 DI. 241.
a Dickenson v. Fitchburg, 13 Gray, (Ma. .) 5.f6, 556.
• Gotlieb v. Hartman, 3 Col. 53.
s Cowley v. P eople, 83 N. Y. 461.
i

2

40

EXPERT TESTilIONY .

40 EXPERT TESTIMONY.

an expert, unless it states the facts as they exist. It is man-

ifest, if this is the rule, that in a trial where there is a dis-

pute as to the facts, which can be settled only by the jury,

there would be no room for a hypothetical question. The

very meaning of the word is that it supposes, assumes

something for the time being. Each side, in an issue of

fact, has its theory of what is the true state of the facts,

and assumes that it can prove it to be so to the satisfaction

of the jury, and so assuming, shapes hypothetical questions

to experts accordingly. And such is the correct practice." 1

The fact that counsel make an error in their assumption,

does not render the question objectionable, if it is within the

possible or probable range of the evidence. 2 But the testi-

mony should tend to establish every supposed fact embraced

in the question. 3 For if the hypothetical question is clearly

exaggerated and unwarranted by any testimony in the case,

an objection to it will be sustained. 4 As declared in the

Supreme Court of Michigan, counsel should not be, per-

mitted to embrace in a hypothetical question " anything not

proved or offered to be proved." 5 And if it turns out that
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the question includes circumstances which are neither

proved, nor as to which there is any tendency of proof,

then the court is to instruct the jury to disregard the opin-

ion based upon it. 6 But where there is any evidence tend-

ing to prove the facts assumed, it is for the jury to weigh

1 See to the same effect Davis v. State, 35 Ind. 496; Guetigv. State, 66

Ind94; Filer v. N. Y. Central K. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 42; Carpenter v.

Blake, 2 Lans. (N. Y.) 206.

2 Harnett v. Garvey, 66 N. Y. 641 ; Nave v. Tucker, 70 Ind. 15.

3 Bouigardner v. Andrews, 55 Iowa, 638 ; Hathaway 's Admr. r. National

Life Ins. Co.. 48 Vt. 335; Hurst v. The C. R. I. &. P. R. Co., 49 Iowa,

76; Gueting v. State, 66 Ind. 94; Daniells v. Aldrich, 42 Mich. 58; Dil-

lebar v. Home Life Ins. Co. (N. Y. Ct. of App., Nov. 1881), 14 Cent. L.

J. 158.

Williams v. Brown, 28 Ohio St. 547, 551, 552; Muldowuey v. Illinois

Central R. R. Co., 39 Iowa, 615; Dickie v. Vanbleck, 5 Redf. (N. Y.)

284, 294.

Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 227.

6 CommoHwealth v. Mullins, 2 Allen (Mass.), 296; Gueting v. State, 60

Ind. 94; Hovey v. Chase, 52 Me. 304.

an expert, unless it states the facts as they exist. It is manifest, if this is the rule, that in a trial where there i~ a dispute as to the facts, which can be settled only by the jury,
there would be no room for a hypothetical question. The
very meaning of the word is that it supposes, assumes
something for the time being. Each side, in an issue of
fact, has its theory of what is the true state of the facts,
and assumes that it can prove it to be so to the satisfaction
of the jury, and so assuming, shapes hypothetical questions
to experts accordingly. And such is the correct practice.'' 1
The fact that counsel make an error in their assumption,
does not render the question objectionable, if it is within the
possible or probable range of the evidence. 2 But the testimony should tend to establish every supposed fact embraced
in the question. 3 For if the hypothetical question is clearly
exaggerated and unwarranted by any testimony in the case,
an objection to it will be sustained. 4 As declared in the
Supreme Court of Michigan, counsel should not be, permitted to embrace in a hypothetical question" anything not
proved or offered to be proved.'' 5 And if it turns out th3:t
the question includes circumstances "hich are neither
proved, nor as to which there is any tendency of proof,
then the court is _to instruct the jury to disregard the opinion based upon it. 6 But where there is any evidence tending to prove the facts assumed, it is for the jury to weigh
See to the same effect Davis v. 8tate, 35 Ind. 496; Guetig v. State, 66
Ind 94; Filer v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 42; Carpenter v.
Blake, 2 Lans. (N. Y.) 206.
2 Harnett v. Garvey, 66 N. Y. 641; Nave v. Tucker, 70 Ind. 15.
3 Bomgardner v. Andrews, 55 Iowa 638; Hathaway s Admr. y. National
Life fos. Co.~ 48 Vt. 335; Hurst v. The C.R. I.&. P.R. Co., 49 Iowa,
76; Gueting v. State, 66 Incl. 94; Daniells v. Aldrich, 42 Mich. 58; Dillebar v. Home Life Ins. Co. (N. Y. Ct. of App., Nov. 1881), 14 Cent. L.
J.158.
• Williams·v. Brown, 28 Ohio St. 547, 551, 552; Muldowney v. illinois
Centra~ R.R. Co., 39 Iowa, 615; Dicki.e v. Vanbleck, 5 Redf. (N. Y.)
284, 294.
5 Fraser v. Jennison,42 Mich. 206, 227.
6 CommoHwealth v . .Mullins, 2 Allen (Mas.,. .) 296; Gneting· -v. State, 66
Ind. 94; Hovey v. Chase, 52 Me. 304..
1

EXAMINATION OF EXPERT WITNESSES. 41

EXAl\UNATIO:X OF EXPERT WITNESSES.

41

the evidence, and determine whether the supposed facts so

stated actually correspond with the facts as proved. 1 The

opinion of an expert cannot be considered of material value,

unless the hypothetical case put to him is fully sustained by

the evidence ; but an exception to the rule arises where the

hypothetical case is susceptible of division, and a part of it

only is sustained by the evidence. 2 In putting the hypo-

thetical case the facts of the actual case should be fairly

represented. 3

2G. The Hypothetical Question The Subject Con-

tinued. Tt is to be noted, however, that if there is no

dispute as to the facts on which the expert is to base his

opinion, it is proper to require that the question to the

expert shall embrace all the facts, and that the witness shall

take them all into consideration. 4 The doctrine as to the

proper form of the hypothetical question, has been very

ably set forth by the Supreme Court of Vermont in an

opinion, from which we quote as follows : "A study of the

various cases will show that the form of the question is

modified and shaped by the courts ; whether it states facts,
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or puts facts hypotheticallv, or refers to the testimony of

witnesses as being true, so as to give the witness no occasion

or opportunity to decide upon the evidence, or mingle his

own opinion of the facts, as shown by the evidence, with

the facts upon which he is to express a professional opinion.

This is the important point, and to secure this, various

forms of inquiry have been adopted. Hypothetical ques-

tions may be so put as to require the witness to decide upon

the evidence, to determine which side preponderates, and to

h'nd conclusions from the evidence, in order to reconcile

connicting facts. Such questions, though hypothetical, are

as clearly improper as if they direct!}' sought the opinion

of the witness on the merits of the case. Hence, in framing

1 Boardman v. Woodman, 47 X. II. 120, 135; Lake v. People, 1 Par-

ker's Cr. Cas. 495; People v. Thurston. 2 Parker's Cr. Cue. 49.

2 Eggers v. Eggers, 57 Ind. 461.

3 Stuart v. State, 57 Tenn. 178. 189.

^ Davis v. State. 35 Ind. 496.

the evidence, and determine whether the supposed facts so
stated actually correspond with the facts as proved. 1 The
opinion of an expert cannot be considered of material value,
unless the hypothetical case put to hjm is fully su tained by
the evidence; but an exception to the rule ari~es where the
hypothetieal case is susceptible of division, and a part of it
only is sustained by the evidence. 2 In putting the hypo.thetical case the fact. of the actual case should be fairly
represented. 3
§ 26. Tile Hypothetical Question-The Subject Continued. -·It is to be noted, however, that if there is no
dispute as to the facts on \vhich the expert is to base his
opinion , it is proper to require that the question to the
expert shall embrace all the facts, and that the witness shall
take them all into consideratioa. 4 The doctrine as to the
proper form of the hypothetical question, has been very
ably set forth by the Supreme Court of Vermont in an
opinion, from which we quote as follows: "A study of the
various cases will show that the form of the que tion is
modified and shaped by the courts; whether it states facts,
or puts facts hypothetically, or refers to the testimony of
witnesses as being true, so as to give the witness no occasion
01· opportunity to decide upon the evidence, or mingle his
own opinion of the facts, as shown by the evidence, with
the facts upon which he is to express a professional opinion . .
'I'his is the important · point, and to secure this, various
forms of inquiry have been adopted. Hypothetical questions may he so put a ~ to require the witness to decide up<!n
the evidence, to determine which side preponderates, and to
find conclusions from the evidence, in order to reconcile
contlicting facts. Such questions, though hypothetical, are
~s c~early improper as if they directly sought the opinion
of the witness on the merits of the case. Hence, in framing
. I Boardman v. w·oodman, 47 x. ll. 120, 135; Lake v. People, 1 Parl.;n's Cr. Ca . 495; People v. Thurston, 2 Parker· Cr. Ca~. 4~ .
2 Eggers v . Eggers, 57 Ind. 461.
s titnart v. State, 57 Tenn. 178, 1 9.
4 D a · i~ v. Stnte. 35 Ind. 496.
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such questions, care should be taken not to involve so much,

or so many facts in them, that the witness will be obliged

in his own mind to settle other disputed facts, in order to

give his answer. * l In some cases, all the facts bearimr

on the issue might be summed up in a single question. But

when facts on one side conflict with facts on the other, they

ought not to be incorporated into one question, but the

attention of the witness should be called to their opposing"

tendencies, and if his skill or knowledge can furnish the

explanation which harmonizes them, he is at liberty to state

it. Then the jury can know all the facts and grounds on

which the opinion is based." 1 It is not always necessary

that a hypothetical question should be asked in a formal

manner. Where a medical expert had read the deposition

of the plaintiff, detailing minutely the injuries and bodily

condition claimed to have resulted to him from an injury

which he related, it was held proper to ask him " from the

knowledge gained by reading the deposition," his opinion

as to the plaintiff's condition at the time the deposition was

made, and as to the cause of that condition. The court
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said that where an expert heard or read the evidence, there

was no reason why he might not form as correct a judg-

ment based upon such evidence, assuming it to be true, as

if the same evidence had been submitted to him in the form

of hypothetical questions, and that it would be an idle and

useless ceremony to require evidence with which he was

already familiar, to be repeated to him in that form. 2 It

has been held proper to ask the expert, " supposing the

testimony of the witness to be truthful," what is your

opinion ? 3 This is said to be a convenient mode of stating

a hypothetical case, permissible in the discretion of the

court. 4 In a recent case in Texas, where the opinion of an

expert was asked on the testimony of one of the witnesses,

1 Fairchild v. Bascomb, 35 Vt. 415.

2 Oilman v. Town of Strafford, 50 Vt. 726.

3 Wright v. Hardy, 22 \Vis. 348. But see Hagadorn v. Connecticut

Mutual Life Ins. Co., 29 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 251.

4 State v. Lautenschlager, 22 Minn. 521 ; Getehell v. Hill, 21 Minn. 464.

such question.;;; care should be taken not to involve so much,
or so many facts in them, that the witness will be obliged
in his own mind to settle other disputed facts, in order to
give ~is answer. * * In some cases, all the facts bearing
on the issue might be summed up in a single question. But
when facts on one side conflict with facts on the other, they
ought not to be incorporated into one question, but the
attention of the witness should be called to their opposing
tendencies, and if his skill or knowledge can furnish the
explanation which harmonizes them, he is at liberty to state
it. Thell' the jury can know all the facts and grounds on
which the opinion is based." 1 It is not always necessary
that a hypothetical question should be asked in a formal
manner. Where a medical expert had read the deposition
of the plaintiff, detailing minutely the injuries and bodily
condition claimed to have resulted to him from an injury
which he related, it was held proper to ask him "from the
knowledge gained by reading the deposition," his opinion
as to the plaintiff's condition at the time the deposition wa&
made, and as to the cause of that condition . The court
said that where an expert heard or read the evidence, there
was no reason why he might not form as correct a judg-·
ment based upon such evidence, assuming it to be true, as
if the same evidence had been suhmitted to him in the form
of hypothetical questions, and that it would be an idle and
useless ceremony to require evidence with which he wa.
already familiar, to he repeated to him in that form .2 It
has been held proper to ask the expert, '' supposing the
testimony of the "·itness to be truthful," what is your
opinion? 3 This is said to be a convenient mode of stating~
a hypothetical case, permissible in the discretion of the
court. 4 In a recent case in Texas, where the opinion of an
expert was asked on the te8timony of one o_f the witnesses,
Fairchild v. Ba comb, 35 V t. 415.
Gilman v. Town of Strafford, 50 Vt. 726.
'Wright v. Hardy, 22 Wis. 348. But see Hagauorn v. Con necticut
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 29 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 251.
•State v. Lautenscblager 22 Minn. 521; Getchell v. Hill, 21 ~Iinn. 464.
I
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the Court of Appeals declared that an opinion could not be

predicated on anything less than the entire testimony,

whether actually or hypothetically presented. 1 And it ha&

been said that the advantage of the usual hypothetical

question, including the substance of the whole testimony r

is so great, that it should only be sacrificed when the cir-

cumstances of the case plainly call for it. 2 The hypothesis

should be clearly stated, so that the jury may know with

certainty upon precisely what state of facts the expert bases

his opinion. 3 We give in the note below an illustration of

the hypothetical question, the question being the one pro-

pounded by the defence to the experts in the trial of

Guiteau, 4 that propounded by the prosecution in the same

case, being of too great length to permit of its reproduction

in these pages.

27. When Questions need not be Hypothetical.

There are two exceptions to the general rule requiring that

1 Webb v. State, 9 Texas Ct. of App. 490.

2 Haggerty v. Brooklyn etc. R. R. Co., 61 N. Y. 624.

3 McMechen v. McMechen, 17 W. Va. 683, 698.
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4 Q. Assuming it to be a fact that there was a strong hereditary taint

of insanity in the blood of the prisoner at the bar; also that at about the

age of thirty-five years his own mind was so much deranged that he was

a fit subject to be sent to an insane asylum; also that at different times

after that date during the next succeeding five years, he manifested such

decided symptons of insanity, without simulation, that many different

persons conversing with him and observing his conduct, believed him

to be insane; also that in or about the month of June, 1881, at or about

the Court of Appeals declared that an opinion could not be
predicated on anything less thari the entire testimony ,
whether actually or hypothetically presented. 1 And it ha
been said that the advantage of the usual hypothetical
question, including the substance of the whole testimony ,.
is so great, that it should only be sacrificed when the circumstances of the case plainly call for it. 2 The hypothesis·
should be clearly stated, so that the jury may know with
certainty upon precisely what state of facts the expert bases
his opinion. 3 We give in the note below an illustration of
the hypothetical question, the question being the one propounded by the defence to the experts in the trial of
Guiteau ,4 that propounded by the prosecution in the same
case, being of too great length to permit of its reproduction
in these pages.
§ 27. When Questions need not be Hypotpetical.There are two exceptions to the general rule requiring that

the expiration of said term of five years, he became demented by the

idea that he was inspired of God to remove by death the President of the

United States; also that he acted on what he believed to be such inspira-

tion, and as he believed to be in accordance with the Divine will in the

preparation for. and in the accomplishment of such a purpose; also that

he committed the act of shooting the President under what he believed

to be a Divine command which he was not at liberty to disobey, and

which belief made out a conviction which controlled his conscience and

overpowered his will as to that act, so that he could not resist the mental

pressure upon him : also that immediately after the shooting he appeared

calm and as if relieved by the performance of a great duty; also that

there was no other adequate motive for the act than the conviction that

he was executing the Divine will for the good of his country assuming

all of these propositions to be true, state whether, in your opinion, the

prisoner was sane or insane at the time of shooting President Garfield ?

Webb v. State, 9 Texas Ct. of App. 490.
Haggerty v. Brooklyn etc. R.R. Co., 61 N. Y. 624.
3 McMechen v. McMechen, 17 W. Va. 683, 698.
4 Q. Assuming it to be a fact that there was a strong hereditary tain t
of insanity in the blood of the prisoner at the bar; also that at about the
age of thirty-five yeara his own mind was so much deranged that he was
a fit subject to be sent to an insane asylum; also that at different times
after that date during the next succeeding five years, he manifested such
decided symptons of insanity, without simulation, that many differen t
persons conversing with him anti observing bis conduct, believed him
to be insane; also that in or about the month of June, 1881, at or about
the expiration of said term of five years, he became demented by the
idea that he was inspired of God to remove by death the President of the
United States; also tliat he acted on what be believed to be such inspiration, and as he believed to be in accordance with the Divine will in the
preparation for, and in the accomplishment of such a purpose; also that
he committed the act of shooting the President under what he believed
to be a Divine command which he was not at liberty to disobey, and
which bellef made out a conviction which controlled his conscience and
overpowered his will as to that act, so that he could not resist the mental
pressure upon him: also that immediately after the shoo ting he appeared
calm and as if relieved by the performance of a ~reat duty; also that
there was no other adequate motive for the act than the conviction that
he was executing the Divine will for the good of hia country-assuming
all of these propositions to be true, state whether, in your opinioa, the
prisoner was sane or insane at the time of shooting Pre icleut Garfield?
1

2
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the opinions of experts should be asked upon an assumed

state of facts.

First. A distinction is taken between cases in which there

as a conflict of evidence upon the material facts, and those

in which no such conflict exists. In the former class of

eases the question must be framed hypothetical!} 7 ", but in

the latter class there is no such necessity. 1

Second. It is not necessary to assume a state of facts in

those cases in which the expert is personally acquainted with

the material facts in the case. 2

For instance, a medical witness who has no personal

knowledge of the prisoner, cannot be asked : " From the

facts and circumstances stated by previous witnesses, and

from those testified to by still other witnesses, relating to

the homicide, and from defendant's conduct on the trial, is

it your opinion that the defendant was sane or insane when

he committed the act? * * * But if a physician visits a

person, and from actual examination or observation becomes

acquainted with his mental condition, he may give an opin-

ion respecting such mental condition at that time that is,
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he may, under such circumstances, state to the jury his

opinion as to the sanity or insanity of the person at the time

when he thus observed or examined him." 3 So, where a

medical expert had made a personal examination of the

uterus of a deceased woman, it was proper to ask him,

"What, in your opinion, caused the death of the person

from whom the uterus was taken? " * And an expert hav-

ing personal knowledge of the facts has been permitted to

testify that a machine was constructed in a workmanlike

1 Cincinnati, etc. Mut. Ins. Co. v. May. 20 Ohio, 211, 224; Tefft v. Wil-

cox, 6 Kan. 46; Page v. State, 61 Ala. 16; Woodbuiy v. Obear, 7 Gray,

467; Pidcockv. Potter, 68 Peiin. St. 342; Bishop v. Spining, 38 Ind. 143:

Ouiterman v. Liverpool, etc. Steamship Co., 83 X. Y. 358, 366; State v.

Klinger, 46 Mo. 224; Carpenter v. Blake. 2 Lans. (X. Y.) 206.

2 Bellefontaine, etc. R. R. Co. v. Bailey, 11 Ohio St. 333, 337; Trans-

portation Line v. Hope, 95 U. S. 297, 298; Brown v. Huffard, 69 Mo. 305 ;

Ayres v. Water Commissioners, 29 X. Y. Sup. Ct. 297; Bellinger v. X.

Y. Cent. R. R. Co. 23 X. Y. 42, 46; Dunham's Appeal, 27 Conn. 193.

8 State v. Felter, 25 Iowa, 67, 74, 75, per Dillon, C. J.

4 State v. Glass. 5 Oregon. 73.

the opinions of experts should be asked upon an assumed
state of facts.
First. A distinction is taken between cases in which there
is a conflict of e·vidence upon the material facts, and those
in which no Ruch conflict exists. In the former class of
-cases the question must be framed hypothetically, but in
the latter class there is no such necessity .1
Second. It is not necessary to assume a state of facts in
those cases in which the expert is personally acquainted with
the material facts in the case. 2
For instance, a medical witness who has no personal
knowledge of the prisoner, cannot be asked: "From the
facts and circumstances stated by previous witnesses, and
from those testified to by still other witnesses, relating to
the homicide, and from defendant's conduct on the trial, is
it your opinion that the defendant was sane or insane when
he committed the act? * * * But if a physician visits a
person, and from actual examination or observation becomes
acquainted with his mental condition, he may give an _opinion respecting such mental condition at that time -that is,
he may, under such circumstances, state to the jury his
opinion as to the sanity or insanity of the per::;on at the time
when he thus observed or examined him." a So, where a
medical expert had ma<le a personal examination of the
uterus ~f , a deceased woman, it was proper to ask him,
'' What, in your opinion, caused the death of the person
from whom the uterus was taken? '' 4 Aud an expert having personal knowledge of the .facts has been permitted to
testify that a machine was constructed in a workmanlike
Cincinnati, etc. Mut. Ins. Co. v. May, 20 Ohio, 211, 224; Tefft v. WU6 Kan. 46; Page v. State, 61 Ala. 16; Woodbury v. Obear, 7 Gray,
467; Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Peµn. St. 342; Bishop v. Spining 3 Ind. 143;
Guiterman v. Liverpool. etc. Steamship Co., 83 N. Y. 358, 366; State v.
Klinger 46 Mo. 224; Carpenter v. Blake. 2 Lan~ (N. Y.) 206.
2 Bellefontaine, etc. R.R. Co. v . Bailey, 11 Ohio St. 333, 337; Tran portation Line v. Hope, 95 U.S. 297, 298; Brown v. Huffard, 69 Mo. 305;
Ayres v. "\iVater Commissioners, 29 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 297; Bellinger v. N.
Y. Cent. R.R. Co. 23 N. Y. 42, 46; Dunham s .Appeal, 27 Conn. 193.
a State v. Felter, 25 Iowa, 67, 74, 75 per Dillon, C. J.
~State v. Glass, 5 Oregon! 13.
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manner ; l that a wall was properly and compactly con-

45

structed ; 2 that the abutments of a bridge were properly and

skillfully placed, and sufficient to discharge water in time of

flood ; 3 that an article was properly stowed in a vessel. 4

In relation to this subject we cannot do better than

quote from the opinion of Lord Chief Justice TINDAL, de-

livered in the House of Lords, in the celebrated McNagh-

ten case : " The question lastly proposed by your Lordships

is : ' Can a medical man conversant with the disease of

insanity, who never saw the prisoner previous to the trial,,

but who was present during the whole trial and the exam-

ination of all the witnesses, be asked his opinion as to the

state of the prisoner's mind at the time of the commission

of the alleged crime, or his opinion whether the prisoner

was conscious at the time of doing the act that he was act-

ing contrary to law, or whether he was laboring under any

and what delusion at the time ? ' In answer thereto, we

state to your Lordships, that we think the medical man,

under the circumstances supposed, cannot in strictness be

asked his opinion in the terms above stated, because each
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of those questions involves the determination of the truth

of the facts deposed to, which it is for the jury to decide,

and the questions are not mere questions upon a matter of

science, in which case such evidence is admissible. But

where the facts are admitted or not disputed, and the ques-

tion becomes substantially one of science only, it may be

convenient to allow the question to be put in that general

form, though the same cannot be insisted on as matter of

right." 5 Whenever a hypothetical question is put in such

a form that the answer to it depends on what the recollec-

tions and impressions of the witness are as to the evidence

1 Cnrtis v. Gano, 26 N. Y. 426.

2 Pullman v. Corning, 9 N. Y. 93.

3 Couhoctoii Stone Road Co. v. Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie K. R. Co., 10 X.

Y. 523.

* Price v. Powelh 3 N. Y. 322.

510C1. &Fin. 200, 211.

manner; 1 that a wall was properly and compactly constructed; 2 that the abutments of a bridge were properly aml
skillfully placed, and sufficient to discharge water in time of
flood ; 3 that an article was properly stowed in a vessel.~
In relation to this subject we cannot do better than
quote from the opinion of Lord Chief Justice TINDAL, deliver.e d in the House of Lords, in the celebrated ~foNagh
ten case: '' The question lastly proposed by your Lordships
is: ' Can a medical man conversant with the disease of
irnmnity, who never saw the prisoner previous to the trial,.
but who was present during the whole trial and the examination of all the witnesses, be asked his opinion as to the
state of the prisoner's mind at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, or his opinion whether the prisoner
was conscious at ~be time of doing the act that he was acting contrary to law, or whether he was laboring under any
and what delusion at the time?' In answer thereto, we
stat~ to your Lordships, that we think the medical man,
under the circumstances supposed, cannot in strictness be
asked his opinion in the terms above stated, because each
of those questions involves the determination of the truth
of the facts deposed to, which it is for the jury to decide,
and the questions are not mere questions upon a matter of
science, in which case such evidence is admissible. Bu.t
where the facts are admitted or not disputed, and the question becomes substantially one of science only, it may be
convenient to allow the question to be put in that general
form, though the same cannot be insisted on as matter of
right.'' 5 Whenever a hypothetical question is put in such
a. form that the answer to it depends on what the recollections and impressions of the witness are as to the evidence
Curtis v. Gano, 26 N . Y. 426.
Pullm:.tn v. Corning, 9 N. Y. 93.
3 Conhocton Stone Road Co. v. B uffalo, N . Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 10 ... r.
Y . 523 .
4 Price v. Powell~ 3 N . Y. 322.
5 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 211.
1
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which he has heard, it is improper, and goes beyond the

limits of questions to experts. 1

It may be remarked as well in this connection as any

other, that answers to hypothetical questions are not objec-

tionable because they include considerations not referred to

in the questions, as constituting the basis of the opinion

given, and such as the testimony tends to prove, and as

might properly have been included in the questions.' 2

28. The Hypothetical Question on the Cross-exam-

ination. After counsel have propounded to an expert a

hypothetical question, based on the facts assumed to have

been proved in accordance with their theory of the case,

opposing counsel may propound the same question to the

same witness based on the facts assumed in the opposing

theory. 3 In the case cited, the court below had sustained

an objection to such method of examination, on the ground

that it was not legitimate cross-examination. This ruling

was reversed on appeal, the court expressing itself as fol-

lows : " We think that when such a witness has expressed

an opinion based on facts assumed by the party introducing
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him to have been proved, or upon a hypothetical case put

by such party, the Other party may cross-examine him by

taking his opinion based on any other set of facts assumed

by him to have been proved by the evidence, or upon a hy-

pothetical case put to him."

Upon the trial of a person indicted for murder, where

the defence was insanity, it was held no error to require the

defendant to submit his hypothetical case to his profes-

sional witnesses, before the rebutting evidence of the State

was heard on the question of sanity. The court declaring

that if evidence materially varying the hypothetical case

was afterwards introduced, the defendant must ask leave to

re-examine as to new matter. 4

1 Hagadorn v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 29 1ST. Y. Sup. Ct. 251.

2 Hathaway 's Admr. v. National Life Ins. Co., 48 Vt. 335.

3 Davis v. State, 35 Ind. 496.

A Dove v. State, 52 Tenn. 348.

which he has heard, it is improper, and goes beyond the
limits of questions to experts. 1
It may be remarked as well in this connection as any
other, that answers to hypothetical questions are not obj~c
tionable because they include considerations not referred to
in the questions, as constituting the basis of the opinion
given, and such as the testimony tends to prove, and as
might properly have been included in the que3tions. 2
§ 28. The Hypothetical Question on the Cross-exam.i nation.-After counsel have propounded to _an expert a
hypothetical question, based on the facts assumed to have
been proved in accordance with their theory of the case,
.o pposing counsel may propound the same question to the
same witness based on the facts assumed in the opposing
theory .a In the case cited, the court below had sustained
an objection to such method of examination, on the ground
that it was not legitimate cross-examination. This ruling
was reversed on appeal, the court expressing itself as follows: "We think that when such a witness has expressed
an opinion based on facts assumed by the party introducing
him to have been proved, or upon a hypothetical case put
by such party, the other party may cross-examine him by
taking his opinion based on any other set of facts assumed
by him to have been proved by the evidence, or upon a hypothetical case l])Ut to him.''
.
Upon the trial of a -person indicted for murder, where
the defence was insa_nity, it was held no error to require the
·d efendant to submit his hypothetical case to his professional witnesses, before the rebutting evidence of the State
was heard on the question of sanity . The court declaring
that if evidence materially varying the hypothetical case
was afterwards introduced, the defendant must ask leave to
re-examine as to new matter. 4
1

Hagadorn v. Connecticut :Mutual Life Ins. Co., 29 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 251.
Hathaway's Admr. v. National Life Ins. Co., 48 Vt. 335.
3 Davis v. State, 35 Incl. 496.
4 'Dove v. State, 52 Tenn. 348.
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47

tions of Law. It is not proper to so frame a question to

an expert as. to call for an expression of an opinion as to

§ 29. Questions to Experts shoulcl not Embrace Ques-

the law of the case. For instance, it is improper to ask a

medical expert whether a person possessed sufficient mental

capacity to enable him to make a will. 1 The question should

l>e so framed as to require him to state the degree of intel-

ligence or imbecility of the person, in the best way he can,

by the use of such ordinary terms as will best convey his

own ideas of the matter. 2 Or the witness may be asked

whether the testator's mind and memory were sufficiently

sound to enable him to know and understand the business

in which he was engaged at the time he executed the will. 3

30. Questions to Experts as to Particular Cases.

While the opinion of experts may be based on their obser-

vation and experience in similar cases, yet the principle is

well settled that such witnesses cannot, on their direct ex-

amination, be questioned concerning the particular cases

which have happened to come within their observation, and

which have no connection with the case in hand. 4 The rea-
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son for the rule is manifestly to prevent the introduction of

innumerable side issues, which might render the trial of a

cause interminable, distract the attention, of the jury from

the real issue, and render the costs in the case unnecessarily

burdensome and enormous. Different experts might have

different theories, and each theory might be founded on the

observance of several and distinct cases, each of which the

opposite party would have a right to controvert. And inas-

much as a party would be unable to anticipate the cases

which the experts on the other side would mention, he

1 Farrell v. Brenuan, 32 Mo. 328; McClintock v. Card, 32 Mo. 411;

May v. Bradlee,127 Mass. 414; Gibson v. Gibson, 9 Yerg. 329; White v.

Bailey, 10 Mich. 135.

2 Fairchild v. Bascomb, 35 Vt, 416, 417; State v. Ilayden, 51 Vt. 304;

Crowell v. Kirk 3 Dev. (X. C.) 358.

3 McClintock v. Card, 32 Mo. 411.

* 1 Greenl. Ev. 448; Clark v. Willett, 35 Cal. 534, 544; Central Pacific

R. R. Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247; Jonan v. Ferrand, 3 Rob. (La.) 3GG;

Home v. Williams 12 Intl. 324.

tions of Law.-It is not proper to so frame a question to

an e}i..i>ert a~ to call for an expression of an opinion as to
the law of the case. :For instance, it is improper to ask a
medical expert whether a person possessed sufficient mental
capacity to enable him to make a will. 1 The question should
be so framed as to require him to state the degree of intelligence or imbecility of the person, in the best wuy he can,
by the use of such ordinary terms as will best convey his
own ideas of the matter. 2 Or the witness may be asked
whether the testator's mind and memory. were sufficiently
sound to enable him to know and understand the business
in which he was engaged at the time he executed the will. 3
§ 30. Questions to E~'l>erts as to Particular Cases."~hi le the opinion of experts may be bused on their observation and experience in similar cases, yet the principle is
well settled that such witnesses cannot, on their direct examination , be questioned concerning the particular cases
which have happened to come within their observation, and
which ha.ve no connection with the case in hand. 4 The reason for the rule is manifestly to prevent the introduction of
innumerable side issues, which might render the trial of a
cause interminable, distract the attentio1 of the jury from
the real issue, and render the costs in the case unnecessarily
burdensome and enormous. Different experts might have
different theories) and each theory might be founded on the
observance of several and distinct cases, each of which the
01 posite party would have a right to controvert. And inasmuch as a party would be unable to anticipate the cases
which the experts on the other side would mention, he
1 Farrell v. Brennan, 32 Mo. 328; 1\IcClintock v . Card, 32 Mo. 411;
)fay v. Bracllee, 1271\fass. -±14; Gibson v. Gibson, 9 Yerg. 329; White v.

Bailey, 10 )Iich. 155.
2 Fairchild v. Bascomb, 35 Vt. 416, 417; State v. Ifayden, 51 Vt. 30J;
Crowell v. Kirk 3 Dev. (N" . C.) 3::> .
3 McClintock v. Card, 32 Mo. 4Jl.
4
1 Greenl. Ev. § 448; Clark v. Willett, 35 Cal. 534, 5-14; Central Pacific
R. R. Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247; Jonn.n v. Ferrand, 3 Rob. (La.) 3G6;
H orne v. William 12 Intl. 32.J..
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would be unable to prepare for their investigation, and

would, therefore, be unable to properly avail himself of his

right to controvert them.

31. An Expert cannot l>e Asked for an Opinion OR

Facts not Stated. An expert, testifying from personal

knowledge, cannot be asked for an opinion based on facts

which he has not given in evidence. He should be first asked

as to the facts, and then allowed to state his opinion. This

is necessary to enable the correctness of the opinion ex-

pressed to be tested by calling other experts, and obtaining

their opinion upon the same state of facts. It is equally

necessary to enable the jury to have the means of deter-

mining whether the facts upon which the opinion is predi-

cated, were correct or not. Hence it has been held improper

to ask a physician " whether a person \vas in good health,

and free from any symptoms of disease," he not having

testified to any facts from which it could be seen upon

what his opinion was based. 1 For the same reason the fol-

lowing question has been held improper : " From what you

found at the time, in the examination of her, from your
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knowledge of her during the] years previous, and from the

symptoms whichjyou observed at that time, paralysis or

trouble with her limbs, and the other difficulties under

which she is laboring, what in your opinion produced the

condition that you then found her in ? ' ' 2 So it has been held

improper to ask experts who saw a railroad accident,

whether, in their opinion after having seen the accident,

anything could have been done by the conductor to pre-

vent it ? It called for an opinion not derived from the tes-

timony, but simply what was seen at the time of the occur-

rence. 3

The opinion of an expert is inadmissible if based on facts

which he has heard outside the court room, and which he

believes to be credible. 4 An exception exists in the case

1 Eeidv. Piedmont, etc. Life Ins. Co., 58 Mo. 425.

2 Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 120.

3 Haggerty v. Brooklyn, etc. K. E. Co., 61 N. Y. 624.

< Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117, 124 ; Baltimore, etc. K. K. Co. v. Shipley..

39 Md. 251.

would be unable to prepare for their investigation, and ·
would, therefore, be unable to properly avail himself of hi&
1·ight to controvert them.
§ 31. An Expert cannot be Asked for an Opini~n on
Facts not Stated.-An expert, testifying from personal
knowledge, cannot be asked for an opinion based on facts.
which he has not given in evidence. He should be first asked
as to the facts, and then allowed to state his opinion. Thi"'
i~ necessary to enable the correctness of the opinion expressed to be tested by calling other experts, and obtaining
their opinion upou the same state of facts. It is equally
necessary tb enable the jury to have the means of determining whether the facts upon which the opinion is predicated, were correct or not. Hence it has been held improper
to ask a physician " whether a person was in good health,
and free from any symptoms of disease," he not having
testi:Ued to any facts from which it ·could be seen upon
what his opinion was based. 1 For the same reason the following question has been held improper : " From what you
fouud at the time, in the examjnation of her, from your
knowledge of her during the}years previous, and from thesymptoms whichfyou observed at that time , paralysis ortrouble with her limbs, and the other difficulties under
which she is . laboring, what in your opinion produced the·
condition ~hat you then found her in? '' 2 So it has been held•
improper to ask experts who saw a railroad accident,.
whether, in their opinion after having seen the accident,
anything could have been done by the conductor to pre-vent it? It called for an opinion not derived from the testimony, but simply what was seen at the time of the occ~r- '
rence. 3
The opinion of an expert is inadmissible if based on facts. '
which he has heard outside the court room , and which he·
believes to be credible. 4 An exception exists in the case
1

Reid v. Piedmont, etc. Life Ins. Co., 58 Mo . 425.
Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 120.
3 Haggertyv. Brooklyn, etc. R . R . Co., 61 N . Y . 624.
4 Polk v. State, 136 Ark. 117, 124; Baltimore, etc. R . R. Co. v. Shipley,.
39 Md. 251. .
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of physicians whose testimony is based in part on declara-

tions of patients, but that is elsewhere considered. 1

32. Latitude of Inquiry in the Examination of Ex-

perts. The rule is laid down that in the examination of

experts, considerable latitude of inquiry is to be indulged,

and that counsel are not to be limited by any narrow or

stringent rules, either in obtaining their opinions upon the

facts disclosed, or in ascertaining their skill and compe-

tency, or the want of them. 2 " There must be some limit

to such an inquiry, and from the nature of the case, no

definite limit can be prescribed as a rule of law. The court

ought to permit the inquiry to proceed far enough to enable

the jury to judge of the reasonableness of the witness' pre-

tentious to skill, so far as such an inquiry can afford the

means." 3 But it is to be observed that after a witness has

been admitted to testify as an expert, evidence cannot be

given to the jury of the opinion of other experts in the same

science, that the witness was qualified to draw correct con-

clusions on the science on which he had been examined, 4

the general rule being, that after such a witness has been
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adjudged competent by the court, his reputation can only

be sustained after it has been impeached. 5 Any different

rule, it has been said, " would lead to anything but a satis-

factory result. Another witness might then be called to

give his opinion as to the capacity of him just examined, to

form a correct opinion on the degree of weight which was

due to the testimony of the first, and so on. The jury are

to judge of the weight due to the opinion of medical men

on the disease, from the facts detailed by them, and the

reasons given in support of their conclusions, not from the

opinion others may form of their capacity." 6 It has been

held competent, however, for one expert to testify as to the

1 47 48.

2 Leopold v. Vim Kirk, 29 Wis. 548, 555; Brown v. Chenoworth, 51

Tex. 469.

3 Andre v. Hardin, 32 Mich. 326.

* Tullis v. Kidd, 12 Ala. 648.

5 De Phul v. State, 44 Ala. 39.

Brabo v. Martin, 3 La. It. 177.

(4)

of physicians whose testimony is based in part on declarations of patients, but that is elsewhere considered. 1
§ 32. Latitude of Inquiry in the Examination of Experts.-The rule is laid down that in the examination of
experts, considerable latitude of inquiry is to be indulged,
and that counsel are not to be limited by any narrow or
stringent rules, either in obtaining their opinions upon the
facts disclosed, or in ascertaining their skill and competency, or the want of them. 2 ' ' There must be some limit
to such an inquiry' and from the nature of the case, no
definite limit can be prescribed as a rule of law. The court
ought to permit the inquiry to proceed far enough to enable
the jury to judge of the reasonableness of the witness' pretentious to skill, so far as such an inquiry can afford the
means. " 3 But it is to be observed that after a witness has
been admitted to testify as an expHt, evidence cannot be
given to the jury of the opinion of other experts in the same
science, that the witness was qualified to draw correct conclusions on the science on which he had been examined,t
the general rule being, that after such a witness has been
adjudged competent by the court, bis reputation can only
l>e sustained after it has been impeached/> Any different
rule, it has been said, '' would· lead to anything but a satisfactory result. Another witness might then be called to
give his opinion us to the capacity of him just examined, to
form a correct opinion on the degree of weight which was
due to the testimony of the first, and so on. The jury are
to judge of the weight due to the opinion of medical men
on the disease, from the fa0ts detailed by them, and the
reasons given in support of their conclusions, not from the
opinion others may form of their capacity." 6 It bas been
held competent, however, for one expert to testify as to the
1

§§ 47 48.
Leopold v. Van Kirk, 29 Wis. 548, 555; Brown v. Chenoworth, 51
T ex . 469 .
a Andre v. Hanlin, 32 Mich. 326.
4 Tullis v. Kidd, 12 Ala.. 64 .
5 De Phul v. State,-!-! Ala. 39.
6 Brnbo v. Martin, 3 La. R. 177.
(4)
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skill of another, where the knowledge of the witness was

derived from personal observation, as distinguished from

an opinion based on such expert's general reputation. 1 In

the case cited, one expert was allowed to testify as to the

correctness of the tests used by another expert in testing

for arsenic. A witness called as an expert cannot be asked

on cross-examination whether he considers himself as good

a judge of the matter in dispute, as other witnesses who

have testified as experts, for the reason that such a question

is simply an attempt to get the opinion of the witness as to

the value of the testimony of the experts on the other side. 2

When a witness has been adjudged competent upon the

preliminary examination, opposing proof going to his in-

competency is to be addressed to the jury to affect the

value of his testimony, and not to the court for the purpose

of excluding his opinion. 3 And it has been held, therefore,

no ground for objection, that counsel was not permitted on

the preliminary examination of the expert, to cross-examine

him for the purpose of testing his competency, he having

an opportunity on the cross-examination in chief to test and
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impeach his skill, 4 for the extent of an expert's acquaint-

ance with the subject matter, may always be inquired into,

to enable the jury to estimate its weight, 5 and counsel have

a right in every case to the reasons upon which the opinion

of the expert is based. 6 In an early case in Massachusetts,

the depositions of medical experts on the question of a

person's sanity, were rejected because the experts did not

state the reasons for their opinion. 7 " Whenever the

opinion of any living person is deemed to be relevant, the

grounds on which such opinion is based are also deemed to

1 Laros v. Commonwealth, 84 Fenn. St. 200, 209.

* Haverhill Loan etc. Ass. v. Cronin, 4 Allen (Mass.) 141.

* Washington v. Cole, 6 Ala. 212.

4 Sari v. Arnold, 7 R. I. 586.

5 Davis v. State, 35 Ind. 496.

6 State v. Hooper, 2 Bailey (S. C.; Law, 37; Fairchikl v. Bascomb, 35

Vt. 398, 406; Lincoln v. Taunton Manufacturing Co., 9 Allen, (Mass.)

182, 191, 192; Keith v. Lothrop, 10 Cash. (Mass.) 457; In re Springer,

4 Penn. Law J. 275; Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cash. (Mass.) 295.

7 Dickinson v. Barber, 9 Mass. 218.

skill of another, where the knowledge of the witness was
derived from personal observation, as distinguished from
an opinion based on such expert's general reputation. 1 In
the case cited, ~me expert was allowed to testify as to the
correctness of the tests used by another expert in testing
for arsenic. A witness called as an expert cannot be asked
on cross-examination whether he considers ·himself as good
a judge of the matter in dispute, as other witnesses who
have testified as experts,. for the reason that such a question
is simply an attempt to get the opinion of the witness as to
the value of the testimony of the experts on the other side. 2
V\"'hen a witness has been adjudged competent upon the
preliminary examination, opposing proof going to his incompetency is to be addressed to the jury to affect the ·
value of his testimony, and not to the court for the purpose
of excluding his opinion. 3 And it has been held, therefore,
no ground for objection, that counsel wits not permitted on
the preliminary examination of the expert, to cross-examine
him for the purpose of testing his competency, he having
an opportunity on the cross-examination in chief to test and
impeach his skill, 4 for the extent of an expert's acquaintance with the subject matter, may always be inquired into,
to enable the jury to estimate its weight,5 and counsel have
a right in every case to the reasons upon which the opinion
of the expert is based. 6 In an early case in :Massachusetts ,
the depositions of medical experts on the question of a
person's sanity, were rejected because the experts did not
state the reasons for their opinion. 7 "Whenever the
. opinion of any living person is deemed to be relevant, the
grounds on which such opinion is based are also deemed to
Laros v . Commonwealth, 84 Penn. St. 200, 209.
Haverhill Loan etc. Ass. v. Cronin, 4 Allen (Mass.)141.
3 Washington v. Cole, 6 Ala. ~12.
4 Sarl v. Arnold, 7 R. I. 586.
5 Davis v. State, 35 Ind. 496.
6 State v. Hooper, 2 Bailey (S . C.j Law, 37; Fairchild v. Bascomb, 35
Vt. 398, 406; Lincoln v. Taunton Manufacturing Co., 9 Allen, (Mass.)
182, 191, 192; Keith v. Lothrop, 10 Cush . (Mass .) 457; In re Springer,
4 Penn. Law J. 275; Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cnsh . (Mass .) 295.
7 Dickinson v. Barber, 9 :Mass. 218.
'
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be relevant." 1 Neither judge nor jury can know what

51

credence to give to a mere opinion, unless the reasons on

which it is founded are set forth. The opinion of an expert

may be contradicted, by showing that at another time he

had expressed a different opinion, 2 and he may be asked as

to the grounds upon which the change of his opinion had

been brought about. 3 While the inquiry into the grounds

and reasons of the opinion of an expert is more frequently

made on the cross-examination of the witness, yet there is

no objection to its being made on the direct-examination. 4

Where an expert was called and asked if he concurred in

the statement of another expert witness, and if not, to state

wherein he differed, the court held this method of examina-

tion to be erroneous. " The mode sought to be adopted in

eliciting the opinion of this witness, may have the merit of

being expeditious, but it might be. attended with some un-

fairness toward the witness himself, as well as to the

opposite party. Witnesses called upon to testify profes-

sionally, should be left free to give their own individual

opinion upon the facts involved, unconnected with, and un-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 20:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t71v5cx5m
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

trammeled by the opinions of others who may have been

examined." 5

33. Some General Rules Governing the Examination

of Witnesses. It would be foreign to our purpose to con-

sider in detail those rules of evidence regulating the exami-

nation of witnesses, which are alike applicable to the

examination of professional and non-professional witnesses.

Yet a concise statement of the more important principles to

be observed in such cases, may be found of convenience in

this connection.

I. Evidence should be confined to the points in issue, and

evidence of collateral facts which are incapable of affording

1 Stephen's Dig. of Ev., Art. 54.

2 Sanderson v. Nashua, 44 N. II. 492.

8 People v. Donovan, 43 Cal. 162.

* Dickenson v. Fitchburg, 13 Gray. 546. 557.

5 Home v. Williams. 12 Intl. 324.

be relevant." 1 Neither judge nor jury can know what
credence to give to a mere opinion, unless the reasons on
which it is founded are set forth. The opinion of an expert
may be contradicted, by showing that at another time he
had expressed a different opinion, 2 and he may be asked as
to the grounds upon which the change of his opinion bad
been brought about. 3 vYhile the inquiry into the grounds
and reasons of the opinion of an expert is more frequently
made on the cross-examination of the witness, yet there is
no objection to its being made on the direct-examination. 4
\Vhere an expert was called and asked if be concurred in
the statement of another expert witness, and if not, to state
wherein he differed, the court held this method of examination .to be erroneous. " The mode sought to be adopted in
eliciting the opinion of this witness, may have the merit of
being expeditious, but it might be. attended with some unfairness toward the witness himself, as well as to the
opposite party. 'iVitnesses called upon to testify professionally, should be left free to give their own individual
opinion upon the facts involved, unconnected with, and untrammeled by the opinions of others who may have been
examined." 5
§ 33. Some General Rules Governing the Examination
of "\Vitnesses.-It would be foreign to our purpose to consider in detail those rules of evidence regulating the examination of witnesses, which are alike applicable to the
examination of professional and non-professional witnesses.
Yet a concise statement of the more important principles to
be observed in such cases, may be found of convenience in
this connection.
I. Evidence should be confiued to the points in i8sue, and
evidence of collateral facts which are incapable of affording
Stephen's Dig. of Ev., Art. 54.
Sanderson v. Nashua, 44 N. II. 492.
8 People v. Donovan, 43 Cal. 162.
4 Dickenson v. Fitchbnrg, 13 Gray, 546. 557.
s Horne v. William._. 12 lncl. 32-1.
1
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any reasonable presumption as to the principal matter in

dispute, should not be received. 1

(a) Evidence of collateral facts may, however, be re-

ceived where the question is a matter of science, and where

the facts proved, though not directly in issue, tend to illus-

trate the opinions of scientific witnesses. 2

II. Leading questions should not be asked on the direct,

but may be asked on the cross-examination of a witness. 3

(a) The above rule may be relaxed when made neces-

sary by the complicated nature of the matter concerning

which the witness is interrogated. 4

(6) And the rule does not apply when the witness appears

to be hostile to the party producing him. 5

III. In England the rule is that the examination and

cross-examination of a witness, must relate to the facts in

issue, or relevant or deemed to be relevant thereto, while

the re-examination must be directed to an explanation of

the matters referred to in the cross-examination. 6 But in

this country, the weight of authority is said to be in favor

of confining the cross-examination of the witness to the
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facts testified to in chief. 7

IV. On the cross-examination, a witness may be asked

any question tending, (1) to test his accuracy, veracity or

credibility, or, (2) to shake his credit by injuring his char-

acter. And he may be compelled to answer the same, unless

such answer would tend to criminate himself. 8

V. If, on the cross-examination, a witness is asked a

question which is relevant only in that it may tend to shake

his credit by injuring his character, his answer cannot be

contradicted unless, (1) he has denied facts tending to show

1 1 Taylor Evicl., 316; 1 Greenl. Evid., 52; 1 AVharton'sEvid., 29.

*1 Taylor Evid., 337'.

3 2 Best Evid., 641 ; 1 Greenl. Evid., 434; 1 Wharton's Evid., 499.

* Stephens' Evid., Art. 128; 2 Best Evid., 642.

* 2 Taylor Evid., 1262 A; 1 Greenl. Evid., 435; 1 Wharton's Evid.,

500.

6 Stephens' Evid., Art. 127.

7 1 Greenl. Evid., 415; 1 Wharton's Evid., 529.

8 Stephens' Evid., Art. 129; 1 Wharton's Evid., 5G2.

any reasonable presumption as to the principal matter m
dispute, should not be received. 1
(a) Evidence of collateral facts may, however, be received where the question is a matter of science, and where
the facts proved, though not directly in issue, tend to illustrate the opiuions of scientific witnesses. 2
II. Leading questions should not be asked on the direct,
but may be asked on the cross-examination of a witne&s. 3
(a) The above rule may be r elaxed when made necessary by the complicated nature of the matter concerning
which the witness is interrogated. 4
( b) And the rule does not apply when the witness appears
to be hostile to the party producing him. 5
III. In England
the rule is that the examination and
......
cross...,ex mnination of a witness, must relate to the facts in
:issue, or relevant or deemed to be relevant thereto, while
the re-examination must be directed to an ·explanation of
the matters refefred to in the cross-examination. 6 But in
this country, the weight of authority is said to be in favor
of confining the cross-examination of the witness to the
facts testified to in chief. 7
IV. On the cross-examination, a witness may be asked
any question tending, ( 1) to test his accuracy, veracity or
.credibility, or, ( 2) to shake his credit -by injuring his character. And he may be compelled to answer the same, unless
such answer would tend to criminate himself .8
V. If, on the cross-examination, a witness is asked a
question which is relevant only in that it. may tend to shake
his credit by injuring his character, ~is answer cannot · be
contra.dieted unless, ( 1) he has denied facts tending to show
1 Taylor Evicl., § 31G; 1 Greenl. Evid., § 52; 1 Wharton's Evid., § 29.
1 'l'aylor Evid., § 337•.
3 2 Best Evid., § 6.J:l; 1 Greenl. Evid., § 43:!; 1 Wharton's Evid., § 499.
•Stephens' Evict., At· t.128; 2BestEvid., § 6:!2.
5 2 Taylor Evid., § 1262 A; 1 Greenl. Evid., § 435; 1 Wharton' s Evid.,
§ 500.
6 Stephens Evid., Art. 127.
1 1 Greenl. Evid., § 415; 1 °vVbarton's Evid., § 529.
B Stephens' Evid., Art. 129; 1 Wharton's Evicl., § 5G2.
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that he is not impartial, or, (2) he has been asked and has

denied or refused to answer whether he has been convicted

of some criminal offence. 1

VI. On the cross-examination, a witness may be asked as

to any former statements which he may have made, and which

are inconsistent with his present testimony. If he denies

having made them, they may be proven against him. 2

VII. The court in its discretion, may permit a witness to

be recalled for further examination. If permission is

granted for further examination-in-chief, or further cross-

examination, the parties have the right of further cross-

examination and of further re-examination respectively. 3

VIII. A party is entitled to the cross-examination of a

witness who has been, ( 1 ) examined-in-chief, or, (2) accord-

ing to the English rule, if he has been intentionally sworn. 4

34. Excluding Experts from the Court Room during

the Examination of AVitnesses. The principle is well

settled that the judge, on the application of either party,

may, at his discretion, order a separation of ordinary wit-

nesses, in order that they may be prevented from hearing
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the testimony of the witnesses as given in the court room. 5

And this practice was established at an early period, being

referred to with approbation by Fortescue, in his work De

Laudibus Legum Anglice. 6 It is evident that in the case of

1 Stephens' Evid., Art. 130; 1 Wharton's Evid., 559; 1 Greenl. Evid.,

448, 449.

2 Stephens' Evid., Art. 131 ; 1 Wharton's Evid., 551 ; 1 Greenl. Evid.,

4G2.

3 Stephens' Evid., Art. 126; 1 Wharton's Evid., 572, 575.

< Stephens' Evid., Art. 12G.

5 Selfe v. Isaacson, 1 F. & F. 194; Southey v. Xash. 7 C. & P. 632;

Regina v. Xewman, 3 C. &. K. 260; McLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672; Wilson

v. State, 52 Ala. 299; Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624, 633; People v.

Boscovitch, 20 Cal. 436; Johnson v. State, 2 Ind. G52; Errisman v. Erris-

man, 25 111. 136; Davenport v. Ogg, ISKans. 363; Sartorious v. State, 24

Miss. 602; Dyer v. Morris, 4 Mo. 214; State v. Fitzsimmons, 30 Mo. 236;

State v. Zellers, 7 X. J. L. 220; Laughlin v. State, 18 Ohio, 99; State v.

Salge, 2 Xev. 321; Hopper v. Commonwealth, 6 Gratt. (Va.) 684;

Beuaway v. Conyne, 3 Chand. (Wis.) 214.

6 - ; Et si necessitas exegerit dividantur testes hujus modi, donee ipsi

that he i~ not impartial, or, ( 2) he has been asked and has
denied or refused to answer whether he has heen convicted
of f:ome criminal off ence. 1
VI. On the cross-examination, a witness may uc asked as
to any former statements whi ch he may have made, and which
are inconsistent with his pre ent testimony. If he denies
having made them, they may be proven against him. 2
VII. The cou1t in its discretion, may permit a. witness to
be recalled for further examination.
If permission is
granted for further examination-in-chief, or further crossexamination, the parties have the right of further crossexamination and of further re-examination respectively .3
VIII. A party js entitled to the cross-examination of a
witness who has been, ( 1) examined-in-chief, or, ( 2) according to the English rule, if he has been intentionally sworn .4
§ 34. Excluding Experts from the Court Room dt1ring
the Examination of Witnesses. -The principle is well
settled that the judge, on the application of either party,
may, at his discretion, order a separation of ordinary witnesses, in order that they may be pre'Vented from hearing
the testimony of the witnesses as given in the court room. c
And this practice was established at au early period, being
referred to with approbation by Fortescue, in his work De
Laudibus L egurn Angliw. 6 It is evident that in the case of
Stephens' Evid., Art. 130; 1 Wharton's Evid., § 559; 1 Greenl. Evicl.,

de posuerint quicquid velint, ita quod dictum unius non docebit aut

i

concitabit eorum alinrn ad consimiliter testificandum." C. 26.

§§

.,us, 4-i!).
2

Stephens' Evid., Art. 131; 1 Wharton's Evid., § 551; 1 Green]. Evid.,

§ -iG2 .

Stephens' Evid ., Art. 126; 1 Wharton's Evicl., §§ 572, 575.
Stephens' Evitl., Art. 126.
s Selfe v. Isaacsori, 1 F. & F. 194; Southey v. Xash. 7 C. & P. 632;
Regina v. Xewmau, 3 C. & . K. 2GO; McLean v. State, 16Ala. 672; Wilson
v. State, 52 Ala. 299; Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 62+, 633; People v.
Boscovitch, 20 Cal. 4?.G; Johnson v. State, 2 Ind. 652; Errisman v. Errisrnan, 25 Ill. 136; Davenport v. Ogg, 15 Kans. 363 ;. Sartorious v. State, 24:
:Miss. G02; Dyer v. Morris, 4 )fo. 214; State v. Fitzsimmons, 30 )Io. 236;
State v. Zellers, 7 X. J. L. 220; Laughlin v. State, L Ohio, 90; State v.
S:ilge, 2 Xev. 321; Hopper v. Commonwealth, 6 Gratt. (Va.) G84;
Be1rnway v. Conyne, 3 Chand . (Wis.) 21-i.
s · Et si neces itas e:x:cgerit dividantur teste hujus modi, cloncc ipsi
c.lc posuerint quicquicl velint, ita qnocl dictum unius non docebit aut
coneitabit eorum a1ium n.d consimiliter testificanclnm .. , C. 26.
3
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the expert witnesses an exception should be made. As they

are to be examined as to opinions based on facts testified to

by other witnesses, they should be allowed to remain in court

and hear the evidence relating to the facts. But when the

testimony as to the facts is closed, and the expert testimony

commences, the judge may, in his discretion, order a separ-

ation of the expert witnesses. Such is the practice in Scot-

land, where it has been the usual practice to exclude medical

witnesses as soon as the medical experts commence testify-

ing concerning matters of opinion. 1 In England the rule is

laid down that " medical or other professional witnesses,

who are summoned to give scientific opinions upon the cir-

cumstances of the case, as established by other testimony,

will be permitted to remain in court until this particular

class of evidence commences, but then, like ordinary wit-

nesses, they will have to withdraw, and to come in one by

one, so as to undergo a separate examination." 2 And in

this country the principle is similarly stated. 3

35. Right of the Court to Limit the Number of Ex-

pert Witnesses. The number of. expert witnesses, whose
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testimony will be received in any particular case, rests in

the sound discretion of the trial court. In the old Roman

law, the power of the court to limit the number of experts

who could be sworn, and even to select two or three from

those proposed by the parties, excluding the others, was

conceded to exist. 4 And in this country, the right of the

court to decline to permit certain witnesses to be sworn as

experts, after a sufficient number have already been exam-

ined, has been maintained in several cases. 5 But it would

not be proper for the court to limit a party to one witness

on any vital point. 6 In France the number of experts who

1 Alison's Practice of Crira. Law of Scotland, 542.

2 Taylors's Evid., 1259. And see Tait. Evid. 420.

8 1 Wharton's Evid., 492.

Bartol in L. 1, pr. de veutr. insp. no. 5; Bald, in L. 20, cod. de fide

inst.

'Sizer v. Burt, 4 Denio, 426; Anthony v. Smith, 4 Bos. (X. Y.) 503,

508; Fraser v. Jeunison, 42 Mich. 206, 223.

e See Hubble v. Osborn, 31 Ind. 249.

the expert witnesses an exception should be made. As they
are to be examined as to opinions based on facts testified to
by other witnesses, they should be allowed to remain in court
and hear the evidence relating to the facts. But when the
testimony as to the facts is closed, and the expert testimony
commences, the judge may, in his discretion, order a separation of the expert witnesses. Such is the practice in Scotland, where it has been the usual practice to exclude medical
witnesses as soon as the medic l experts commence testifying concerning matters of opinion. 1 In England the rule is
laid down that " medical or other professional witnesses,
who are summoned to give suientific opinions upon the circumstances of the case, as established by other testimony,
will be permitted to remain in court until this particular
class of evidence commences, but then, like ordinary witnesses, they will have to withdraw, and to come in one by
one, so as to undergo a separate examination." 2 And in
this country the principle is similarly stated. 3
§ 35. Right of the Court to Limit the Number of Expert Witnesses.-The number of. expert witnesses, whose
testimony will be received in any particular case, rests in
the sound discretion of the trial court. In the old Roman
law, the power of the court to limit the· number of experts
who could be sworn, and even to select two or three from
those proposed by the parties, excluding the others, was
conceded to exist.4 And in this country, the right of the
court to decline to permit certain witnesses to be sworn as
€xperts, after a sufficient number have already been exammed, has been maintained in several- cases. 5 But it would
not be proper for the court to limit a party to one ·witness
011 any vital point. 6 In France the number of. experts who
Alison's Practice of Crim. Law of Scotland, 542.
2 Taylors's Evid., § 1259. And see Tait. Evid. 420.
s 1 Wharton's Evid., § 492.
4 Bartol in L. 1, pr. de veRtr. insp. no. 5; Ba.Id.. in L. 20, cod. de fide
inst.
s Sizer v. Burt, 4 Denio, 426; Anthony v. Smith, 4 Bos. (N. Y.) 503,
i08; Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 223.
6 See Hubble v. Osborn, 31 Incl. 249.
i
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may be examined in questions of handwriting, seems to be

limited to three, 1 while in Kansas the opinions of at least

three experts are required by law, to establish the genuine-

ness of a disputed writing. 2 In a recent case in Michigan,

involving testamentary capacity, the trial court", after listen-

ing to the testimony of five experts called by the contestants

of the will, declined to permit a sixth expert to be exam-

ined. The Supreme Court sustained the action of the court

below, and Mr. Justice Cooley said: "If testamentary

cases are ever to be brought to a conclusion, there must be

some limit to the reception of expert evidence, and that

which was fixed in this case, was quite liberal enough. To

obtain such evidence is expensive, since desirable witnesses

are not to be found in every community ; but an army may

be had if the court will consent to their examination ; and

if legal controversies are to be determined by the prepon-

derance of voices, wealth, in all litigation in which expert

evidence is important, may prevail almost of course. But

one familiar with such litigation, can but know that for the

purposes of justice, the examination of two conscientious
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and intelligent experts on a side, is commonly better than

to call more. And certainly when five on each side have'

been examined, the limit of reasonable liberality has in most

cases been reached. The jury cannot be aided by going

farther. Little discrepancies that must be found in the testi-

mony of those even who in the main agree, begin to attract

attention and occupy the mind, until at last, jurors, with

their minds on unimportant variances, come to think that

expert evidence, from its very uncertainty, is worthless.

This is not a desirable state of things, and it can only be

avoided by confining the use of expert evidence within

reasonable bounds." 3

36. By whom Expert Witnesses are Selected. In

France experts are officially delegated by the court, to in-

1 Code de Procedure civile, Part 1, 1. 2, tit. 10, s. 200.

2 Gen. Stat. (1868) p. 854, 216.

s Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 223. 224.

may be examined in questions of handwriting, seems to be
limited to three, 1 while in Kansas the opinions of at least
three experts are required by law, to establish the genuineness of a disputed writing. 2 In a recent case in :M ichigan,
involving testamentary capacity, the trial court~ after listen- ·
ing to the testimony of five experts called by the contestants
of the will, declined to permit a sixth expert to be examined. The Supreme Court sustained the action of the court
below, and nlr. Justice Cooley said: "If testamentary
cases are ever to be brought to a conclusion, there must be
some limit to the reception of expert evidence, and that
which was fixed in this case, was quite liberal enough. To
obtain such evidence is expensive, since desirable witnesses
·are not to be found in every community; but an army may
be had if the court will consent to their examination; and
if legal controversies are to be determined by the preponderance of voices, wealth, in all litigation in which expert
evidence is important, may prevail almost of course. But
one familiar with such litigation, can but know that for the
purposes of justice, the examination of two conscientious
and intelligent experts on a side, is commonly better than
to call more. An~ certainly when five on each side have··
been examined, the limit of reason·.a ble liberality has in most
cases been reached. The jury cannot be aided by going
farther. Little discrepancies that must be found in the testimony of those even who in the main agree, begin to attract
attention and occupy the miud, until at last, jurors, with
their minds on unimportant variance8, come to think that
expert evidence, from its very uncertainty, is worthless.
This is not a desirable state of things, and it can only be
avoided by confining the use of expert evidence within
reasonable bounds. " 3
§ 36. By whom Expert Witnesses are Selected. - In
France experts are officially delegated by the court, to in1
2

3

Code de Procedure civile , Part I, 1. 2, tit. 10, s. 200.
Gen. Stat. (1 6 ) p. 5-!, § 216.
Fraser v. J enni -on, 42 )Iich. 206, 223. 22-!.
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quire into the facts, and report thereon. 1 But in Germany

even greater care has been taken to provide, that only those

who are in every way qualified by their learning and expe-

rience, shall be permitted to testify in the character of

experts. The courts of that country are not granted the

power of appointment, nor allowed to pass upon the quali-

fications of the witnesses, but the experts, in criminal cases,

first summoned are exclusively those whom the State, after

prior examination of their competency and skill in such par-

ticular inquiries, has duly authorized to testify in such

cases. In addition to this, provision is made for an appeal

to a tribunal of experts, to which the opinions of the expert

witnesses- can be referred. 2 In Prussia it was the practice

for the State to appoint as experts, a physician and surgeon

for every county. A medical college was established for

each province, to which men of peculiar knowledge in med-

ical jurisprudence were assigned. And if a difference of

opinion existed between the county experts, or the parties

desired an appeal, the case could be brought before this

medical college of the province. In addition to this an
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appellate medical commission for the whole Monarchy ex-

isted.' In England and in this country, as all know, the

practice has been entirely different from that adopted in

either France or Germany. Both here and in England the

parties usually select their own experts, and pay them their

compensation. The adoption in this country of the German

system of governmental experts, has been advocated by a

distinguished writer on medico-legal questions, 4 who pro-

poses that there should be selected after an adequate com-

petitive examination, a medical expert for each county in a

State, to whom should be referred all questions of medical

science that-might arise in a litigation. It is proposed that

1 Code de Procedure civile, Part 1, 1. 2, tit. 10, s. 200. And see Best on

Evidence, 515.

* Casper's Gericht Med., Berlin, 1871, 1, 3. See 2 Wharton & StiUe's

Med. Juris. (Part II) 1249.

Rechte lexicon, Leipzig, 1870, 1, 478.

4 2 Wharton & StUle's Medical Jurisprudence, Pt. II, 1250.

quire into the f acts, and report thereon .1 But in Germany
even greater care has been taken to provide, that only those
who ar e in every way qualified by their learning and experience, shall. be permit ted to testify in the character of
experts. The courts of that country are not granted the
power of appointment, nor allowed to pass upon the qualifications of the witnesses, but the experts, in criminal cases,
first summoned a.re exclusively those whom the State, after
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it should be his duty to take testimony bearing on such

questions, and hear counsel thereon, and after having

judicially heard the case, should certify his opinion to the

court, by whom the reference was made. In proper cases

an appeal could be taken from such an opinion to a Supreme

Court of governmental experts appointed by the State at

large. In this way it is thought that the expert would be

free from the embarrassment of any personal relations to

the parties. 4i He will have no client to serve, and no past

partisan extravagances to vindicate. He will render his

opinion >s the advocate neither of another nor of himself.

When he speaks, he will do so judicially, as the representa-

tive of the sense of the special branch of science which the

case invokes, governed by the opinion of the great bodv of

scientists in this relation, and advised of the most recent

investigations. When this is done, we will have expert evi-

dence rescued from the disrepute into which it has now

fallen, and invested with its true rights as the expression of

the particular branch of science for which it speaks." The

appointment of a board of State experts certainly has much
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to commend it to judicial approval. By the adoption of

some such system, the mature judgment of the best minds

could be obtained, and the superficial opinions of quacks

and mountebanks would not be thrust upon the jury to

their confusion, and to the hinderance of justice. Whether

the experts are appointed by the court or by the State, in

either case there would be eliminated the embarrassment

caused by having the experts appear in the case as the in-

terested partisans of the party by whom they are called

and specially paid. But while we should under the system

proposed be rid of some of the embarrassments we now

labor under, there are certain disadvantages connected with

it which seriously detract from its practicable value. Men

eminent in one branch of their profession often have but a

superficial knowledge of other branches, and a physician

who may be very able and learned in certain subjects con-

nected with his profession, may be quite ignorant of certain

intricate questions of medical science. So that if all ques-

it hould be his duty to ake e- imony bearina on ~uch
que tions and he~tr cot n.:el thereon, and af er hanng
judicially heard the ca~e ~houl certify hiE opinion to th
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free from the em.}arr·i.:-ment of any per.:onal elation~ o
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tions of medical science, for instance, have to be referred to

a board of governmental experts, suitors would be practi-

cally prohibited from availing themselves of the testimony

of other experts, who might be much better qualified by

their special knowledge on that particular subject, to form a

correct and accurate opinion.

Another distinguished writer, 1 has expressed the opinion

that it would be better to take away from counsel the exam-

ination of experts, and devolve it upon the court. " It

would be better," he says, " were it possible, for the court

alone to examine experts upon those points on which their

professional opinions are needed, rather than to hand them

over to counsel, each of whom has an interest in making

their testimony aid his own side, and to that extent forcibly

impressing upon it a unilateral character." He overlooks

the fact that it is necessary to a thorough and enlight-

ened examination of an expert witness on an intricate ques-

tion of medical, or other science, that the examiner should

have made himself as familiar as possible with the subject

matter of inquiry. To prepare himself for the examination
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of an expert witness, counsel often spend days and even

weeks in the careful investigation of the scientific question

involved. This the court cannot do, both for want of time,

and for want of knowledge of the questions which will be

raised. It is the part of wisdom that the inquisitorial and

judicial functions should be so far as possible kept distinct.

37. Weight of Expert Testimony a Question for the

Jury. But while the court determines the competency of

the witness to testify as an expert, the weight to be ac-

corded to the testimony which he may give, is a question

for the jury to determine. 2 " There is no rule of law that

1 Ordonaux's Jurisprudence of Medicine, 104, p. 123.

2 Mitchell v. State, 58 Ala. 418; Delaware etc. Steam Towboat Co. v.

Starrs, 69 Penn. St. 36, 41; Sikes v. Paine, 10 Ired. (N. C.) Law, 282;

Davis v. State, 35 Ind. 496; Forgery v. First National Bank, 66Ind. 123;

Howard v. Providence, 6 R. I. 516; Parnell v. Commonwealth, 86 Penn.

St. 260, 269; Snyder v. State, 70 Ind. 349; Johnson v. Thompson, 72 Ind.

167; Flynt v. Bodenhamer, 80 N. C. 205; State v. Secrest, 80 N. C. 450,

57; Keithsburg etc. K. E. Co. v. Henry, 79 111. 290; Pratt v. Kawson,

tions of medical science, for instance, have to be referred to
a board of goverp.mental experts, suitors would be practi-cally prohibited from availing themselves of the testimony
of other experts, who might be much better qualified by
their special knowledge on that particular subject, to form a
-correct and accurate opinion.
Another distinguished writer, 1 has exi)ressed the opinion
that it would be better to take away from counsel the e·x amination of experts, and devolve it upon the court. "It
would be better," he says, "were it possible, for the court
.alone to examine experts upon those points on which their
professional opinions are needed, rather than to hand them
over to counsel, each of whom has an in.t erest in making
their testimony aid his own side, and to that extent forcibly
impressing upon it a unilateral character." He overlooks
the fact that it is necessary to a thorough and enlightened examination of an expert witness on an intricate question of medical, or other science, that the examiner should
have made him~elf as familiar as possible. with the subject
matter of inquiry. To prepare ,himself for the examination
of an expert witness, counsel often spend days and even
weeks in the careful investigation of the scientific questioD:
involved. This the court can.not do, both for want of time,
and for want of knowledge of the questi()IlS which will be
raised. It is the par:t of wisdom that the inquisitoria.l and
judicial functions should be so far as possible kept distinct.
§ 3 7. Weight of Expert Testimony a Question for the
Jury.-But while the court determines the competency of
the witness to testify as an expert, the weight to be ac-corded to the testimony which he may give, is a question
for the jury to determine. 2 "There is no rule of law that
Ordonaux's Jurisprudence of Mcclicine, § 104:, p. 123.
Mitchell v. State, 58 Ala. 418; Delaware etc. Stearri Towboat Co. v.
Starrs, 69 Penn. St. 36, 41; Sikes v. Paine, 10 Ired. (N. C.) Law, 282;
Davis v. State, 35 Ind. 496; Forgery v. First National Bank, 66 Ind.123;
Howard v. Providence, 6 R. I. oJ 6; Parnell v. Commonwealth, 86 Penn.
St. 260, 269; Snyder v. State, 70 Ind. 349; Johnson v. Thompson, 72 Ind.
167; Flynt v. Bodenhamer, 80 N. C. 205; State v. Secrest, 80 N. C. 450,
57; Keithsburg etc. R.R. Co. v. Henry, 79 Ill. 290; Pratt v. Rawson,
i
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requires jurors to surrender their judgments implicitly to,

59

or even to give a controlling influence to the opinions of

scientific witnesses, however learned or accomplished they

may be, and however they may speak with conceded intelli-

gence and authority, aided by the accumulated results of a

long experience." 1 The testimony of experts is to be con-

sidered like any other testimony, and is to be tried by the

same tests, and receive just so much weight and credit as

the jury may deem it entitled to, when viewed in connection

with all the circumstances. 2 Their testimony is given, it is

said, for the purpose of enlightening the jury, artd not for

the purpose of controlling their judgment. 3 " It must have

its legitimate influence by enlightening, convincing and gov-

erning the judgment of the jury, and must be of such a

character as to outweigh, by its intrinsic force and proba-

bility, all conflicting testimony. The jury cannot be required

by the court to accept, as matter of law, the conclusions of

the witnesses instead of their own." 4 Upon the jury rests

the responsibility of rendering a correct verdict, and if the

testimony of the experts is opposed to the jury's convictions
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of truth, it is their duty to disregard it. 5 They should take

into consideration the expert's means of knowledge, and the

reasons he assigns for the opinion he has given, and give

or withhold credence to his testimony, as they may find his

qualifications sufficient, and his reasons satisfactory or

otherwise. 6 The value of an opinion does not depend upon

the skill and knowledge professed by the expert, but upon

the skill and knowledge which he actually possesses, and of

40 Vt. 183, 188; Tatum v. Mohr, 21 Ark. 354; Humphries v. Johuson, 20

Ind. 190.

1 Brchm v. Great Western R. R. Co., 34 Barb. 256, 272.

2 Carter v. Baker, 1 Sawyer (U. s'. C. C.) 512, 525; Cuneo v. Bessoui,

63 Ind. 524.

8 Fletcher v. Seekel, 1 R. I. 267; Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424, 481.

4 Anthony v. Stinsou, 4 Kans. 221.

* United States v. McGlue, 1 Curtis C. C. 1, 9.

6 State v. Hinkle, 6 Io\va, 380'; Wood v. Sawyer, Phillips (X. C.) Law,

253, 276; Fail-child v. Bascomb, 35 Vt. 398. 406; In re Springer. 4 Penu.

Law J. 275.

reqmres jurors to surrender their judgments implicitly to,
or even to give a controlling influence to the opinions of
scientific witnesses, however learned or accomplished they
may be, and however they may speak with conceded intelligence and authority, aided by the accumulated results of a
long experience.' ' 1 The testimony of experts is to be considered like any other testimony, and is to be tried by the
same tests, and receive just so much weight and credit as
the jury may deem it entitled to, when viewed in connection
with all the circumstances. 2 Their testimony is given, it is
said, for the purpose of enlightening the jury, a11d not for
the purpose of controlling their judgment. 3 "It must have
its legitimate influence by enlightening, convincing and governing the judgment of the jury, and must be of such a
character as to outweigh, by its intrinsic force and probability, all conflicting testimony. The jury cannot be required
by the court to accept, as matter of law, the conclusions of
the witnesses instead of their own. " 4 Upon the jury rests
the responsibility of rendering a correct verdict, and if the
testimony of the experts is opposed to the jury's convictions
of truth, it is their duty to disregard it.a They should take
into consideration the expert's means of knowledge, and the
reasons he assigns for the opinion he has given, and give
or withhold credence to his testimony, as they may find his
qualifications sufficient, and his reasons satisfactory or
otherwise. 6 The value of an opinion does not depend upon
the skill and knowledge professe.d by the expert, but upon
the skill and knowledge which he actually possesses, and of
40 Vt. 183, 188; Tatum v. Mohr, 21 Ark. 35J; Humphries v. Johnson, 20
Ind. mo.
1 Brehm v. Great W estern R.R. Co., 3J Barb. 25G, 2i2.
! Carter v. Baker, 1 Sawyer (U.
C. C.) 512, 525; Cuneo v. Bessoni,
63 Ind. 524.
3 Fletcher v. Seekel, 1 R. I. 267; Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424, 4 1.
4 Anthony v. Stinson, 4 Kans. 221.
5 Un5ted States v. McGlue, 1 Curtis C. C. 1, 9.
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253, 276; Fairchild v. Bascomb, 35 Vt. 398, 406; In re Springer, 4 Penn.
Law J. 275.
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the accuracy of such knowledge the jury must judge. 1 It

has been said, however, that "an expert's opinion on a

question of art or science, is a fact which must be accepted

by a jury, if uncontradicted." 3

38. Right of the Jury to Exercise an Independent

Judgment. The right of the jury to determine the weight

to be accorded to the testimony of experts, is well illus-

trated in a case but recently decided in the Supreme Court

of the United States, where it was held that the following

instruction was erroneous, in an action brought to recover

for professional services as attorneys at law: "You must

determine the value of the services rendered from the evi-

dence that has been offered before you, and not from your

own knowledge and ideas as to the value of such services."

The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Justice Field,

in the course of which he says: "It was the province of

the jury to weigh the testimony of the attorneys as to the

value of the services, by reference to their nature, the time

occupied in their performance, and other attending circum-

stances, and by applying to it their own experience and
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knowledge of the character of such services. To direct

them to find the value of the services from the testimony of

the experts alone, was to say to them that the issue should

be determined by the opinions of the attorneys, and not by

the exercise of their own judgment of the facts on which

those opinions were given. The evidence of experts as to

the value of professional services, does not differ in princi-

ple, from such evidence as to the value of labor in other

departments of business, or as to the value, of property.

So far from laying aside their own general knowledge and

ideas, the jury should have applied that knowledge and

those ideas to the matters of fact in evidence, in determining

the weight to be given to the opinions expressed ; and it

was only in that way that they could arrive at a just conclu-

sion. While they cannot act in any case upon particular

facts material to its disposition resting in their private

1 Snyder v. State, 70 Ind. 349.

2 Atchison etc. K. R. Co. v. United States, 15 Ct. of Cl. 140.

the accuracy of such knowledge the jury must .judge. 1 It
has been said, however, that "an expert's opinion on a
question of art or science, is a fact which must be accepted
by a jury, if uncontradicted." 2
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the value of professional services, does not differ in principle, from such evidence as to the value of labor in other
departments of business, or as to the value. of property.
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ideas, the jury should have applied that knowledge and
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was only in that way that they could arrive at a just conclusion. vVhile they cannot act in any case upon particular
facts material to its disposition resting in their private
i
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knowledge, but should be governed by the evidence adduced,

they may, and, to act intelligently, they must judge of the

weight and force of that evidence by their own general

knowledge of the subject of inquiry. If, for example, the

question were as to the damages sustained by a plaintiff

from a fracture of his leg by the carelessness of a defendant,

the jury would ill perform their duty, and probably come

to a wrong conclusion, if controlled by the testimony of the

surgeons, not merely as to the injury inflicted, but as to the

damages sustained, they should ignore their own knowledge

and experience of the value of a sound limb. * They

should not have been instructed to accept the conclusions of

the professional witnesses in place of their own, however

much that testimony may have been entitled to consider-

ation. The judgment of witnesses, as a matter of law, is

in no case to be substituted for that of the jurors." 1

39. Instructions to Jury as to the Nature and Weight

of Expert Testimony. While the jury must determine the

credibility of the experts and the weight of their testimony,

and to this end must be left at liberty to exercise their own
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judgment, independent of any positive direction of the

court, yet it has been held that a mere expression of opinion

as to the weight of the evidence, which still allows the jury

to be guided and governed by their own convictions, forma

no proper ground for an exception. 2 In the case last cited,

Mr. Justice Daniels says : " That may be proper, and even

necessary under certain circumstances, to enable the jury to

give appropriate consideration to evidence requiring their

judgment. The evidence of witnesses who are brought

upon the stand to support a theory by their opinions, is

justly exposed to a reasonable degree of suspicion. They

are produced, not to swear to facts observed by them, but

to express their judgment as to the effect of those detailed

by others, and they are selected on account of their ability

to express a favorable opinion, which there is great reason

1 Head v. Hargrave, 14 Cent. Law J. 388, 389.

* Templeton v. People, 10 Hun, (X. Y.) 357.

knowledge, but should be governed by the evidence adduced,
they may, and, to act intelligently, they must judge of the
weight and force of that evidence by their own general
knowledge of the subject of inquiry. If, for example, the
question were as to the damages sustained by a plaintiff
from a fracture of his leg by the carelessness of a defendant,
the jury would ill perform their duty, and probably come
to a wrong conclusion, if controlled by the testimony of the
t-urgeons, not merely as to the injury inflicted, but as to the
damages sustained, they should ignore their own knowledge
and experience of the value of a sound limb. * * They
should not have been instructed to accept the conclusions of
the professional witnesses in place of their own, however
much that testimony may h:we been entitled to consideration . The judgment of witnesses, as a n~atter of law, is
in no case to be substituted for that of the jurors. " 1
§ 3~). Instructions to Jury as to the Nature and Weig·ht
of Expert Testimony.-,iVhile the jury must determine the
credibility of the experts and the weight of their testimony,
and to this .end mm.t be left at liberty to exercise their own
judgment, independent of any positive direction of the
court, yet it has been held that a mere expression of opinion
as to the weight of the evidence, which still allows the jury
to be guided and governed by their own convictions, forms
no proper ground for an cxception. 2 In the case last cited,
l\ir. Justice Daniels says: '' That may be proper, and even
necessary under certain circumstances, to euable the jury to
give approp.r iate consideration to evidence requiring their
judgmcut. The evidence of witnesses who are brought
upon the stand to support a theory by their opinions, is
justly exposed to a reasonable degree of suspicion . They
are produced, not to swear to facts observed by them, but
to express their judgment us to the effect of those detailed
by others, and they are selected on account of their ability
to express a favorable opinion, which there is great reason
1
:.i

Head v. Hargrave, H Cent. Law J. 3 , 3 9.
Templeton v. People, 10 Hun, ( N". Y. ) 357.
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to believe, is, in many instances, the result alone of employ-

ment, and the bias arising out of it. Such evidence should

be cautiously accepted as the foundation of a verdict, and

it forms a very proper subject for the expression of a

reasonably guarded opinion by the court. That is often

necessary to prevent the jury from being led astray, by giving

too much weight to evidence really requiring to be sus-

piciously watched, and which, in many instances, has induced

unwarranted verdicts, discreditable to the administration of

justice, as well as exceedingly detrimental to the public in-

terest." The following instruction, however, was held in

this case to be erroneous : " There is no more reliance to

be placed upon it (the testimony of the expert) than upon

the testimony of any other person in this case. I regard

you gentlemen of the jury as equally skilled, and as able to

decide from the evidence, whether or not the prisoner was

insane as Dr. Clymer." In a recent case in North Carolina,

an instruction was sustained, charging the jury that the law

attached peculiar importance to the opinions of medical

men who have had opportunity of observation upon ques-
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tions of mental capacity. 1

40. Instructions to the Jury as to the Nature and

Weight of Expert Testimony The Subject Continued.

In Iowa the following instruction has been sustained : " Ev-

idence of this character (comparison of handwriting by

experts) has been introduced in the case at bar, and it will

be for you to say how much weight shall be given to such

testimon} 7 ", taking into consideration the amount of skill

possessed by the witnesses. But while it is proper to con-

sider such evidence, and to give to it -such weight as you

may think it justly entitled, yet it is proper to remark that

it is of the lowest order of evidence, or evidence of the most

unsatisfactory character. It cannot be claimed that it

ought to overthrow positive and direct evidence of credible

witnesses who testify from their personal knowledge, but it is

most useful in cases of conflict between witnesses as corrob-

1 Flyut T. Bodenhamer, 80 X. C. :0>.

to believe, is, in many instances, the result alone of employment, and the bias arising out of it. Such evidence should
be cautiously accepted as the foundation of a verdict, .and
it forms a very proper subject for the expression of a
reasonably guarded opinion by the court. That is often
necessary to prevent the jury from being led astray, by giving
too much weight to evidence really requiring to be suspiciously watched, and which, in many instances, has induced
unwarranted verdicts, discr~ditable to the administration of
justice, as well as exceedingly detrimental to the public interest." The following instruction, however, was held in
this case to be erroneous : '' There is no more reliance t0>
be placed .upon it (the testimony of the expert) than upon
the testimony of any other person in this case. I regard
you gentlemen of the jury as equally skilled, and as able to.
decide from the evidence, whether or not th~ prisoner ..was
insane , as Dr. Clymer." In a recent case in North Carolina,.·
an instruction was sustained, charging the jury that the law
attached peculiar importance to the opinions of medical
men who have had opportunity of_ ohservation upon questions of mental capacity ._1
§ 40. Instructions to the Jury as to the Nature and.
Weight of Expert Testimony -

The Subject Continued.-

In Iowa the following instruction has been sustained : '' Ev-:
idence of thi3 character (comparison of handwriting by
experts) has been introduced in the case at bar, and it will
be for you to say how much weight shall be given to such
testimony, taking into consideration the amount of skill
possessed by the witnesses. But while it is proper to con- ·
sider such evidence, and to give to it -such weight as you
may think it justly entitled, yet it is proper to remark that
it is of the lowest order of evidence, or evidence of the most.
unsatisfactory character. It cannot be claimed that it
ought to overthrow positive and direct evidence of credible
witnesses who testify from their personal knowledge, but it is
most useful in cases of conflict between witnesses as corrobi

Flynt T. Bodenhamer, tO N. U.
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orating witnesses." Counsel claimed that the above in-

struction was erroneous, as it practically destroyed expert

evidence, by taking from it the force and weight given to it

by law. But in sustaining the instruction the court says :

" The observation and experience of daily life, as well as in

the administration of justice in the courts of law, must be

applied by judges and jurors to enable them to decide to

what extent the mind should be influenced by evidence sub-

mitted to them. * * * The effect, then, which all evi-

dence has upon the mind is determined by observation and

experience, the only original instructors of wisdom. These

teach that the evidence of experts is of the very lowest

order, and of the most unsatisfactory character. We be-

lieve that in this opinion experienced laymen unite with

members of the legal profession." l And in Vermont the

Supreme Court of that State declared, that if the trial judge

had " told the jury, what to be sure is unusual, as expressed

in an early case, that it (testimony of experts in hand-

Avriting) was entitled to but little weight as proof of the

disputed fact, but, after all leaving it for them to weigh
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and consider, it would not have been an error." 2 So, in a

case which involved a question as to the permanency of a

person's loss of vision, where one of the experts testified

that in his examination of the eye he had not used the

opthalmoscope, or stereoscope, while the other had em-

ployed both instruments and reached a different conclusion,

it was held to be error to refuse the following request to

charge: "Considering the extraordinary character of the

injuries alleged in this case, and the great difficulty attend-

ant upon their proper investigation, great weight should be

given by the jury to the opinion of scientific witnesses, ac-

customed to investigate the causes and effect of injuries to

the eye, and a distinction should be made in favor of the

opinion of those accustomed to use the most perfect instru-

ments and processes, and who are acquainted with the most

1 Whittaker v. Parker, 42 Iowa, 586. See, too, Borland v. Wahvrath,

33 Iowa, 133.

2 Pratt v. Rawson, 40 Vt. 183, 188.

orating witnesses.'; Counsel claimed that the above instruction was erroneous, as it practically destroyed expert
evidence, by taking from it the force and weight given to it
by law. But in sustaining the instruction the court says:
''The observation and experience of daily life, as well as in
the administration of justice in the courts of law, must be
applied by judges and jurors to enable them to decide to
what extent the mind should be influenced by evidence submitted to them. * * * The effect, then, which all evidence has upon the mind is determined by observation and
experience, the only original instructors of wisdom. These
teach that the evidence of experts is of the very lowest
order, and of the most unsatisfactory character. We believe that in this opinion experienced laymen unite with
members of the legal profession." 1 And in Vermont the
Supreme Court of that State declared, that if the trial judge
had '' told the jury, what to be sure is unusual, as expressed
in an early case, that it (testimony of experts in handwriting) was entitled to but little weight as proof of the
disputed fact, but, after all leaving it for them to weigh
and consider, it would not have been an error." 2 So, in a
caBe which involved a question as to the permanency of a
person's loss of vision, where one of the experts testified
that in his examination of the eye he had not used the
opthalmoscope, or stereoscope, while the other had employed both instruments and reached a different conclusimi,.
it was held to be error to refuse the following request to
charge : '' Considering the extraordinary character of the
injuries alleged in this case, and the great difficulty attendant upon their proper investigation, great weight should be
given by the jury to the opmion of sci~ntific witi1esses, accustomed to investigate the causes and effect of injuries to
the eye, and a. distinction should be made in favor of the
opinion of those accustomed to use the most perfect instruments and processes, and who are acquainted with the most
t 'Vhittaker v. Parker, 42 Iowa, 586;
33 Iowa , 133.
2 Pratt v. R ay•; on, 40 Vt. 183, 1"8.

See, too, B orland v. Walwrath,
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recent discoveries in science, and most approved methods of

treatment and investigation." l

41. Instructions to the Jury as to the Nature and

Weight of Expert Testimony The Subject Continued.

recent discoveries in science, and most approved methods of
treatment and investigation." 1
§ 41. Instructions to the Jury as to the Nature and

The following has been held an erroneous instruction:

" That in questions involving science and skill, the opinions

of scientific men in professions or pursuits, to which such

questions may pertain, are authoritative, and in all doubtful

cases in which such questions are involved should control

the jury.'-' The Supreme Court in reviewing the instruc-

tion declared that " such opinions are to be received and

treated by the jury like any other evidence in the cause." 2

The same court in a subsequent case held the following in-

struction erroneous. It illustrates the other extreme to

which trial courts are apt to go : " Some persons have been

introduced as experts on the question of unsoundness (of

testator's mind). These witnesses gave opinions based

upon hypothetical cases. These opinions are of no value,

unless the hypothetical cases put to the experts are fully

sustained by the evidence given in the cause. If the hy-
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pothetical cases are fully proved by the evidence, and the

experts understand the subject upon which their opinions

are given, those opinions ought to have some weight, but

the testimony of experts is usually of very little value in

determining the sanity or insanity of a party. The opinions

of experts are not so highly regarded now as formerly ;

for, while the}' sometimes afford aid in the determination

of facts, it often happens that experts can be found to tes-

tify to any theory, however absurd ; and they frequently

come with biased minds, prepared to support the cause in

which they are embarked. I do not wish to be understood

that the witnesses called in this case are biased. You are

the judges of that matter."

The court held that this instruction underrated too much

the value of the testimonv of experts as a class. And it

declared its belief that the trial court was mistaken in say-

1 Tinney v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 12 Abbott's Pr. (X. S.) 1.

2 Humphries v. Johnson. 20 Ind. 190.

Weight of Ex1rnrt Testimony-The Subject Continued.-

The following has been held an erroneous instruction:
'' That in questions involving science and skill, the opinions
of scientific men: in professions or pursuits, to which such
questions may pertain, are authoritative, and in all doubtful
cases in which such questions are involved should control
the jury.'? The Supreme Court in reviewing the instruction declared that " such opinions are to be received and
treated by the jury like any other evidence in the cause." 2
The same court in a subsequent case held the following instructioi1 erroneous. It illustrates the other extreme to
which trial courts are apt to go : " Some persons have been
introduced as experts on the question of unsoundness (of
testator's mind). These witnesses gave opinions based
upon hypothetical cases. These opinions are of no value,
unless the hypothetical cases put to the experts are fully
sustained by the evidence given in the cause. If the hypothetical cases are fully proved by the evidence, and the
experts understand the subject upon which their opinions
are given, those opinions ought to have some weight, hut
the testimony of experts is usually of very little value in
determining the sanity or insanity of a party. The opinions
of experts are not so highly regarded now as formerly;
for, "·bile .they sometimes afford aid in the determination
of facts, it often happens that experts can be found to testify to any theory, however absurd; and they frequently
come with biased minds, prepared to support the cause in
which they are em barked. I do not wish to be understood
that the witnesses called in this case are biased. You are
the judges of that matter."
The court held that this instruction underrated too much
the value of the testimony of experts as a class. And it
declar6d its belief that the trial court was mistaken in say1
2

Tinney v. New Jersey Steamboat Co ., 12 Abbott"s Pr. (N. S.) 1.
Humphries v. Johnson, 20 Incl. 190.
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ing that "the testimony of experts is usually of very little

value in determining the sanity or insanity of a party." As

to the value of expert testimony, the court declares it " de-

pends as much upon all the facts and circumstances con-

nected with each particular case as that of any other class

of witnesses. It is for the court first to decide whether a

witness is competent to testify as an expert ; but when per-

mitted to testify, an expert stands substantially on the same

footing as any other witness as to credibility. His testi-

mony may be valuable, or it may not be, depending upon

the manner in which it may be able to withstand the

usual tests of credibility which may be app ied to it." l

And the same court in a still more recent case has also held

the following instruction erroneous, as giving too much

prominence to experience: "The less experience a profes-

sional witness has, and the less satisfactory the reasons for

his opinion, the less weight should the opinion have. As

to all the witnesses, whether medical or not, you are the

exclusive judges of the weight to be given to the evi-

dence." 2
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42. Tlie Value and Weight of Expert Testimony. We

have collected in the appendix the expressions of judicial

opinion as to the value attaching to the testimony of experts.

It is evident that the value of expert testimony depends on

the learning and skill of the expert, and on the nature of the

subject of investigation. If the subject of inquiry relates

to the cause, nature or effect of disease, for instance, the

opinions of eminent or learned physicians would be entitled

to the very highest consideration. If, on the other hand,

the subject of inquiry is the genuineness of a disputed signa-

ture, great importance cannot always be attached to the tes-

timony of the experts. The value of the testimony varies

with the circumstances of each case, and of those circum-

stances the jury must be the judges. They must determine

whether great or little weight is to be accorded it. But in

all cases, the testimony of experts is to be received and

1 Eggers v. Eggers, 57 Ind. 461.

2 Cuneo v. Bessoni, 63 Ind. 524.

(5)

ing that "the testimony of experts is usually of very little
value in determining the sanity or insanity of a party.'' As
to the value of expert testimony, the court declares it "depends as much upo~ all the facts and circumstances connected with each particular case as that of any other class
of witnesses. It is for tbe court first to decide whether a
witness is competent to testify as an expert; but when permitted to testify, an expert stands substantially on the same
.f ooting as any other witness as to credibility. His testimony may be valuable, or it may not be, depending upon
the manner in which it may be able to withstand the
usual tests of credibility which may be app.ied to it." 1
And the same court in a still more recent case has also held
the following instruction erroneous, as giving too much
prominence to experience : '' The less e}qJerience a professional witnes has, and the less satisfactory the reasons for
his opinion, the less weight should the opinion have. As
to all the witnesses, whether medical or not, you are the
exclusive judges of the weight to be given to the evi·dence." 2
§ 42. The Value and Weight of Expert Testimony.-,Ve
lmYe collected iu the appendix the expressions of judieial
opinion as to the value attaching to the testimony of experts.
It is evident that the value of el:pert testimony depends on
the learning and skill of the expert, and on the nature of the
subject of investigation. If the subject of inquiry relates
to the cause, nature or effect of disease, for instance, the
opinions of eminent or learned physicians would be entitled
to the very highest consideration. If, on the other hand,
the subject of inquiry is the genuineness of a disputed signature, great importance cannot always be attached to the testimony of the experts. The value of the testimony varies
with the circumstances of each case, and of those circumstances t.he jury must be the judges. They must determine
whether great or little weight is to be accorded it. But in
all case-.;, the testimony of experts is to be received and
i
2

Eggers v. Eggers~ 57 Ind. 461.
Cnneo v. Bessoni, 63 Ind. 524.
(5)
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weighed with great caution. As a judge in one of the Irish

courts has expressed it, " such evidence ought, as all evi-

dence of opinion ought, to be received and considered with

narrow scrutiny, and with much caution." 1 And no error

would be found with an instruction which should merely

caution the jury as to such evidence. Indeed, it would seem

to be the duty of the trial court in all cases, to give the jury

to understand that they must consider all such testimony

with caution. It would seem to be as proper in such cases

to caution the jury, as it is conceded to be to caution them

as to the testimony of detectives and police officers, or as to

the testimony of the relatives of an accused person. It may

also be highly proper, too, in many cases, to remind the jury

that the weight of the testimony of experts does not depend

so much on the number of the witnesses, as upon their

capacity, their opportunities for observation, the unpreju-

diced state of their minds, and the nature of the facts. 2

But cautions to a jury against the testimony of witnesses

should, in all cases, be very guarded, as they may easily

become erroneous and misleading. 3 .
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1 M'Fadden v. Murdock, 1 Irish E. (C. L.) 211, 218.

2 Clark v. Fisher, 1 Paige, Ch. (N. Y.) 171 ; s. c. 19 Am. Decis.^402.

8 See Grand Rapids etc. E. E. Co. v. Martin, 41 Mich. 672.

weighed with great caution. As a judge in one of the Irish
courts has expressed it, " such evidence ought, as all evidence of opinion ought, to be receiv~d and considered with
narrow scrutiny, and with much caution." 1 And no error
would be found with an instruction which should merely
caution the jury as to· such evidence. Indeed, it would seem
t0 be the duty of the trial court in all cases, to give the jury
to understand that they must consider all such testimony
with caution . It would seem to be as proper in such cases
to caution the jury, as ,i t is conceded to be to caution them
as to the testimony of detectives and police officers, or as to
the testimony of the relatives of an accused person . . It may ·
also be highly proper, too, in many cases, to remind the jury
that the weight of the testimony of experts does not depend
s0 much on the number of the witnesses, as upon their
capacity, their opportunities for observation, the unprejudiced state of their minds, and the nature of the facts. 2
But cautions to a jury against the testimony of witnesses
should, in all cases, be very guarded, as they may easily
become erroneous and misleading. 3 •
M'Fadden v. Murdock, 1 Irish R. (0. L.) 211, 218.
Clark v. Fisher, 1 Paige, Oh. (N. Y.) 171; s. c. 19 Am. Decis.~402.
s See Grand Rapids etc. R.R. Co. v. Martin, 41 Mich. 672.
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CHAPTER IV.

EXPERT TESTIMONY IN MEDICINE, SURGERY AND CHEMISTRY.

SECTION.

43. Competency of Physicians to Testify as Experts.

44. Competency of Physicians to Testify as Experts The Subjec

Continued.

45. Disqualifications Arising from Information Acquired .while

Attending: Patient.

4G. Cases in which Physicians may Testify, notwithstanding the Pro-

hibitory Statutes.

47. Opinions Based on Statements made out of Court, and not under

Oath.

48. Opinions of Physicians Based in part on Declarations of Patients.

49. Opinions as to the Condition of a Patient.

50. Opinions as to Cause of Death.

51. The Xature and Symptoms of Disease.

52. Who are Competent to Express Opinions in such cases.

53. Xatnre and Effect of Wounds.

54. Character of Instrument with which Wound was Produced.

55. Who are Competent to Express Opinions as to Instrument used.
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56. Opinions of Medical Experts as to Mental Condition.

57. The Rule in Massachusetts.

58. Roman Catholic Priest an Expert as to Sanity.

59. Mode of Examination as to Sanity.

GO. Evidence Bearing on Question of Insanity.

Gl. Opinions of Non-Professional Witnesses as to Mental Condition.

62. This Subject Continued.

63. Rape, Abortion and Pregnancy.

G4. Opinions in Miscellaneous Cases.

65. Opinions of Medical Experts in Malpractice Cases.

66. Right to Order an Examination of the person by Medical Experts

in cases of alleged Impotency.

67. Who should be Appointed to make the Examination.

68. When Compulsory Examination in such cases will not be ordered.

69. Summoning Experts to Assist in Determining the Proper Inter-

rogatories.
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70. The Subject of Inquiry. Structural Defect. Impracticability of

Consummation.

71. The Testimony of the Experts in such Cases to be Received with

Caution.

72. Defraying the Expenses of the Examination by the Expert.

73. Compulsory Examination in Criminal Cases.

74. Compulsory Examination in Criminal Cases The Subject Con-

tinued.

75. Compulsory Examination in Actions for Damages.

.76. Detection of Poisons by Chemists.

77. Chemical Analysis of Poison not necessary when.

78. Chemical Analysis of Contents of Stomach.

79. Order of Research in Analysis for Poisons.

80. Chemical and Microscopic Examination of Blood.

81. Whether Ordinary Witnegses may Testify as to Blood Stains.

82. Blood Stains Proper Question Concerning.

83. Other Cases in which the Opinions of Chemists have been received.

84. Diseases in Animals Qualifications of Expert.

43. Competency of Physicians to Testify as Experts.

The principle is well established that physicians and sur-
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geons of practice and experience, are experts in medicine

and surgery, and that their opinions are admissible in evi-

dence upon questions that are strictly and legitimately em-

braced in their profession and practice. 1 Persons are pre-

70. 'l'he Subject of Inquiry. Structural Defect. Impracticability of
Consummation.
71. The Testimony of the Experts in such Cases to be Received with
Caution.
72. Defraying the Expenses of the Examination by the Expert.
73. Compulsory Examination in Criminal Cases.
74. Compulsory Examination in Criminal Cases -The Subject Continued .
75. Compulsory Examination in Actions for Damages.
-76. Detection of Poisons by Chemists.
77. Chemical Analysis of Poison not necessary when.
78. Chemical Analysis of Contents of Stomach.
79. Ord.er of Research in Analysis for Poisons.
80. Chemical and Microscopic Examination of Blood.
81. Whether Ordinary WitneRses may Testify as to Blood Stains.
82. Blood Stains-Proper Question Conceh1ing.
83. Other Cases in which the Opinions of Chemists have been received.
84. Diseases in Animals-Qualifications of Expert.
·

sumed to understand questions appertaining to their own

profession. 2 As expressed in a recent case in South

Carolina a physician is "in law an expert as to all mat-

ters embraced within the range of his profession." 3

In the absence of any statutory provision to the con-

trary, it does not seem to be necessary that they should

be graduates of any medical college, or have a license

to practice from any medical board, in order to render them

competent to testify as experts in relation to matters con-

nected with their profession.* If it is shown that the

witness is a practicing physician or surgeon, it is sufficient

evidence that he is competent .to express an opinion upon

1 Hathaway Adm'r v. National Life Ins. Co., 48 Vt. 335, 351 ; De Phue

v. State, 44 Ala. 39; Livingston v. Commonwealth, 14 Grattan (Va.)

592 ; Bird v. Commonwealth, 21 Grattan (Va.) 800.

2 Jones v. White, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 268.

3 State v. Clark, 15 S. C. (N. s.) 403, 408.

4 New Orleans etc. R. R. Co. v. Allbritton, 38 Miss. 242.

§ 43. Com1letency of Physicians to Testify as Experts.
-The principle is well established that physicians and surgeons of practice and experience, are experts in medicine
and surgery, and that their opinions are admissible in evidence upon questions that are strictly and legitimately embraced in their profession and practice. 1 Persons are presumed to understand questions appertaining to their own
profession. 2 As expressed in a recent case in South
Carolina a physician is ''in law an expert as to all matters embraced within the range · of his profession." 3
In the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, it docs not seem to be necessary that they should
be graduates of any medical college, or have a license
to practice from any medical board, in order to render them
competent to testify as experts in relation to matters connected with their profession. 4 If it is shown that the
witness is a practicing physician or surgeon, it is sufficient
evidence that he is competent ~ to express an opinion upon
Hathaway Adm ·r v. National Life Ins. Co., 48 Vt. 335, 351; De Phue
v. State, 44 Ala. 39; Livingston v. Commonwealth, 14. Grattan (Va.)
592; Bird v. Commonwealth, 21 Grattan (Va.) 800.
2 Jones v. White, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 268.
3 State v. Clark, 15 S. C. (N. s.) 403, 408.
4 New Orleans etc. R.R. Uo. v. Allbritton, 38 Miss. 242.
1
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a medical question. 1 But in Wisconsin, the legislature

has interposed, and enacted a law providing that "no

person practicing physic or surgery shall have the right * *

to testify in a professional capacity as a physician or

surgeon in any case, unless he shall have received a diploma

from some incorporated medical society or college, or shall

be a member of the State or some county medical society,

duly organized in this State." 2 The mere fact, that a person

was by education a physician, is not deemed in itself suffi-

cient to justify his admission as an expert, provided he never

practiced his profession. 3 His competency, it is said, should

be shown "from his study and experience in medicine." 4

But it is not to be supposed that a physician and surgeon,

who shows himself otherwise qualified, is to be considered

as disqualified by the fact that at the time of giving his tes-

timony, he is not in full practice. That merely goes to his

credit, and is for the consideration of the jury in weighing

his testimony. 6 Hence, a witness was held competent to

testify as a medical expert, who stated that he had attended

a course of medical lectures, had obtained a license from
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the State, and had practiced as a physician for a year, when

he abandoned the medical profession for that of the law,

which had been his profession for the last sixteen years, but

that he had continued to read medical works, had kept up

with the improvements made in the science of medicine,

and felt competent to express a medical opinion upon the

subject of inquiry. 6 Although the witness had once practiced

medicine, it appears that the court in this case inclined to the

opinion that he would have been competent had that fact

not been shown, for they say : "If one asserts an ability

to give correct opinions upon any art or science, from an

1 Wisconsin Kev. Stat. (1878) pr. 440, 1436.

"Livingston v. Commonwealth, 14 Gratt. (Va.) 592; Washington v.

Cole, G Ala. 212.

Fairchild v. Bascomb, 35 Vt. 410.

* Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117, 123.

5 Roberts v. Johnson, 58 X. Y. 613.

6 Tullis v. Kidd, 12 Ala. 648, 650.

a medical que&tion. 1 But in Wisconsin, the legislature
has interpo.sed, and enacted a law providing that "no
person practicing physic or surgery shall have the right • *
to te8tify in a professional capacity as a physician or
surgeon in any case, unless he shall have received a diploma
from some incorporated medical society or college, or shall
be a member of the State or some county medic.tl society,
duly organized in this State. " 2 The mere fact, that a person
was by education a physician, is not deemed in itself sufficient to justify his admission as an expert, provided he never
practiced his profession. 3 His competency, it is said, should
be shown ''from his study and experience in medicine.' ' 4
But it is not to be supposed that a physician and surgeon,
who shows himself otherwise qualified, is to be considered
as disqualified by the fact that at the time of giving his testimony, he is not in full practice. That merely goes to his
credit, and is for the consideration of the jury in weighing
his testimony. 6 Hence, a witness was held competent. to
testify as a medical e,·pert, who stated that he had attended
a course of medical lectures, had obtained a license from
the State, and had practiced as a physician for a year, when
he abandoned the medical profession for that of the law,
which had been his profession for the ]ast sixteen years, bu't
that he had continued to read medical works, had kept up
with the improvements made in the science of medicine,
and felt competent to express a medical opinion upon the
subject of inquiry .6 Although the witness had once practiced
medicine, it appears that the court in this case inclined to the
opinion that he would have been competent bad that fact
not been shown, for they say: "If one asserts an ability
to give correct opinions upon any art or science, from an
1

Wisconsin Rev. Stat. (1878) p-. 4-±0, § 1436.
Livingston v. Commonwealth, 14 Gratt. (Va.) 592; Washington v.
Cole, G Ala. 212.
8 Fairchild v. Bascomb, 35 Vt. 410.
4 Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117, 123.
s Roberts v. Johnson, 58 :N. Y. 613.
6 Tullis v. Kidd, 12 Aln. 648, 650.
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acquaintance with the subject, acquired by observation and

study, we cannot perceive on what ground he can be re-

jected because he has not been in the actual practice of his

profession." It is not necessary that a physician should

have made the particular disease involved in any inquiry, a

specialty, in order to make his testimony admissible as being

that of an expert. 1 But if he has devoted himself exclu-

sively to one branch of his profession, and has had no

practical experience in that subject matter to which he is

called to testify, as if an oculist is called to testify as an

expert in insanity, his testimony would be inadmissible. 2

Hence, it has been held that a physician was incompetent to

express an opinion upon the question of insanity, whose

habit, it had been, when his patients required medical treat-

ment for insanity, to call. in the services of a physician who

had made a special study of mental diseases, or to recom-

mend their removal to a hospital for the insane. 3

44. Competency of Physicians to Testify as Experts

The Subject Continued. So in a recent case in Mississippi,

the court declared, that a medical practice confined to the
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treatment of ordinary diseases, does not qualify a physician

to testify as an expert upon insanity upon hypothetical in-

terrogations as to supposed facts, of which he had no

personal knowledge. 4 But his testimony is admissible if he

has a personal knowledge of the facts, 6 or if he has studied

somewhat the subject of psychological medicine. 6 It has

been held that a physician who had been in practice for

several years, but who had no experience as to the effect

upon health of breathing illuminating gas, could not testify

in relation thereto, as an expert. 7 The fact that he was a

* Hathaway v. National Life Ins. Co., 48 Vt. 335, 351; State v. Red-

dick, 7 Kans. 143.

Fairchild v. Bascomb, 35 Vt. 410.

3 Commonwealth v. Rice, 14 Gray (Mass.), 335.

4 Russell v. State, 53 Miss. 367.

* Baxter v. Abbott, 7 Gray (Mass.), 71.

'-State v. Reddick, 7 Kans. 143; Davis v. State, 35 Ind. 496. See too

Bitner v. Bitner, 65 Penn. St. 347, and Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Penn. St.

347.

7 Emerson v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 6 Allen, 14(3.

acquaintance with the subject, acquired by observation and
study, we cannot perceive on what ground he can be rejected because he has not been in the actual practice of his
profession." ' It is not necessary that a physician should
have made the particular disease involved in any inquiry, a
specialty, in order to make his testimony admissible as being
that of an expert. 1 But if he has devoted himself exclusively to one branch of his profession, and has had no
practical experience in that subject matter to which he is
called to testify, as 'if an oculist is called to testify as an
expert jn insanity, his testimony would be inadmissible. 2
Hence~ it has been held that a physician was incompetent to
express an opinion upon the question of insanity, whose
habit it had been, when his patients required medical treatment for insanity, to call.in the services of a physician who
had made a special study of mental diseases, or to recommend their removal to a hospital for the insane. 3
§ 4.4. Competency ·of Physicians to Testify as ExpertsThe Subject Continued.-So in a recent case iu Mississippi,
the court declared, that a medical practice confined to the
treatment of ordinary diseases, does not qualify a physician
to testify as an expert upon insanity upon hypothetical interrogations as to supposed facts, of which he had no
personal knowledge. 4 But his testimony is admissible if he
has a personal knowledge of the facts,1> or if he has studied
somewhat the subject of psychological medicine. 6 It has
been held that a physician who had been in practice for
several years, but who had no experience as to the effect
upon health of breathing illuminating gas, could not testify
in relation thereto,as an expert. 7 The fact that he was a
i Hathaway v. National Life Ins. Co., 4 Vt. 335, 351; State v. Reddick, 7 Kans. 143.
2 Fairchild v. Bascomb, 35 Vt. 410.
3 Commonwealth v. Rice, 14 Gray (Mass.) , 335.
4 Russell v. State, 53 Miss. 367.
5 Baxter v. Abbott, 7 Gray (Mass.), 71.
a.state v. Reddick, 7 Kans. 14-3; Davis v. 8 tate, 35 Ind. 496. See too
Bitner v. Bitner, 65 Penn. St. 347, and Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Penn. St.
34:7.
7 Emerson v. Lowell Ga Light Co., 6 Allen , 14:6.
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physician, it was said, did not necessarily give him any

knowledge of gas and its effects upon health ; and an expe-

rience in attending other persons who were alleged to have

been made sick by breathing gas from the same leak, was

pronounced insufficient. It has been held in New Jersey,

that a physician may be examined as to injuries done to the

eyes of a party by violence, although he may not be a sur-

geon or an oculist. 1 The case was decided upon the statute

of that State, which requires all physicians to be skilled in

both medicine, surgery and anatomy. A practicing physician

whose knowledge of the particular subject of inquiry was

derived from study alone, has been held competent to express

an opinion as an expert. 2 When a medical witness declines

to express an opinion on the ground of the want of sufficient

information, it is improper to ask him for his "impres-

sions." 3

45. Disqualifications Arising' from Information Ac-

quired while Attending Patient. In the absence of any

statutory provision to the contrary, it is well settled that a

physician or surgeon may be compelled to disclose any com-
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munications made to him in professional confidence. 4 A

physician, therefore, would not be incompetent at the com-

mon law, to testify to a professional opinion based on facts

which may have been learned by him from such communi-

cations.

But in several of the States statutes have been enacted

which have abrogated the common law rule on this subject.

In Wisconsin the statute is that ' ' no person duly authorized

to practice physic or surgery, shall be compelled to disclose

any information which he may have acquired in attending

1 Castner v. Sliker, 33 X. J. L. 95; s. c., ib. 507.

2 Taylor v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 48 X. H. 304. The opinion ex-

pressed in this case, was that injuries from railroad accidents were more

severe than from other causes, although bearing the same external

appearance.

3 Higbee v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 66 Barb. 462, 467.

4 Stephens' Dig. of Evidence, Art. 117; Dutchess of Kingston's Case,

Hargr. St. Tr. 243, 20 How. St. Tr. 613, 614; Ashland v. Marlborough, 99

Mass. 48; Barber v. Merriam, 11 Allen, 322; People .v. Stout, 3 Parker

Cr. Cas. 670.

physician, it was said, did not necessarily give him any
knowledge of gas ~nd its effects upon health; and an experience in attending other persons who were alleged to have
been made sick by breathing gas from the ame leak, was
pronounced insufficient. It ha been held in X ew ,Jersey,
that a physician may be examined as to injuries done to the
eyes of a party by violence, although he may not be a surgeon or an oculist. 1 The case was decided upon the statute
of that State, which 'requires all physicians to be. skilled in
both medicine, surgery and anatomy. A practicing physician
whose knowledge of the particular subject of inquiry was
derived from study alone, has been held competent to express
an opinion as an expert. 2 "\Vhen a medical witness declines
to express an opinion on the ground of the want of sufficient
information, it is improper to ask him for his "impressions." 3
§ 45. Disqualifications Arising from Information A~
quired while Attending· Patient.-In the absence of any
statutory provision to the contrar:y, it is well settled that a
physician or surgeon may be compelled to disclose any communications made to him in professional confidence. 4 A
physician, therefore, would not be incompetent at the common law, to testify to a professional opinion based on facts
which may hav~ been learned by him from· such communications.
But in several of the States statutes have been enacted
which have abrogated the common law rule on this subject.
In vVisconsin the statute is that '' no person duly authorized
to practice physic or surgery, shall be compelled to disclose
any information which he may have acquired in attending
Castner v. Sliker, 33 ::N". J. L. 95; s. c., ib. 507.
Taylor v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 4 ::N". H. 30-1. The opinion expressed in this case, was that injuries from railroad accident were more
severe than from other causes, although bearing the same external
appearance.
3 Higbee v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 66 Barb. 462, 467.
4 Stephens' Dig. of Evidence, Art. 117; Dutchess of Kingston's Case,
Hargr. St. Tr. 24.3, 20 How. St. Tr. 613, 61-1; Ashland v. Marlborough, 99
Mass. 48; Barber y, Merriam, 11 Allen, 32:2; People .v. Stout, 3 Parker
Cr. Cas. 670.
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any patient in a professional character, and which informa-

tion was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient

as a physician, or to do any act for him as a surgeon." 1

This provision is distinguished from the ones adopted in

New York, 2 Michigan, 3 Iowa, 4 Minnesota, 5 Missouri, 6 Ohio, 7

Indiana, 8 and Nebraska, 9 in which it is provided that the wit-

ness shall not be competent, or shall not be allowed to make

the disclosure, while in Wisconsin the language is that he

shall not be compelled to make the disclosure. But in Iowa,

Indiana and Minnesota, his testimony may be received with

the consent of the patient ; and in Minnesota the prohibition

is confined to civil cases.

46. Cases in which Physicians may Testify Notwith-

standing the Prohibitory Statutes. The statutory pro-

visions noticed in the preceding section were undoubtedly

designed for the exclusive protection of the patient, and al-

though the statutes declare that the physician ' ' shall not be

allowed " to make the disclosure, it is not believed that they

will be construed so as to prejudice the public interests,

provided the disclosure to be obtained manifestly works no
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injustice to the spirit and intent of the law. In a recent

case in New York, where a prisoner was charged with mur-

der committed by the administration of arsenic, the State

called as a witness the physician who attended the deceased

in a professional capacity, and inquired of him concerning

the symptoms exhibited by the deceased, and what he had

learned concerning his condition during the time of his at-

tendance upon him. Counsel for- the prisoner objected that

the examination was contrary to the statute, but the Su-

preme Court overruled the objection for the reason that it

1 Wisconsin Kev. Stat. (1878) p. 992, 4075.

2 Code, 834,

8 Comp. Laws, 5943.

< Code of 1873, p. 565, 3643.

* Stat. of 1878, p. 793, 10.

6 1 Rev. Stat. (1879) p. 690, 4017.

' 2 Rev. Stat. (1880) p. 1278, 5241.

8 2 Rev. Stat. (1876) p. 134, 2.

9 Gen. Stat. (1873) p. 582, 333.

any patient in a professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient
as a physician, or to do any act for him as a surgeon." 1
This provision is distinguished from the ones adopted in
New York, 2 Michigan, 3 Iowa, 4 Minnesota, 5 : M.issouri, 6 Ohio, 7
Indiana, 8 and Nebraska',9 in which it is provided that the witness shall not be competent, or shall not be allowed to make
the discloaurQ, while in Wisconsin the language _is that he
shall not be compelled to make the disclosure. But in Iowa,
Indiana and Minnesota, his testimony may be received with
the consent <?f the patient; and in Minnesota the prohibition
is confined to civil cases.
§ 46. Cases in which Physicians may Testify Notwith
standing the Prohibitory Statutes.-The statutory provisions noticed in the preceding section were undoubtedly
designed for the exclusive protection of the patient, and although the statutes declare that the physician "shall not be
allowed '' to make the disclosure, it is not believed that they
will be construed so as to prejudice the public interests,
provided the disclosure to be obtained manife tly works no
injustice to the spirit and intent of the law. In a recent
case in New York, where a prisoner was charged with murder committed by the administration of arsenic, the State
called as a witness the physician who attended the deceased
in a professional capacity, and inquired of him concerning .
the symptoms exhibited by the deceased, and what he had
learned concerning his condition during the time of his attendance upon him. Counsel for· the prisoner objected that
the examination was contrary to the sta~ute, but the Supreme Court overruled the objection for the reason that it
1

Wisconsin Rev. Stat. (1878) p. 992, § 4075.

Code, § 834,
s Comp. Laws, § 59±3.
4 Code of 1873, p. 565, § 36-13.
5 Stat. of 1878, p. 793, § 10.
6 1 Rev. Stat. (1879) p. 690, § 4017.
1 2 Rev. Stat. (i880) p . 1278, § 52±1.
s 2 Rev. Stat. (1876) p. 134, § 2.
9 Gen. Stat. (1873) p. 582, § 333.
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was not within the spirit and intent of the statute, although

within the letter." 1

The matter was taken to the Court of Appeals, and the

judgment of the Supreme Court affirmed, the court saying:

" That the purpose for which the aid of this statute is in-

voked in this case, is so utterly foreign to the purposes and

objects of the act, and so diametrically oppos-ed to any in-

tention which the legislature can be supposed to have had

in the enactment, so contrary to and inconsistent with its

spirit, which most clearly intended to protect the patient,

and not to shield one who is charged with his murder, that

in such a case the statute is not to be so construed as to be

used as a weapon of defense to the party so charged, instead

of a protection to his victim." ' 2

The same subject was under discussion in a subsequent

case which involved the mental capacity of a testator. The

surrogate excluded the testimony of a physician who at-

tended the testator, and who stated that all his knowledge

was derived from what he observed while attending de-

ceased professionally. The Supreme Court held that the
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testimony was admissible. That it did not involve the dis-

closure of any confidential information acquired in his pro-

fessional capacity, but of facts which were open to the ob-

servation of any person who had seen or conversed with the

testator. 3 The same question has been considered in Mich-

igan, where an objection was made against allowing the pro-

ponents of a will to examine a physician, for the purpose of

showing the condition of the decedent while he was treating

him professionally. The court held 4 that while the statute

covered information acquired by observation while the phy-

sician was in attendance upon his patient, as well as com-

munications made by the patient to him, 5 yet the rule it

1 Pierson v. People, 25 X. Y. Sup. Ct. 239.

2 Piersou v. People, 79 X . Y. 434.

3 Staunton v. Parker, 26 X. Y. Sup. Ct. 56. See also People v. Stout,

3 Parker Cr. Cas. 670; Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 31 N. Y.

Sup. Ct. 43.

4 Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 200, 224.

5 Briggs v. Briggs, 20 Mich. 34.

was not within the spirit and intent of the statute, although
within the letter.'' 1
The matter was taken to the Court of Appeals, and the
judgment of the Supreme Court affirmed, .the court saying:
" That the purpose for which the aid of this statute is invoked in this case, is so utterly foreign to the purposes and
objects of the act, and so diametrica1Iy oppo~ed to any intention which the legislature can be supposed to have had
in the enactment, so contrary to and inconsistent with its
spirit, which most clearly jntended to protect the patient,
and not to shield one who is charged with his murder, that
in such a case the statute is not to be so construed as to be
used as a weapon of defense to the party so charged, instead
of a protection to his victim.'' 2
The same subject was under discussion in a subsequent
case which involved the mental capacity of a testator. The
surrogate excluded the testimony of a physician who attended the testator, and who stated that all his knowledge
was derived from what he observed while attending deceased professionally. The Supreme Court held that the
testimony was admissible. That it did not involve the disclosure of any confidential information acquired in his profes sional capacity, but of facts :which were open to the observation of any person who had seen or conversed with the
testator. 3 The same q'u estion has been considered in Michigan, where an objection was made against allowing the proponents of a will to examine a physician, for the purpose of
showing the condition of the decedent while he was treating
· him professionally. The court held 4 that while the statute
coYered information acquired by observation while the physician was in attendance upon his patient, as well as com:.
munications made by the patient to him,5 yet the rule it
Pierson v. People, 25 :N. Y. Sup. Ut. 239.
Pierson v. People, 79 ~. Y. 434.
3 Staunton v. Parker, 26 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 56.
See also People v. Stout,
3 Parker Cr. Ca~. 670; Grattan v. 1\letropolitan Life Ins. Co., 31 N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 43.
~Fraser v. J ennison, 4:.! :Mich. 206, 224.
s Briggs v. Briggs, 20 Mich. SJ.
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established was one of privilege for the protection of the

patient, which he might waive if he saw fit ; l and that what

he might do in his lifetime, those who represented him af-

ter his death might also do for the protection of the inter-

ests they claimed under him. In a case in the St. Louis

Court of Appeals, arising under the Missouri statute, that

court declared that objective signs, which are obvious on an

observation of a patient by the physician, but which imply

no disclosure on the part of the patient, as well as symp-

toms which are apparent before the patient submits himself

to any examination, are not to be excluded under the statute.

"It is not an objection," remarked the court, "that the

trained eye of the physician might thus detect sure signs of

a given disease." 2 The same court in another case, has

declared that where the whole testimony of a physician is

excluded on the ground that he could not separate the im-

pressions received by him, growing out of the relation of

physician and patient, and those received by observation of

the patient when that relation did not exist, it is necessary

that the facts justifying such exclusion should appear. The
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statement of the physician that he is unable to distinguish

between such impressions, is not sufficient. And the fact

that such discrimination can be made by the witness, may

be developed on a proper cross-examination. 3

47. Opinions Based on Statements made out of Court

and not under Oath. The rule is that an expert cannot be

allowed to give his opinion based upon statements made to

him by parties out of court and not under oath. 4 His

opinion to be admissible, must be founded either on his

own personal knowledge of the facts, or else upon an

hypothetical question. 5 Hence the opinion of a physician,

called in consultation with the attending physicians, cannot

be received if based upon declarations made to him by such

1 Scripps v. Foster. 41 Mich. 742.

2 Linz v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 8 Mo. App. 369.

3 Gartside v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.. 8 Mo. App. 593.

4 Hurst v. The C. K. I. & P. E. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 76, 79.

5 Hunt v. State, 9 Tex. Ct. of App. 166.

established was one of privilege for the protection of the
patient, which he might waive if he saw fit; 1 . and that what
he might do in his lifetime, those who represented him after his death might also do for the protection of the interests they claimed under him. In a case in the St. Louis
Court of Appeals, arising under the :Missouri statute, that
court declared that objective signs, which are obvious on an
observation of a patient by the physician, but which imply
no disclof!ure on the part of the patient, as well as symptoms which are apparent before the patient submits himself
to any examination, are not to be excluded under the statute.
"It is not au objection," remarked the court, "that the
trained eye of the physician might thus detect sure signs of
a given disease.'' 2 The same court in another case, bas
declared that where the whole testimony of a physician is
excluded on the ground that he could not separate the impressions received by him, growing out of the relation of
physician and patient, and those received by observation of
the patient when that relation did not exist, it is uecesEary
that the facts justifying such exclusion should appear. The
statement of the physician that he is unable to distinguish
between such impression , is not sufficient. And the fact
that such discrimination c~n be made by the witnesA, may
be developed on a proper cross-examination. 3
§ 4 7. Opinions Base~ on Statements made out of Court
and not under Oath.- The rnle is that au expert cannot be
allowed to give his opinion based upon statements made to
him by parties out of court and not under oath .4 His
opinion to be admissible, niust be fQunded either on his
own personal knowledge of the f acts, or else upon an
hypothetical question. 5 Hence the opinion of a physician,
called in consultation with the attending physicians, cannot
be received if based upon declarations made to him by such
Scripps v. Foster, 41 Mich. 742.
Linz v. Mass. 1\Iut. Life Im;. Co. 8 Mo . APP· 369.
!3 Gart icle v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 8 Mo. App. 593.
4 Hur t v. The C.R. I. & P.R. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 76, 79.
s Hunt v. State, 9 Tex . Ct. of App. 166.
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physicians, or by the wife and nurse of the patient as to his

previous symptoms or condition. 1

48. Opinions of Physicians Based in part on Declara-

tions of Patients. But the principle stated in the preceding

section, does not apply to the opinions of a physician or

surgeon, based in part on statements made by the patient

himself to the physician, to enable the latter to determine

upon the proper course of treatment. Upon this point the

Supreme Court of Massachusetts says: " The opinion of

a surgeon or physician is necessarily formed in part on the

statements of his patient, describing his condition and symp-

toms, and the causes which have led to the injury or disease

under which he appears to be suffering. This opinion is

clearly competent as coming from an expert. * * The

existence of many bodily sensations and ailments which go

to make up the symptoms of disease or injury, can be

known only to the person who experiences them. It is the

statement and description of these which enter into, and

form part of the facts on which the opinion of an expert, as

to the condition of health or disease, is founded." 2 In a
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case in the Supreme Court of Illinois, it was said that a

physician must necessarily, in forming his opinion, be, to

some extent, guided by the statements of his patient, and

that the opinion of an expert, founded in part upon such

data, may be received in evidence. 3 In the same case, the

court held that the physician might state what the patient

said in describing his condition, if spoken under circum-

stances freeing it from suspicion of having been spoken with

reference to future litigation. A similar ruling has been

lately made in New Jersey, it being held that the declara-

tions made to a physician of bodily feelings and symptoms

of pregnancy, at the time of his examination, were admissi-

i Heald v. Thing, 45 Me. 392 ; Wood v. Sawyer, Phillips Law (X. C.)

253; Wetherbee's Exr's v. Wetherbee's Heirs, 38 Vt. 454; Hunt v. State,

9 Tex. Ct. of App. 166.

z Barber v. Merriam, 11 Allen, 322, 324. See also Thompson v. Treva-

nion, Skinner, 402; Aveson v. Kinnaird, 6 East. 188, 195, 197; Bacon v.

Charlton, 7 Cush. 581, 586; Denton v. State, 1 Swan (31 Tenn.) 279.

3 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Suttou, 42 111. 438.

physicians, or by the wife and nurse of the patient as to his
previous symptoms or condition .1
§ 48. Opinions of Physicians Based in part on Declarations of Patients.-But the principle stated in the preceding
section, does not apply to the opinions of a physician or
surgeon, baRed in part on statements made by the patient
himself to the physician, to enable the latter to determine
upon the proper course of treatment. Upon this point the
Supreme Court of :M~ssacl~usetts says: '' The opinion of
a surgeon or physician is necessarily formed in part on the
statements of his patient, describing his condition and symptoms, and the causes which have led to the injury or disease
under which he appears to be suffering. This opinion is
clearly competent as corning from an expert. * * The
Bxistence of many bodily sensations and ailments which go
to make up the symptoms of disease or injury, can be
known only to the person who experiences them. It is the
statement and description of these which enter into, and
form part of the facts on which the opinion of an expert, as
to the condition of health or disease, is founded." 2 In a
case in the Supreme Court of Illinois, it was said that a
physician must necessarily, in forming his opinion, be, to
some extent, guided by the statements of his patient·, and
that the opinion of an expert, founded in part upon such
data, may be received in evidence. 3 In the same case, the
court held that the physician might state what the patient
said in describing his condition, if spoken under circumstances freeiug it from suspicion of having been spoken with
reference to future litigation. A similar ruling has been
lately made in New .Jersey, it being held that the declarations made to a physician of bodily feelings and symptoms
of pregnancy, at the time of his examination, were admissi1 Heald v. Thing, 45 Me. 392; Wood v. Sawyer, Phillips Law (N. C.)
253; Wetherbee 's Exr's v. Wetherbee ·s Heirs, 38 Vt. 45-!; Hunt v. State,
9 Tex. Ct. of App. 166.
2 Barber v. Merriam, 11 Allen, 322, 324. See also Thompson v. Trevanion, Skinner, 402; Aveson v. Kinnaird, 6 Eat. 188, 195, 197; Bacon v.
Charlton, 7 Cush. 581, 586; Denton v. State, 1 Swan (31 Tenn.) 279.
3 Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Sutton, 42 Ill. 438.
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ble evidence as a part of the facts on which his opinion was

founded. 1 The jury should have these declarations, in order

that they may know whether the physician's conclusions

are careful, skillful and reliable. In a case in Alabama, the

court say that the physician may state the declarations of

the patient as to his symptoms and condition during pre-

vious similar attacks, when they form the predicate of his

opinion, in whole or in part, as to the duration and char-

acter of the disease. 2 Upon this general subject, a very

interesting case was decided by the Supreme Court of

Wisconsin in 1879, 3 and as it is worthy of careful con-

sideration, a somewhat detailed statement of it may not

be deemed inappropriate. The action was brought to re-

cover damages for an injury sustained by the negligence of

the defendant, the plaintiff claiming to be lame in her hip

and to suffer pain there, and that she was unable to use her

limb as she had used it before the accident. That it was

still so weak and painful as to render it unsafe for her to

attempt to walk without the aid of a crutch. At the sug-

gestion of the defendant, the plaintiff submitted to an
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examination by experts for the purpose of testing the truth-

fulness of the claim, and of placing before the jury her real

condition. The result of the examination was that the

experts found no such appearances as would indicate lame-

ness or pain. As one of the experts testified, " the general

opinion was that we could not find anything. The only way

I could tell that she ached, was by what she said, and how

she looked and appeared." Counsel for the defendant

claimed that an error was committed in permitting one of

the experts, who testified as above, to answer the following

questions :

"Question. Do you think that you could tell whether or

not she suffered pain by the movement of the hip, judging

from all the examination, including what she said? Answer.

I think I could. Q. Now go on and state whether, in your

1 State v. Geclicke, 43 N. J. L. 86.

2 Ecles v. Bates, 26 Ala. 655.

3 Quaife v. Chicago etc. K. R. Co., 48 Wis. 513.

ble evidence as a part of the facts on which his opinion wasfounded.1 The jury should have these declarations, in order
that they may know whether the physician's conclusions
are careful, skillful and reliable. In a case in Alabama, the
court say that the physician may state the declarations of
the patient as to his symptoms and condition during previous ~imilar attacks, when they form the predicate of his
opinion, in whole or in part, as to the duration and character of the disease. 2 Upon this general subject, a very
interesting case was decided by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in 1879,3 and as it is worthy of careful consideration, a somewhat detailed statement of it may not
be deemed inappr~priate. The action , was brought to recover damages for an injury sustained by the negligence of
the defendant, the plaintiff claimiug to be lame in her hip
and to suffer pain there, and that she was unable to use her
limb as she had used it before the accident. That it was
still so weak and painful as to render it unsafe for her to
attempt to walk without the aid of a crutch. At the suggestion of the defendant, the plaintiff submitted to an
examination by experts for the purpose of testing the truthfulness of the claim, and of placing before the jury her real
condition. The result of the examination was that the
experts found no such appearances as would indicate lameness or pain. As one of the experts testified, " the general
opinion was that we could not find anything. The only way
I could tell that she ached, was by what she said, and how
she looked and appea'r td.'' Counsel for the defendant
claimed that an error was committed in permitting one of
the experts, who testified as above, to answer the following
questions:
''Question. Do you think that you could tell whether or
not she suffered pain by the movement of the hip, judging
from all the examination, including what she said r .Answer.
I thjnk I could. Q. Now go on and state whether, in your
J

State v. Gedicke, 43 N. J. L. 86.
Ecles v. Bates, 26 Ala. 655.
s Quaife v. Chicago etc. R.R. Co., 48 Wis. 513.
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opinion, she did suffer pain? A. She gave every indication

of suffering pain. Q. In your opinion, did she suffer pain?

A. Yes, sir ; that is my opinion, that she did."

It was claimed that this was in effect, asking the witness

whether he believed the statements of the plaintiff that she

suffered pain. The Supreme Court held that the questions

were proper. That as the plaintiff insisted upon the fact of

lameness and pain, it was a question for the experts whether

such pains and lameness were imaginary, feigned or real ;

and that to determine this, it was necessary to resort to

other evidences than those to be derived from the limb

itself. "And in such case, we think it is clearly competent

for the expert to give an opinion from the general appear-

ance, actions and looks of the patient, and what she says at

the time in regard to her condition."

49. Opinions as to the Condition of a Patient. A

physician may give his opinion as to the actual condition of

a patient whom he has visited, 1 or whose symptoms and con-

dition have been described by others. 2 He may state his

belief that a woman had been delivered of a child within
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three or four days, and state his opinion as to the condition

of her mind at the time of giving birth to the child. 3 And

he may state what effect certain drugs would have upon a

person in a particular condition. 4 But it has been held that

he cannot be asked his opinion, from the condition of a

person whom he had not seen, as described by witnesses

whose testimony was conflicting, whether the attention of a

physician was necessary. 5

50. Opinions as to Cause of Death. The opinions of

physicians are also received as to the cause of the death of any

particular person ; such opinion being founded either upon

1 Bush v. Jackson, 24 Ala. 273; Bennett v. Fail, 20 Ala. 605.

2 Livingston v. Commonwealth, 14 Gratt. 592 ; Cooper v. State, 23

Texas, 336, 340.

3 State v. Matthews, 66 X. C. 113.

* Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 202, 210. That the opinions of

physicians are admissible as to the ordinary effect of medicines, see also

Cooper v. State, 23 Texas, 336, 340.

5 Wilkinson v. Mosely, 30 Ala. 562.

opinion, she did suffer pain? A. She gave every indication
of suffering pain. Q. In your opinion, did she suffer pain?
A . Yes, sir; that is my opinion, that she did."
It was claimed that this was in effect, asking the witness
whether he believed the statements of the plaintiff that she
suffered pain. The Supreme Court held that the questions
were proper. That as the plaintiff insisted upon the fact of
lameness and pain, it was a question for the experts whether
such pains and lameness were imaginary, feigned or real;
and that to determine this, it was necessary to resort to
other evidences than those to be derived from the limb
itself. ''And in such case, we think it is clearly competent
for the expert to give an opinion from the general appearance , actions and looks of the patient, and what she says at
the time in regard to her condition."
§ 49. Opinions as to the Condition of a Patient.-A
physician may give his opinion as to the actual condition of
a patient whom he has visited,1 or whose symptoms and condition have been described by others. 2 He may state his
b~lief that a woman had been delivered of a child within
three or four days, and state his opinion as to the condition
of her mind at the time of giving birth to the child .3 And
he may state what effect certain drugs would have upon a
person in a particular condition. 4 But it has been held that
he cannot be asked his opinion, from the condition of a
person whom he had not seen, as described by witnesses
whose testimony was conflicting, whether the attention of a
physician was necessary. 1>
§ 50 . Opinions as to Cause of Death.- The opinions of
physicians are also received as to the cause of the death of any
particular person; such opinion being founded either upon
Bush v. Jackson, 2-! Ala. 2i3; Bennett v. Fail, 2G Ala. 605.
Livingston v. Commonwealth, 14 Gratt. 592; Cooper v. State, 23
Texas, 336, 340.
3 State v. Matthews, 66 N . C. 113.
4 Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. (X. Y .) 202, 210.
That the opinions of
pllysicians are aumissible as to the ordinary effect of medicines, see also
Cooper v. State, 23 Texas, 336, 3-10.
5 Wilkinson v. Mosely, 30 Ala. 56:2.
1
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a personal knowledge of the facts of the case, or upon a

statement of the symptoms of the disease as detailed by

others. 1 If such opinions were not received, it would be

impossible in many cases to prove the cause and manner of

death ; especially in those cases where there was no one

present at the time of death. In such cases the opinions of

physicians and surgeons who have made a post-mortem

examination of the deceased, seem to be necessary in order

to ascertain the facts and clear up the mystery. And where

the attending physicians were dead at the time of trial, it

was held competent for the wife of the deceased to state the

declarations made to her at the time by the physicians, as

to the cause of death. The declarations made by them

were in the ordinary line of their professional duty, and as

such were receivable in evidence to establish the fact that

they entertained such opinion as they stated. 2

In a recent case in Arkansas, where the subject of inquiry

was as to the cause of death, the court considered the mode

of examination which should be pursued in such cases. The

case was one of alleged poisoning, and it was held not erro-
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neous to ask a physician to describe the symptoms of

strychnine in the human system, and stop and allow the

jury to compare the symptoms testified to by the witness

with those given by the expert, as to the usual effects of

strychnine, as affording some tendency to prove the manner

of death. "But," said the court, " although not erroneous,

such a course of examination is eminently unsatisfactory,

and liable to mislead. The proper course is to take the

opinion of the expert upon the facts given in evidence, not

as to the merits of the case, or the guilt or innocence of the

prisoner, but as to the cause of the death, so that the jury

may first determine whether any crime has been committed

by any one at all." B

1 Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472; State v. Bowman, 78 N. C. 509; Shelton

v. State, 34 Tex. 666; State v. Baptiste, 26 La. An. 134, 137; State v.

Smith, 32 Me. 370; Mitchell v. State, 58 Ala. 418; State v. Pike, 65 Me.

Ill, 114; Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117, 124.

* McNair v. National Life Ins. Co., 20 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 146. See, too,

Stephen's Dig. of Evidence, Art. 27, p. 33.

8 Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117, 124.

a personal knowledge of the facts of the case, or upon a
statement of the symptoms of the disease as detailed by
others. 1 If such opinions were not received, it would ·be
impossible in many cases to prove the cause and manner of
death; especially in those cases where there was no one
present at the time of death. In such cases the opinions of
physicians and surgeons who have made a post-mortem
examination of the deceased, seem to be necessary in order
to ascertain the facts and clear up the mystery. And 'Where
the attending physicians were dead at the time of trial, it
was held competent for the wife of the deceased· to state the
declarations made to her at the time by the physicians, as
to the cause of death. The declarations made by them
were in the ordinary line of their professional duty, and as
such were receivable in evidence to establish the fact .that
they entertained such opinion as they stated. 2
In a recent case in Arkansas, where the subject ?f inquiry
was as to the cause of death, the court considered the mode
of examination which should be pursued in such cases. The
case was one 0f alleged poisoning, and it was held not en:oneous to ask a physician to describe the symptoms of
strychnine in the human system, and etop and allow the
jury to compare the symptoms testified to by the witness
with those given by the _expert, as to the usual effects of
strychnine, as affording some tendency to prove the manner
of death. "But," said the court, "although not erroneous,.
' such a course of examination is eminently unsatisfactory,
and liable to ·mislead. The proper course is to take the
opinion of the expert upon the facts given in evidence, not
as to the merits of the case, or the guilt or innocence of the
prisoner, but as to the cause of the death, so that the jury
may first determine whether any crime ba_s been committed
by any one at all.'' 3
I Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472; State v. Bowman, 78 N. C. 509; Shelton
v. State, 34 Tex. 666; State v. Baptiste, 26 La. An. 134, 137; Statev.
Smith, 32 Me. 370; Mitchell v. State, 58 Ala. 418; State v. Pike, 65 Me.
111, 114; Polk v. State,36 Ark. 117·, 124.
:z McNair v. National Life Ins. Co., 20 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 146. See, too,
Stephen's Dig. of Evidence, Art. 27, p. 33.
s Polk y. State, 36 Ark. 117, 124.
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51. The Nature and Symptoms of Disease. The

opinions of witnesses skilled in the science and practice of

medicine, are admissible as to the nature of the disease a

person is afflicted with, 1 and as to how long he has probably

been afflicted with it. 2 Their opinions are also received as

to the severity and ordinary duration of the disease, 3 as well

as to the probability of its recurrence, 4 and the effects upon

the general health. 5 They are also permitted to testify as to

the cause of the disease and the remedy for it, 6 and to de-

scribe the symptoms of any particular disease, 7 explaining

its characteristics, 8 and that it is contagious. 9 And an at-

tending physician may be asked whether he ever saw any

appearance of a certain disease in the family of a particular

person, 10 and that before a certain injury he considered the

person to be a hearty and vigorous man. 11

1 Napier v. Ferguson, 2 P. & B. (New Brans.) 415; Polk v. State, 36

Ark. 117, 124; Tatum v. Mohr, 21 Ark. 354; Hook v. Stovall, 26 Ga. 704;

Flynt v. Bodenhamer, 80 N. C. 205, 208; Jones v. White, 11 Humph.

(Teun.) 268; Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa. St. 342, 344; Lush v. McDaniel,

13 Ired. (N. C.) 485; Washington v. Cole, 6 Ala. 212; Linton v. Hurley,
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14 Gray (Mass.), 191; Cooper v. State, 23 Tex. 336, 340; State v. Ten-ill,

12 Rich. (S. C.) 321.

2 Lush v. McDaniel, 13 Ired. (N. C.) 485; Bennett v. Fail, 26 Ala. 605;

Edington v. ./Etna Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 564, 568; Tatum v. Mohr, 21

§ 51. The Nature and Symptoms of Disease.-The
opinions of witnesses skilled in the science and practice of
medicine, are admissible as to the nature of the disease a
·person is affiicted with,1 and as to how long he has probably
been affiicted with it. 2 Their opinions are also received as
to the severity and ordinary duration of the disease, a as well
as to the probability of its recurrence, 4 and the effects upon
the general health. 5 They are also permitted to testify as to
the cause of the disease and the remedy for it, 6 and to describe the symptoms of any particular disease, 7 explaining
its characteristics, 8 and that it is contagious .9 And an attending physician may be asked whether he ever saw any
appearance of a certain disease in the family of a particular
person, 10 and that before a certain injury he considered the
person to be a hearty and vigorous man.11

Ark. 354 ; Eckles v. Bates, 26 Ala. 655.

3 Linton v. Hurley, 14 Gray (Mass.), 191; Willey v. Portsmouth, 35 N.

H. 303, 308.

* Filer v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co.. 49 N. Y. 42.

5 Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Penn. St. 344, 342 ; Flynt v. Bodenhamer, SO N.

C. 205, 208; Filer v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 49 N. Y. 42; Anthony v.

Smith, 4 Bos. (N. Y.) 503.

6 Matteson v. N. Y. etc. R. R. Co., 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 364; Jones v.

Tucker, 41 N. H. 546; Cooper v. State, 23 Tex. 336, 340; Napier v. Fer-

guson, 2 P. & B. (New Brans.) 415.

7 Welch v. Brooks, 10 Rich. (S. C.) 124; State v. Ten-ill, 12 Rich. (S. C.)

3-21 ; United States v. McGlue, 1 Curtis C. C. 1, 9; Napier v. Ferguson, 2

P. & B. (Xew Brims.) 415; Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472; People v. Robin-

son, 2 ParKer Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 236; Lake v. People, 1 Parker Cr. Cas.

(X. Y.) 495.

8 Jones v. White, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 268, Washington v. Cole, 6 Ala.

212.

9 Moore v. State, 17 Ohio St. 521. 526.

10 Morrissey v. Inghain, 111 Mass. 63.

11 Sanderson v. Nashua, 44 N. H. 492.

Xapier v. Ferguson, 2 P. & B. (New Bruns.) 415; Polk v. State, 36
Ark. 117, 12~; Tatum v. Mohr, 21Ark.354; Hook v. Stovall, 26 Ga. 704;
Flynt v. Bodenhamer, 80 N. C. 205, 208; Jones v. White, 11 Humph.
(Tenn.) 268; Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa. St. 342, 3-i-i; Lush v. MeDani_el,
13 Ired. (N. C.) 485; Washington v. Cole, 6 Ala. 212; Linton v. Hurley,
14 Gray (Mass.), 191; Cooper v. State, 23 Tex. 336, 340; State v. TE>rrill,
12 Rich. (S . C.) 321.
2 Lush v. McDaniel, 13 Ired. (N. C.) 485; Bennett v. Fail, 26 Ala. 605;
Edington v . ..iEtna Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 564, 568; Tatum v. ~Iohr, 21
Ark. 354; Eckles v. Bates, 26 Ala. 655.
s Linton v. Hurley, 1-1 Gray (Mass .), 191; Willey v. Portsmouth, 35 N.
H. 303, 308.
4 Filer v. N. Y. Central R.R. Co .. 49 N. Y. 42.
5 Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Penn. St. 344, 342; Flynt v. Bodenhamer,80 N.
0 . 205, 208; Filer v. N. Y. Uentral R. Co., 49 N. Y . 42; Anthony v.
Smith, 4 Bos. (N. Y.) 503.
6 Matteson v. N. Y. etc. R. R. Co., 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 364; Jones v.
Tucker, 41 N. II. 546; Cooper v. State, 23 Tex. 336, 340; Napier v. Ferguson, 2 P. & B. (Xew Bruns.) 415.
1 Welch v. Brooks, 10 Rich. (S. C.) 124; State v. Terrill, 12 Rich. (S. C.)
321; United States v. ~lcGlue, 1 Curtis C. C. 1, 9; Napier v. Ferguson, 2
P. & B. (Xew Bruns.) 415; Pitts v. State, 43 :Miss. 472; People v. Robinson, 2 Pa.rRer Or. Oas. (S . Y.) 236; L::i.ke v. People, 1 Parker Or. Oas.
(N. Y.) 495.
8 Jones v. V{hite, 11 Humph. (Tenn .) 268, Washington v. Cole, 6 A.la.
212.
9 Moore v. State, 17 Ohio St. 521! 526.
io Morrissey v. Ingham, 111 Mass. 63.
11 Sanderson v. Nashua, 44 N. H. 492.
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52. Wlio are Competent to express Opinions in such

Cases. A physician may testify that a certain disease pre-

vailed in a certain neighborhood at a certain time. 1 But it has

been held that one not an expert cannot testify whether there

was any case of a particular disease in the neighborhood in

question. 2 And the general rule seems to be that one who

is not skilled in the science or practice of- medicine, is not

competent to express an opinion that a person is afflicted

with a particular disease. 3 But any person of ordinary un-

derstanding is competent to form an opinion, whether one

whom he has had an opportunity of observing, and with

whom he has been acquainted, appeared to be sick or well. 4

It has been held, too, that a person who is not a physician

may testify whether it was necessary for a party to receive

medical assistance, and the length of time such assistance

was necessary. " But, in a question of this kind, any per-

son of intelligence is capable of judging of the necessity of

medical advice and services. It is universally acted upon

by all classes of mankind, and we are not disposed to lay

down a rule that none but a physician is competent to prove

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 20:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t71v5cx5m
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

that a person is sick, or so sick as to require medical ad-

vice." 5 A non-professional witness may also testify that a

person was decidedly worse at one time than he was at

another, and could not do so much work as before his

testimony being based on facts within his observation. 6

1 Lush v. McDaniel, 13 Ired. 485.

2 Evans v. People, 12 Mich. 27.

3 Lush Y. McDaniel, 13 Ired. (X, C.) 485; Thompson v. Bertrand, 23

Ark. 730; Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. George, 19 111. 510, 516; Shawnee-

town v. Mason, 82 111. 337, 339.

4 Bennett v. Fail, 26 Ala. 605; Barker v. Coleman, 35 Ala. 221 ; Stone

v. Watson, 37 Ala. 279; Higbie v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 53 X.

Y. 603; s. c., 66 Barb. 462; Shawneetown v. Mason, supra. Brown Y.

Lester, Ga. Decis. Part I, 77; See Thompson T. Bertrand, 23 Ark. 730.

fl Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. George, 19 111. 510.

6 Parker v. Boston, etc. Steamboat Co. 109 Mass. 449. This case dis-

tinguishes Ashland v. Marlborough, 99 Mass. 48 (which held that one not

an expert could not testify that another " did not appear like a well

man "), upon the ground that the witness in the latter case had not tes-

tified to any appearances which indicated disease, such as weakness or

§ 5 2. Who are Competent to expr ess Opinions in such
Cases.- A physician may testify that a certain disease prevailed in a certain neighborhood at a certain time.1 But it has
been held that one not an expert cannot testify whether there
was any case of a particular disease in the neighborhood in
question. 2 A11d the general rule seems to be that one who
is not skilled in the science or practice of. medicine, is not
competent to express an opinion -that a person is affiicted
with a particular disease. 3 But any person of ordinary understanding is competent to form an opinion, whether one
whom be has had a.n opportunity of observing, and with
whom he has been acquainted, appeared to be sick or well. 4
It has been held, too, that a person who is not a physician
may testify whether it was necessary for a party to receive
medical assistance, and the length of time such assistance
was necessary. "But, in a question of this kind, any person of intelligence is capable of judging of the necessity of
medical advice and services. It is universally acted upon
by all classes of mankind, and we are not disposed to lay
down a rule that none but a physician is competent to prove
that a person is sick, or so sick as to require medical adviee.'' 15 A non-professional witness may also testify that a
person was decidedly worse at one time than he was at
another, and could not do so much work as before - his
testimony being based on facts within bis observation. 6

inability to labor.

Lush v. McDaniel, 13 Ired. 485.
Evans v. People, 12 :M:ich. 27.
3 Lush v. McDaniel, 13 Ired. (N, C.) 485; Thompson v. Bertrand, 23
Ark. 730; Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. George, 19 Ill. 510, 516; Shawneetown. v. Mason, 82 Ill. 337, 339.
4 Bennett v. Fail, 26 Ala. 605; Barker v. Coleman, 35 Ala. 221; Stone
v. Watson, 37 Ala. 279; Higbie v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 53 N.
Y. 603; s. c., 66 Barb. 462; Shawneetown v. Mason, su,pm; Brown Y.
Lester, Ga. Decis. Part I, 77; See Thompson v. Bertrand, 23 Ark. 730.
"'5 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. George, 19 Ill. 510.
e1 Parker v. Boston, etc. Steamboat Co. 109 Mass. 449.
This case distingnishes Ashland v. Marlborough, 99 Mass. 48 (which held that one not
an expert could not testify tliat another " did not appear like a well
man"), upon the ground that the witness in the latter case had not tes tified to any appearances which indicated disease, such as weakness or
inability to labor.
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But such a witness cannot testify that he thought a person

was going to die. 1 In an action on a warranty of a slave, a

person who was not an expert has been permitted to testify as

to his opinion of the soundness of the slave, stating the facts

upon which his opinion was founded. 2 So a wife has been per-

mitted to testify that her husband had a rupture ; the testi-

mony being received upon the theory that it was not a fact

resting in opinion, and its determination did not involve any

question of science or skill. 3 But where the question was

whether a woman had been pregnant, the opinions of un-

professional witnesses were held to be inadmissible. 4 In

Alabama it is laid down that any person may speak of the

existence of disease in another, when the disease is percep-

tible by the senses. 5 In a case in Michigan it is said, that

" no witness, medical or otherwise, can be allowed to

give testimony from his observation concerning the nature

of a person's illness or its causes, without proof both of a

sufficient examination, and such knowledge or experience

as will qualify him to offer an opinion." 6

53. Nature and Effect of Wounds. The opinions of
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physicians and surgeons are admissible as to what would be

the natural and probable results of wounds, 7 and whether

they were sufficient to cause death. 8 In a recent case, where

it was objected that the physician who made the post-mortem

examination of the deceased, could not express an opinion

that death resulted from concussion of the brain, unless he

had opened the head and examined the brain, the court

1 Blackmail v. Johnson, 35 Ala. 252.

* Norton v. Moore, 40 Tenn. 483.

3 Duntz v. Van Beuron, 12 N. T. Sup. Ct. 6-48.

< Boies v. McAllister, 12 Me. 310.

Milton v. Rowland, 11 Ala. 732; Fountain v. Brown, 38 Ala. 72 ; Wil-

keson v. Mosely, 30 Ala. 562.

8 People v. Olmstead, 30 Mich. 434; s. c., 1 Hawley's Cr. R. 301.

7 Curry v. State, 5 Neb. 412 ; State v. Porter, 34 Iowa, 131 ; Page v.

State, 61 Ala. 16; Kline v. The K. C., St. J. etc. R. Co., 50 Iowa, 656,

660; State v. Stoyell, 70 Me. 360.

8 State v. Powell. 7 N. J. Law, 295; Livingston r. Commonwealth, 14

Gratt. (Va.) 592; State v. Morphy, 33 Iowa, 272; Ebos v. State, 34 Ark.

520; State v. Jones, 68 X. C. 443; State v. Matthews, 66 N. C. 113.

(6)

But such a witness cannot testify that he thought a person
was going to die. 1 In an action on a warranty of a elave, a
person who was not an exp~rt has been permitted to testify as
to his opinion of the soundness of the slave, stating the facts
upon which his opinion was founded. 2 So a wife has been permitted to testify that her husband had a rupture ; the testimony being received upon the theory that it was not a fact
resting in opinion, and its determination did not involve any
question of science or skill. 3 But where the question was
whether a woman had been pregnant, the opinions of unprofessional witnesses were held to be inadmissible.' In
Alabama it is laid down that any person may speak of the
existence of disease in another, when the disease is perceptible by the senses. 5 In a ca::-;e in Michigan it is said, that
" no witness, medical or otherwise, can be allowed to
give testimony from his observation concerning the nature
of a person's illness or its causes, without proof both of a
sufficient examination, and such knowledge or experience
as will qualify him to offer an opinion." 6
§ 53. Nature and Effect of Wounds.-The opinions of
physicians and surgeons are admissible as to what would be
the natural and probable results of wounds,7 and whether
they were sufficient to cause death. 8 In a recent case, where
it was objected that the physician who made the post-mortem
examinatif>n of the deceased, could not express an opinion
that death resulted from concussion of the brain, unless he
had opened the head and examined the brain, the court
1

Blackman v. Joh nson , 35 Ala. 252.
Norton v. Moore, 40 T enn. 483.
3 Duntz v. V an Beuren, 12 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 648.
4 Boies v. McAllister, 12 Me. 310.
'Milton v. R owland, 11 Ala. 732; F ountain v. Brown , 38 Ala. 72; Wil keson v. Mosely, 30 Ala. 562.
8 P eople v . Olmstead, 30 Mich. 434; s. c., 1 H awley's Cr. R. 301.
7 Curry v. State, 5 Neb. 412; State v. Porter, 34 Iowa., 131; Page v.
State , 61 Ala . 16; Kline v. The K. C., St. J. etc. R. C-0., 50 Iowa, 656,
660; State v. Stoyell, 70 Me. 360.
8 State v. Powell, 7 N. J. Law, 295; Livingst-On v. C-Ommonwealth, 14
Gratt. (Va .) 592; State v. Morphy, 33 Iowa, 272; Et>os v. State, 34 Ark.
520 ; State v. J ones, 68 N. C. 443 ; State v. Matthews, 66 N. C. 113.
(6)
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said : " We are aware of no law that required him to open

the skull and examine the brain, before he could be per-

mitted to express such an opinion to the jury. Of course,

the opinion of a medical witness in such case would have

more or less weight with the jury, according to the extent

of the examination, the professional rank and character of

the witness." 1 They are allowed to give their opinion as to

whether the effects of the wound are permanent in their

nature, 3 and as to the probable effect of the wound on the

general health of the injured person, whether in consequence

of it he is liable to any particular disease. 3 The opinion of

an expert has been received as to which of two wounds,

either by itself necessarily fatal, actually caused the death

of the deceased. 4 The opinion of such a witness has been

received, too, as to whether the fracture of a skull was

recently made, the body having been found six months

after the person's disappearance. 5 And it is not necessary

that the expert should have actually seen the wound, pro-

vided he has heard it described. 6 He may express an opin-

ion that a wound was inflicted after death. 7 It has been
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held that a non-professional witness, who had seen the

wounded person, could describe the wound as inflamed and

tender to the touch, and could testify that such person com-

plained of stiffness in the fingers, and in the neck and in the

jaws, and that since the injury the witness had observed

that the wounded man could not use his arm as he could

before. 8 And one need not be an expert to testify as to

the condition of a person's health and body before and

after an injury. 9 It has been held that a physician or

1 Ebos v. State, supra.

8 Wilt v. Vickers, 8 Watts, (Perm.) 227; Eowell v. City of Lowell, 11

Gray (Mass.), 420; Noblesville etc. R. R. Co. v. Gause, 76 Ind. 142;

Maeer v. Third Avenue R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. Superior Ct. 461.

8 Montgomery v. Town of Scott, 34 Wis. 338.

4 Eggler v. People, 56 N. Y. 642.

s Lindsay v. People, 63 N. Y. 143.

6 State v. Powell, 7 N. J. Law, 295; Page v. State, 61 Ala. 16.

7 State r. Harris, 63 N. C. 1 ; Shelton v. State, 34 Texas, 666.

8 Craig v. Gerrish, to appear in 58 N. H. ; s. c. 25 Alb. L. J. 498.

9 Townsdin v. Xutt, 19 Kans. 282.

said : " We are aware of no law that required him to open
the skull and examine the brain, before he could be permitted to express such an opinion to the jury. Of ~ourse,
the opinion of a medical witness in such case would have
more or less weight with the jury, according to the extent
of the examination, the professional rank and char cter of
the witness.' ' 1 They are allowed to give their opinion as to
whether the effects of the wound are permanent in their
nature·,:.i and as to the probable effect of the wound on the
general health of the injured person, whether in consequence
of it he is liable to any particular disease. 3 The opinion of
an expert has been received as to which of two ';VOUnds,
either by itself necessarily fatal, actually caused the death
of the deceased. 4 The opinion of such a witness has been
received, too, as to whether the fracture -of a skull was
recently made, the body having been found six months
after the person's disappearance. 0 And it is not necessary
that the expert should have actually seen the wound, provided he has heard it described. 6 He may express an ot>inion that a wound was inflicted after death. 7 It has been
held that a non.. professional witness, who had seen the
wounded person, could describe the wound as inflamed and
tender to the touch, and could testify that such person complained of stiffness in the :fingers, and in the neck and in the
jaws, and that since the injury the witness had observed
that the wounded man could not use his arrn as he could
before. 8 And one need not be an expert to testify us to
the condition of a person's health and body before and
after an injury .9 It has been held that a physician or
Ebos v. State, supra.
Wilt v. Vickers,~ Watts, (Penn.) 227; Rowell v. City of Lowell, 11
Gray (Mass.), 420; Noblesville etc. R. R. Co. v. Gause, 76 Ind. 142;
· 1ilaecr v. Third Avenue R.R. Co., 47 N. Y. Superior Ct. 461.
3 Montgomery v. Town of Scott, 34 Wis. 338.
•Eggler v. People, 56 N. Y. 642.
s Lindsay v. People, 63 N. Y. 143.
G State v. Powell, 7 N. J. I .aw, 295; Page v. State, 61 Aln..16.
7 State T. Harris, 63 N. C. 1; Shelton v. State, 34 Texas, 666.
8 Craig v. Gerrish, to appear ·in 58 N. H.; s. c. 25 Alb. L .•T. 498.
g Townsdin v. Nutt, 19 Kans. 282.
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or surgeon may testify as to the amount of force required

to break a person's skull, his opinion being based on his

familiarity with anatomy, and his knowledge of the struc-

ture, thickness and strength of the human skull generally. 1

It has been held, too, that one having a knowledge of gun

shot wounds, may be asked as to the posture and position

of the deceased at the time he was shot, 2 and whether, if he

was in a stooping position at the time he was struck, the

ball would have taken the course which it did. 3 But it has

been held that a physician or surgeon is not an expert as to

the manner of giving blows upon the head, and is, there-

fore, incompetent to express an opinion as to the position

of the body when struck. "The form, nature, extent,

depth, length, width and direction of the wound being

given, and its precise location on the head, with a general

statement of the amount of force requisite, and the probable

shape of the instrument, the jury can judge as well as any

one, in what position the head or the body probably was

when the blow was given." 4 For the purpose of explaining

and rendering his evidence intelligible to the jury, an expert
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may be allowed, in describing wounds, to make use of

plates and diagrams, although not cluimed to be strictly

accurate, and not intended to be used as evidence. 5 In the

trial of a person indicted for murder, counsel for the pris-

oner insisted that experts should have been summoned to

show that the wound inflicted was dangerous, or mortal, or

caused death. The court held that no such testimony was

necessary, as it appeared that the deceased was a strong

and apparently healthy man, who took to his bed immedi-

ately after the wound, suffered intensely for two days, and

then died. 6 And on the trial of an indictment for murder,

where a witness testified that he had made certain experi-

1 Kennedy v. People, 39 N. Y. 245.

2 State v. Jones, 63 N. G. 443.

4 Commonwealth v. Lenox, 3 Brewster, 249.

< Kennedy v. People, 39 X. Y. 245, 256.

5 State v. Knight, 43 Me. 1, 130.

6 State "Murphy, 9 Nevada, 394.

or surgeon may testify as to the amount of force required
to break a person's skull, his opinion being based on his
familiarity with anatomy, and his knowledge of the structure, thickness and strength of the human skull generally .1
It has been held, too, that one having a knowledge of gun
shot wounds, may be asked as to the posture and position
of the deceased at the time he was shot, 2 and whether, if he
was in a stooping position at the time he was struck, the
ball would have taken the course which it did. 3 But it has
been held that n. physician or surgeon is not an expert as to the manner of giving blows upon the head, and is, therefore, incompetent to express an opinion as to the position
of the body when struck. "The form, nature, extent>
depth, length, width and direction of the wound being
given, and its precise location on the head, with a general
statement of the amount of force requisite, and the probable
shape of the instrument, the jury can judge as well as any
one, in what position the head or the body probably was
when the blow was given." 4 For the purpose of explaining
and rendering his evidence intelligible to the jury, an expert
may be allowed, in describing wounds, to make use of
plates and diagrams, although not cPtl.imed to be strictly
accurate, and not intended to be used as evidence. 6 In the
trial of a. person indicted for murder, counsel for the prisoner insisted that experts should have been summoned to
show that the wound inflicted was dangerous, or mortal, or
caused death. The court held that no such testimony was
necessary, as ii appeared that the deceased was a strong
and apparently healthy man, who took to his. bed immediately after the wound, suffered intensely for two days, and
then died. 6 And on the trial of an indictment for ·murder,
where a witness testified that he bad made certain experi1

Ke1rnedy v. People, 39 N. Y. 245.
State v. Jones, 6 N. C. 4-13.
is Commonwealth v. Lenox, 3 Brew•ter, 249.
4 Kennedy v. People, 39 N. Y. 245, 256.
5 State v. Knight, 43 Me. 1, 130.
6 State "" . "\forphy, 9 Nevada, 394.
2

84

,EXPERT TESTIMONY.

84 ^EXPERT TESTIMONY.

ments upon a dynamometer, an instrument for measur-

ing the force of blows and the weight of falling bodies,

by striking it with a bat of substantially the same form and

weight as that with which the government contended the

murder was committed, it was held that the court might, in

its discretion, properly reject such testimony, unless the

experiments were shown to have been made under condi-

tions the same as those existing in the case on trial. 1

54. Character of Instrument with which Wound was

Produced. A practicing physician or surgeon may be asked

his opinion as to the kind of instrument used in inflicting

wounds, 2 as whether a wound was produced with a blunt

or a sharp instrument ; 8 and whether the fractures on the

sknll of the deceased, produced in court, were caused by

blows from a gun shown to the witness ; *. also whether the

skin of a person's throat had been cut by a sharp instru-

ment, or torn. 5 It has been held proper to show that the

corner of a hatchet's edge, if held by a person standing in

front of the deceased while he was on his feet, exactly fitted

the hole in the skull. 6 A surgical expert who had examined
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the wound, has been allowed to testify, whether, from its

form and appearance, it could have been produced by a

razor ; 7 and whether certain injuries to the head could have

been produced at the same time, and by one blow ; 8 also

whether the wounds could have been inflicted accidentally : 9

and whether the wound could have been produced by coming

in contact with a body of hard material, where there were

no sharp angles or points. 10 A physician and surgeon of

experience with gunshot wounds, may testify whether a

l! Corcmonwealth v. Piper, 120 Mass. 185.

a Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15, 35; State v. Porter, 34 Iowa, 131.

3 State v. Morphy, 33 Iowa, 272.

4 Gardner y. People, 6 Parker Cr. Cas. 155.

8 State v. Clark, 12 Ired. Law (N. C.) 152.

8 Colt v. People, 1 Parker Cr. Cas. 611, 620.

* State v. Knight, 43 Me. 1, 130.

8 Commonwealth v. Piper, 120 Mass. 185.

8 Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15, 37.

u State v. Pike, 65 Me. Ill, 114.

men ts upon a dynamo meter, an ·instrument for measuring the force of blows and the weight of falling bodies,
l>y striking it with a bat of substantially the same form and
weight as that with ·which the government contended the
murder was committed, it was held that the court might, in
its discretion, properly reject such testimony, unless ihe
experiments were shown to have been made under conditions the same as those existing in the case on trial .1
§ 54. Character of Instrument with which Wound was
Produced.-A practicing physician or surgeon may be asked
his opinion as to the kind of instrument used in inflicting
wounds, 2 as whether a wound was produced with a blunt
tJr a sharp instrument; 8 and whether the fractures on the
skull of the deceased, produced in court, were caused by
lllows from a gun shown to the witness; 4 • also whether the
skin of a person's throat had been cut by a sharp instrument, or torn.t> It has been held proper to show that the
eorner of a hatchet's edge, if held by a person standing in
front of the deceased while he was on his feet, exactly fitted
the hole in the skull. 6 A surgical expert who had examined
the wound, has been allowed to testify, whether, from its
fo:rm and appearance, it could have been produced by a
razor; 7 and whether certain injuries to the head could have
been produced at the same time, and by one blow ; 8 also
whether the wounds could have been inflicted accidentally ;9
snd whether the wound could have been produced by coming
in contact with a body of hard material, where there were'
no sharp angl~s or points. 10 A physician and surgeon of
experience with gunshot wounds, may testify whether a
0ommonwealth v. Piper, 120 Mass. 185.
ll Davis v. St.ate, 38 Md. 15, 35; St.ate v. Porter, 34 Iowa, 131.
i1

3

State v. Morphy, 33 Iowa, 272.
•Gardner v. People, 6 Parker Cr. Cas. lM.
1t State v. Clark, 12 Ired. Law (N. C.) 152.
6 Colt v. People, 1 Parker Cr. Cas. 611, 620.
q;tate v. Knight, 43 Me. 1, 130.
&·Commonwealth v. Piper, 120 Mass. 18:1.
~Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15, 37.
18 State v.. Pike, 65 Me. 111, 114.
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wound was inflicted by a shot from a gun, 1 and he may ex-

plain to the jury why the wound looks smaller than the ball

which caused it. 2

55. AVho are Competent to Express Opinions as te

the Instrument Used. It seems that one who is not skilled

in the science of medicine or surgery, is not competent to

express an opinion as to whether a wound was made by a

gunshot, or by a knife or other sharp instrument, no matter

what may have been his experience and observation. 8 But

a physician or surgeon, although he has never seen a wound

made by a knife or dirk, is competent to express an opinion,

if he states that from his general acquaintance with the

human body, and his knowledge of the practice and princi-

ples of surgery, he believes he can successfully distinguish

and form a correct opinion in the case. 4

5(>. Opinions of Medical Experts as to Mental Condi-

tion. The general rule undoubtedly is that the opinions of

medical experts are admissible, where the question involved

relates to soundness or unsoundness of mind. If a physi-

cian visits a person, and from actual examination or obser-
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vation becomes acquainted with his mental condition, there

would seem to be no good reason why he should not state

to the jury his opinion as to such person's sanity or insanity,

mental soundness or unsoundness, at the time he thus ob-

served him. As Mr. Chief Justice DILLON expressed it, in

a case in Iowa : " There is no more reason why he may not

do this, than why he might not testify that he saw a certain

person at a certain time, and that he was then laboring un-

der an epileptic fit, or under an attack of typhus fever, or

had been stricken down and rendered unconscious by aii

apoplectic stroke." 5

It is not to be supposed, however, that it ia at all essen-

tial that a physician should have seen the person, and made

1 Rash v. State, 61 Ala. 90; Colt v. People, 1 Parker Or. Cas. 611, 620.

1 Schlencker v. State, 9 Neb. 250.

Caleb v. State, 39 Miss. 721 ; Rash v. State, Gl Ala, 90.

4 Mendum v. Commonwealth, 6 Rand. (Va.) 704. See too, State v,

Clark, 12 Ired. (X. C.) Law, 152.

s State v. Felter, 25 Iowa, G7. 75.

wound was inflicted by a shot from a gun, 1 and he may ~x
plain to the jury why the wound looks smaller than the ball
which caused it. 2
§ 5 5. 'Vho are Competent to Express Opinions as to
the Instrument Used.-It seems that one who is not skilled
in the science of medicine or surgery, is not competent ta
express an opinion as to whether a wound was made by a
gunshot, or by a knife or other sharp instrument, no matter
what may have been his experience and observation ..3 But
a physician or surgeon, although he has never seen a WGuml
made by a knife or dirk, is competent to express an opinion.,
if he states that from bis general acquaintance with the
human body, and his knowledge of the practice and principles of surgery, he believes he can successfully distinguish
and . form a correct opinion in the case. 4
§ 56. Opinions of Medical Experts as to Mental Condition.- The .general rule undoubtedly is that the opinions of
medical experts are admissible, where the question involved
relates to soundness or unsoundness of mind. If a. physician visits a person, and from actual examination or observation becomes acquainted with his mental condition, there
would seem to be no good reason why he should not state
to the jury his opinion as to such person's sanity or insanity,
mental soundness or unsoundness, at the time he thus observed him. As Mr. Chief Justice DILLON expressed it, in
a case in Iowa : '' There is no more reason why he may not
do this, than why he might not testify that he saw a certain
person at a certain time, and that he was then laboring under uu epileptic fit, or under an attack of typhus fever, or
had been stricken down and rendered unconscious by a11
apoplectic stroke." 6
It is not to be supposed, however, that it is at all essential that a physician should have seen the person, and made
1

Rah v. State, 61 Ala. 90; Colt v. People, 1 Parker Cr. Cas. 611, 620.
Srhlencker v. State, 9 Neb. 250.
8 Caleb v. State, 39 Miss. 721; Rae;b v. State, 61 Ala, 90.
4 Mendum v. Commonwealth~ 6 Rand. (Va.) 704.
See too, State v.
Clark, 12 Ired. (N. C.) Law 152.
s State v. Felter, 25 Iowa, G7. 75.
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a personal examination of the case, in order to make him

competent to express an opinion as to his mental condition.

On the contrary, the rule is that his opinion is admissible,

whether it is founded on facts within his personal observa-

tion, or upon a hypothetical case based on the testimony of

others. 1 But where he has made a personal examination it

is necessary for him to describe the symptoms observed, and

state the circumstances from which he has drawn his con-

clusions. 2

57. The Rule in Massachusetts. In Massachusetts

greater strictness prevails as to the competency of witnesses

to express opinions upon the subject of mental disease.

The rule is in that State to receive the opinions of profes-

sional men who are conversant with insanity, who have

made a specialty of mental diseases, and had experience

with the insane. Such witnesses are permitted to express

their opinions, and it is not necessary that they should have

made any personal examination of the individual concerned. 3

But it seems that a physician who has not made a specialty

of mental diseases, is not competent to express an opinion,
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unless he was the person's attending physician, in which

case his opinion is received, as "It is his duty to make him-

self acquainted with the peculiarities, bodily and mental, of

a person who is the subject of his care and advice." 4

58. Roman Catholic Priest as an Expert as to

Sanity. A very interesting case was decided in the Su-

preme Court of California in 1880, which involved the ques-

tion whether a Roman Catholic priest could express an

opinion as to the sanity of a testator, such opinion being

1 Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324; Boavdinan v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120, 135;

State v. Windsor, 5 Harr. (Del.) 512; Pigg v. State, 43 Tex. 110; Guet-

ing v. State, 66 Ind. 94; Cooper v. State, 23 Tex. 336, 340; Lessee of

Hoge v. Fisher, 1 Peters C. C. 163, 164.

* Puryear v. Reese, 46 Tenn. 21 ; Gibson v. Gibson, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.)

329; White v. Bailey, 10 Mich. 155; Hathorn v. King, 8 Mass. 371 ; Dick-

inson v. Barber, 9 Mass. 225.

8 Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Metcalf . 500.

4 Hastings v. Rider, 99 Mass. 625. But see Commonwealth v. Rich, 14

Gray, 335.

a personal examination of the case·, in order to make him
competent to express an opinion as to his mental condition.·
On the contrary, the rule is that his opinion is admissible,
whether it is founded on facts within his personal observation, or upon a hypothetical case based on the testimony of
others. 1 But where he has made a personal examination it
is necessary for him to describe the symptoms observed, and
state the circumstances from which he has drawn his conclusions.7
§ 57. The Rule in l\lassachusetts.- In :Massachusetts
greater strictness prevails as to the competency of witnesses
to express opinions upon the subject of mental disease.
The rule is in that State to receive the opinions of professional men who are conversant with insanity, who have
made a specialty of mental diseases, and had experience
with the insane. Such witnesses are permitted to express
their opinions, and it is not necessary that they should have
made any personal examination of the individual concerned. 3
But it seems that a physician who has not made a specialty
of mental dise_ases, is not competent to express an opinion,
unless he was the person's attending physician, in which
case his opinion is received, as '' It is his duty to make himself acquainted with the peculiarities, bodily and mental, of
a person who is the subject of his care. and advice.'' 4
§ 58. Roman Catholic Priest as an Expert as to
Sanity.- A very interesting case was decided in the Supreme Court of California in 1880, which involved the question whether a Roman Catholic priest could express an
opinion as to the sanity of a testator, such opinion being
Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324 ; ~o anlm an v. Wootlman, 47 N . H. 120, 135 ;
State v. Windsor, 5 Harr. (Del.) 512; pj gg v. State, 43 Tex. 110; Gueting v. State, 66 Ind. 94; Cooper v. State, 23 Tex. 336, 340; Lessee of
Hoge v. Fisher, 1 Peters C. C. 163, 164.
¥Puryear v. Reese, 46 Tenn. 21; Gibson v. Gibso n, 9 Y erg. (Tenn. )
329; White v. Bailey, 10 Mich. 155; Hathorn v. King, Mas . 371; Dickinson v. Barber, 9 Mass. 225.
s Commonwealth v. Rogers', 7 .Metcalf, 500.
4 Hastings v. Rider, 99 Mass. 625.
Bu t ee Commomvealth v. Rich , U
Gray, 335.
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given by him in the character of an expert. The court,

overruling the decision of the trial court, held that he was

competent to testify as an expert. The evidence showed

that he had been regularly educated for the priesthood in a

college in Spain, that he had officiated as a priest for

ten years, that it was part of his preparatory educa-

tion to become competent to pass upon the mental condition

of communicants in his church, and that for that purpose

physiology and psychology were branches of his study. It

appeared, said the court, " That previous to officiating as a

priest it was requisite that he should be skilled in determin-

ing the mental condition of those who sought the sacra-

ments. That in every case of the administration of the

rites of his church to invalids or dying persons, it was

necessary for the priest to make an examination of the men-

tal condition of the recipient, to ascertain if his mind was

in a proper state to reason or act of its own volition.

That the sacrament could only be administered after, such a

preliminary examination, and that therefore as a priest he

was daily required to exercise and pass his judgment on the
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mental condition of persons." l

59,. Mode of Examination as to Sanity. We have

elsewhere considered the mode of examination to be pur-

sued in the case of expert witnesses. 2 The principles there

stated are, of course, as applicable to the examination of

experts in mental diseases, as to the examination of any

other class of experts, and it is not necessary to make any

reference to that subject in this connection, farther than to

call attention to the mode of inquiry, which has been sug-

gested in New York as proper to be pursued in the examina-

tion of medical witnesses testifying as to sanity. First

inquire of the witness, said Judge HARRIS, as to the partic-

ular symptoms of insanity, asking whether all or any, and

which of the circumstances spoken of by the witnesses upon

the trial are to be regarded as such symptoms. Then in-

1 Estate of Tooraes, 54 Cal. 510.

* See Chapter III.

given by him in the character of an expert. The court,
ov'erruling the decision of the trial court, held that he was
competent to testify as an expert. The evidence showed
that he had been regularly educated for the priesthood in a
college in Spain, that he had officiated as a priest for
ten years, that it was part of his preparatory education to become competent to puss upon the mental condition
of communicants in his church, and that for that purpose
physiology and psychology were branches of his study. It
appeared, said the court, " That previous to officiating as a
priest it was requisite that be should be 8killed in determining the mental condition of those who sought the sacraments. That in every case of the administration of the
rites of his church to invalids or dying persons, it was
necessary for the priest to make an examination of the mental condition of the recipient, to ascertain if his mind was
in a . proper state to reason or act of its own volition.
That the sacrament could only be administered after. such a
preliminary examination, and that therefore as a priest he
was daily required to exercise and pass his judgment on the
mental condition of persons." 1
§ 5 9.. Mode of Examination as to Sanity.- 'Ve ha\re
€lsewhe·re considered the mode of examination to be pursued in the case of expert witnesses. 2 The principles there
stated are, of course, as applicable to the examination ot
experts in mental diseases, as to the .examination of any
other class of experts, und it is not necessary to make any
reference to .t hat subject in this connection, farther than to
call attention to the mode of inquiry, which has been suggested in New York as proper to be pursued in the examination of medical witnesses testifying as to sanity. First
inquire of the witness, said Judge HARRIS, as to the particular symptoms of insanity, asking whether all or any, and
which of the circumstances spoken of by the witnesses upon
the trial are to be regarded as such symptoms. Then in1

!l

Estate of Toomes, 54 Cal. 510.
See Chapter III.
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quire of him whether any and what combination of these

circumstances would, in his opinion, amount to proof of

insanity. 1

60. Evidence Bearing on Question of Insanity. The

opinions of experts are received as to the causes tending to

the development of mental unsoundness. For instance, the

opinions of experts have been received showing that paral-

ysis in old persons has a tendency to impair the mind. 2

As bearing upon the question of a person's insanity, or

tendency to insanity, evidence is received that such person's

father or mother were of unsound mind, 8 or that his uncle,*

or brother, 5 or other relations suffered from mental disease. 6

And reputation in the family of the insanity of some of

the members of the family, is admissible on the same

principle which admits such reputation as to deaths, births,

genealogies, etc. 7 But it is highly important that evidence

should not be received as suggesting insanity, unless

it has some legitimate tendency to prove it. " We are

pursuaded that much wrong has unwittingly been done

in many cases, by allowing misfortunes, family calamities
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and personal peculiarities, to go to the jury as having some

necessary tendency to unsettle the mind, and therefore,

some bearing on the issue of mental soundness." 8 It is

proper to inquire as to the person's state of mind, both

before and after the time concerning which the the par-

ticular inquiry is directed. 9 " Upon the question of sanity

1 See People v. McCann, 3 Parker O. Cos. 272, 298.

Lord v. Beard, 79 N. C. 5.

3 Coughlin v. Poulson, 2 McArthur, 308 ; Baxter v. Abbott, 7 Gray,

(Mass.) 71.

4 Baxter v. Abbott., supra.

8 Eraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 228.

e People v. Montgomery, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 207, 250; State v. Wind-

sor, 5 Harr. (Del.) 512.

J State v. Windsor, supra.

8 Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 227.

McAllister v. State, 17 Ala. 434, 436; McLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672;

Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn. 203, 208; Kinne v. Kinne, 9 Conn. 102;

Norwood v. Morrow, 4 Dev. & Batt. 442, 451; State v. Felter, 25 Iowa,

quire of him whether any and what combination of these
circumstances would, in his opinion, amount to proof of
insanity. 1
§ 60. Evidence Bearing on Question of Insanity.-The
opinions of experts are received a~ to the causes tending to
the development of mental unsoundness. For instance, the
opinions of experts have been received showing that paralysis in old persons has a tendency to impair the mind. 2
As bearing upon the question of a person's insanity, or
tendency to insanity, evidence is received that su_ch person s
father or mother were of unsound mind, 8 or that his uncle,4
or brother, 5 or other relations suffered from mental disease.&
And reputation in the family of the insanity of some of
the members of the family, is admissible on the same
principle which admits such reputation as to deaths, births,
genealogies, et~. 1 But it is highly important that evidence
should not be received as suggesting insanity, unless
it has some legitimate tendency to prove it. '' 'Ve are
pursuaded that much wrong has unwittingly been done
in many cases, by allowing misfortunes, family calamities
and personal peculiarities, to go to the jury as having some
necessary tendency to unsettle the mind, and therefore,
some bearing on ·the issue of mental soundness." 8 It is
proper to inquire as to the person's state of mind, both
before and after the time concerning which the the particular inquiry is directed. 9 "Upo~ the question of sanity
1

1

See P eople v. McCann, 3 Parker Cr. Uas. 272, 298.
Lord v. Beard, 79 N. C. 5.
8
Coughlin v. Poulson, 2 McArthur, 308 ; Baxter v. Abbott, 7 Gray, ·
(Mass.) 71.
4 Baxter v. Abbott., supra.
s Fraser v. Jennison, 421\lich. 200, 228.
6 People v. Montgomery, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 207, 250; State v. Windsor, 5 Harr. (Del.) 512.
1 State v. Windsor, supra.
8 Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 227.
~McAllister v. State, 17 Ala. 434, 436; McLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672;
Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn. 203, 208; Kinne v. Kinne, 9 Conn. 102;
Norwood v. Morrow, 4 Dev. & Batt. 442, 451; State v. Felter, 25 Iowa,
2
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at the time of committing an offence," says the Supreme

Court of Massachusetts, " the acts, conduct and habits of

the prisoner at a subsequent time, may be competent as evi-

dence in his favor. But they are not admissible, as of

course. When admissible at all, it is upon the ground,

either that they are so connected with, or correspond to evi-

dence of disordered or weakened mental condition preceding

the time of the offence, as to strengthen the inference of

continuance, and carry it by the time to which the inquiry

relates, and thus establish its existence at that time ; or else

that they are of such a character as of themselves to indi-

cate unsoundness to such a degree, or of so permanent a

nature, as to have required a longer period than the interval

for its production or development." 1 It is admissible to

give in evidence particular acts of madness. 2 But it is not

competent to introduce the doubt of an expert as to a

person's sanity. 3 And a record of the condition and treat-

ment of a patient in a hospital, produced at a trial forty

years after its date by the superintendent of the hospital, of

which he is the official custodian, and which purports to
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have been contemporaneously made by the attending physi-

cians, of all cases there treated, and which it was their duty

to make, has been held in Massachusetts to be admissible in

evidence, as a foundation for the opinion of an expert as to

whether it indicated mental disease of the patient, and that

without identifying the person who made it. 4 In a case

where the sanity of a testatrix was questioned, and positive

evidence of her insanity had been given, upon its being

proved that she had a paralytic attack shortly before the

execution of the will, it was held improper to prove by an

expert that, in nine cases out of ten, paralysis did not pro-

G7, 75; Lake v. People, 1 Parker Or. Cas. 495; Freeman v. People, 4

Denio, 9.

1 Commonwealth v. Pomeroy, 117 Mass. 148. See too, White v. Graves,

107 Mass. 325.

* Clark v. Periam, 2 Atk. 337, 340.

8 Sanchez v. People, 22 K. Y. 147.

4 Townsend v. Pepperell, 99 Mass. 40.

at the time of committing an offence," says the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, '' the acts, conduct and habits of
the prisoner at a subsequent time, may be competent as evidence in his favor. But they are not admissible, as of
course. When admissible at all, it is upon the ground,
either that they are so connected with, or correspond to evidence of disordered or weakened mental condition preceding
the time of the offence, as to strengthen the inference of
continuance, and carry it by the time to which the inquiry
relates, and thus establish its existence at that time; or else
that they are of such a character as of themselves to indicate unsoundness to such a degree, or of so permanent a
nature, as to have required a longer period than the foterval
for its production or development.' ' 1 It i8 admissible to
give in evidence particular acts of madness. 2 But it is not
competent to introduce the doubt of an expert as to a
person's sanity.a And a record of the condition and treatment of a patient in a hospital, produced at a trial forty
years after its date by the superintendent of the hospital, of
which he is the official custodian, and which purports to
have been contemporaneously made by the attending physicians, of all cases there treated, and which it was their duty
to make, has been held in Massachusetts to be admissible in
evidence, as a foundation for the opinion of an expert as to
whether it indicated mental disease of the patient, and that
without identifying the person who made it. 4 In a case
where the sanity of a testatrix was questioned, and positive
evidence of her insanity h~d been given, upon its being
proved that she had a paralytic attack shortly before the
execution of the will, it was held improper to prove by an
expert that, in nine cases out of ten, paralysis did not proG7, 75; J,ake v. People, 1 Parker Cr. Cas. 495; Freeman v. People, 4
Denio, 9.
1 Commonwealth v. Pomeroy, 117 Mass. HS. See too, White v. Graves,
107 :Mass. 325.
7 Clark v. Periam, 2 Atk. 337, 340.
s Sanchez v. People, 22 N. Y. 147.
4 Townsend v. Pepperell, 99 Mass. 40.
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duce any effect upon the mind. 1 If it could have been shown

that it in no case affected the mind, the ruling would, of

course, have been different.

61. Opinions of Xon-Professional Witnesses as to

Mental Condition. There seems to have been no dispute

as to the right of the subscribing witnesses to a will, to

testify concerning the actual mental condition of the tes-

tator, but their opinions have been received as fully as

those of medical experts. The fact that they were present

at the time the will was signed, makes them competent to

speak upon the subject, whether they "happen to be th,e

attending physicians, nurses, children, or chance strangers." 3

And it does not seem to be necessary that they should state

the facts upon which their opinions are predicated. 8 But a

marked difference of opinion has existed as to the right of

persons, who are neither the subscribing witnesses to the

will, nor experts in mental diseases, to express any opinion

whatever as to a person's sanity or insanity, soundness or

unsoundness of mind. It has been held in a number of

cases, that the opinions of such witnesses cannot be re-
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ceived. 4 Such opinions were excluded upon the theory, that

special knowledge and skill was required to judge intelli-

gently of the mental condition of another, and that if the

1 Lands v. Lands, 1 Grant (Penn.), 248.

2 Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227, 243; Poole v. Richardson, 3 Mass.

330; Chase v. Lincoln, 31 Mass. 237; Needham v. Ide, 5 Pick. 510; Potts

v. House, 6 Ga. 324; Van Huss v. Rainbolt, 42 Tenu. 139; De Witt v.

Barley, 9 X. Y. 371 ; Williams v. Lee, 47 Md. 321 ; Boardman v. Wood-

man, 47 N. H. 120, 134; Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn. 203; Wogan v.

Small, 11 S. & R. (Penn.) 141 ; Rambler v. Tyron, 7 S. & R. (Peun.) 90,

92; Cilley v. Cilley, 34 Me. 162; Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369; Logan

v. McGinnis, 12 Penn. St. 27; Titlow v. Titlow, 54 Penn. St. 216; Gibson

v. Gibson, 9 Yerg. (Teun.) 329.

3 Williams v. Lee, 47 Md. 321 ; Van Huss v. Rainbolt, 42 Tenn. 139.

4 Wyman v. Gould, 47 Me. 159; Hickman v. State, 3S Texas, 191; State

v. Archer, 54 N. H. 465; Boardman v. Woodman, 47 X. H. 120; Com-

duce any effect upon. the mind. 1 If it could have been shown
that it in no case affected the mind, the ruling woul<l, of
course, have been different.
§ 61. Opinions of Non-Professional Witnesses as to
.Mental Condition.-There seems to have been no dispute
as to the right of the subscribing witnesses to a will., to
testify concerning the actual mental condition of the testator, but their opinions have been received as fully as
those of medical experts. The fact that they were present
at the time the will was signed, mak~s them competent to
speak upon the subject, whether they "happen to be th.e
attending physicians, nurses, children, or chance strangers. ":I
And it does not seem to be necessary that they should state
the f acts upon which their opinions are predicated. 8 But a
marked difference of opinion has existed as to the right of
persons, who are neither the subscribing witnesses to the
will, nor expertR in mental diseases, to express any opinion
whatever as to a person's sanity or insanity, soundness or
unsoundness of mind. It has been held in a number of
cases, that the opinions of such witnesses cannot be receivcd.4 Such opinions were excluded upon the theory, that
special knowledge and skill was required to judge intelligently of the mental condition of another, and that if the

monwealth v. Fairbanks, 2 Allen (Mass.), 511; Townsend v. Pepperell,

99 Mass. 40 ; Hastings v. Rider, 99 Mass. 624, 625 ; Commonwealth v.

Wilson, 1 Gray, 337; State v. Pike, 49 X. H. 399; Van Horn v. Keenan,

28 111. 445, 419; De Witt v. Barley, 9 X. Y. 371; State v. Geddis, 42

Iowa, 268.

Land v. Lands, 1 Grant (Penn.), 248.
Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227, 243; Poole v. Richard on, 3 Ma
330; Chase v. Lincoln, 31 Mass. 237; Needham v. Ide, 5 Pick. 510; Pott
v. House, 6 Ga. 324; Van Huss v. Rainbolt, 42 Tenn. 139; De Witt v.
Barley, 9 N. Y. 371; William v. Lee, 47 Md. 321; Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120, 134; Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn. 203; Wogan v.
Small, 11 S. & R. (Penn.) 141; Rambler v. Tyron, 7 S. & R. (Penn.) 90,
92; Cilley v. Cilley, 3-! Me. 162; Robin1ton v. Adams, 62 Me. 369; Logan
v. McGinni , 12 Penn. St. 27; Titlow v. Titlow, 5-!Penn. St. 216; Gibson
v. Gibson, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 329.
3 Williams v. Lee, 47 Mu. 321; Van Hu
v. Rainbolt, 42 Tenn. 139.
• Wyman v. Gould, 47 Me. 159; Hickman v. State, 38 Texas, 191; tate
v. Archer, 54 N. H. 465; Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H. l:lO; Commonwealth v. Fairbanks, 2 Al1en (Mass.), 511; Town end v. Pepperell,
99 Mas. 40; Hastings v. Rider, 99 Mass. 6:H, 625; Commonwealth v.
Wil on, 1 Gr:iy, 337; State v. Pike 49 N. H. 399; Van Horn v. Keenan,
28 Ill. 415, 4l9; De Witt v. Barley, 9 N. Y. 371; tatc v. Geddi ~ , 42
Iowa, 26 .
1
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witnesses gave a detailed account of the acts and conduct of

the person whose mental capacity was in question, the jury

was as competent to form an opinion thereon, as the wit-

nesses themselves. That the opinions of professional

witnesses should be received, as they could judge with some

degree of accuracy, from pathological symptoms, but as

non-professional witnesses could only form their opinions

from the actual demonstrations of the person, those demon-

strations should be stated to the jury, and that body left to

form their own opinion as to the cause and character of the

appearances described. The fact has come, however, to be

generally recognized, that it is impossible so to describe the

appearance and demonstrations of a person, as to convey

any accurate idea of their exact character, and to leave

upon the mind of jurors the legitimate impressions which

such demonstrations and appearances naturally leave upon

the mind of the actual observer. The result has been that

many of the earlier cases have been overruled, and the prin-

ciple has come to be generally recognized that non-profes-

sional witnesses may give their opinions as to sanity, as a

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 20:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t71v5cx5m
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

result of their personal observation of the person whose

mental condition is in question, after first stating the facts

which they observed. 1

1 Thomas v. State, 40 Texas, 05; Whitcomb v. State, 41 Texas, 125;

McClackey v. State, 5 Tex. Ct. of App. 320; Webb v. State, 5 Tex. Ct.

of App. 596; Hardy V. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227; Dennis v. Weeks, 51 Ga.

24; Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424, 466; Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511; People

v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29; Roe v. Taylor, 45111.486; Beller v. Jones, 22

Ark. 92; Clark v. State, 12 Ohio, 483; State v. Hayden, 51 Vt. 296;

Crane v. Crane, 33 Vt. 15; Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; Florey's

Ex'rs v. Florey. 24 Ala. 247 ; Puryear v. Reese, 46 Tenn. 21 ; Gibson v.

Gibson, 9 Yerg. (Teun.) 329; People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482, 484; Walker

v. Walker, 14 Ga. 242; Fielder v. Collier, 13 Ga. 4D6; Dieken v. Johnson,

7 Ga. 484; Foster v. Brooks, 6 Ga. 290; Crowe Adm'r v. Peters, 63 Mo.

429; Sutherland v. Hawkins, 56 Incl. 343; Rush v. Megee, 36 Ind. 69;

Hunt's Heirs v. Hunt, 3 B. Monr. (Ky.) 577; Rambler v. Tyron, 7 S. &

R. 90; Wilkinson v. Pearson, 23 Penn. St. 117; MeDougald v. McLean,

-witnesses gave a detailed account of the acts an<l conduct of
·the person whose mental capacity was in question, the jury
was as competent to form an opinion thereon. as the wit· nesses themselves. That the opinions of professional
witnesses should be received, as they could judge with some
.degree of accuracy, from pathological symptoms, but as
non-professional witnesses c-ould only form their opinions
from the actual demonstrations of the person, those demonstrations should be stated to the jury, and that body left to
form their own opinion as to the cause and character of the
appearanc~s described.
The fact has come, however, to be
generally recognized, that it is impossible so to describe the
appearance and demonstrations of a person, as to convey
.a.ny accurate idea of their exact character, and to leave
upon the mind of jurors the legitimate impressions which
such demonstrations and appearances naturally leave upon
·the mind of the actual observer. The result has. been that
many of the earlier cases have been overruled, and the principle has come to be generally :recognized that non-professional witneEses may give their opinions as to sanity, as a
,result of their personal observation of the person whose
mental condition is in question, after first stating the facts
·which they observcd. 1

1 Winston (N. C.) Law, 120; Estate of Brooks, 54 Cal. 471; Williams v.

Lee, 47 Md. 321 ; Dove v. State, 50 Tenn. 348; Waters v. Waters, 35 Md.

531; Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Penn. St. 342; State v. Newlin, 69 Ind. 108;

State v. Klinger, 46 Mo. 224; Clary v. Clary, 2 Ired. (X. C.) 78; De Witt

1 Thomas v. State, 40 Texati, G5; Whitcomb v. State, 41Texas,125;
McClackey v. State, 5 Tex. Ct. of App. 320; Webb v. State, 5 Tex. Ct.
-of App. 596; Hardy v. Menill, 56 N. H. 227; Dennis v. Weeks, 51 Ga.
2-1; Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424, 466; Berry v. Stnte, 10 Ga. 511; People
v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29; Roe v. Taylor, 45 Ill. 486; Beller v. Jones, 22
Ark. 92; Clark v. State, 12 Ohio, 483; State v. Hayden, 51 Vt. 296;
Crane v. Crane, 33 Vt. 15; Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; Florey's
Ex'rs v. Florey, 24 Ala. 247; Purye.ar v. Reese, 46 Tenn. 21; Gibson v.
·Gibson, 9Yerg. (Tenn.) 329; People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 4 2, 484; Walker
v. Walker, 14 Ga. 242; Fielder v. Collier, 13 Ga. 406; Dieken v. Johnson,
7 Ga. 484; Foster v. Brooks, 6 Ga. 290; Crowe Adm'r v. Peters, 63 Mo.
429; Sutherland v. Hawkins, 56 Ind. 343; Rush v. Megee, 36 Ind. 69;
Hunt's Heirs v. Hunt, 3 B. Monr. (Ky.) 577; Rambler v. Tyron, 7 S. &
R. 90; Wilkinson v. Pearson, 23 Penn. St. 117; McDougald v. McLean,
1 Winston (N. C.) Law, 120; Estate of Brooks, 54 Cal. 471; Williams v.
Lee, 47 ¥d. 321; Dove v. State, 50 Tenn. 348; Water ' v. Waten•, 35 Md.
531; Pidcock v. Potter, 6 Penn. St. 342; State v. Newlin, 69 Ind. 108;
.State v. Klinger, 46 :;\Io. 224; Clary v. Clary, 2 Ired. (N. ().) 78; De Witt
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62. This Subject Continued. This whole subject has

been elaborately discussed in a recent case in New Hamp-

shire, in which Mr. Chief Justice FOSTER states that; "A

tolerably careful investigation authorizes me to repeat the

language of Judge DOE, that ' in England no express deci-

sion of the point (the admissibility of such evidence) can

be found, for the reason that such evidence has always

been admitted without objection. It has been universally

regarded as so clearly competent, that it seems no English

lawyer has ever presented to any court any objection, ques-

tion, or doubt in regard to it.' " *

It must be conceded, we think, that the interests of

justice require that such testimony should be received.

The inquiry does not seem to be one necessarily involv-

ing scientific evidence, as being one beyond the domain

of common sense. And it is quite possible for non-profes-

sional witnesses to observe innumerable acts, motions and

expressions, which it is impossible to communicate so as to

convey any fair conception of their importance, and which

are nevertheless sufficient to conclusively satisfy the obser-
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ver as to a person's mental condition. While such opinions

are admissible, yet no general rule can be laid down aa to

what shall be deemed a sufficient opportunity of observation

in the witness, other than it has enabled him to form a belief

or judgment thereon. 2 And in a recent case in the Court of

Appeals of Texas, the idea is repudiated that it is within

the province of the court to determine, upon the acquaint-

ance and the sufficiency of the means of information, as to

the facts stated upon which the conclusion of the witness is

v. Barley, 17 N. Y. 340 ; Beaubien v. Cicotte, 13 Mich. 459; Kelly's Heirs

v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555, 601; Stewart v. Redditt, 3 Md. 67; Dorsey v.

Warfield, 7 Md. 65; Brooke v. Townshend, 7 Gill (Md.), 24; Burnham

v. Mitchell, 34 Wis. Ill; Kilgore v. Cross, 1 Fed. Rep. 582; People v.

Wreden (Sup. Ct. of Cal.), 12 Reporter, 682; Pinney's Will, 27 Minn.

280.

1 State v Pike, 49 N. H. 408, 409 : Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227, 240.

See, too. Lord Denman's charge In Regina v. Oxford, 9 C. & P. 525;

and Carevv v. Johnston, 2 Sch. & Lef. 280, 285; Regina v. Nerville,

Crawf. & Dix Ab. Not. Cas. 96.

2 Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424, 4G7.

§ 62. This Subject C<mtinued.-Tbis whole subject has
been elaborately discussed in a recent case in New Hampshire, in which Mr. Chief Justice FosTER states that; " A
tolerably careful investigation authorizes me to repeat the
language of Judge DoE, that 'in England no express decision of the point (the admissibility of such evidence) can
be found, for the reason that such evidence has always
been admitted without objection. It has been universally
regarded as so clearly competent, that it seems no English
lawyer has ever presented to any court any ~bjection, question, or doubt in regard to it.' '' 1
It must be conceded, we think, that the interests of
justice require that such testimony should be received.
The inquiry does not seem to be one necessarily involving scientific evidence, as being one beyond the domain
of common sense. And it is quite possible for non-professional witnesses to observe innumerable acts, motions and
expressions, which it is impossible to communicate so as to
convey any fair conception of their importance, and which
are nevertheless sufficient to conclusively satisfy the observer as to a person's mental condition. While such opinions
are admissible, yet no general rule can be laid down as to
what shall be deemed a sufficient opportunity of observation
in the witness, other than it has enabled him to form a belief
or judgment thereon. 2 And in a recent case in the Court of
Appeals of Texas, the idea is repudiated that it is within
the province of the court to determine, upon the acquaintance and the sufficiency of the means of information, as to
the facts stated upon which the conclusion of the witness is
v. Barley, 17 N. Y. 340; Beaubien v. Uicotte, 13 Mich. 459; Kelly's Heirs
v. McGuire, 15 A.rk. 555, 601; Stewart v. Redditt, 3 Md. 67; Dorsey v.
Warfield, 7 Md. 65; .Brooke v. Townshend, 7 Gill (Md.), 24; Burnham
v. Mitchell, 34 Wis. 111; Kilgore v. Cross, 1 Fed. Rep. 582; 'People v.
Wreden (Sup. Ct. of Cal.), 12 Reporter, 682; Pinney'& Will, 27 Minn.
280.
1 State v Pike, 49 N. II. 408, 409: Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227, 240.
See, too, Lord Denman's charge in Regina v. Oxford, l) C. & P. 525;
and Carew v. Johnston, 2 Sch. & Lef. 2 O, 285; Regina v. Nerville,
Crawf. & Dix A.b. Not. Cas. 96.
2 Choice v. State, 31Ga.424, 467.
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based, and to determine upon the admissibility of the evi-

dence, and to admit or exclude it, according as the facts

should appear, as developed on the examination of the wit-

ness. It was said that " whether the means of information,

or facts proved, or the conclusions drawn by the witness

are of the satisfactory character required to base a finding

upon, or not, is for the consideration of the jury, under

proper instructions." l While the rule that non-professional

witnesses shall not be permitted to give an opinion upon the

question, seems to bo still maintained in Massachusetts, yet

such witnesses have been permitted to testify in that State,

being acquainted with the person in question, whether they

noticed any change in his intelligence, or any want of cohe-

rence in his remarks. Such inquiries, as it was said, did

not call for the expression of an opinion upon the question

whether the testator was of sound or unsound mind, and

were therefore admissible. 2 So it has been held in the same

State that one, who had been for many years the guardian

of the testator, could be asked whether he ever observed

any fact which led him to infer that there was any derange-
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ment of intellect. 8 In a case in Ohio the Supreme Court of

that State ruled that the witness should be asked what

opinion he entertained at the time of trial, and not as to the

opinion which he may have entertained at the time of the

acts referred to by him, inasmuch as subsequent reflection

and consideration might have satisfied him that the opinion

formed at the time of observation was erroneous. 4 And in

Vermont the court held that, the fact that the witness did

not form his opinion at the time he saw and observed the

facts testified to by him, did not render his opinion on that

account inadmissible. 5 The rule in New York has been

laid down by the courts with great care and precision.

Non-professional witnesses who have testified to facts tend-

1 McClackey v. State, 5 Tex. Ct. of App. 331.

2 Barker v. Comins, 110 Mass. 477.

3 May v. Bradlee, 127 Mass. 414.

4 Runyan v. Price, 15 Ohio St. 14.

3 Hathaway's Admr. v. National Life Ins. Co., 48 Vt. 335.

based, and to determine upon the admissibility of the evidence, and to admit or exclude it, according as the facts
should appear, as developed on the ~xamination of the witness. It was said that " whether the means of information,
or fact'3 proved, or the conclusions drawn by the witness
are of the satisfactory character required to base a finding
upon, or not, is for .t he consideration of the jury, under
proper instructions.'' 1 'Vhile the rule that non-professional
witnesses shall not he permitted to give an opinion upon the
question, seems to bo still maintained in Massa.chusctts, yet
such witnesses have been permitted to testify in that State,
being acquainted with the person in question, whether they
noticed any change in his intelligence, or any want of coherence in his remarks. Such inquiries, as it was said, did
not call for the expression of n.u opinion upon the question
whether the testator was of sound or unsound mind, and
were therefore admissible. 2 So it has been held in the same
State that one, who had been for many years the guardian
of the testator, could be asked whether he ever observed
.a ny fact which led him to infer that there was any derangement of intellect. 8 In a case in Ohio the Supreme Court of
that State ruled that the witness should be asked what
opinion he entertained at the time of trial, and not as to the
-0pinion which he may ha·1e entertained at the time of the
acts referred to by him, inasmuch as subsequent reflection.
and consideration might have satif~fied him that the opinion
formed at the time of observation was erroneous.'' And in
Vermont the court held that, the fact that the witness did
not form his opinion at the time he saw and observed the
facts testified to by him, did not render his opinion on that
account inadmissible. 6 The rule in New York has been
laid down by the courts with great care and precision.
Non-professional witnesses who have testified to facts tend1
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ing to show menial unsoundness, are not permitted in?

the courts of that State to state what they thought of the

person's condition of mind, or their impressions as to his

state of mind. 1 But they are allowed to characterize as ra-

tional or irrational the acts and declarations to which they

have testified, and to state the impression produced upon

their minds by what they beheld or heard, their examina-

tion being limited to their conclusions from the specific

facts they disclose, and so confined as to exclude any opinion

on the general question of soundness or unsoundness of

mind. 2

63. Rape, Abortion, Pregnancy, etc. On the trial of

an indictment for the rape of a child, the opinion of a

physician that there had been actual penetration, is held

admissible. 3 And upon such trials medical experts may be

examined as to the health and physical condition of the

prosecutrix at the time of the alleged offence, as bearing

upon her ability to resist the defendant.* But it has been

held incompetent to ask such witnesses the following ques-

tions : " From what you know of her health and strength,
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in 3 r our opinion could the defendant have had carnal con-

nection with her against her will, without resort to other

means than the exercise of his ordinary physical powers? "

And whether, in the opinion of the witness, " a rape could

be committed on a female who had borne children, and was

in ordinary health and strength, without resort to other means

than the exercise of ordinary physical powers." 5 It has

been held proper for an expert to state what effect a rape

would have on the sexual organs of the female, and that

upon an examination of the prosecutrix several days after

Real v. People, 42 N. Y. 282; Sisson v. Conger, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 569.

* Hewlett v. Wood, 55 X. Y. 635; O'Brien v. People, 36 N. Y. 276;

Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 190; Howell v. Taylor, 18 N. Y. Sup. Ct.

214; Higbee v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 53 N. Y. 603; People v.

Lake, 12 N. Y. 358.

State v. Smith, Phillips (N. C.) Law, 302.

4 State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148.

5 Woodin v. People, 1 Parker Cr. Cas. 461. And see Cook v. State, 24

N. J. L. 843.

i noto show mental unsoundness,- are not permitted irn
0
the courts of that State to state what they thought of the
person's condition of mind, or their impressions as to his
state of mind. 1 But they are allowed to characterize as rational or irrational the acts and declarations to which they
have testified, and to state the impression produced upon
their minds by what they beheld or heard, their examination being limited to their conclusions from the specific·
facts they disclose, and so confined as to exclude any opinion
on the general question of soundness or unsoundness of
mind. 2
§ 63. Rape, Abortion, Pregnancy, etc.- On the tria.l of
an indictment for the rape of a child, the opinion of a
physician that there had been actual penetration, is held .
admissible. 3 And upon such trials medical experts may beexamined as to the health and physical condition of the
prosecutrix at the time of the alleged offence, as bearing
upon her ability to resist the defendant. 4 But it has been
held incompetent to ask such witnesses the following questions : '' From what you know of her health and strength r
in your opinion could the defendant have had carnal connection with her against her will, without resort to other
means than the exercise of his ordinary physical powers? ''
And whether, in the opinion of the witness, " a rape could
be committed on a female who had borne children, and was.
in ordinary health and strength, without resort to other means
than the exercise of ordinary physical powers."~ It has.
been held proper for an expert to state what effect a rape
would have on the sexual organs of th~ female, and that
upon an examination of the prosecutrix several days after
1

Real v. People, 42 N. Y. 282; Sisson v. Conger, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 569.
Hewlett v. Wood, 55 :N". Y. 635; O'Brien v. People, 36 N. Y. 276;
Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 190; Howell v. Taylor, 18 N. Y. Sup. Ct.
214; Higbee v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 53 N. Y. 603; People v.
Lake, 12 N. Y. 358.
3 State v. Smith, Phillips (N. C.) Law, 302.
4 State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148 ..
5 Woodin v. People, 1 Parker Cr .. Ca . 46!.
And see Cook v. State, 24
N. J. L. 843.
1

EXPERT TESTIMONY IN :l.\IEDICINE, ETC.

95

EXPERT TESTIMONY IN MEDICINE, ETC. 95

an alleged rape, he found her sexual organs inflamed. 1 But

the witness cannot usurp the province of the jury, said the

court in the case cited, by expressing the opinion that such

inflammation "was produced by having a violent connection."

Tke opinions of medical experts are received upon the ques-

tion of whether an abortion has been performed, 2 and that

certain medicines are known as abortives, and that it would

be a dangerous thing to give certain drugs, in almost any dose,

to a pregnant woman, and as to how large a dose would be

required to produce an abortion. 3 It has been held that the

parts of the person upon whom instruments were alleged

to have been used for the purpose of procuring an abor-

tion, and which had been preserved in alcohol, could be

submitted to the jury in connection with the testimony of

the physician who made the post-mortem examination. 4 And

medical experts have been held competent to testify that cer-

tain surgical instruments found in the house of the defend-

ant, indicted for an abortion, were adapted to produce an

abortion. 5 Physicians are permitted to express an opinion

upon the question of pregnancy. 6 A medical witness has been
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allowed to testify that pregnancy was just as likely to take

place in case of rape as in the case of a voluntary sexual

connection. 7 But a witness who has had no peculiar expe-

rience and possesses no peculiar skill, is not competent to

express an opinion as to pregnancy. 8

In a prosecution for seduction the opinion of medical

experts has been held admissible,' who testified to the effect

that it was highly improbable, if not impossible for inter-

course to have occurred under the circumstances described

by the complainant (i. e., in a buggy) ; and also as to

the pain and suffering the complainant would have expe-

i Xoonan v. State, U The Reporter, 320. (Sup. Ct. of Wis., May, 1882.)

* State v. Smith, 32 Me. 370; State v. Wood, 53 N. H. 484, 495.

8 Regina v. Still, 30 Upper Canada (C. P.), 30.

4 Commonwealth v. Brown, 14 Gray, 419.

s Commonwealth v. Brown, 121 Mass. 69.

8 State v. Wood, 53 N. H. 484, 495.

T State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148, 152.

Boies v. McAlister. 12 Me. 308.

an alleged rape, be found her sexual organs inflamed. 1 But
the witness cannot usurp the province of the jury, said the
court in the case cited, by expressing the opinion that such
inflammation ''was produced by having a violent connection.''
Tim opinions of medical experts are received upon the question of whether an abortion bas been performed, 2 and that
certain medicines are known as abortives, and that it would
be a dangerous thing to give certain drugs, in almost any dose,
to a pregnant woman, and as to how large a dose would be
required to produce an abortion. 3 It bas been held that the
parts of the person upon whom instruments were alleg~d
to have been used for the purpose of procuring an abortion, and which had been preserved in alcohol, could be
submitted to the jury in connection with the testimony of
the physician who made the post-mortem examination. 4 And
medical experts have been held competent to testify that certain surgical instruments found in the house of the defendant, indicted for an abortion, were adapted to produce an
abortion. 6 Physicians are permitted to express an opinion
upon the question of pregnancy. 6 A medical witness has been
allowed to testify that pregnancy was just as likely to take
place in case of rape as in the case of a voluntary sexual
connection. 7 But a witness who has had no peculiar experience and possesses no peculiar skill, is not competent to
e},._rpress an opinion as to pregnancy. 8
In a prosecution for seduction the opinion of medical
experts has been held admissible; who testified to the effect
that it wa.s highly improbable, if not impossible for intercourse to have occurred under the circumstances described
by the complainant ( i. e., in a buggy) ; and also as to
the pain and suffering the complainant would have expeNoonan v. State, 14 The Reporter, 320. (Sup. Ct. of Wis., May, 1882.)
State v. Smith, 32 Me. 3i0; State v. Wood, 53 N. H. 484, 495.
8 Regina v. Still, 30 Upper Canada (C. P.), 30.
4 Common"·ealth v. Brown, 14 Gray, 419.
5 Commonwealth v. Brown, 121 Mass. 69.
15 State v. Wood, 53 N. H. 484, 495.
1 State v. Knapp, 45 N. H.148, 152.
3 Boies v. McAlister , 12 Me. 308.
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rienced had such an act taken place. 1 And it has been held

that a woman who had experience as a nurse in childbirth,

and as such had been in attendance at premature births,

might express an opinion as an expert as to whether the

birth of a child was premature. 2 "The witness, by her

experience and observation," said the court, " appears to

have acquired knowledge of the subjects about which she

was testifying, that persons generally do not have. To the

extent of this peculiar knowledge, she was a person of

skill and science, and her opinion, founded upon it, was

evidence to go to the jury."

64. Opinions In Miscellaneous Cases. A medical

expert has been permitted to express an opinion as to the

permanency of a person's loss of vision. 8 It has been held

proper to ask a physician who made a post-mortem exami-

nation as to the condition of the body of the deceased as

to fulness or paucity of blood. 4 Upon the question of

whether it be good medical practice to withhold from a

patient in a particular emergency, or under given or sup-

posed circumstances, a knowledge of the danger and extent
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of his disease, medical practitioners are allowed to give

testimony. 5 Experts have been allowed to testify as to the

condition of human remains after burial ; as to how long

before decay would set in, and when it would be complete. 8

Medical witnesses have testified that a certain routine of

diet was injurious to the health of children. 7 A physician

has been permitted to state his opinion as to the manner in

which prolapsus uteri would be caused, and the degree of

violence that would produce it. 8 It has been held that a

physician who made the post-mortem examination, could be

asked whether the appearance of the extra vasated blood in

1 People v. Clark, 33 Mich. 112.

2 Mason v. Fuller, 45 Vt. 29.

3 Tinney v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 12 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 1.

4 O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 75 Penn. St. 424.

8 Twombly v. Leach, 11 Gush. 405.

State v. Secrest, 80 N. C. 450, 453.

T Crowley v. People, 83 N. Y. 464, 471.

6 Napier v. Ferguson, 2 P. & B. (New Brunswick) 415.

rienced had such an act taken place; 1 And it has been held
that a. woman who had experience as a nurRe in childbirth,
and as such had been in attendance at premature births,
mjgbt express an opinion as an expert as to whether the
birth of a child was premature. 2 "The witness, by her
experience and observation," said the court, " appears to .
have acquired knowledge of the subjects about which she
was testifying, that persons generally do not have. To the
extent of this peculiar knowledge, she was a person of
skill and science, and her opinion, founded upon it, was
evidence to go to the jury."
§ 64. Opinions in Miscellaneous Cases.-A medical
expert has been permitted to express an opinion as to the
permanency of a person's loss of vision. 8 It has been held
proper to a~k a physician who made a post-mortem examination as to the condition of the body of the deceased as
to fulness or paucity of blood. 4 Upon the question of
whether it be good medical practice to withhold from a
patient in a particular emergency, or under given or supposed circumstances, a knowledge of the danger and extent
of his disease, medical practitioners are allowed to give
testimony. r> Experts have been allowed to testify as to the
condition of human remains after burial ; as to how long
before decay would set in, and when it would be complete. 6
l\1edical witnesses have testified that a certain routine of
diet was injurious to the health of children. 7 A physician
has been permitted to state his opinion as to the manner in
which prolapsus uteri w~uld be caused, and the degree of
violence that would produce it. 8 It has been held that a
physician who made the post-mortem examination, could be
asked whether the appearance of the extravasated blood in
People v. Clark, 33 Mich. 112.
Mason v. Fuller, 45 Vt. 29.
8 Tinney v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 12 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 1.
4 O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 75 Penn. St. 424.
6 Twombly v. Leach, 11 Cush. 405.
~State v. Secrest, 80 N. C. 450, 453.
r Crowley v. Pool)le, 83 N. Y. 4:64, 471.
6
Napier v. Ferguson , 2 P. & B. (New Brunswick) 415.
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the neck was an indication of mechanical violence or

disease, and whether the clot of blood found could have

existed twelve hours without causing death. 1 Whether a

child was a " full time child," may be shown by any physi-

cian of ordinary experience who attended at the birth. 2

Where a body was found in the water, it has been held

proper to ask a medical expert, who made the post-mortem

examination, as to what indications would have been found

if the person had been suffocated first, and then had fallen

into the water. 3 A physician may be asked as to the cura-

bility of a disease, the nature and cause of which he has

described. 4 So a surgeon may be asked whether a certain

wound given on the chest endangered life. 5 So expert testi-

monv is admissible as to the injuries likely to be produced

under a given state of facts, the precise facts being stated,

on which he is to base his opinion. 6 A physician being

skilled in anatomy, may testify as to the sex of a person

from an examination of the skeleton, but it is an error to

receive the opinion of a non-professional witness on such a

question. 7
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65. Opinions of Medical Experts in Malpractice

Cases. In actions of malpractice brought against physicians

or surgeons, for the improper treatment of a patient, the

opinions of medical experts, who have heard the testimony

as to the manner in which the case was treated, are received

in evidence upon the question whether such treatment was

proper or not. 8 But their opinions will -not be received as

to the general skill of the physician or surgeon on trial, 9

1 State v. Pike, 65 Me. Ill, 114.

2 Young v. Makepeace, 103 Mass. 50.

3 Erickson v. Smith, 2 Abb. App. Decis. (N. Y.) 64.

Matteson v. Xew York etc. R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 487.

* Rumsey v. People, 19 N. Y. 41.

6 Wendell v. Troy, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 329.

* Wilson v. State, 41 Tex. 320, 321.

8 Wright v. Hardy, 22 Wis. 348; Hoener v. Koch, 84 111. 408; Mertz v.

Detweiler, 8 VV. & S. (Penn.) 376; Heath v. Glisan, 3 Oregon, 67; Rob-

erts v. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613, 615.

9 Boydston v. Giltner. 3 Oregon, 118; Williams v. Poppleton, 3 Oregon

(7)

the neck was an indication of mechanical violence or
disease, and whether the clot of blood found could have
existed twelve hours without causing death. 1 Whether a
child was a '' full time child,'' may be shown by any physician of ordinary experience who attended at the birth. 2
Where a body was found in the water, it has been held
proper to ask a medical expert, who made the post-mortem
examination, as to what indications would have been found
if the person had been suffocated :first, and then had fallen
into the water .3 A physician may be asked as to the curability of a disease, the nature and cause of which he has
described. 4 So a surgeon may be asked whether a certain
wound given on the chest endangered life. 5 So expert testimony is admis ible as to the injuries likely to be produced
under a given state of facts, the precise facts being stated,
on which he i. to base his opinion. 6 A physician being
skilled in anatomy, may testify as to the sex of a person
from an examination of the skeleton, but it is an error to
receive the opinion of a no:p.-professional witness on such a
question. 7
§ 65. Opinions of Medical Experts in Malpractice
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or surgeons, for the improper treatment of a patient, the
opinions of medical experts, who have heard the te timony
as to the manner in which the case was treated, are received
in evidence upon the question whether such treatment wa
proper or not. 8 But their opinions will·not be received as
to the general skill of the physician or surgeon on trial, 9
i S~te

v. Pike, 65 Me. 111, 114.
Young v. Makepeace, 103 Mass. 50.
3 Erick on v. Smith, 2 A'bb. App. Decis. (N. Y.) 64.
4 .Matteson v. New York etc. R.R. Co., 35 N. Y. 487.
0 Rumsey v. People, 19 N. Y. 41.
6 Wendell v. Troy, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 329.
7 Wilson v. State, 41 Tex. 320, 321.
8 Wright v. Hardy, 22 Wis. 348; Hoener v. Koch, 84 ill. 408; Mertz v.
Detweiler, 8 W. & S. (Penn.) 376; Heath v. Glisan 3 Oregon, 67; Roberts v. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 61il, 615.
9 Boydston v. Giltner, 3 Oregon, 118; Williams v. Puppleton, 3 Oregon
(7)
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although it has been said that they may state facts within

their knowledge as to such person's skill. 1 Neither can the

o-eneral reputation of the medical institution at which the

defendant attended lectures, be introduced in evidence in

such cases. 2 And it is no error to' exclude an inquiry of a

physician as to what the defendant had told him about the

symptoms in cases the defendant had been treating, and the

course of treatment he had been pursuing, and the opinion

of the witness from these statements of the defendant, and

the symptoms he himself saw in the cases, as to the propriety

of the course the defendant said he had been pursuing, as

showing his skill. 3 But medical experts may be asked as to

the nature and properties of the medicines employed by the

defendant in the particular instance in question ;* and also

as to the practice of physicians in regard to consultations. 5

It is also competent to ask whether the treatment in the

particular case was in conformity with the rules and practice

of the medical profession. 6 And a physician who attended

a patient who had been under the care of another physician,

can testify as to what, so far as he could judge, had been
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the first physician's treatment ; in what respects it differed

from his own ; what effect, so far as he could judge, it had

upon the plaintiff, and whether or not he saw any evidence

that the plaintiff had been injured by his treatment. 7 A

medical expert may be asked wjiether, in his opinion, the

death of the patient was or was not the result of any

neglect or want of skill in the attending physician. 8 Where

the action was brought for a personal injury to the patient's

139; Leighton v. Sargent, 11 Foster (N. H.), 120; Mertz v. Detweiler, 8

W. & S. 376.

1 Williams v. Poppleton, 3 Oregon, 139. And see Boydston v. Giltner,

3 Oregon, 118.

2 Leighton v. Sargent, 11 Foster (N. H.), 120.

3 Leighton v. Sargent, supra.

4 Mertz v. Detweiler, 8 W. & S. 376.

5 Mertz v. Detweiler, supra.

6 Twombly v. Leach, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 405.

7 Barber v. Merriam, 11 Allen, 322.

8 Wright v. Hardy, 22 Wis. 348.

although it has been said that they may st ate facts within
their knowledge as to such person's skill. 1 Neither can the
general reputation of the medical institution at which the
defendant attended lectures, be introduced in evidence in
such cases. 2 And it is no error to· exclude an inquiry of a
physician as to what the defendant had told him about the
symptoms in cases the defendant had been treating, and the
course of treatment he had been pursuing, and the opinion
of the witness from these statements of the defendant, and
the symptoms he himself saw in the cases, as to the propriety
of the course the defendant said he had been pursuing, as
showing his skill. 3 But medical experts may be asked as to
the nature and properties of the medicines employed by the
defendp.nt in the particular instance in question ;4 and also
as to the practice of physicians in regard to consultations. 5
It is also competent to ask whether the treatment in the
particuhir case was in conformity with the rules and practice
of the medical profession. 6 And a physician who attended
a patient who had been under the care of another physician,
can testify as to what, so far as he could judge, had been·
the first physician's treatment ; in what respects it differed
from his own; what effect, so far as -he could judge, it had
upon the plaintiff, and whether or not he saw any evidence
that the plaintiff had been injured by his treatment. 7 A
medical expert may be asked wpether, in his opinion, the
death of the patient was or was not the result of any
neglect or want of skill in the attending physician .8 Where
the action was brought for a personal injury to the patient's
139; Leighton v. Sargent, 11 Foster (N. H .), 120; Mertz v. Detweiler, 8
w. & s. 376.
1 Williams v. Poppleton, 3 Oregon, 139. And see Boydston v. Giltner,
3 Oregon, 118.
2
Leighton v. Sargent, 11 Foster (N . H.), 120.
s Leighton v. Sargent, supm .
•
4 Mertz v. Detweiler, 8 W. & S. 376.
5 Mertz v. Detweiler, supm .
6 Twombly v. Leach, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 405.
7 Barber v. Merriam, 11 Allen, 322.
8 Wright v. Hardy, 22 Wis. 348.
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limb, caused by the negligence of the surgeon, it was held

proper to ask a medical expert as to the. permanent effects

of the injury, and whether the patient would ever recover

the use of his limb. 1 But an expert cannot express an

opinion as to whether, from all the evidence in the case, the

defendant was guilty of malpractice or not. 2 That is the

very question which the jury is to try and determine for

themselves. 3 In an action for damages for injury to the

eyes, producing blindness, for negligent and unskillful

treatment, it was held that the following question might be

properly asked of an expert: " Within your experience,

have you ever known a case where contagion of this kind

was communicated, of gonorrheal opthalmia, by the use of

the brush?" The question was proper as showing the im-

probability of such an occurrence. 4

66. Right to Order an Examination of the Person by

Medical Experts in Cases of Alleged Impotency. Wher-

ever impotency has been acknowledged as an impediment

to marriage, the courts have compelled the parties, in pro-

ceedings to obtain a decree of nullity, to submit their per-
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sons to an examination by experts, whenever such an exam-

ination was necessary for the purpose of determining the

fact of impotency. This arises from the necessity of the

case, especially in the case of females, for impotency on the

part of the female, which cannot be cured by proper medi-

cal treatment or a surgical operation, is said to be very

rare. And divorce for the impoteifcy of the female is lim-

ited to cases of an impervious or supposed impervious

vagina, from an original malformation, or the effect of

some supervening infirmity or disease, as mere sterility is

not sufficient ground for a decree of nullity. " From the

very nature of the case, it appears to be impossible to as-

certain the fact of incurable impoteucy, especially where

1 Wilt v. Vickers, 8 Watts (Penn.), 227; See too, Koberts v. Johnson,

58 N. Y. 613, 615.

2 Hoener v. Koch, 84 111. 408.

3 See 24, chap. HI.

4 Doyle v. New York Eye and Ear Infirmary, SO X. Y. 631.

limb, caused by the negligence of the surgeon, it was held
proper to ask a medical expert as to the. permanent effects
of the injury, and whether the patient would ever recover
the use of his limb. 1 But an expert cannot express an
opinion as to whether, froni all the evidence in the case, the
defendant was guilty of malpractice or not. 2 That is the
very question which the jury is to try and determine for
themselves. 3 In an action for damages for injury to the
eyes, producing blindness, for negligent and unskillful
treatment, it was held that the following question might be
properly asked of an expert: " Within your experience,
have you ever known a case where contagion of this kind
was communicated, of gonorrheal opthalmia, by the use of
the brush?'' The question was proper as showing the improbability of such an occurrence. 4
§ 66. Right to Order an Examination of the Person by
])iedical Experts in Cases of Alleged Impotency. -Wherever impotency has been acknowledged as an impediment
to marriage, the courts have compelled the parties, in proceedings to obtain a decree of nullity, to submit their persons to an examination by experts, whenever such an examination was necessary for the purpose of determining the
fact of impotency. This arises from the necessity of the
case, especially in the case of females, for impotency on the
part of the female, which cannot be cured by proper medical treatment or a surgical operation, is said to be very
rare. And divorce for the impote1(cy of the female is limited to cases of an impervious or supposed impervious
vagina, from an original malformation, or the effect of
some supervening infirmity or disease, as mere sterility is
not sufficient ground for a decree of nullity. '' From the
very nature of the case, it appears to be impossible to ascertain the fact of incurable impotency, especially where
Wilt v. Vickers, 8 Watts (Penn.), 227; See too, Roberts v. Johnson,
58 N. Y. 613, 615.
2 Hoener v. Koch, 84 Ill. 408.
3 See § 24, chap. III.
4 Doyle v. New York Eye and Ear Infirmary, 80 N. Y. 631.
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the husband is the complaining party, except by a proper

surgical examination by skillful and competent surgeons in

connection with other testimony. * * * And I have no

doubt as to the power of this court to compel the parties,

in such a suit, to submit to a surgical examination, when-

ever it is necessary to ascertain facts which are essential to

the proper decision of the cause." l As it is essential that

the impotency should be incurable, 2 it is necessary that the

fact of incurability should be made out by the evidence of

experts who have made a personal examination. The right

of the court to order such an examination, and the necessity

for making such order, can no longer be considered as in-

volved in any doubt whatever. 3 And when the wife is the

plaintiff, and the libel states her to have been a spinster at

the time of the marriage, it is usual to order an inspection

of her person, as well as that of the husband, because her

virginity and capacity implies his impotency. 4

67. Who should be Appointed to make the Examina-

tion. According to the English practice the inspection was

intrusted to three medical experts, either two physicians
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and a surgeon, or two surgeons and a physician, the adverse

party having the privilege of naming one or more. 5 But in

Welde v. Welde, 6 decided in 1830, the inspection of the wife

was made by mid wives, while that of the husband was by

physicians. In this country we find Chancellor WALWORTH

declaring that the examination should be made by " physi-

cians of intelligence or skill, who by study or practice have

made themselves well acquainted with the nature and pro-

gress of the disease which has caused the defendant's inca-

pacity." 7 And in this same case the Chancellor said:

1 Devenbagh v. Devenbagh, 5 Paige, 554.

2 Brown v. Brown, 1 Haggard, 523.

8 Briggs v. Morgan, 3 Phillimore, 325; Welde v. Welde, 2 Lee, 580;

H v. P (L.K.), 3 Prob. & Div. 126; G v. G (L.

K.), 2 Prob. &. Div. 287; Newell v. Newell, 9 Paige, 26.

4 Coote's Ecc. Pr. 367. And see Norton v. Seton, 3 PhUlimore, 147.

5 Coote's Ecc. Prac. 388. And see Dean v. Aveling, 1 Robertson, 279.

6 2 Lee, 580.

7 Newell y. Newell, 9 Paige, 26.

the husband is the complaining pa'rty, except by a proper
surgical examination by skillful and competent surgeons in
connection with other testimony. * * * And I have no
doubt as to the power of this court to compel the partie ,
in such a suit, to submit to a surgical examination, whenever it is necessary to ascertain facts which are e sential to
the proper decision of the cause.'' 1 As it is e~sential that
the impotency should be iticurable, 2 it is necessary that the
fact of incurability should be made out by the evidence of
experts who have made a personal examination. The right
of the court to order such an examination, and the necessity
for ma.king such order, can no longer be considered as involved in any d0ubt whatever. 3 And when the wife is the
plaintiff, and the libel states her to have been a spinster at
the time of the marriage, it is usual to order an inspection
of her person, as well as that of the husband, because her
virginity and capacity implies his impotency. 4
§ 67. Who should be Appointed to make the Examination.- According to the English practice the inspection wa
intrusted to three medical experts, either two physicians
and a surgeon, or two surgeons and a physician, the adver e
party having the privilege of naming one or more. 0 But in
Welde v. Welde, 6 decided in 1830, the inspection of the wife
was made by midwives, while that of the husband was by
physicians. In this country we find Chancellor WALWORTH
declaring that the examination should be made by '' physicians of intelligence or skill, who by study or practice have
made themselves well acquainted with the nature and progress of the disease which has caused the defendant's incapacity." 7 And in this same case the Chancellor aid :
Devenbagh v. Devenbagh, 5 Paige, 554.
Brown v. Brown, 1 Haggard, 523.
3 Biiggs v. Morgan, 3 Phillimore, 3215; Welde v. Welde, 2 Lee, 5 O·
H - - v. P - - (L.H.), 3 Prob. & Div. 126; G
v. G
(L.
R.), 2 Prob.&. Div. 287; Newell v. "N"ewell, 9 Paige, 26.
4 Coote s Ecc. Pr. 367.
And see Norton v. Seton, 3 Phillimore, 147.
5 Coote s Ecc. Praa. 388.
And see Dean v. AveUng, 1 Robertson , 279.
s 2 Lee, 580.
.
7 Newell v. Newell, 9 Paige, 26.
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" The defendant must therefore submit to such an examin-

ation by one or more respectable gentlemen of the medical

profession, who may be named for that purpose by the

husband, with the sanction of the court. Such

medical attendants as she may think proper to call in are

also to be present at the time of her examination by the

complainant's professional witnesses." In another case it

is said that in the selection of the experts due regard will be

paid to the feelings and wishes of the defendant. 1 Proper

respect for the feelings of the party to be examined, re-

quires that the number of the experts appointed to make

the examination should be restricted to the smallest number

consistent with the interests of justice.

68. When Compulsory Examination in such Cases

will not be Ordered. Where the party against whom im-

potency is alleged, has already submitted to an examination

of competent physicians, whose testimony can be readily

obtained, it is said that a further examination will not be

insisted on. 2 But where the wife claimed that her inca-

pacity existed now, but not at the time of the marriage,
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and to prove her claim produced the certificate of two med-

ical gentlemen who had examined her recently, expressing

their belief that the incapacity had arisen since the marriage,

Chancellor WALWORTH, upon the application of the hus-

band, ordered another examination, declaring that under

the peculiar circumstances of the case, the complainant

ought not to be compelled to leave the decision of his cause

to rest solely upon the ex parte examination made by the

physicians selected by the wife. 3

69. Summoning Experts to assist in Determining the

Proper Interrogatories. The usual practice in such cases

has been to direct a reference to a master, to take the testi-

mony and report thereon. And when the parties do not

agree as to the interrogatories to be propounded on the ex-

1 Devenbagh v. Devenbagh, 5 Paige, 554, 558.

2 Brown v. Brown, 1 Haggard, 523, note o; Devenbagh v. Devenbagh,

554, 558.

3 Newell v. Newell, 9 Paige, 26.

'' The defendant must therefore submit to such an examination by one or more respectable gentlemen of the medical
profession, who may be named for that purpose hy the
husband, with the sanction of the court. * * * Such
medical attendants as she may think proper to call in are
also to be present at the time of her examination by the
complainant's professional witnesses." In another case it
is said that in the selection of the experts due regard will be
paid to the feelings and wishes of the defendant. 1 Proper
respect for the feelings of the party to· be examined, requires that the number of the experts appoi~ted to make
the examination should be restricted tq the smallest number
consistent with the interests of justice.
§ 68. When Compulsory Examination in such Cases
will not be Ordered.-Where the party against whom impotency is alleged, has already submitted to an examination
of competent physicians, whose testimony can be readily
obtained, it is said that a further examination will not be
insisted on. 2 But where the wife claimed that her incapacity existed now, but not at the time of the marriage,
and to prove her claim produced the certificate of two medical gentlemen who had examined her recently, expressing
their belief that the incapacity had arisen since the marriage,
Chancellor WALWORTH, upon the application of the husband, ordered another examination, declaring that. under
the peculiar circumstances of the case, the complainant
ought not to be compelled to leave the decision of his cause
to rest solely upon the ex parte examination made by the
physicians selected by the wife. 3
§ 69. Summoning· Experts to assist in Determining the
Proper Interrog·atories.-The usual practice in such cases
has been to direct a reference to a m.aster, to take the testimony and report thereon. And when the parties do not
agree as to the interrogatories to be propounded on the ex1

Dcvenbagh v. Devenbagh, 5 Paige, 554, 558.
Brown v. Brown, 1 Haggard, 523, note a; Devenbagh v. Devenbagh,
554, 558.
s Newell v. Newell, 9 Paige, 26.
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amination, they must be settled by the master, who may

summon physicians or surgeons to assist him in determining

the necessary interrogatories. It is necessary that the

defendant, in connection with the examination by the

experts, should answer all needful inquiries propounded by

them, and the answers should be given under oath. This

subject was considered by Chancellor WALWORTH at an early

day in New York. " The interrogatories to be propounded

to her (the defendant)," he says, " must be such only as

relate to this alleged incapacity, and the commencement

and progress of the disease by which it has probably been

produced. And if the parties cannot agree upon the proper

interrogatories, after having consulted with their physicians

on the subject, the master in settling the interrogatories to

be propounded to the defendant in connection with her ex-

amination by medical gentlemen, is to be at liberty to sum-

mon before him, and examine on oath, any physicians or

surgeons, to enable him to decide what interrogatories may

be necessary or proper to be allowed." 1

70. The Subject of Inquiry Structural Defect Im-
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practicability of Consummation. The inquiry of the ex-

perts is to be directed not merely to the discovery of whether

a structural defect exists. It is possible that although no

structural defect exists, the case may show the impractica-

bility of consummation. In a recent case in England, 2 a

divorce was obtained, where the professional witnesses

swore that no structural defect existed, but there was an

impracticability of consummation. As this is important,

we quote the language of the court : "The impossibility

must be practical. It cannot be necessary to show that the

woman is so formed that connection is physically impos-

sible, if it can be shown that it is possible only under con-

ditions to which the husband would not be justified in

resorting. The absence of a physical structural defect can-

not be sufficient to render a marriage valid, if it be shown

that connection is practically impossible, or even if it be

1 Newell v. Newell, 9 Paige, 26, 27.

2 G v. G , 2 Prob. & Div. (L. R.) 287.

amination, they must be settled by the master , who may
summon physicians or surgeons to assist him in determining
the necessary interrogatories. It is necessary that the
defendant, in connection with the examination by the
experts, should answer all needful inquiries propounded by
them, and the answers should be given under oath. This
subject was considered by Chancello~· WALWORTH at an early
day in New York. '' The inter:rogatories to be propounded
to her (the defendant)," he says, "must be such only as
relate to this alleged incapacity, and the commencement
and progress of the disease by which it has probably been
produced. And if the parties cannot agree upon the proper
interrogatories, after having consulted with their physicians
on the subject, the master in settling the interrogatories to
be propounded to the defendant in connection with her examination by medical gentlemen, is to be at liberty to summon before him, and examine on oath, any physicians or
surgeons, to enable him to decide what interrogatories may
be necessary or proper to be allowed." 1
§ 70. The Subject of Inquiry-Structural Defect-Impracticability of Consummation.-The inquiry of the experts is to be directed not merely to the discovery of wheth~r
a structural defect exists. · It is possible that although no
structural defect exists, the case may show the impracticability of consummation. In a recent case in England, 2 a
divorce was obtained, where the professional witnesses
swore that no structural defect existed, but thei~e was an
impracticability of consummation. As this is important,
we quote the language of the court : '' The impossibility
must be practical. It cannot be necessary to show that the
woman is so formed t~at connection is physically impos~
sible, if it can be shown that it is possible only under conditions to which the husband would not be justified in
resorting. The absence of a physical structural defect cannot be sufficient to render a marriage valid, if it be shown
that connection is practically impossible, or even if it be
1
2

Newell v. Newell, 9 Paige, 26, 27.
G - - v. G - - , 2 Prob. & Div. (L. R.) 287.
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shown that it is only practicable after a remedy has been

applied, which the husband cannot enforce, and which the

wife, whether wilfully or acting under the influence of

hysteria, will not submit to." 1 But a merely wilful and

wrongful refusal of marital intercourse will never justify a

decree of nullity by reason of impotence, although if per-

sisted in long enough, the court may infer that it arises

from incapacity. 2

71. The Testimony of the Experts in such Cases to be

Received with Caution. After the experts have made

their examination and given their testimony, it is to be re-

ceived and weighed with great caution, and Sir John Nichol

goes so far as to declare, that he is " not aware that it has

ever been held sufficient alone," 3 to justify a decree of

nullity.

72. Defraying the Expenses of the Examination by

the Experts. The husband must, of course, furnish all the

necessary funds to pay the expenses of the surgical exami-

nation. 4 If the wife refuses to submit herself to the

examination ordered by the court, the allowance of her ali-
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mony may be suspended until she consents to the examina-

tion as directed. 5 And either party refusing to submit to

such an examination, might undoubtedly be punished for

contempt of court. 6 But as a refusal to submit to the ex-

amination has been regarded as evidence of incapacity, 7 a

party will perhaps ordinarily hesitate before refusing com-

pliance with the order of the court in such cases.

iSee also P v. L , 3 Prob. Division (L. R.), 73, note 2;

H v. P , 3 Prob. & Div. (L. R.) 126.

2 S v. A , 3 Probate Division (L. R.), 72.

3 Norton v. Seton, 3 Phillimore, 147.

4 Devenbagh v. Devenbagh, 5 Paige, 554, 558.

5 Newell v. Newell, 9 Paige, 26.

6 See Schroeder v. The C., R. I. etc. R. Co., 47 Iowa, 375.

7 Harrison v. Harrison, 4 Moore, P. C. 96, 103, Lord Brougham's

opinion. See too, H v. P , 3 Prob. & Div. (L. R.) 126. The

court should be satisfied, however, that there was no collusion between

the parties. Pollard v. Wybourn, 1 Hagg. Ecc. R. 725; Sparrow v.

Harrison, 3 Curteis, 16.

shown that it is only practicable after a remedy has been
applied, which the husband cannot enforce, and which the
wife, whether wilfully or acting under the influence of
hysteria, will not submit to." 1 But a merely wilful and
wrongful refusal of marital intercourse will never justify a
decree of nullity by reason of impotence, although if persisted in long enough, the court may infer that it arises
from incapacity .2
§ 71. The Testimony of the Experts in such Cases to be
Received with Caution. -After the experts have made
their examination and given their testimony, it is to be received and weighed with great caution, and Sir John Nichol
goes so far as to declare, that he is " not aware· tha~ it has
ever been held sufficient alone," 3 to justify a decree of
nullity.
§ 72. Defraying the Expenses of the Examination by
the Experts.-The husband must, of course, furnish all the
necessary funds to pay the expenses of the surgical examination. 4 If the \\rife refuse3 to submit herself to the
examination ordered by the court, the allowance of her alimony may be suspended until she consents to the examination as directeq. 5 And either party refusing to submit to
such an examination, might undoubtedly be · punished for
contempt of court. 6 But as a refusal to submit to the examination has been regarded as evidence of incapacity ,7 a
party will perhaps ordinarily hesitate before refusing compliance with the order of the court in such cases.
i See also P - - v. L - - , 3 Prob. Division (L. R.), 73, note 2;
H - - v. P - - , 3 Prob. & Div. (L. R.) 126.
2 S- - v. A - - , 3 Probate Division (L. R.), 72.
3 ~o rton v. Seton, 3 Phillimore, 147.
4 Devenbagh v. D evenbagh, 5 Paige, 554:, 558.
0 Newell v. Newell, 9 P aige, 26.
6 See Schroeder v. 1.'he C., R. I. etc. R. Oo., 47 Iowa, 375.
1 H arrison v. H arrison , 4 Moore, P. C. 96, 103, Lord Brougham's
opinion. See too , H - - v. P - - , 3 Prob. & Div. (L. R.) 126. The
court should be satisfied , however, that there was no collusion between
t he parties. Pollard v. Wybourn, 1 Hagg. Ecc. R. 725; Sparrow v.
H arrison, 3 Curteis, 16.
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73. Compulsory Examination in Criminal Cases.

Whether the court has power to order a compulsory exam-

ination by experts of the person of a defendant in a criminal

proceeding, is an important question which has been somewhat

considered by the courts. The question turns on the construc-

tion to be placed on the constitutional provisions which pro-

vide that the accused shall not be compelled to give evidence

against himself in any criminal case. Such a provision is

found in the Constitution of the United States, and in the

Constitutions of the several States, with hardly an exception.

In Jacob's Case l the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in

1858, held that a defendant could not be compelled to ex-

hibit himself to the inspection of a jury for the purpose of

enabling them to determine his status as a free negro. And

this ruling was approved by the same court in Johnson's

Case 2 in 1872. Two years later the subject again came up

in the same court in Garrett's Case. 3 In that case it ap-

peared that the defendant had stated to persons present

on the night of the homicide, that the deceased came to her

death by her clothes accidentally catching fire while the de-
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ceased was asleep, and that she, the defendant, in attempt-

ing to put out the flames burnt one of her hands. At the

coroner's inquest the defendant was compelled to unwrap

the hand which she had stated was burnt, and exhibit it to

a physician, in order that he might see whether there was

any indication of burn upon it. And it was held that the

actual condition of her hand, although she was ordered by

the coroner to exhibit it to the doctor, was admissible evi-

dence. Jacob's Case was distinguished as follows : "The

distinction between that and our case is that in Jacob's Case,

the prisoner himself, on trial, was compelled to exhibit him-

self to the jury, that they might see that he was within the

prohibited degree of color ; thus he was forced to become a

witness against himself. This was held to be error. In

our case, not the prisoner, but the witnesses-, were called to

1 5 Jones, 259.

2 67 N. C. 58.

3 71 N. C. 58.

§ 73. Compulsory Examination· in Criminal Cases.- .
Whether the court has power to order a compulsory examination by experts of the person of a defendant in a criminal
proceeding, is an important question which has been somewhat
considered by the courts. The question turns on the construction to be placed on the constitutional provisions which provide that the accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
Such a provision is
against himself in any criminal case.
found in the Constitution of the United States, and in the
Constitutions of the several States, with hardly an exception.
In Jacob's Gase 1 the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in
1858, held that a defendant could not be compelled to exhibit himself to the inspection of a jury for the purpose of
enabling them to determine his status as a free negro. A.nd
this ruling was approved by the same court in Johnson's
Uase 2 in 1872. Two years later the subject again came up
in -the same court in Ga1·rett' s Uase. 3 In that case it appeared that the defendant had stated to persons present
on the
night of the homicide, that the decea ed came to her
I
death by her clothes accidentally catching :fire while the deceased was asleep, and that she, the defendant, in attempting to put out the flam~s burnt one of her hands. A.t the
coroner's inqu~st the defendant was compelled to unwrap
the hand which she had stated was burnt, and exhibit it to
a physician, in order that he might see whether there was
any indication of burn upon it. A.nd it was held that the
actual condition of her hand, although she was ordered by
the coroner to exhibit it to the doctor, wai admi sible evidence. Jacob's Case was distinguished as follows : "The
. distinction between ·that and our case is that in Jacob's Gase,
the prisoner himself, on trial, was compelled to exhibit himself to the jury, that they might see that he was within the
prohibited degree of color ; thus he was forced to become a
witness against himself. This was held to be error. In
our case, not the prisoner, but the witnesses., were called to
i
2

3

5 Jones, 259.
67 N. C. 58.
71 N. C. 58.
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prove what they saw upon inspecting the prisoner's hand,

although that inspection was obtained by intimidation." In

Nevada it has been held that the court could lawfully com-

pel a criminal defendant, against his objection, to exhibit

his bare arm, for the purpose of determining whether it had

on it certain tatoo marks. The question of identity was

raised, and a witness had testified that he knew the defend-

ant, and knew that he had tatoo marks (describing them)

on his right forearm. 1 This is one of the best considered

cases on this side of the question. The court declared that

the Constitution prohibited the State from compelling a de-

fendant to be a witness against himself, because it was be-

lieved that he might, by the flattery of hope or suspicion of

fear, be induced to tell a falsehood, and that this reason was

inapplicable to an examination of the person, which could

not in the very nature of things lead to a falsehood. " The

Constitution means," said the court, " just what a fair and

reasonable interpretation of its language imports. No per-

son shall be compelled to be a witness, that is to testify,

against himself. To use the common phrase, ' it closes the
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mouth ' of the prisoner. A defendant in a criminal case can-

not be compelled to give evidence under oath or affirmation,

or make any statement for the purpose of proving or dis-

proving any question at issue before any tribunal, court,

judge, or magistrate."

74 . Compulsory Examination in Criminal Cases The

Subject Continued. The same question was similarly de-

cided in the Court of Appeals of Texas, in 1879, although

the question was presented in a different form. In that

case testimony was held admissible that the footprints,

which the prisoner was compelled to make in an ash heap,

corresponded with those made on the night of the murder

about the premises of the deceased. 2 And a similar ruling

on a similar state of facts was made in North Caro-

lina. 3 But a different conclusion has been reached in

1 State v. Aa Chuey, 14 Ney. 79; s. c., 1 Crim. Law Mag. 634.

* Walker v. State, 7 Tex. Ct. of App. 245, 265.

3 State v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646; s. c.,21 Am. Rep. 493.

prove what they saw upon inspecting the prisoner's hand,
although that inspection was obtained by intimidation." In
Nevada it ha been held that the court could lawfully compel a criminal defendant, against his objection, to exhibit
his bare arm , for the purpose of determining whether it had
on it certain tatoo marks . The question of identity was
raised, and a witness had testified that he knew the defendant, and knew that he had ta.too 'marks (describing them)
on his right forearm .1 This is one of the best considered
cases on this side of the question . The_court declared t~at
the Con titution pror.ibited the State from compelling a defendant to be a witness against himself, because it was believed that he might, by the flattery of hope or suspicion of
fear, be induced to tell a falsehood, and that this reason was
inapplicable to an examination of the person, which could
not in the very nature of things lead to a falsehood. "The
Constitution means~" said the court, "just what a fair and
rea onable interpretation of its language imports. No person shall be compelled to be a witness, that is to testify,
against himself. To use the common phrase, 'it closes the
mouth' of the prisoner. A defendant in a criminal case cannot be compelled to give evidence under oath or affirmation,
or make any statement for th.e purpose of proving or disproving any question at issue before any tribunal, court,
judge, or magistrate ."
§ 74. Compulsory Examination in Criminal Cases-The
Subject Continued.- The same question wa::s similarly decided in the Court of Appeals of Texas, in 1879, although
the question was presented in a different form. In that
ca e testimony was held admissible that the footprints,
which the prisoner was compelled to make in an ash heap,
corresponded with those made on the night of the murder
about the premises of the deceased. 2 And a similar ruling
on a similar state of facts was made in North Carolina .3 But a different concl usion has been reached in
1
2

3

State v. Ail Chuey, 14 Nev. 79; s. c., 1 Crim. Law Mag. 634.
Walker v. State, 7 Tex. Ct. of App . 245, 265.
tate v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646; s. c., 21 Am. Rep. 493.
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Georgia, 1 and in Tennessee 2 on a like state of facts.

But in New York the subject was presented in a case

which involved the question whether the prisoner had been

delivered of a child. The coroner directed two physicians to

go to the jail and make an examination of the woman, and

determine whether she had recently been delivered of a

child or not. She denied having been pregnant, and objected

to being examined by the physicians. But on being told

that if she did not submit to the examination, she would be

compelled to submit by force, she yielded, and her private

parts were examined by the physicians with a speculum,

and they examined her breasts. The court refused to

allow the physicians to testify, declaring that such an ex-

amination was a violation of the spirit and meaning of the

Constitution, which declares that " no person shall be com-

pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."

" They might as well have sworn the prisoner, and com-

pelled her by threats, to testify that she had been pregnant

and been delivered of the child, as to have compelled her,

by threats, to allow them to look into her person, with the
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aid of a speculum, to ascertain whether she had been preg-

nant and had been recently delivered of a child." 3 It will

be observed that in some of the cases in which the question

has been considered, the right to order an examination of

the person by experts was not directly involved, but they all

involve the same principle, and it has been necessary to con-

sider them all in this connection. The result of the exam-

ination of the cases shows a decided conflict of authorities,

and that the question is still unsettled and open.

75. Compulsory Examination in Actions for Dam-

ages. It has been held, too, that in an action for damages

for personal injuries, the plaintiff may be required by

the court, upon an application of the defendant, to sub-

mit his person to an examination by physicians and sur-

1 Day v. State, 63 Ga. 667; Blackwell v. State, 13 Reporter, 271 ; s. c.,

3 Crim. Law Mag. 394.

2 Stokes v. State, 5 Baxt. 519; s. c., 30 Am. Rep. 72.

3 People v. McCoy, 45 How. Pr. 216.

Georgia,1 and in Tennessee 2 on a like state of facts.
But in New York the subject was presented in a case
which involved the question whether the prisoner had been
delivered of a child. The coroner directed two physicians to
go to the jail and make an examination of the woman, and
determine whether she had recently been delivered of a
child or not. She denied having been pregnant, and objected
to being examined by the physicians. But on being told
that if she did not submit to the examination, she would be
corhpelled to submit by force, she yielded, and her private
parts were examined by the physicians with a speculum ,
The court refused to
and they examined her breasts.
allow the physicians to testify, declaring that such an examination was a violation of the spirit and meaning of the
Constitution, which declares that " no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.,,
"They might as well have sworn the prisoner, and compelled her by threats, to testify that she had been pregnant
and been delivered of the child, as to have compelled her,
by threats, to allow them to look into her person, with the
aid of a speculum, to ascertain whether she had been pregnant and had been recently delivered of a child." 3 It will
be observed that in some of the cases in which the question
has been considered, the right to order an examination of
the person by experts was not directly involved, but they all
involve the same principle, and it has been necessary to consider them all in this connection . The resuit of the examination of the cases shows a decided conflict of authorities,
and that the question is still unsettled and open.
§ 75. Compulsory Examination in Actions for Damages.- It has been held, too, that in an action for damages
for personal injuries, the plaintiff may be required by
the court, upon an application of the defendant, to submit his person to an examination by physicians and sur1

Day v. State, 63 Ga. 667; Blackwell v. State, 13 Reporter, 271; s. c.,

3 C1im. J1aw Mag. 394.
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geons for the purpose of ascertaining the character and

extent of his injuries. 1 The court in this case declared that

refusal to submit to an examination so ordered, would ren-

der the party liable to punishment for contempt of court,

and if continued so long as to effectively obstruct the prog-

ress of the case, all allegations as to personal injury might

be stricken from the pleadings. And it is declared that,

" under the explicit directions of the court, the physicians

should have been restrained from imperiling, in any de-

gree, the life or health of the plaintiff. The use of

anaesthetics, opiates or drugs of any kind, should have

been forbidden, if indeed it had been proposed, and it

should have prescribed that he should be subjected to no

tests painful in their character." The above case was

decided in 1877, and the conclusion reached was arrived at

irrespective of authority, the court declaring that it was

unable to find any case in which the question had been con-

sidered. But the same question had been considered in

New York in 1868, and it was there held that the court, in

an action for malpractice against a surgeon, could compel
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the plaintiff to submit her person to an examination at the

hands of the defendant's experts. 2 "It is not proper,"

said the court, " that the cause should be left to be deter-

1 Schroder v. The K. I. & P. R. R. Co., 47 Iowa, 375.

2 Walsh v. Sayre, 52 How. Pr. 334. The complaint alleged that the

defendant, in treating the plaintiff for an injury in the neighborhood of

her hips, had so negligently and unskillfully, as to puncture the joint,

causing the synovial fluid which lubricates the cartilaginous surface of

the joint to escape, thereby seriously and permanently injuring the hip,

and rendering the whole leg useless, and perhaps rendering its amputa-

tion necessary. The defendant petitioned the court, stating that since

the commencement of the action, he had endeavored to obtain leave to

make a professional examination of the affected part, but had been re-

fused permission so to do. That he could not safely proceed to trial,

nor properly defend the action, unless he could have a personal inspec-

tion and professional examination of the affected parts, and praying that

said examination and personal inspection by himself and such other

geons for the purpose of ascertaining the character and
extent of his injuries. 1 The court in this case declared that
refusal to submit to an examination so ordered, would render the party liable to punishment for contempt of court,
and if continued so long as to effectively obstruct the progress of the case, all allegations as to personal injury might
be stricken from the pleadings. And it is declared that,
" under the explicit directions of the court, the physicians
should have been restrained from imperiling, in any degl'ee, the life or health of the plaintiff.
The use of
anresthetics, opiates or. drugs of any kind, should have
been forbidden, if indeed it had been proposed, and it
should have prescribed that he should be subjected to no
tests painful in their character.'' The above case was
decided in 1877, and the conclusion reached was arrived at
irrespective of authority, the court declaring that it was
unable to find any case in which the question had been considered. But the same question had been considered in
New York in 1868, and it was there held that the court, in
an action for malpractice against a surgeon, could compel
the plaintiff to submit her person to an examination at the
hands of the defendant's experts. 2 "It is not proper,"
said the court, '' that the cause should be left to be deter-

skillful and eminent surgeons as he might name, might be had under the

direction of the sheriff, or a referee appointed for that purpose, at such

time and place, and in such form or manner, as to the court might seem

just and proper.

Schroder v. The R. I. & P.R. R. Co., 47 Iowa, 375.
Walsh v. Sayre, 52 How. Pr. 334. The complaint alleged that the
defendant, in treating the plaintiff for an injury in the neighborhood of
her hips, had so negligently and unskillfully, as to puncture the joint,
causing the synovial fluid which lubricates the cartilaginous surface of
the joint to escape, thereby seriously and permanently injuring the hip,
and rendering the whole leg useless, and perhaps rendering its amputation necessary. The defendant petitioned the court, !Stating that since
the commencement of the action, he had endeavored to obtain leave to
make a profes!Sional examination of the affected part~ but had been refused permission so to do. That he could not safely proceed to tlial,
nor properly defend the action, unless he could have a personal inspection and professional examination of the affected parts, and praying that
said examination and personal inspection by himself and such other
skillful and eminent surgeons as he might name, might be had under the
direction. of the heriff, or a referee appointed for that purpose, at such
time and place, and in such form or 'm anner, as to the court might seem
just and proper.
1
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mined on the evidence of two or three surgeons, selected

by the plaintiff out of the whole body of surgeons, perhaps

because their views are adverse to the defendant's ; but it is

" eminently proper that defendant should l^ave the benefit of

the testimony of one or two surgeons of his own selection,

and that these surgeons should have the requisite means of

forming a correct judgment, one of which is the examination

of the affected part."

The question, too, was considered in Missouri in 1873, in

an action against a railroad company for personal injuries.

The point raised was, however, very summarily disposed of

in the opinion, and the right to order the examination

denied. The court merely said : " The proposal to the court

to call in two surgeons, and have the plaintiff examined

during the progress of the trial, as to the extent of her in-

juries, is unknown to our practice and to the law. There

was abundant evidence on this subject on both sides ; any

opinion of physicians or surgeons at that time would have

only been cumulative evidence at best, and the court had no

power to enforce such an order." 1
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76. Detection of Poisons by Chemists. It is said that

there is no poison accessible to the public, which cannot be

detected by modern methods of research, and oftentimes

months and years after it has slain its victims. " There is

probably no limit to the time when the metallic poisons

might not be discovered after the demise of the victim." 2

Experts are, therefore, allowed to testify, after having made

a chemical analysis of the contents of the stomach, as to the

presence of poison in the internal organs of the body. 3 And

a person who is a chemist and toxicologist, may testify as

an expert concerning the effect of a certain poison upon the

human system, and it is not necessary that he should be a

physician or surgeon. 4 A physician is also competent to

1 Loyd v. Hannibal etc. K. B. Co., 53 Mo. 509, 515, 516.

2 Crim. Law Mag. 294. Article by R. Ogden Doremug, M. D., LL. D.,

Prof. Chemistry and Toxicology in Bellevue Hosp. Med. Coll.

8 State v. Bowman, 78 N. C. 509, 510.

4 State v. Cook, 17 Kans. 394.

mined on the evidence of two or· three surgeons, selected
by the plaintiff out of the whole body of surgeons, perhaps
because their views are adverse to the defendant's ; but it is
· eminently proper that defendant should l;iave the benefit of
the testimony of one or two surgeons of his own selection,
and that these surgeons sh(:mld have the requisite means of
forming a correct judgment, one of which is the examination
of the affected part.' '
The question, too, was considered in Missouri in 1873, in
an action against a railroad company for personal injuries.
The point ·raised was; however, very summarily disposed of
in the opinion, and the right to order the examination ·
denied. The court merely said: "The proposal to the court
to call in two surgeons, and have the plaintiff examined
during the progress of the trial, as to the extent of her injuries, is unknown to our practice and to the law. There
was abundant evidence on this subject on both sides; any
opinion of physicians or s·urgeons at that time would have
only been cumulative evidence at best, and the court had no
power to enforce such an order.' ' 1
§ 76. Detection of Poisons by Chemists.-It is said that
there is no poison accessible to the public, which cannot be
detected by modern methods of research, and oftentimes
months and years after it has slain its victims. '' There is
probably no limit to the time when the metallic poisons
might not be discovered after the demise of 'the victim." 2
Experts are, therefore, allowed to testify, a.fter having made
a chemical analysis of the contents of the stomach, as to the
presence of poison in the internal organs of the body. 3 And
a person who is a chemist and toxicologist, may testify as
an expert concerning the effect of a certain poi~on upon the
human system, and it is not necessary that he should be a
physician or surgeon. 4 A physician is also · competent to
1

Loyd v. Hannibal etc. R.R. Co., 53 Mo. 509, 515, 516.
Crim. Law Mag. 294.~ Article by R. Ogden Doremus, M . D., LL. D. ,
P rof. Chemistry and Toxicology in Bellevue Hosp. Med. Coll.
8 State v. Bowman, 78 N. C. 509, 510.
•State v. Cook, 17 Kans. 394.
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testify upon the same subject, 1 and may be asked to describe

the symptoms which appear upon the administration of any

particular poison. 2 They may express an opinion that death

was caused by the administration of poison. 3 In the case

last cited, a physician, after describing the symptoms, gave

his opinion that the deceased died from the effects of

arsenic, and in answer to an inquiry put to him, declared

that he would not have formed such an opinion had he not

been informed that there was arsenic in the house, but

learning that fact, he reached his conclusion from observa-

tion of the symptoms of the case. Counsel sought to

exclude the opinion upon the ground that it was not a med-

ical opinion, but the objection was not sustained.

77. Chemical Analysis of Poison not Necessary Tyiien.

It is held that it is not always essential that there should

be a chemical analysis of a mixture, in order to qualify an

expert to express an opinion as to its ingredients, and to its

being a poison. 4 In the case cited; which was the trial of a

prisoner indicted for administering a poisonous drug, a

bottle was produced and shown to a medical expert, which
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contained the mixture administered by the defendant; he

stated that he had made no chemical analysis of its con-

tents, but thought he could tell its ingredients from its

smell, taste and appearance. v He was allowed to give an

opinion as to what the mixture was composed of, its effect

upon a woman in pregnancy when taken, and the danger to

life.

78. Chemical Analysis of Contents of Stomach. It

has been held, however, that in a case of poisoning, chem-

ical tests and an analysis of the contents of the stomach and

bowels are essential to the ascertainment of the truth, and

should be resorted to in all cases where there is no direct

proof of the act. Symptoms of themselves, without other

1 State v. Terrill, 12 Rich. 321.

2 People v. Robinson, 2 Parker Cr. Cas^ 236; Polk v. State, 36 Ark.

117,124.

3 Mitchell v. State, 58 Ala. 418.

4 State v. Slagh, 83 N. C. 630.

testify upon the same subject,1 and ma.y be asked to describe
the sy111ptoms which · appear upon the administration of any
particular poison .~ They may express an opinion that death
· was caused by the administration of poison. 3 In the case
last cited, a physician, after describing the symptoms, gave
his opinion that the deceased died from the effects of
arsenic, and in answer to an inquiry put to him, declared
that he would not have formed such an opinion had he not
been informed that there was arsenic in the house, but
]earning that fact, he reached his conclusion from observation of the symptoms of the case . Counsel sought .to
exclude the opinion upon the ground that it was not a medical opinion, but the objection was not sustained.
§ 7 7. Chemical Analysis of Poison not Necessary When.
-It is held that it is not alwavs essential that there should
"'
be a chemical analysis of a mixture, in order to qualify an
expert to express an opinion as to its ingredients, and to its
being a poison.4 In the case cited; which was the trial of a
prisoner indicted for administering a poisonous drug, a
bottle was produced anq shown to a medical expert, which
contained the mixture administered by the defendant ; he
stated that he had made no chemical analysis of its contents, but thought he could tell its ingredients from its
smell, taste and appearance. "He was allowed to give an
opinion as to what the mixture was composed of, its effect
upon a woman in pregnancy when taken, and the danger to
life.
§ 7 8. Chemical Analysis of Contents of Stomach.- It
has been held, however, that in a case of poisoning, chemical tests and an analysis of the contents of the stomach and
bowels are essential to the ascertainment of the truth, and
should be resorted to in all cases where there is no direct
proof of the act. Symptoms of themselves, without other
State v. Terrill, 12 Rich. 321.
.
People v. Robinson, 2 Parker Or. Oas, 236; Polk v. State, 36 Ark.
117, 124.
3 Mitchell v. ~tate, 58 Ala. 418.
~State v. Slagb, 83 N. O. 630.
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circumstances, are pronounced unreliable, and said to be

inconclusive evidence of guilt. 1 But in all cases where the

opinions of experts are to be received as to the chemical

contents of the stomach and bowels, it is necessary that

there should be preliminary proof of the identity of the

stomach and its contents and that the same have not been

improperly tampered with. Such proof should be first sub-

mitted, and passed upon by the court, before the opinions

of the experts should be received. 2 In the case last cited it

is declared that the evidence should show that the stomach

taken from the deceased was the identical stomach whose

contents were analyzed, and that no foreign substance

could have been introduced into the stomach, or into its

contents, subsequent to the death of the deceased and prior

to the chemical analysis. The court proceeded to say :

" It was not necessary that the stomach should have been

kept continuously under lock and key from the time it was

taken from the body of the deceased until the final analysis,

or that it should have been kept continuously sealed up.

And it was not necessary that all possibility of

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 20:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t71v5cx5m
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

its being tampered with should have been excluded."

After it is made to appear that no mistake has been made as

to the identity of the stomach audits contents, the opinions

of practicing physicians, who are not professional chemists,

are received as to the analysis of the stomach, and the tests

usually applied for detecting poison in such cases. Al-

though it is said that the opinions of those who are not

practical chemists, are entitled to less weight than those

given by that class of experts whose conclusions are based

upon experience as well as books. 3

79. Order of Research in Analysis for Poisons. In

the analysis of a poison case it is essential that the toxicol-

ogist should have followed a scientific order of research, as

1 Joe v. State, 6 Fla. 591.

2 State v. Uook, 17 Kan. 394.

3 State v. Hinkle, 6 Iowa, 380. In this case the opinions of two prac-

ticing physicians were received. One of them stated that he was not a

professional chemist, but understood some of the practical details of

circumstances, are pronounced unreliable, and said to be
inconclusive evidence of guilt. 1 But in all cases where the
opinions of experts are to be received as to the chemical
contents of the stomach and bowels, it is necessary that
there should be preliminary proof of the identity of the
stomach and its contents and that the same have not been
improperly tampered with. Such proof should be first submitted, and passed upon by the court, before the opinions
of the experts should be received. 2 In the case last cited it
is declared that the evidence should show that the stomach
taken from the deceased was the identical stomach whose
contents were analyzed, and that no foreign substance
could have been introduced into the stomach, or into its
contents, subsequent to the death of the deceased and prior
to the chemical analysis. The court proceeded to say:
''It· was not necessary that the stomach should have been
kept continuously under lock and key from the time it wa
taken from the body of the deceased until the final analysis,
or that it should have been kept continuously sealed up .
* * * And it was not necessary that all possibility of
its being tampered with should have been excluded ."
After it is made to appear that no mistake has been made a'
to the identity of the stomach and its contents , the opinions
of practicing physicians, who are not professional chemists,
are received as to the analysis of the stomach, and the tests
usually applied for detecting poison in such cases . Although it is said that the opinions of those who are not
practical chemists, are entitled to less weight than t hose
given by that class of experts whose conclusions are based
upon experience as well as books .3
§ 79. Order of Research in Anal ysis for Poisons. - I n
the analysis of a poison case it is essential that t he toxicol. ogist should have followed a scientific order of research, as
1

Joe v. State, 6 Fla. 591.
State v. Uook, 17 Kan. 394.
8
State v. Hinkle, 6 Iowa, 380. In this case the opinions of two practicing physicians were received. One of them stated t.hat he was not a
professional chemist, but understood some of the practical details of
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otherwise it is quite possible for him to fail to discover the

presence of the poison. It is important for counsel in the

examination of such witnesses to bear this fact in mind,

and we, therefore, append this order of research. The ex-

amination should be :

1. For the volatile poisons, such as hydrocyanic acid,

chloroform, ether, etc. These poisons being most liable to

escape detection, as they may be lost by evaporation.

2. For the vegetable poisons, such as strychnine, morphia,

belladona, etc., as the tests employed for the detection of

mineral poisons are often destructive of the vegetable

poisons.

3. For the various acids, alkalies, metallic poisons, etc. 1

80. Chemical and Microscopic Examination of Blood.

Persons accustomed to make chemical and microscopic

examination of blood and blood stains, are, of course,

allowed to testify whether human blood can be distinguished

from animal blood, and, if so, whether a particular blood

stain was made by human or animal blood. 2 Such evidence

has been received in numerous cases, and without any
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objection. It has been admitted lately in two especially

notable cases, those of Rubenstein in New York, and of

Hayden in Connecticut. The controversy is not over the

admissibility of such testimony, but has been as to the possi-

bility of distinguishing human from animal blood. The

possibility of so doing is asserted on the one hand, 3 and

chemistry that portion at least which belonged to his profession ; that

he had no practical experience in the analysis of poisons, until he anal-

yzed the contents of the stomach of the deceased ; that he was previously

acquainted with the means of detecting poisons, and had since had some

experience in that way. The other declared that he was not a practical

chemist, but understood the chemical tests by which the presence of poi-

son could be detected : that he had never experimented with the view

of detecting strychnine by chemical tests, but that he had seen experi-

ments by professors of chemistry, and that there was one test much re-

lied on, the trial of which he had witnessed.

1 See 1 Crim. Law Mag. 309.

2 See Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122, 124; State v. Knight,

43 Me. 1, 133.

3 See 19 Am. Law Reg. (N. Js.) 529, where the subject is discussed

with learning and ability.

otherwise it is quite possible for him to fail to discover the
presence of the poison. It is important for counsel in the
examination of such witnesses to bear this fact in mind,
and we, therefore, append this order of research. The examination should be:
1. For the volatile poisons, such as hydrocyanic acid,
chloroform, ether, etc.. These poisons being most liable to
escape detection, as they may be lo~t by evaporation.
2. For the vegetable poisons, such as strychnine, morphia,
belladona, etc., as the tests employed for the detection of
mineral poisons are often destructive of the vegetable
poisons.
3. For the various acids, alkalies, metallic poisons, etc. 1
§ 80. Chemical and Microscopic Examination of Blood.
-Persons accustomed to make chemical and microscopic
examination of blood and blood stains, are, of course,
allowed to testify whether human blood can be distinguished
from auima.l blood, and , if ~o , whether a particular blood
stain was made by human or animal blood. 2 Such evidence
has been received in numerous cases, and without any
objection. It has been admitted lately in two especially
notable cases , those of Rubenstein in New York, and of
H ayden in Connecticut. The controversy is not over the
admissibility of such testimony, but has been as to the possibility of distinguishing human from animal blood. The
possibility of so doing is asserted on the one hand, 3 and
chemistry-that portion at least which belonged to his profession; Lhat
be had no practical e},,_f}erience in the analysis of poisons, until be analyzed the content of the stomach of the deceased; that he was previously
acquainted with the mean of detecting poisons, and had since had some
experience in that way. The other decl ared that he was not a practical
chemist, but understood the chemical tests by which the presence of poison could be detected: that he bad never expelimented with the view
of detecting strychnine by chemical tests, but that he had seen experiments by professors of chemistry, and that there was one test much relied on, the trial of which he had witne ed.
1 See 1 Crim . Law Mag. 309.
2 See Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117Mass.122,124; State v. Knight,
43 Me. 1, 133.
3 See _19 Am. Law Reg. (N. fs .) 529, where the subject is discu sed
with learning and ability.
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denied on the other. 1 While it is not within our province to

enter upon this discussion, we may be permitted to cite

below, the opinion of a distinguished expert, in the latest

discussion of this important question. 2 An expert may

illustrate his testimony touching the properties of human

blood, as ascertained by chemical tests and microscopic

observation, by the use and exhibition to the jury of a dia-

gram. "It would be very difficult for an expert of the

most accurate and extensive observation, to exhibit in

language with precision, so as to be understood, those deli-

cate appearances which are appreciable only by the sense of

vision. Nothing short of an exact representation to the

sight can give with certainty, a perfectly correct idea to the

mind. * * A diagram approximating in any degree to

perfect representation, when exhibited by one qualified

from knowledge and experience to give explanations, may

do much to make clear his testimony without danger of mis-

leading." 3 In a criminal trial it is, of course, proper that

1 See 10 Cent. Law Journal, 183.

2 " The whole question may be, 1 think, summed up as follows :
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1. Human and other mammalian blood, the corpuscles of which are

circular, can be distinguished by the criterion of form from that of all

other red-blooded animals, with the exception of that of the monotre-

mata (ornithorhynchus and echidna) , which, according to Gulliver, have

circular corpuscles. The camel family, which belong to the class mam -

malia, have oval corpuscles, as do all those not belonging to the mam-

malia, with the exception noted above.

2. Human blood can be distinguished from that of other red-blooded

animals having circular corpuscles, in every case of individual compar-

ison, where the average size of the corpuscles is greater than those of

the animal with which it is compared, or where the largest corpuscles

are larger than the largest of those of the animal with which they are

being compared.

3. Human blood may be distinguished in a given case, from that of an

animal (the dog for example) , in which the averages of the corpuscles,

and the size of single corpuscles in individual cases, are equal to, or ex-

ceed that of the average human blood.

4. Under the same conditions of actual individual comparison, the

blood of two individuals of the same species may be distinguished from

each other.

5. Blood may be distinguished from the opposite conditions of disease

and health, as between individuals of the same species, or between a

human being and a lower animal." 19 Am. Law Register, (N. S.) 605.

3 State v. Knight, 43 Me. 1.

denied on the other. 1 While it is noi within our province to
enter upon this discussion, we may be permitted to cite
below, the opinion of a distinguished expert, in the latest
discussion of this important question. 2 An expert may
illustrate his testimony touching the properties of hµman
blood, as ascertained by chemical tests and microscopic
observation, by the use and exhibition to•the jury of a diagram. "It would be very difficult for an expert of the
most accurate and extensive observation, to exhibit in
language with precision, so as to be undei:stood, those delicate appearances which are appreciable only by the sense of
v1s10n. Nothing short of a.n exact representat1011 to the
sight can give with certainty, a perfectly correct idea to the
mind. * * A diagram approximating in any degree to
perfect representation, when exhibited by one qualified
from knowledge and experience to give explanations, may
do much to make clear his testimony without danger of misleading." 3 In a criminal trial it is, of · course, proper that
See 10 Cent. Law Journal, 183.
"The whole question may be, I think, summed up as follows:
L Human and other mammalian blood, the corpuscles of which are ·
circular, can be distinguished by the criterion of form from that of all
other red-blooded animals, with the exception of that of the monotremata (ornit.horhynchus and echidna), which., according to Gulliver, have
circular corpuscles. The camel family, which belong to the class mam malia, have oval corpuscles, as do all those not belonging to the mammalia, with the exception noted above.
2. Human blood can be distinguished from that of other .red-blooded
animals having circular corpuscles, in every case of individual comparison, where the average size of the corpuscles is greater than those of
the animal with which it is compared, or where the largest corpuscles
are larger than the largest of those of the animal with whieh they are
being compared.
3. Human blood may be distinguished in a given case, from that of an
animal (the dog for example), in which the averages of the corpuscles,
and th~ size of single corpuscles in individual cases, are equal to, or exceed that of the average human blood.
·
4. Unaer the same conditions of actual individual comparison, the
blood of two individuals of the same species may be distinguished from
each other.
5. Blood may be distinguish~d from the opposite conditions of disease
and health, as between individuals of the same species, or between a
human being and a lower animal." 19 .Am. Law Register, (N. s.) 605.
a State v. Knight, 43 Me. 1.
i
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the prisoner should be allowed to have the articles, which

the prosecution allege to be smeared with blood, examined

by his own experts. After such articles have been offered

in evidence by the government, they are placed in the

special custody of the court, to be dealt with as justice re-

quires. Then, if the prisoner desires an examination to be

made by his experts, it should be allowed under proper pre-

cautions. As Mr. Justice LUDLOW has expressed it, "the

court should see to it that they are guarded from intentional

or accidental injury, with the most scrupulous care, and

they may be examined in open court by any persons selected

by the prisoner or his counsel, or if, from necessity, the

examination cannot be made accurately in open court, they

should be placed in the hands of any respectable chemist or

physician to be selected by the prisoner, with the consent

of the court. They should be properly identified as the

very articles offered in evidence by the Commonwealth,

before they are delivered to the person who has been

selected by the prisoner's counsel, and for this purpose, that

person should receive them in open court, and they should
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then be examined in the presence of an officer or officers of

the court." l

81. Whether Ordinary Witnesses may Testify as to

Blood Stains. But it has been made a question in several

cases,' whether ordinary witnesses may testify as to blood

stains, it being objected that no one but a chemist is quali-

fied to state whether stains, apparently made by blood, arc

really blood stains or not. We cannot find that such an

objection has been sustained in a single instance. And the

rule is, that ordinary witnesses are competent to testify that

they observed spots of blood upon the clothing, etc., and

no chemical analysis of the substance supposed to be blood

is necessary. 2 "The testimony of the chemist who has

analysed blood, and that of the observer who has merely

recognized it, belong to the same legal grade of evidence ;

1 Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 1 Brewster (Perm.), 562.

'Dillard v. State, 58 Miss. 368, 386; People v. Greenfield, 30N.Y,

Sup. Ct. 462; a. c. 85 N. Y. 75.

(8)

the prisoner should be allowed to have the articles, which
the prosecution allege to be smeared with blood, examined
by his own experts. After such articles have been offered
in evidence by the government, they are placed in the
special custody of the court, to be dealt with as justice requires. Then, if the prisoner desires an examination to be
made by his experts, it should be allowed under proper precautions. As Mr. Justice LUDLOW has expreesed it, "the
court should see to it that they are guarded from intentional
or accidental injury, with the most scrupulous care, and
they may be examined in open court by any persons selected
by the prisoner or his counsel, or if, from necessity, the
examination cannot be made accurately in open court, they
should be placed in the hands of any respectable chemist or
physician to be selected by the prisoner, with the consent
of the court. They should be properly identified as the
very articles offered in evidence by the Commonwealth,
before they are delivered to the person who has been
selected by the prisoner's counsel, and for this purpose, that
person should receive them in open court, and they .should
then be examined in the presence of an officer or officers of
the court.'' 1
§ 81. Wheth er 6 rdinary Witnesses may Testify as to
Blood Stains.-But it has been made a question in several
Dases; whether ordinary witnesses may testify as to blood
stains, it being objected that no one but a chemist is qualified to state whether stains, apparently made by blood, are
really blood stains or not. vVe canuot find that such an
· objection has been sustained in a single -instance. And the
rule is, that ordiuary witnesses are competent to testify that
they observed spots of blood upon the clothing, etc., and
.no chemieal analysis of the substance supposed to be blood
is necessary .2 ''The te5timony of the chemist who has
analysed blood, and that of the observer who has merely
recognized it, belong to the same legal grade of evidenoe;
1

Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 1 Brewster (Penn.), 562.
Dillard v. State, 58 Miss. 368, 386; People v. Green.field, 30 N.
Sup. Ct. 462; s. c. 85 N. Y. 75.
%
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and though the one may be 'entitled to much greater weight

than the other with the jury, the exclusion of either would

be illegal. * * Either party in the present case had the

right to resort to microscopic or chemical tests, but neither

was bound to do it, and neither can complain of the other

for the omission. * * The affairs of life are too pressing

and manifold to have everything reduced to absolute cer-

tainty, even in the administration of justice. * * Micro-

scopes, chemists and men of science are not always at hand ;

and criminals are neither anxious to court observation, nor

careful to preserve the evidences of their guilt." l

82. Blood Stains Proper Question Concerning. It

is sometimes very important to determine whether blood

stains upon clothing were occasioned by blood flowing upon

the outer, or upon the inner surface of the fabric. If

caused by blood flowing directly upon the outer surface of

the fabric, the coloring matter of the blood, which is sus-

pended in the blood, will, of course, remain on the outer

surface, whereas it would be on the inner surface of the

garment if it came from within. It is held, therefore, that
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one who is qualified by chemical observations and experi-

ments, may testify whether a blood spot upon a garment

could have been occasioned by blood flowing directly upon

the outer surface thereof. 2 And an expert may testify as

to the direction from which a blood stain came, as, for in-

stance, that it came from below upwards. 3 But in a case in

Mississippi , where it was proposed to ask the experts to give

their opinions as to the relative positions of the combatants

at the time of the difficulty, as indicated by blood upon the

shirt, with a view of showing by the blood marks, that the

prisoner was probably prostrate on the ground, and deceased

on top of him when the stains on the shirt were received,

the question was excluded upon the ground that it did not

involve any matter of science or skill, and that the jury

must judge for themselves. 4

1 People v. Gauzalez, 35 N. Y. 49, 61.

2 State v. Knight, 43 Me. 1, 133.

3 Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mas?. 122.

4 Dillafd v. State, 58 Miss. 3G8, 387.

and though the one may be ·entitled t? much greater weight
than the other with the jury, the exclusion of either would
be illegal. * * Either party in the present case had the
right to resort to microscopic or chemical tests, but neither
was bound to do it, and neither can complain of the other
for the omission. * * The affairs of life are too pressing
and manifold to have everything reduced to absolute certainty, even in the administration of justice. * * :Microscopes, chemists and men of science are not always at hand;
and criminals are neither anxious to court observation, nor
careful to preserve the evidences of their guilt.'' 1
§ 82. Blood Stains-Proper Question Concerning.-It
is sometimes very important to determine whether blqod
stains upon clothing were occasioned by blood flowing upon
the outer, or upon the inner surface of the fabric. If
caused by blood flowing directly upon the outer surface of
the fabric, · the coloring matter of the blood, which is su pended in the blood, will, of course, remain on the outer
surface, whereas it would be on the inner surface of the
garment if it came from within. It is held, therefore, that
one who is qualified by chemical observations and experiments, may testify whether a blood spot upon a garment
could have been occasioned by blood flowing directly upon
the outer surface thereof. 2 And an expert may testify a "
to the direction from which a blood stain came, as, · for instance, that it came from below upwards. 3 But in a case in
Mississippi, where it was proposed to ask the experts to give
their opinions as to the relative positions of the combatants
at the time of the difficulty, as indicated by blood upon the
shirt, with a view of showing by the ,blood marks, that the
prisoner was probably prostrate on the ground, and deceased
on top of him when the stains on the shirt were Teceived,
the question was excluded upon the ground that it did not
involve any matter of science or skill, and that the jury
.must judge for themselves. 4
1

People v. Ganzn.1ez, 35 N. Y. 49, 61.
v. Knight, 43 Me. 1, 133.
Commonwealth v. Sturtivn.nt, 117 l\Iass. 122 .
.. I;>illai'd v. State, 58 Miss. 3G8, 387.
2 Stab~
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83. Other Cases in which the Opinions of Chemists

have been received. A chemist has been permitted to

testify as to the safety of camphene lamps. 1 In this case

the witness was held competent to express an opinion as to

the safety of the lamp, although he had never experimented

With lamps, or made or used camphene, or paid any partic-

ular attention to camphene lamps, but it appeared that he

had studied chemistry with a distinguished chemist, that he

was himself an instructor in chemistry, and acquainted with

gases, having experimented with them, and also knew how

camphene was made. And in an action which involved the

question whether a certain fertilizer was merchantable, and

reasonably suited to the use intended, the opinion of a

chemist, who had made an analysis of the fertilizer, was

considered competent evidence, although not conclusive as

to the suitableness of the fertilizer for the use intended, 2

So in an action to recover damages for injury to land by

working a copper mill producing noxious gases, from which

poisonous substances are discharged, the testimony of ex-

perts has been received, showing that they had made exper-
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iments with gases taken from the land, by means of which

they had obtained copper. 3 The testimony of a chemist has

been received, that the point of drainage of surrounding

lands by a filter basin, on land taken for that purpose,

could be determined, and it has been held proper to ask him

.whether the level had been determined by experiment, at

which water stood under soil generally, and that he could

state the results of experiments made by him in his labora-

tory in proving that fact. 4 A chemist might properly be

asked as to the probability of spirits evaporating while un-

dergoing transportation in certain casks. 5 The opinions of

1 Bierce v. Stocking, 11 Gray (Mass.), 174.

2 Wilcox v. Hall, 53 Ga. 635. See too, Gossler v. Eagle Sugar Refinery

103 Mass. 331, that certain sugar contained 3 per cent, of sand.

3 Lincoln v. Taunton Manuf. Co., 9 Allen (Mass.), 182. See too, Salvitt

v. North Brancepeth Coal Co., 9 Ch. App. (L. R.) 705.

< Williams v. Taunton, 125 Mass. 34.

5 Turner v. The Black Warrior, 1 McAlister, 181, 184.

§ 83. Other Cases in which the Opinions of Chemists
have been received. -A chemist has been permitted t0
testify as to the safety of camphene lamps. 1 In this case
the witness was held competent "to express an opi.nion as ta
the safety of the lamp, although he had never experimented
~ith lamps, or made or used camphene, or paid any particular attention to camphene lamps, but it appeared that he
had studied chemistry with a distinguished chemist,. that he
was himself an instructor in chemistry, and acquainted with
gases, having experimented with them, and also knew how
camphene was made. And in an action which involved the
question whether a certain fertilizer was merchantable, anQ
reasonably suited to the use intended, the opinion of a
chemist, who had made an analysis of the fertilizer, was
considered competent evidence, although not conc1usive .a s
to the suitableness of the fertilizer for the use intended .. 2
So in an action to recover damages for injury to land by
working a copper mill producing noxious gases, from whi~h
poisonous substances are discharged, the testimony of experts has been received, showing that they had made experiments with gases taken from the land, by means of which
they had obtained copper. 3 The testimony of a chemist has
been received, that the point of drainage of surrounding
lands by a filter basin, on land taken for that purpose,
could be determined, and it has been held proper ·to ask him
.whether the level had been determined by experiment, at
which water stood under soil generally, and that he c~mld
state the results of experiments made by him in his laboratory in proving that fact. 4 A chemist might properly be
asked as to the probability of spirits evaporating while undergoing transportation in certain casks. i> The opinions of
Bierce v. Stocking, 11 Gray (Mass.), 174.
Wilcox v. Hall, 53 Ga. 635. See too, Gossler v. Eagle Sugar Refinery
103 Mass. 331, that certain sugar containe<l 3 per cent. of sand.
3 Lincoln v. Taunton Manuf. Co., 9 Allen (Mass.), 182. See too, SalviR
v. North Brancepeth Coal Co., 9 Ch. App. (L. R.) 705.
4 Williams v. Taunton, 125 Mass. 34.
5 Turner v. The Black 'Varrior, 1 McA1ister,. l Sl , 184.
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chemists are, of course, received as to the constituent

parts of a compound. 1 We have elsewhere considered the

admissibility of the opinions of chemists as to the nature

of inks, and the age of writing, in cases involving the

genuineness of handwriting. 2

84. Diseases in Animals Qualifications of Expert. 2

In determining who are qualified to testify as experts in

reference to disease in animals, it has been laid down as

follows : "A liberal rule must be applied in regard to evi-

dence as to diseases in animals, as it is rare that persons are

found who make the treatment of diseases in domestic ani-

mals a distinct profession, or attain to great skill or science

therein. The best skill and science that can be expected,

all that can be practically admitted in such cases, will be

the evidence of persons who have had much experience,

and have been for years made acquainted with such diseases,

and with their treatment. They may give their opinions

upon such experience, and on statements of fact upon which

their opinions are based, as some evidence to be considered

and weighed." 3 And to the same effect was the language
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of Mr. Justice BLACKFORD in a case decided in Indiana in

1837. In that case, a witness, who was not a farrier, was

called to testify as to the disease of the eyes of a horse.

The witness professed to understand when he examined a

horse whether his eyes were good or not, though [he

acknowledged that there might be diseases of the eyes of

horses with which he was unacquainted. He was asked,

whether, from his knowledge of the diseases of horses eyes,

ne believed the disease of the eyes of the horse in question

had been of long standing, and had existed before the ex-

change of horses made by the parties. It was held that he

should be permitted to answer, and it was said : " We have

scarcely any veterinary surgeons in our country, and the

opinions of men of such knowledge as this witness ap-

pears to have, must be admitted in cases like the present. 4

1 Allen v. Hunter, 6 McLean, 303, 310.

2 See 134, 135.

* Slater v. Wilcox, 57 Barb. 604, 608.

4 House v. Fort, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 293.

chemists are, of course, received as to the constituent
parts of a compound. 1 "-re have elsewhere considered the
admissibility of the opinions of chemists as to the nature
of inks, and the age of writing, in cases involving the
genuineness of handwriting. 2
§ ~4. Diseases in Animals-Qualifications of Expert.-•In determining who are qualified to testify as experts in
reference t@ disease in animals, it has been laid down as
follows: "A liberal rule must be applied in regard to evidence as to diseases in animals, as it is rare that persons are
f ound who make the treatment of diseases in domestic animals a distinct profession, or attain to great skill or science
therein. The best skill and science that can be expected,
all that can be practically admitted in such cases, will be
the evidence of persons who have had much experience,
and have been for years made acquainted with such diseases,
and with their treatment. They may give their opinions
upon such experience, and on statements of fact upon which
their opinions are based, as some evidence to be considered
and weighed.'' 3 And to the same effect was the language
of Mr. Justice BLACKFORD in a case decided in Indiana in
1837. In that case, a witness, who was not a farrier, was
called to testify as to the disease of the eyes of a horse .
The witness professed to understand when he examined a
horse whether his eyes were good or not, though Lhe
acknowledged that there might be diseases of the eyes of
horses with which he was unacquainted. He was asked,
whether, from his knowledge of the diseases of horses eyes,
e believed the disease of the eyes of the horse in question
bad been of long standing, and had existed before the
€hange of horses m:tde by the parties. It was held that he
should be permitted to answer, and it was said : " '1Ve have
scarcely any veterinary surgeons in our country, and the
opinions of men of such knowledge as this witness appears to have, must be admitted in cases like the present. 4

ex-

1

Allen v. Hunte}\, 6 McLean, 303, 310.
See §§ 134, 135.
• Slater v. Wilcox, 57 Barb. 60-J., 608.
~House v. Fort, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 293.
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But the witness should be one who has some special

knowledge and experience in relation to the diseases of

animals. Hence, a witness who is not an expert cannot

testify whether a horse is or is not sound, or as to

what constitutes unsoundness in a horse. 1 And a witness

who is not an expert, cannot be permitted to state the symp-

toms and appearance of cattle that die from want of feed. 2

Neither can such a witness be asked whether he had

observed certain appearances in horses that had been

hard driven and then exposed. 3 So the opinion of a witness

that a wound which he saw inflicted on a horse, was suffi-

cient to cause his death, is inadmissible, unless th'e witness

has some peculiar skill or knowledge as to the effect of such

wounds. 4 But any witness may testify whether a horse

seemed well or not, that being matter of common ex-

perience. 5 It has been held that a medical witness, who has

stated that he had read various standard authors on the

subject of diseases, and who has given his opinion in respect

to the character of the disease of which the animal in ques-

tion died, may be asked for " his best medical opinion,
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according to the best authority." 6 Of course no question

is raised as to the right of a veterinary surgeon to testify as

an expert, in cases relating to the diseases of animals. 7

1 Spear v. Richardson, 34 N. H. 428.

2 Stonam v. Waldo, 17 Mo. 489.

3 Moulton v. Seruton, 39 Me. 288.

* Harris v. Panama R. R. Co., 3 Bosw. 7.

s Spear v. Richardson, supra. And see Willis v. Quinaby, 11 Foster

(N. H.), 489.

6 Pierson v. Hoag, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 243.

' Pinney v. Cahill, 12 N. W. Reporter, 862; s. c. 14 The Reporter, 337

(Sup. Ct. of Mich., June, 1882).

But the witness should be one who has some special
knowledge and experience iu relation to the diseases of
animals. Hence, a witness who is not an expert cannot
testify whether a horse is or is not sound, or as to
what constitutes unsoundness in a horse. 1 And a witnes
who is not an expert, cannot be permitted to state the symptoms and appearance of cattle that die from want of feed. 2
Neither can such a witness be asked whether he had
observed certain appearances in horses that ha:d been
hard driven and then exposed. 3 So the opinion of a witness
that a wound which he saw inflicted on a horse, was sufficieRt to cause his death, is inadmissible, unless tlie witness
has some peculiar skill or knowledge as to the effect of such
wounds. 4 But any witness may testify whether a horse
seemed well or not, that being matter of common experience. 5 It has been held that a medical witness, who has
stated that he had read various standard authors on the
subject of diseases, and who has given his opinion in respect
to the character of the disease of which the animal in question died, may be asked for '' his best medical opinion,
according to the best authority.' ' 6 Of course no question
is raised a~ to the right of a veterinary surgeon to testify as
an expert, in cases relating to the diseases of animals. 7
Spear v. Richardson, 34 N. H . 428.
Stonam v. Waldo, 17 Mo. 489.
s Moulton v. Seruton, 39 Me. 288.
4 Harris v. Panama R.R. Co., 3 Bosw. 7.
5 Spear v. Richardson, supra.
And see Willis v. Quimby, 11 Fostet·
(N. H.) , 4 9.
6 Pierson v. Hoag, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 243.
7 Pinney v. Cahill, 12 N. W. Reporter, 862; s. c. 14 The Reporter, 337
(Snp. Ct. of ~Iich., June, 1882).
1

2

118

EXPERT TESTIMONY.

118 EXPERT TESTIMONY.

CHAPTER V.

EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE SCIENCE OF LAW.

SECTION.

85. The Law as a Subject for the Testimony of Experts.

86. Of what Laws Courts take Judicial Notice, and Expert Testimony

is not Received.

87. Of what Laws Courts do not take Judicial Notice, and Expert

Testimony is Received.

88. Distinction between Written and Unwritten Law as to Mode of

Proof by Experts.

89. Presumption that Law is Unwritten.

90. Expert Testimony in Connection with the Written Law.

CHAPTER V.

91. Statutory Provisions in Delaware, Kentucky, Maine, Massachu-

setts and Wisconsin.

92. Proof of Written Law by Experts The Practice in England.

93. Proof of Written Law by Experts The Practice in England

The Subject Continued.

EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE SCIENCE OF LAW.

94. Verification of Written Law by Experts.

95. Presumption that the Law remains Unchanged.

96. Who are Qualified to Testify as Experts in Foreign Law.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 20:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t71v5cx5m
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

97. Who are Qualified to Testify as Experts in Foreign Law The

Subject Continued.

98. Who are Qualified to Testify as Experts in Foreign Law The

Subject Continued.

99. Mere Knowledge of the Foreign Law is Insufficient.

100. Knowledge of the Foreign Law must have been Acquired where.

101. Pvight of Expert to Cite Text Books, Decisions, Codes, etc.

102. How the Citations are to be Regarded.

103. Testimony as to Usage and Practice of Courts of Another State.

104. Testimony as to Powers and Obligations of an Attorney in his

Relations to his Client.
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is not Received.
87. Of what Laws Courts do not take Judicial Notice, and Expert
Testimony is Received.
88. Distinction between W1itten and Unwritten Law as to Mode of
Proof by Experts.
89. Presumption that Law is Unwritten.
90. Expert Testimony in Connection with the Written Law.
91. Statutory Provisions in Delaware, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts and Wisconsin.
92. Proof of Written Law by Experts-The Practice in En~land.
~3. Proof of Written Law· by Experts -The Practice in England The Subject Continued.
94. Verification of Written Law by Experts.
95. Presumption that the Law remains Unchanged.
96. Who are Qualified to Testify as Experts in Foreign Law.
97. Who are Qualified to Testify as Experts in Fordgn Law-The
Subject Continued. ·
98. Who are Qualified to Testify as EA-perts in Foreign Law-The
Subject Continued.
99. Mere Knowledge of the Foreign Law is Insufficient.
100. Knowledge of ~he ~'oreign Law must have been Acquired where.
101. Right of Expert to Cite Text Books, Decisions, Codes, etc.
102. How the Citations are to be Regarded.
103. Testimony as to Usage and Practice of Courts of Another State.
104. Testimony as to Powers and Obligations of an Attorney in his
Relations to his Client.

§ 85. The Law as a Subject for the Testimony of Experts.- From the earliest times it seems to have been the
practice of the English judges to receive, in certain cases,
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the opinions of persons skilled in the law. As early as the

time of Henry VI., in a case which involved a question re-

lating to civil law, we find it laid down that the common law

judges heard a bachelor of the civil law " argue and dis-

course upon the difference between compulsions prcedsa et

causativa, as men that were not above being instructed and

made wiser by him." 1 And in another case during the

same reign, where ex commengement had been pleaded, and

the party answered that he ought not to be disabled thereby

as an appeal was pending, the common law judges inquired

of those who were well versed in the canon law, touching

the question involved. 2

86. Of what Laws Courts take Judicial Xotice, and

Expert Testimony is not Received. Since experts cannot,

as a general rule, be examined concerning such laws as the

courts take judicial notice of, 3 it is important to distinguish

between the laws which will be judicially noticed, and those

which must be proved as facts, when advantage of them is

desired.

I. We shall consider first, then, those laws of which
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courts take judicial notice, and concerning which, therefore,

the testimony of experts will not be received, as not being

necessary for the information of the court. Such laws

are :

1. The law of nations. 4

2. The law merchant. 5

3. The maritime law, so far at least as recognized by the

law of nations. 6

1 7 Henry VI., 11.

2 20 Henry VI., 25.

3 Jewell v. Center, 23 Ala. 498, 505; The Clement, 2 Curtis, 3G3.

The Scotia, 14 Wallace, 171, 188.

5 Edie v. East India Co., 2 Burr, 1226; Jewell v. Center, 25 Ala., 498;

Bradford v. Cooper, 1 La. Ann. 325; Goldsmith v. Sawyer, 46 Cal. 209.

The case last cited holds that where a board of brokers have rules, which

are not rules or usages of trade and commerce that would be recognized

without their adoption by the board, these will not be judicially.noticed,

but must be shown by experts therein.

8 Chandler v. Grieves. 2 II. Bl. GOG, n; Maddox v. Fisher, 14 Moore,

the opinions of persons skilled iu the law. As early as the
time of Henry VI., in a case which involved a question relating to civil law, we find it laid down that the common law
judges heard a bachelor of the civil law '' argue and discourse upon the difference between conipitlsione prrecisa et
causativa, as men that were not above being instructed and
made wiser by him." 1 And iu another case during the
same reign, where ex comrnengement had been pleaded, and
the party answered that he ought not to be disabled thereby
as an appeal was pending, the common law judges inquired
of those who were well versed in the canon law, touching
the queEtion involved. 2
§ 86. Of what Laws Courts take Judicial Notice, and
Expert Testimony is not Received.-Since experts cannot,.
as a general rule, be examined concerning such laws as the
courts take judicial notice of ,3 it is important to distinguish
between the laws which will be judicially noticed, and those
which must be proved as facts, when advantage of them is
desired.
I.
c shall consider first, then, those laws of which
courts take judicial notice, and concerning which, therefore,
the testimony of experts will not be received, as not being
necessary for the information of the court. Such laws
a.re:
1. The law of nations. 4
2. The law merchaut. 5
3. The maritime l::ny, so far at least as recognized by the
law of nations.G

"r

7 llemy VI., 11.
20 Henry YI., 25.
3 Jewell v. Center, 25 Ala. 4£18, 505; r.rhe Clem~nt, 2 Curtis, 363.
4 The Scotia, 14 'Vallace, 171, 188.
5 Edie v. East India Co., 2 Burr, 1226; Jewell v. Center, 25 Ala., 498;
Bradford v. Cooper, 1 La. Ann. 325; Goldsmith v. Sawyer, 46 Cal. 20£1.
The ca e last cited holds that where a board of brokers have rules, which
are not rules or usages of trade and commerce that would be recognized
without their adoption by the board, these will not be judicially,noticed,
but must be shown by experts therein.
6 Chancller v. Grieves, 2 H. BL 606, n; Maddox v. Fisher, 14 Moore,
i
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4. The ecclesiastical law, for the purpose of determining

how far it is a part of the common law. 1

5. The courts of a State which has been carved out of

another State, take judicial notice of the statutes of the lat-

ter State passed prior to the separation. 2

6. All courts take judicial notice of their domestic law.*

And the common law of a State which had no political ex-

istence before the [Revolution, is the common law as modi-

fied and amended by the English statutes passed prior to

the Revolution. 4 But it is held that in those States where

colonies were established before the Revolution, with a

power to legislate for themselves, English statutes passed

after the colonies were thus established, but prior to the

Revolution, are not a part of their common law. 5

7. The State courts take judicial notice of the Federal

Constitution, and of its amendments, 6 as well as of Federal

statutes. 7

8. The Federal courts take judicial notice of the laws of

the several States composing the national government. 8

P. C. 103; Zugasti v. Lamer, 12 Moore, P. C. 331; The Scotia, 14 Wal-
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lace, 171, 188; Taylor on Evidence, 5; Wharton on Evidence, 298.

1 Sims v. Maryatt, 17 Q. B. (79 E. C. L.) 292; 1 Boll. Abr. 526; 6 Viu.

Abr. 496.

2 Delano v. Jopling, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 417; Stokes v. Macker, 62 Barb. (N.

Y.) 145; Doe v. Eslava, 11 Ala. 1028; Chouteau v. Pierre, 9 Mo. 3; Ott

v. Soulard, 9 Mo. 581; United States v. Turner, 11 Howard, 663, 668;

City of Brownsville v. Cavazos, 2 Woods, 293.

3 State v. Jarrett, 17 Md. 309; State v. O'Conner, 13 La. Ann. 486;

Pierson v. Baird, 2 Greene (Iowa), 235; Berliner v. Waterloo, 14 Wis.

378; Springfield v. Worcester, 2 Gush. (Mass.) 52; Division of Howard

4. The ecclesiastical law, for the- purpose of determining ..
how far it is a part of the common law .1
5. The courts of a State which has been carved out of
another State, take judicial notice of the statutes of the latter State passed prior to the separation. 2
6. All courts take judicial notice of their domestic law .l!
And the common law of a State which had no political ex_istence before the Revolution, is the common law as modi-,
fied and amended by the English statutes passed prior to
the Revolution. 4 But it is held that in those States where
colonies were f,Stablished before the Revolution, with a
power to legislate for themselves, English statutes passed
after the colonies were thus established, but prior to the
Revolution, are not a part of their common law. 5
7. The State courts take judicial notice of the Federal
Constitution, and of its amendments, 6 as well as of Federal
statutes. 7
8. The Federal courts take judicial notice of the laws of
the several States composing the national gov·ernment. 8

County, 15 Kans. 194; Dolph v. Barney, 5 Oreg. 191.

* Coburn v. Harvey, 18 >Vis. 147; Dutcher v. Culver, 24 Minn. 584.

8 Sackett v. Sackett, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 309, 316 ; Commonwealth v.

Knowlton, 2 Mass. 534.

6 Graves v. Keaton 3 Coldw. (43 Tenn.) 8.

7 Kessel v. Albetis, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 362; Papin v. Ryan, 32 Mo. 21;

Morris v. Davidson, 49 Ga. 361; Rice's Succession, 21 La. Ann. 614, 616;

Bayly v. Chubb, 16 Grattan (Va.) , 284 ; Minis v. Swartz, 37 Tex. 13 ; Jones

v. Laney, 2 Texas, 342 ; Semple v. Hagar, 27 Cal. 163 ; United States v. De

Coursey,! Pinney (Wis.), 508; Montgomery v. Deeley, 3 Wis. 709, 712.

8 Junction Railroad Co. v. Bank of Ashland, 12 Wallace, 226, 229 ; Ben-

nett v. Bennett, Deady, 299, 311; Merrill v. Dawson, Hempstead, 563;

P. C. 103; Zugasti v. Lamer, 12 Moore, P. C. 331; The Scotia, 14 Wallace, 171, 188; Taylor on Evidence, § 5; Wharton on Evidence, § 298.
1 Sims v . .Maryatt, 17 Q. B. (79 E. C. L.) 292; 1 Roll. A.br. 526; 6 Vin.
A.br. 496.
·
2 Delallo v. Jopling, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 417; Stokes v. Macker, 62 Barb. (N.
Y.) 145; Doe v. Eslava, 11A.la.1028; Ch9uteau v. Pierre, 9 Mo. 3; Ott
v. Soulard, 9 Mo. 581; United States v. Turner, 11 Howard 663, 66 ;
City of Brownsville v. Cavazos, 2 Woods, 293.
3 State v. Jarrett, 17 Md. 309; State v. 0 Conner, 13 La. A.nn. 486;
Pierson v. Baird, 2 Greene (Iowa), 235; Berliner v. Waterloo 14: W i .
378; Springfield v. Worcester, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 52; Division of Howard
County, 15 Kans. 194; Dolph v. Barney, 5 Oreg. 191.
4 Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 147; Dutcher v. Culver, 24 Minn. 584.
6 Sackett v. Sackett, 8 Pick. (Mass. ) 309, 316; Commonwealth v.
J{nowlton, 2 Mass. 534.
6 Graves v. Keaton 3 Coldw. (43 Te nn.) 8.
7 Kessel v.A.lbetis, 56 :Barb. (N . Y.) 362; Papin v. Ryan, 32Mo. 21;
Morris v. Davidson, 49 Ga. 361; Rice's Succes ion, 21 La. A.nn. 614, 616;
Bayly v. Chubb, 16 Grattan (Va.), 284; Mim v. Swartz, 37 Tex. 13; Jone
v. Laney, 2 Texas, 342; Semple v. Hagar, 27 Cal.163; United States v. De
Coursey, 1 Pinney (Wis.), 508; Montgomery v. Deeley, 3 Wis. 709, 7_12.
8 Junction Railroad Co. v. Bank of Ashland, 12 Wallace, 226 229; Bennett v. Bennett, Deady, 299, 311; Men-ill v. Dawson, Hemp ~tea d , 563;
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87. Of what Laws Courts do not take Judicial No-

tice, and Expert Testimony may be Received. II. In

passing, in the second place, to the consideration of those

laws which will not be judicially noticed, and as to which

experts may, therefore, testify, we find :

1. That courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of

foreign States. 1 As said by Lord LANGDALE in England :

" With foreign laws an English judge cannot be familiar;

there are many of which he must be totally ignorant ; there

is in every case of foreign law, an absence of all the accu-

rate knowledge and ready associations which assist him in

the consideration of that which is the English law." 2 So in

this country, Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL remarked : " The

laws of a foreign nation designed only for the direction of

its own affairs, are not to be noticed by the courts of other

countries, unless proved as facts." 3

2. That the courts of one State will not take judicial notice

of the laws of any other State. This is upon the theory that

the separate States which together constitute the nation,

are, as respects their political relations to each other, essen-
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tially foreign countries, whose laws must be proved as

facts. 4 At an early day it was held in Vermont, that judi-

Smith v. Tallapoosa Co., 2 Woods, 574, 576; United States v. Turner, 11

How. 663, 668; Owings v. Hull, 9 Peters, 607.

1 Freemoultv. Dedire, 1 P. Wms.430; Feaubert v. Turst, Pre. Ch. 207;

Mostyn v. Farrigas, Cowp. 174; Male v. Roberts, 3 Esp. 163; Smith v.

Gould, 4 Moore, P. C. 21 ; Strother v. Lucas, 6 Peters, 763; Armstrong

v. Lear, 8 Peters, 52; United States v. Wiggins, 14 Peters. 334; Damess

v. Hale, 1 Otto, 13; Bowditch v. Soltyk, 99 Mass. 138; Owen v. Boyle.

15 Me. 147; Hosford v. Nichols, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 220; McCraney v. Al-

den, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 274; Monroe v. Douglass, 5 N. Y. 447, 452.

2 Nelson v. Bridport, 8 Beavan, 527.

3 Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 38.

* Drake v. Glover. 30 Ala. 382 ; Mobile Railroad Co. v. Whitney, 39

Ala. 468 ; Forsyth v. Freer, 62 Ala. 443 ; Newton v. Cocke, 10 Ark. 169 ;

§ 87. Of what Laws Courts do not take Judicial Notice, and E~-pert Testimony may be Received.- II. In
passing, in the second place, to the consideration of those
laws which will not be judicially noticed, and as to which
experts may, therefore, testify, we find :
1. That courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of
foreign States. 1 As said by Lord LANGDALE in England:
" With foreign laws an English judge cannot be familiar;
there are many of which he must be totally ignorant; there
is in every case of foreign law, an absence of all the accurate knowledge and ready associations which assist him in
the consideration of that which is the English law. " 2 So in
this country, Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL remarked: "The
laws of a foreign nation designed only for the direction of
its own affairs, are not to be noticed by the courts of other
countries, unless proved as facts. " 3
2. That the courts of one State will not take judicial notice
of the laws of any other State. This is upon the theory that
the separate States which together constitute the nation,
are, as respects their political relations to each other, essentially foreign countr~es, whose laws must · be proved as
facts. 4 At an early day it was held in Vermont, that judi-

Hempstead v. Reed, 6 Conn. 480; Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517; Dyer

v. Smith, 12 Conn. 384; Bailey v. McDowell, 2 Harrington (Del.), 34;

Stanford v. Pruet, 27 Ga. 243; Mason v. Wash, Breese (111.), 39; Irving

v. McLean. 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 52; Davis v. Rogers, 14 Ind. 424; Johnson

v. Chambers, 12 Ind. 112; Carey v. Cincinnati etc. R. R. Co., 5 Iowa,

357; Taylor v. Banyan, 9 Iowa, 522; Shed v. Augustine, 14 Kans. 282;

Beauchamp v. Mudd, Hardin (Ky.), 163; Stephonson v. Bannister, 3

Smith v. 'l'a11apoosa Co., 2 Woods, 574, 576; United States v. Turner, 11
How. 663, 668; Owings v. Hull, 9 Peters, 607.
.
1 Freemoult v. Dedire, 1 P. Wms. 430; Feaubert v. Turst , Pre. Ch. 207;
Mostyn v. Farrigas, Cowp. 174; Male v. Roberts, 3 E p. 163; Smith v.
Gould, 4 Moore, P. C. 21; Strother v. Lucas, 6 Peters, 763; .Armstrong
v. Lear, 8 Peters, 52; United States v. Wiggins, 14 Peters. 334; Damess
v. Hale, 1 Otto, 13; Bowditch v. Soltyk, 99 Mass. 138; Owen v. Boyle,
15 Me.147; Hosford v. Nichols, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 220; Mccraney v . .Alden, 46 Barb. (N . Y.) 274; Monroe v. Dougla s, 5 N. Y. 447, 452.
2 Nelson v. Bridport, 8 Beavan, 527.
s Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 38.
4 Drake v. Glover: 30 .Ala.. 382; Mobile Railroad Co. v. Wllitney, 39
.Ala. 46 ; Forsyth v. Preer, 62 .Ala. 443; Newton v. Cocke, 10 .Ark. 16!>;
Hemp tead v. Reed, 6 Conn. 480; Brackettv.Norton,4Conn.517; Dyer'
v. Smith, 12 Conn. 384; Bailey v. McDowell, 2 Harriagton (Del.), 34;
Stanford v. Prnet, 27 Ga. 243; Mason v. Wa. h, Breese (Ill.) , 39; Irving
v. McLean~ 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 52; Davis v. Rogers, 14 Ind. 424; Johnson
v. Chambers 12 Ind. 112; Carey v. Cincinnati et,c. R. R. Co., 5 Iowa ,
357; Taylor v. Runyan, 9 Iowa, 522; Shed v. Augustine, 14 Kans. 2 2;
Beauchamp v. l\Iudd Hardin (Ky. ), 163; Stephenson v. Banni ter, 3
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cial notice would be taken of the laws of sister States. 1

But that doctrine was subsequently overruled. 2 In an early

case in New Jersey, a similar doctrine was intimated, 3 but

the dicta in that case have also been overruled in later cases

in the same court. 4 A similar position was taken at an early

day in Tennessee, and has been ever since .maintained. 5

And now, under the code of that State, the Supreme Court

takes judicial notice of all foreign laws and statutes. 6 In a

recent case in Khode Island, the court took judicial notice

of a law of the State of New York. 7 An exception

should perhaps be made to the general rule, in so far

that where a State recognizes acts done in pursuance

of the laws' of another State, the courts of the first

State should take judicial cognizance of the said laws,

so far as may be necessary to judge of the acts alleged to

be done under them. And it has been so held. 8 And ill a

case in Pennsylvania, it was held that a State court, when

its judgment would be liable to review by the Supreme

Court of the United States, in a case arising under the laAV

Bibb. (Ky.) 369; Dor?ey v. Dorsey, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 280; Tyler v.
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Trabue, 8 B. Mour. (Ky.) 30G; Syme v. Stewart, 17 La. Ann. 73; Ander-

son v. Folger, 11 La. Ann. 269; Legg v. Legg, 8 Mass. 99; Knapp v.

Abell, 10 Allen (Mass.), 485; Brimhall v. Van Campen, 8 Minn. 13;

Hoyt v. McNeil, 13 Minn. 390; Hempbill v. Bank of Alabama, 6 Sm. &

M. (Miss.) 44; Babcock v. Babcock, 46 Mo. 243; Morrissey v. Wiggins

Ferry Co., 47 Mo. 521 ; Ball v. Consolidated Franklin etc. Co., 32 N. J.

Law, 102, 104; Uhler v. Semple, 5 C. E. Green (N. J.), 288; Campion

v. Kille, 1 McCarter (N. J.), 229; Hosford v. Nichols, 1 Paige (N. Y.),

220; State v. Twitty, 2 Hawks (N. C.), 248; State v. Surtly, 2 Hawks

(N. C.), 441; Evans v. Keynolds, 32 Ohio St. 163; Ripple v. Ripple, 1

Rawle (Penn.), 386; VVhitesides v. Poole, 9 Rich. (S. C.) 68; Jones v.

Laney, 2 Texas. 342; Anderson v. Anderson, 23 Texas, 639; Rape v.

Heaton, 9 Wis. 328; Territt v. Woodruff, 19 Vt. 183; Woodrow v.

O'Conner, 28 Vt. 776; Walsh v. Dart, 12 Wis. 635.

1 Middlebury Coll. v. Cheney, 1 Vt. 348.

2 Territt v. Woodruff, 19 Vt. 182; Woodrow v. O'Conner, 28 Vt. 776.

3 Curtis v. Martin, 2 N. J. Law, 290.

Van Buskirk v. Mulock, 18 N. J. Law, 184.

5 Foster v. Taylor, 2 Overton, 191; Coffee v.' Neely, 2 Heisk. 311;

Hobbs v. Railroad Co., 9 Heiskell, 873.

6 See Hobbs v. Memphis etc. R. R. Co., 56 Tenn. 874.

7 Paine v. Sclienectady Ins. Co., 11 R. I. 411.

8 Carpenter v. Dexter. 8 Wallace, 513.

cial notice would be taken of the .laws of sister States. 1
But that doctrine was subsequently overruled. 2 In an early
case in New Jersey, n. similar doctrine was intimated,3 but
the dicta in that case have also been overruled in later cases
in the same court. 4 A similar position was taken at an early
day in Tennessee, and has been ever since .maintained.fl
And now, under the code of that State, the Supreme Court
takes judicial notice of all foreign laws and statuies .6 In a
recent case in Rhode Island, the court took judicial notice
of a law of the State of New York. 7 An exception
should perhaps be made to the general rule, in so far
that where a State recognizes acts done in pursuance
of the laws· of another State, the courts of the first
State should take judicial cognizance of the said laws,
so fur as may be necessary to judge of the acts alleged to
be done under them. And it has been so held. 8 And in a
case in Pennsylvania, it wa.s held that a State court, when
its judgment would be liable to review by the Supreme
Court of the United States, in a case arising under the law
Bibb. (Ky.) 369; DorFey v. Dorsey, 5 J. J . Marsh. (Ky.) 280; Tyler v.
'l'rabue, 8 B. l\Ionr. (Ky.) 306; Syme v . Stewart, 17 La. Ann . 73; Anderson v. Folger, 11 La. Ann. 269; Legg v. Legg, 8 Ma s. 99; Knapp v.
Abell, 10 Allen (Mass.), 485; Brimhall v. Van Campen, 8 .Minn. 13;
Hoyt v. McNeil, 13 Minn. 390; Hemphill v. Bank of Alabama, 6 Sm. &
M . (Miss.) 44; Babcock v. Babcock, 46 Mo. 243; Morrissey v. Wiggins
Ferry Co., 47 Mo . 521; Ball v. Consolidated Franklin etc. Co., 32 N. J.
Law, 102, 104; Uhler v. Semple, 5 C. E. Green (N. J .), 288; ()ampion
v. Kille, 1 :Mccarter (N. J.), 229; Hosford v. Nichols, 1 Paige (N . Y .),
220; State v. Twitty, 2 Hawks (N. C.), 248; State v. Surtly, 2 Hawks
(N. C.), 4-11; Evans v. Reynolds, 32 Ohio St. 163; Ripple v. Ripple, 1
lfawle (Penn.), 386; Whitesides v. Poole, 9 Rieb . (S . C.) 68; Jones v.
Laney, 2 Texas: 342; Anderson v. Auderson, 23 'l'exas, 639 ; Rape v.
Heaton, 9 Wis. 328; T erritt v. Woodruff, 19 Vt. 1 3; Woodrow v.
O'Conner, 28 Vt. 776; Walsh v. Dart, 12 Wis. 635.
·
1 Middlebury Coll. v. Cheney, 1 Vt. 34.8.
2 'l'erritt v. Woodruff, 19 Vt. 182 ; "'Woodrow v. O'Conner, 28 Vt. 776.
3 Curtis v. Martin, 2 N. J. Law, 290.
4 Van Buskirk v. Mulock, 18 N. J . Law, 1'34.
5 Fo ter v. Taylor, 2 Overton, 191; Coffee v. · Neely 2 Heisk. 311;
Hobbs v. Railroad Co., 9 Heiskell, 873.
6 See Hobbs v. Memphi etc. R.R. Co., 5G 'l'enn. 874 .
7 Paine v. Schenectady Ins. Co., 11 R. I. 411.
8
Carpenter ' " Dexter, ·wallace, 513.
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of a sister State, would take judicial notice of such law. 1 It

has been held in Kansas that the constitutions of sister

States will be judicially noticed. 2 Where it is desired to in-

troduce evidence of the laws of other States, it is necessary

that they should be pleaded. 3

88. Distinction between Written and Unwritten I.aw

as to Mode of Proof by Experts. In this country a dis-

tinction is taken between the written and the unwritten law,

and while the latter may be proven by the testimony of ex-

perts, 4 the former can, in general, only be shown by the pro-

duction of the written law itself, duly authenticated. 5 In an

early case, Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL said: " That no

testimony shall be received which presupposes better testi-

mony attainable by the party who offers it, applies to foreign

law, as it does" to all other facts." 6 Upon this principle,

the statute itself must be regarded as better evidence of

what it contains, than is the testimony of any individual,

who, though he may know the general purport of the law,

1 State of Ohio v. Hinchman, 27 Perm. St. 479.

- Butcher v. Bank, 2 Kaiis. 70; Dodge v. Coffin, 15 Kans. 277.
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3 Roots v. Merriwether, 8 Bush. 401 ; Peck v. Hibbard, 26 Vt. COS.

< Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Glenn, 28 Md. 287; Ileberd v. Myers,

5 Ind. 94; People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 349; Merritt v. Merritt, 20 111. 65;

Ennisv. Smith, 14 How. (U. S.) 400, 426; McRae v. Mattoon, 13 Pick.

(Mass.) 53; Owen v. Boyle, 15 Me. 147, 151; Tyler v. Trabue, 8 B.

Monr. (Ky.) 306.

5 Zimmerman v. Hesler, 32 Md. 274; Kermott v. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181;

Woodbridge v. Austin, 2 Tyler (Vt.), 3(34; Dauforth v. Reynolds, 1 Vt.

265; Territt v. Woodruff, 19 Vt, 1S4; McNeill v. Arnold, 17 Ark. 154,

of a. sister State, would take judicial notice of such law .1 It
has been held in Kansas that the constitutions of sister
States will be judicially noticed. 2 " ;here it is desired to introduce evidence of the laws of other States , it is necessary
that they should be pleaded. 3
§ 88. Distinction between Written and Unw1·itten I.aw
as to Mode of Proof by Experts.-In this country a dis. tinction is taken betv\'-een the written and the unwritten law,
and while the latter may be proven by the testimony of experts,4 the former can , in general , only be shown by the production of the written law itself, duly authenticated .5 ID: an
early case, l\fr. Chief Justice 1\'IARSHALL said: "That no
testimony shall be received which presupposes better testimony attainable by the party who offers it, applies to foreign
law, as it doeg to all other facts." 6 Upon this principle,
the statute itself must be regarded as better evidence of
what it ~ontains, than is the testimony of auy individual,
who, though he may know the general purport of the law,

167, explaining Barkman v. Hopkins, 11 Ark. 168; Bowles v. Eddy, 33

Ark. 645; Emery v. Berry, 8 Foster (X. II.), 473; Comparet v. Jernegan,

5 Blackf. (Ind.) 375; Line v. Mack, 14 Ind. 330; Hoes v. Van Alstyne,

20 111. 202; McDeed v. McDeed, 67 111. 545; Lee v. Matthews, 10 Ala.

682; Inuerurity v. Minis, 1 Ala. 660; Spaulding v. Vincent, 24 Vt. 501,

505; Gardner v. Lewis, 7 Gill (Md.), 379; Robinson v. Clifford, 2 Wash.

C. C. 2; United States v. Otega, 4 Wash. C. C. 533; Ennis v. Smith, 14

How. (U. S.) 400, 426; Toulandon v. Lachenmeyer, 1 Sweeny (X. Y.),

45; Isabella v. Pecot, 2 La. Ann. 387; Raynham v. Canton, 3 Pick.

(Mass.), 293; Bryant v. Kelton, 1 Texas, 434; Willings v. Consequa, 1

Peters C. C. 225; Kenny v. Clarkson, 1 Johnson (X. Y.), 385; Lincoln

v. Battelle, 6 Wend. (X. Y.) 475.

6 Church v. Ilubbart, 2 Cranch, 187.

1

State of Ohio v . Hinchman, 27 Penn. St. 479.
Butcher v. Bank, 2 Kans. 70; Docl2;e v. Coffin, 15 Kans. 2Ti .
3 Roots v. Merriwether, 8 Bnsh. 401; Peck v. Hibbard, 26 Vt. 698.
4 Baltimore & Ohio R . R . Co. v. Glenn, 28 Md. 287; Ileberd v. Myers ,
i5 Ind . 94; People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 349; Merritt v. Merritt, 20 Ill. 65;
Ennis v . Smith, 14 How. (U. S.) 400, 426; McRae v. Mattoon, 13 Pick.
(liass .) 53; Owen v. Boyle, 15 l\fe. 147, H>l; 'l'yler v . Trabue, 8 B.
Monr. (Ky.) 306.
5 Zimmerman v. Hesler, 32 Md. 274; Kermott v. Ayer, 11 :Mich. 181;
Woodbridge v. Austin, 2 Tyler (Vt.), 364; Danforth v. Reynolds, 1 Vt.
265; Territt v. Woodruff, 19 Vt. 184; 1\lcNeill v. Arnold, 17 Ark . 154,
1G7, explaining Barkman v. Hopkins, 11Ark.168; Bowles v. Eddy, 33
Ark. 645; Emery v. Berry, 8 Foster (N. H .),473; Cornparet \'. Jernegan,
5 Blackf. (Incl. ) 375; IJne v. Mack, 14 Ind . 330; Hoes v. Van Alstyne,
20 Ill. 202; l\IcDeecl v. McDeed, 67 Ill. 545; Lee v. Matthews, 10 Ala.
682; I nner:Hity v. l\Iims, 1 Ala . 660; Spaulding v . Vincent, 24 Vt. 501,
505; Gardner v . Lewis, 7 Gill (Md.), 379; Robinson v. Clifford, 2 Wash.
C. C. 2; United States v. Otega, 4 Wash. C . C. 533; Ennis v. Smith, 14:
How. (U.S.) 400, 426; Tonlandon v. La~he nmeyer, 1 Sweeny (N. Y.) ,
45; Isabella v. Pecot, 2 La. Ann. 387; Raynham v. Canton, 3 Pick.
(Mass.), 293; Bryant v. Kelton, 1 Texas, 434; Willings v . Consequa, 1
Peters C. C. 225; Kenny v . Clarkson, 1 Johnson (N. Y.), 385; Lincoln
v. Battelle, G Wend. (N. Y.) 475.
6 Church v. Ilnbbart, 2 Crnnch , 1 7.
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may not carry in his mind so minute and exact a knowledge

thereof, as is often necessary for its proper application.

89. Presumption that Law is Unwritten. It has been

held that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it will

be presumed that the foreign law is unwritten, and that

parol testimony of experts in such law will be received upon

this assumption. ''These laws are generally difficult of

proof. It would be a very expensive matter to prove them

by copies authenticated. It, therefore, shall reasonably

fall on the parties objecting to the parol proof, to show that

the law was a written edict of the country." *

90. Expert Testimony in Connection with the Written

Law. While the general rule excludes, in this country, the

testimony of experts as to the written or statutory law, yet

such testimony has been received when the question \\as,

not so much as to the language of the written law, but as to

what was the law altogether, " as shown by its exposition,

interpretation and adjudication." In admitting such testi-

mony in Alabama, as to the law of Louisiana, the court

said : " The exposition, interpretation and adjudication may
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never have been evidenced by books or writings ; but may,

nevertheless, have become well understood, as the rule of law

deduced by the court from the written words of the code upon

a particular state of facts. Upon such a question, the testi-

mony or opinions of competent witnesses instructed in the

law of that State, may be resorted to." 2 In another case de-

cided in Illinois, it is held that while the statute of a foreign

State cannot be proved by parol, yet the construction given

to such statute by the tribunals where they are in force,

may be given in evidence by witnesses learned in such laws. 3

And the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has recently per-

mitted a Spanish lawyer, formerly of Havana, to testify

that a verbal special partnership was valid under the laws

of Cuba ; that he might state the written law without pro-

1 Dougherty v. Snyder, 15 S. & R. (Penn.) 84, 87. And see Livingston

v. Maryland Ins. Co., 6 Cranch, 274, 280.

2 Walker v. Forbes, 31 Ala. 9.

3 Hoes v. Van Alstyne, 20 111. 202.

may not carry in his mind so minute· and exact a knowledge
thereof, as is often necessary for its proper application.
§ 89. Presumption tbat Law is Unwritten. -It has been
held that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it will
be presumed that the foreign iaw is unwritten, and that
parol testimony of experts in such law will be received upon
this assumption.
'' These laws are generally difficult of
proof. It would be a very expensive matter to prove them ·
by copies authenticated. It, the~efore, shall reasonably
fall on the parties objecting to the parol proof, to show that
the law was a written edict of the country.'' 1
§ 90. Expert Testimony in Connection with the Written
Law.-vVhile the general rule excludes, in this country, the
testimony ·of experts as to the written or statutory law, yet
such testimony has been received when the question was,
not so much as to the language of the written law, but as to
what wasthe law altogether, "as shown by its exposition,
interpretation and adjudication." In admitting such testimony in Alabama, as to the law of Louisiana, the court
said: "The exposition, interpretation and. adjudication may
never have been evidenced by books or writings; but may,
nevertheless, have become well understood, as the rule of law
deduced by the court from the written wor.ds of the code upon
a particular state of facts. Upon such a question, the testimony or opinions of competent witnesses instructed in the
. law of that State, may be resorted to.': 2 In an9ther case decided in Illinois, it is held that while the statute of a foreign
State cannot be proved by parol, yet the co~struction given
to s~ch statute by the tribunals where they are in force,
may be given in evidence by witnesses learned in such laws. 3
And the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has recently permitted a SpaniRh lawyer, formerly of Havana, to testify
that a verbal special partnership was valid under the laws
of Cuba; that he might state the written law without pro1

Dougherty v. Snyder, 15 S. & R. (Penn.) S-1, 87.
v. Maryland Ins. Co., 6 Crunch, 274, 280.
·
2 Walker v. Forbes, 31 Ala. 9.
3 Hoes v. Van Alstyne, 20 Ill. 202.

And see Livingston
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ducing it. 1 The court declared that in the case of the

Spanish colonies it was difficult to ascertain what their law

was without the aid of an expert, their law being composed

partly of the various codes of Spain, and partly of the va-

rious decrees contained in the Recopilacion de las Inclias, and

the various decrees of later date. In the course of its de-

cision the court says : " There are many cases where the

evidence of a professional person, or one skilled virtute

officii, may be much more satisfactory evidence of what the

law is, than the mere exemplification of the exact words of

a foreign statute, which the court may not have the neces-

sary knowledge to construe. And it seems to us, that the

requiring an exemplified copy is pressing the rule of requir-

ing the best evidence to an extent that would often defeat

the ends of justice." Chancellor KENT, in an early case,

also permitted a Spanish lawyer to testify that a will was

executed according to the laws of Cuba, without the produc-

tion of the written law. 2 And recently in Pennsylvania, a

witness was permitted to testify as to the laws of Baden,

though his testimony involved a statute. 3 So in a late case
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in Maryland, a New York lawyer was held competent to

testify, in the absence of opposing proof, whether a sale

made by a receiver was made after due public notice and

advertisement, as required by the laws of New York. 4 In

other cases, too, in this country, experts have been allowed

to testify as to the law of another State, where a statute

and its construction have been involved. 5

91. Statutory Provisions in Delaware, Kentucky,

Maine, Massachusetts and Wisconsin. In a few States

statutory provision has been made with reference to the

proof of foreign law, which seems to leave it to the discre-

tion of the court, to require the production of a copy of the

1 Barrows v. Downs, 9 R. I. 453.

2 In the matter of Roberts' Will, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 446.

3 American Life Ins. Co. v. Rosenagle, 27 P. F. Smith, 507.

4 Consolidated Real Estate & Fire Ins. Co. v. Cashow, 41 Md. 59.

8 Hooper v. Moore, 5 Jones Law (N. C.)i 130; Barkman v. Hopkins, G

Eng. (Ark.) 157.

ducing it. 1 The court declared that in the case of the
Spanish colonies it was difficult to ascertain wh~t their law .
was without the aid of an mqJert, their law being composed
partly of the various codes of Spain, and partly of the ~a
rious decrees contained in the Recopilacion de las Indias, and
the various decrees of later date. In the course of its decision the court says: "There are many cases where the
evidence of a professional person, or one skilled vfrtule
oificii, may be much more satisfactory evidence of what the
law is, than the mere exemplification of the exact words of
a foreign statute, which the court may not have the necessary knowledge to construe. And it seems to us, that the
requiring an exemplified copy is pr~ssing the rule of requiring the best evidence to an extent that would often defeat
the ends of justice.'' Chancellor KENT, in an early case,
also permitted a Spanish lawyer to testify that a will was
executed according to the laws of Cuba, without ihe production of the written law. 2 And recently in Pennsylvania, a
witness was permitted t0 testify as to the laws of Baden,
though his testimony involved a statute. 3 So in a late case
in Maryland, a New York lawyer was held competent to
testify, in the absence of opposing proof, whether a sale
made by a receiver was made after due public notice and
advertisement, as required by tpe laws of New York.-t In
other cases, too, in this country, experts have been allowed
to testify as to the law of another State, where a statute
and its construction have been involved. 5
§ 91. Statutory Provisions in Delaware, Kentucky,
Maine, Massachusetts and Wisconsin.- In a few States
statutory provision has been made with reference to the
proof of foreign law, which seems to leave it to ihe discretion of the court., to require the production of a copy of the
Banows v. Downs, 9 R. I. 453.
In the matter of Roberts' Will, 8 Paige tN· Y.), 446.
a American Life Ins. Co. v. Rosenagle, 27 P. F. Smith, 507.
•Consolidated Real Estate & Fire Im,. Co. v. Cashow, 41 Md. 59.
ts Hooper v. Moore, 5 Jones Law (N. C.), 130; Barkman v. Hopkins! G
Eng. (Ark.) 157.
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written law, or to receive the testimony of experts therein.

In Delaware, Massachusetts and Wisconsin, the provision is

as follows : " The existence and the tenor or effect of all

foreign laws mav be proved as facts by parol evidence ; but

if it shall appear that the law in question is contained in a

written statute or code, the court may, in their discretion,

reject any evidence of such law that is not accompanied by

a copy thereof." l The phraseology of the Kentucky and

Maine statutes differ somewhat from the above provision.

The Kentucky statute reads as follows: "The existence

and the tenor or effect of all foreign laws beyond the limits

of the United States, may be proved by the parol evidence

of persons learned in those laws. But if it appear that the

law in question is contained in a written statute, the court

may reject such parol evidence, unless it be accompanied by

a copy of the statute." 2 While in Maine it runs as follows :

" Foreign laws may be proved by parol evidence, but when

such law appears to be existing in a written statute or code,

it may be rejected unless accompanied by a copy thereof.

The unwritten law of any other State or territory of the
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United States may be proved by parol evidence, and by

books of reports of cases adjudged in their courts." 3

92. Proof of Written Law by Experts The Practice

in England. The practice in England, formerly was to

require the production of the written law, and to exclude all

proof of it by the testimony of experts. When it was pro-

posed to call a person conversant with the law of Russia as

to the right to stop goods in transitu, LordKENYON refused

to receive his testimony, and the distinction between

written and unwritten law was taken. "Can the laws of

a foreign country," he asks, " be proved by a person

who may be casually picked up in the streets? Can a

court of justice receive such evidence of such a matter? I

shall expect it to be made out to me, not by such loose cvi-

1 Delaware Rev. Code (1874), p. 652, 8; Massachusetts Gen. Stat.

(1882), p. 993, 73; Wisconsin Rev. Stat. (1878), p. 1002, 4139.

' 2 Gen. Stat. (1873) , p. 413, 18.

3 Rev. Stat. (1871), p. 653, 98.

written law, or to receive the testimony of experts therein.
In Delaware, JYiassachusetts and vVisconsin, the provision is
as follows: "The existence and the tenor 01· effect of all
foreign laws may be proved as facts by pa1~01 evidence; but
if it shaU appear that the law in question is contained in a
written statute or code, the court may, in their discretion,
reject any evidence of such law that is not accompanied by
a copy thereof." 1 The phraseology of the Kentucky and
Maine statutes differ somewhat from the above provision.
The Kentucky statute reads as follows : '' The existence
and the tenor or effect of all foreign laws beyond the limit.
of the United States, may be proved by the parol evidence
of persons learned in those laws. But if it appear that the
law in question iS' contained in a written statute, the court
may reject such parol evidence, unless it be accompanied by
a copy of the statute.'' 2 While in Maine it runs as follows:
''Foreign laws may be proved by parol evidence, but when
such law appears to be existing in a written statute or code,
it may be rejected unless accompanied by a copy thereof.
The unwritten law of any other State or territory of the
United States may be proved by parol evidence, and by
books of reports of cases adjudged in their courts." a
§ !J 2. Proof of Written Law by Experts - The Practice
in Eng'land.-The practice in England, formerly was to
require the produ<.:tion of the written law, and to exclude all
proof of it by the testimony of experts. When it was proposed to call a person conversant with the law of Russia as
to the right to stop goods in fransitu, Lord KENYON refused
to receive his testimony, and the distinction between
written and unwritten law was taken. " Can the laws of
a forejgn country,'' he asks, " be proved by a person
who may be casually picked up in the streets? Can a
court of justice receive such evidence of such a matter? I
shall expect it to be made out to me, not by such loose evi1

Delaware Rev. Code (1874), p. 652, § 8; Massachusetts Gen. Stat.
(1882), p. 993, § 73; Wisconsin Rev. Stat. (1878), p. 1002, § 4139.
1 2 Gen. 8tat. (1873), p. 413, § 18.
3 Rev. Stat. (1871), p. 653, § 98.
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dence, but by proof from the country whose laws you pro-

pose to give in evidence, properly authenticated." Lord

ELLENBOROUGH also refused to receive parol evidence as to

the law of Surinam, and declared that the law being in

writing, an authenticated copy of it ought to be produced. 2

Chief Justice GIBBS, in a subsequent case, took the same

distinction between the written and unwritten law, declaring

that a copy of the former must be produced. 3 And Sir

GEORGE HAY had, in 1776, refused to accept proof of

foreign laws " by the opinions of lawyers, which is the

most uncertain way in the world," and required certificates

of the laws to be laid before him. 4 But this doctrine is no

longer observed in that country, and the rule is now to re-

gard the law as being something distinct from statutory or

common law taken by themselves merely. It is considered

as a resultant of the lex scripta and lex non scripta, and as

such it is to be proved as any other fact of science, by wit-

nesses duly qualified by learning and experience. As early

as 1811 the opinions of Scotch advocates were received to

prove the law of Scotland, although they referred to printed
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authorities as forming the basis of their opinions. 5 It was

not, however, until the year 1845 that the principle can be

said to have become settled, of admitting expert testimony

as to law considered as a complex resultant of the written

law, and its interpretation and construction. In that year

a French advocate was permitted to testify that the feudal

law was abolished in Alsace, de facto, in 1789, by the revo-

lution, and de jure, by the- treaty of Luneville ; and that a

formal decree existed abrogating the feudal law. 6

93. Proof of Written Law by Experts The Practice

in England The Subject Continued. Lord Chief Jus-

tice DENMAN, in sustaining the admission of the testimony,

1 Boehtlinckv. Schneider, 3 Esp. 58. This case criticised by Lord Den-

man, C. J., in Baron De Bode's Case. 8 Ad. & Ellis (N. s.) -208.

2 Clegg v. Levy, 3 Camp. 166.

3 Millar v. Heinrick, 4 Camp. 155.

* Harford v. Morris, 2 Hagg. 430.

5 Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. 54.

6 Baron De Bode's Case, 8 Ad. & Ellis (N. s.) 208.

<lence, but by proof from the country whose laws you propose to give in evidence , properly authenticated." 1 Lord
ELLENBOROUGH also refused to receive parol evidence as to
the law of Surinam, and declared that the law being in
writing, an authentic2.ted copy of it ought to be produced. 2
Chief Justice GIBBS, in a subsequent case, took the same
distinction between the written aud unwritten law, declaring
that a copy of the former must be produced. 3 And Sir
GEORGE HAY had, in 1776, refused to accept proof of
foreign laws " by the opinions of lawyers, which is the
most uncertain way in the world," and required certificates
of the laws to be laid before him. 4 But this doctrine is no
longer observed in that country, .and the rule is now to regard the law as being something distinct from statutory or
common law taken by themselve~ merely . It is considered
as a resultant of the lex scripta and lex non scripta, and as
such it is to be proved as any other fact of science, by witnesses duly qualified by learning and experience. As early
as 1811 the opinions of Scotch advocates were received to
prove the law of Scotland, although they referred to printed
authorities as forming the basis of their opinions. :i It was
not, however, until the year 1845 that the principle can be
I
said to have become settled, of admitting expert testimony
as to law considered as a complex resultant of the written
law, and its interpretation and construction. In that year
a French advocate was permitted to testify that the feudal
law was abolished in Alsace, de facto, in 1789, by the revolution, and de }ure, by the treaty of Luneville; and that a
•
formal decree existed abrogating the feudal ]aw .6
§ 93. Proof of Written L aw by Experts-The Practice
in England - The Subject Continued.- Lord Chief J ustice DEN3IAN, in sustaining the admission of the testimony,
Boebtlinck v. Sclmeider, 3 Esp. 58. This case critici~ed by Lonl Denman, C. J., in Baron De Bode's Case~ 8 Ad. & Ellis (N. s.) 20".
2 Clegg v. Levy, 3 Camp. 166.
s Millar v. Heinrick, 4 Carnp. 155.
~Harford v. l\Iorris, 2 Hagg. 430.
1

5

Dalrymple v . Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. 5-1.

6

Baron De Bocte·s Ca::;<.> "'Ad. & Ellis ( 1 . 8. ) 20 .
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in the above case, said:, " There is another general rule:

that the opinions of persons of science must be received as

to the facts of their science. That rule applies to the evi-

dence of legal men ; and I think it is not confined to un-

written law, but extends also to the written laws which such

men are bound to know. Properly speaking, the nature of

such evidence is not to set forth the contents of the written

law, but its effect and the state of the law resulting from it.

The mere contents, indeed, might often mislead persons not

familiar with the particular system of law. The witness is

called upon to state what law does result from the evi-

dence." The same principle is laid down in Earl Nelson

v. Lord Bridport? where the court declares that although

the written law is produced, and due proof made that it has

not been repealed, varied, or fallen into disuse, and that

the words have been accurately translated, " still the words

require due construction, and the construction depends on

the meaning of words to be considered with reference to

other words not contained in the mere text of the law, and

also with reference to the subject matter, which is not insu-
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lated from all others. The construction may have been,

probably has been, the subject of judicial decision ; instead

of one decision, there may have been a long succession of

decisions, varying more or less from each other, and ulti-

mately ending in that which alone ought to he applied in

the particular case." It is evident that as to such con-

struction the evidence of experts is required for the instruc-

tion of the court. As Lord BROUGHAM declared in the

House of Lords, in the celebrated Sussex Peerage Case : 2

" The witness may refer to the sources of his knowledge ;

but it is perfectly clear that the proper mode of proving a

foreign law is not by showing to the House the book of the

law ; for the House has not organs to know and to deal

with the text of that law, and therefore requires the assist-

ance of a lawyer who knows how to interpret it. If the

Code Napoleon was before a French court, that court

1 8 Beavan, 527.

* 11 Cl. & F. 85, 115.

in the above case, said: " There is another general rule:
that the opinions of persons of science must be received as
to the facts of their science. That rule applies to the evidence of legal men ; and I think it is not confined to unwritten law, but extends also to the written laws which such
men are bound to know. Properly speaking, the nature of
such evidence is not to set forth the contents of the written
law, but its effect and the state of the law resulting from it.
The mere contents, indeed, might often mislead persons not
familiar with the particular system of law. The witness is
called upon to state what law does result from the evidence." The same principle is laid down in Earl Nelson
v. Lord Bridpo'l't, 1 where the court declares that although
the written law is produced, and due proof made that it has
not been repealed, varied, or fallen into disuse, and that
the words have been accurately translated, '' still the words
require due construction, and the construction depends on
the meaning of words to be considered with reference to
other word& not contained in the mere text of the law, and
also with reference to the subject matter, which is not insulated from all others. The construction may have been,
pro_b ably has been, the subject of judicial decision; instead
of one decision, there may have been a long succession of
decisions, varying more or less from each other, and ultimately ending in that which alone ought to he applied in
the particular case.'' It is evident that as to such construction the evidence of experts is required for the instruction of the court. As Lord BROUGHAM: declared in the
House of Lords, in the celebrated Sussex Peerage Case: 2
"The witness rui:ly refer to the som·ces of his knowledge;
but it is perfectly clear that the proper mode of proving a
foreign law is not by showing to the House the book of the
law; for the House bas not organs to know and to deal
with the text of that law, and therefore requires the assistance of a lawyer who knows how to interpret "it. If the
Gode Napoleon was before a French court, that court
1 8 Beavan, 527.
:.111 Cl. & F. 85, 115.
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would know how to deal with and construe its provisions,

but in England we have no such knowledge, and the English

judges must, therefore, have the assistance of foreign law-

yers." So in another case the court declares that the

proper course to be pursued, in ascertaining the laws of a

foreign country, is to call a witness expert in such laws,

and " ask him, on his responsibility, what the law is, and

not to read any fragment of a code, which would only mis-

lead." 1 A person skilled in the laws of Bohemia was

therefore permitted, against objection, to testify as to the

written laws of that country.

94. Verification of Written Law by Experts. When

it is necessary to prove the language of the written law by

producing a copy thereof , the question arises as to the man-

ner in which the law is to be verified or authenticated. In

a majority of the States express provision has been made

for the admission of the printed statute books of any State.

In some States it is provided that the statute books of

another State, purporting to be published by the authority

of such State, may be received in evidence without further
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proof , a In others, the provision is that statute books of a

sister State, purporting or proved to be published by author-

ity, or proved to be commonly admitted in the courts of such

State, may be received in evidence. 3 In three of the

States, that statute books of other States, purporting to be

published by authority or commonly admitted in the courts

of such State may be received. 4 In two of the States, that

1 Cocks v. Pin-day. 2 C. & K. 269.

2 Alabama Code of 1876, 3045; Arkansas Dig. of Statutes (1858),

<-h. 67, 2; Indiana, Rev. Stat. (1881), 477; Illinois, Rev. Stat.

(1S74), p. 490, 10; Maine, Rev. Stat. (1871), p. 653, 97; Mary-

land, Rev. Code (1878), p. 759, 46; Rhode Island, Public Statutes

(1882). p. 589. 144; Texas, Rev. Stat. (1879), p. 329, 2250.

8 Florida, Bush's Dig. (1872). p. 547, 357; Iowa, Code of 1873, p. 573,

3718; Massachusetts, Gen. Stat. (1882). p. 943. 71; New York, Code

of 1871, 42(5, and new Code, 942; North Carolina, Battle's Revi.-al

(1873). p. 23:5; Ohio, 2 Rev. Stat. (1880), p. 1280, 5244; Tennessee,

2 Statutes (1871). 3800.

4 Delaware. Rev. Code (1874). p. 652, 6; Michigan, 2 Comp. Laws

(1871;, p. 1708, 78; Minnesota Statutes (1878), p. 03, 57.
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would know how to deal with and construe its provisions, .
but in England we have no such knowledge, and the English
judges must, therefore, have the a8sistance of foreign lawyers." So in another case the court declares that the
proper course to be pursued, in ascertaining the ·1aws of a
foreign country, is to call a witness expert in such laws,
and " ask him, on his responsibility, what the law i8, and
not to read any fragment of a co<le, which would only mislead." 1 A person skilled in the laws of Bohemia was
therefore permitted, against objection, to testify as to the
written laws of that country.
§ 94. Yeri:fication of Written Law by Experts. - vVhen
it is necessary to prove the language of the written law by
producing a copy thereof, the question arises as to the manner in which the law is to be verified or authenticated. In
a majority of the States express provision has been made
for the admission of the printed statute books of any State.
In some States it is provided that the statute books of
another State, purporting to be published by the authority
of such State, may be received in evidence without further
proof .2 In others, the provision is that statute books of a
sister State, purporting 01· pr·oved to be published by autlw1·ity, or proved to be commonly admitted in the courts of such
State, may be received in evidence. 3 In three of the
States, that statute books of other States, purp01·ting to be
published by authority or commonly admitted in the courts
of .such State may be received. 4 In two of the States, that
Cocks v. Purday. 2 C. & K. 269.
Alabam a Code of 1876, § 3045; Arkansas Dig. of Statutes (1858) ,
<'h. 67, § 2 ; Indiana , Rev. Stat. (1881 ) , § 477; Illinois, Rev. Stat .
(l SU ) , p. 4-90, § 10; Maine , Rev. Stat. (1871) , p. 653, § 97; l\Iaryland, Rev. Cod e (1878) , p. 759, § 4G; Rhode Island, Public Statutes
( 1882). p. 58!), § 1-1-1; T exas. Rev. ~Hat. (1879), p. 3::!9, § 2250.
3 FloridH, Bu~h· s Dig. (1872) . p. 5-17, § 357; Iowa, Code of 1873, p. 573,
§ 3718; Mas:::a chnsetts, Gen. Stat. (1882). p. 943. § 71; New York, Code
of 1871 , § 426, and new Code, § 9-12; North Carolina, Battle's Revi:<al
(1873) . p. 23 : ~; Ohio, 2 R ev. Sta t. ( 1880), p. 1280, § 524-i; Tennessee,
2 Statntes (1871 ) , § 3800.
4 Delaware. R ev. Cod e (187-l) , p. Gi>2, § 6; )1kl1igan, 2 Comp. L aws
( 1871 ) , p. 170 , § 78 ; l\lin; ie~o ta 8 tatntes (187 ) , p. fO.) , § 57.
(!J)
1

2
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statute books of other States, printed by authority or proved

to be commonly admitted in the courts of such State, ma}'

be read in evidence. 1 While in a few others the provision

is that statute books, printed by authority , may be received

without further proof. 2 In Louisiana the statutory provi-

sion is that the published digests and statutes of other States

shall be received in evidence. 3 While in New Jersey the

provision is so different from those in the statutes of other

States, that we give it entire. 4

It is evident that in those cases in which provision is made

for receiving the statute books of sister States, which are

" commonly admitted," or "proved to be commonly ad-

mitted," in the courts of such States, the evidence of per-

sons practicing in the courts of those States would be

received to authenticate the law, by showing that the book

containing it is received in evidence in the courts of the

State whose law it purports to be. It has been held that

these statutory provisions are to be regarded as cumulative,

and that they do not repeal the common law mode of

1 Oregon, Gen. Laws (1843-1872), p. 253, 715; Wisconsin, Rev. Stat.
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(1878), p. 1002, 4136.

2 Colorado, Gen. Laws (1877), p. 405, 1078; Connecticut. Gen. Stat.

(Rev. of 1875), p. 438. 19; Georgia, Code of 1873, p. 671, 3824; Ken-

tucky, Gen. Stat. (1873), p. 413, 21. And see 1 Rev. Stat. of Missouri

(1879), p. 379, 2272.

* Revised Statutes of 1870, p. 283, 1440.

4 " The printed statute books and pamphlet session laws of any of the

United States, printed and published by the direction or authority of

such State, shall be received as evidence of the public laws of such

State, in any court of this State; and the court may determine whether

any book or pamphlet, offered as such, was so printed or published,

statute books of other States,p1·inted by authority 01· p»oveil
to be conimonly adniitted in the courts of such State, may
be read in evidence. 1 vVhile in a few otherR the provision
. is that statute books, p1·inted by au'tlw1·ity, may be received
without further proof. 2 In Louisiana the statutory provision is that the publisheu digests and statutes of-other States
shall be received in evidence. 3 While in New Jersey the
provision is so different from those in the statutes of other
States, that we give it entire. 4
It is evident that in those cases i1~ which provision is made
for receiving the statute books of sister States, which are
"commonly admitted," or "proved to be commonly admitted," in the courts of such State3, the evidence of persons practicing in the courts of those States would be
received to authenticate the law, by showing that the book
containing it is recci ved in evidence in the court., of the
State whose law it purports to be. It has been held that
these statutory provisions are to be regarded as cumulative, .
and that they do not repeal the common law mode of

either from inspection, or the knowledge of the judge or judges, or from

testimony ; and no error shall be assigned for the rejection of any book or

pamphlet, offered as such, unless it be proved on error that such book or

pamphlet is received as a statute book or pamphlet containing the session

laws of said State, in the courts of such State whose statute book or

pamphlet containing the session laws, it purports to be; nor shall any

error assigned for the admission of such book or pamphlet be sustained

unless it be shown in support thereof, that the statute offered in evi-

dence or some material pare thereof, was not in force in such State at

the time of the transaction or matter to which it was offered as pertinent

or material.'" Revision (1709-1877). p. 381, 22*

Oregon, Gen. Laws (1843-1872), p. 253, § 715; Wisconsin, Rev. Stat.
(1878)' p. 1002, § 4136.
2 Colorado, Gen. Laws (1877), p. 405, § 107 ; Connecticut, Gen. Stat.
(Rev. of 1875),p. 438. § 19; Georgia, Code of 187~, p. 671, §3 24; Kentucky, Gen. Stat. (1873), p. 413, § 21. And . ee 1 Rev. Stat. of Mi souri
(1879)' p. 379, § 2272.
a Revised Statutes of 1870, p. 2 3, § 1440.
4 "The printed statute books and pamphlet ses ion law of any of th e
United States, printed and published by the direction or antltority of
such State, shall be received as evidence of the public laws of such
State, in any court of this State; and the court may determine whether
~rny book or pamphlet, offered as snch, wa so printed or published
either from inspectiou, or the knowledge of the judge or judges, or from
testimony; and no enor shall be assigned for the rejection of any book or
pamphlet, offered as such, unless it be proved on error that such book orpamphlet is received as n statute book or pamphlet containing the session
laws of said State, in the courts of such State whose statute book or
pamphlet containing the session laws, it purports to be~ nor shall any
error assigned for the ndmis5ion of such book or pamphlet be suslai11P.d
unless it be shown in support thereof, that the ·tutnte offered in evidence or some material pan thereof, was not in force in snch State at
the time of the transaction or matter to which it wa offered as pertinent
or material." Rev bi on (1 i09-J , 77): p. 3Q1, § ~2 ..
1
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proof. 1 But, as the Supreme Court of Michigan has lately

said, foreign statutes should, when possible, be proved, as

provided for in the State laws and the Acts of Congress,

rather than by the testimony of a lawyer who had practiced

within the jurisdiction where they are in force. 2 And in

the absence of all statutory provision regulating the mode

of proof, it has been held that a copy of the foreign statute

should be produced, which the witness can swear was recog-

nized in the foreign country as authoritative. 3 So in an

early case in Pennsylvania, the court received a printed

copy of Irish statutes to show the law of Ireland, an Irish

barrister having testified that he received the same from the

King's printer, and that it was good evidence in that

country. 4 And in England a book was received as evidence

of the written law of France, which purported to be printed

at the Royal Printing Office, and which the French Vice

Consul produced, testifying that it contained the French

code of laws upon which he acted, and that the office where

it purported to be printed by authority of the government,

was the government printing office. 5 But in a case decided
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in New York, the court refused to receive a book in the

French language, purporting to contain the commercial code

of France, and which was produced by the Chancellor of

the French Consulate at New York, who testified that it was

an exact copy of the laws furnished by the French govern-

ment to its consul in New York. 6 And in New Jersey, prior

to the adoption of any statutory provision regulating the

matter, the courts held that parol proof by an attorney,

that the book was read and received in the courts of the

other State as an authentic copy of their statutes, was not

1 Bieseiithrall v. Williams, 1 Duval (Ky.), 330. And see Chamberlain

v. Maitland, 5 B. Monroe (Ky.), 448.

2 Kopke v. People, 43 Mich. 41.

3 Spaulding v. Vincent, 24 Vt. 501, 505.

4 Jones v. Maffett. 5 S. & R. 523.

5 Lacon v. Higgins, 3 Starkie (X. P.) ITS. See also, Middtetoti v. Jan-

verin, 2 Jlag. Cons. R. 437.

6 Clianoine v. Fowler, X Wend. 173.

proof .1 But, as the- Supreme Court of Michigan has lately
said, foreign statutes should, when possible, be proved, as
provided for in the State laws and the Acts of Congress.,
rather than by the testimony of a lawyer who had practiced
within the jurisdiction where they are in force .2 And in
the absence of all statutory provision regulating the mode
of proof, it has been held that a copy of the foreign statute
should be produced, which the witne s can swear was recqgnized in the foreign country as authoritative. 3 So in an
early case in Penn ylvania, the court received a printed
copy of Irish stat.utes to show the law of Ireland, an Irish
barrister having testified that he received the same from the
King's printer, and that it was good evidence in that
country .4 And in England a book was received as evidence
of the written law of France, which purported to be printed
at the Royal Prin~ing Office, and which the French Vice
Consul produced, testifying that it contained the French
code of laws upon which he acted, and that the office where
it purported to be printed by authority of the government,
was the government pr~nting office. 5 But in a case decided
in New York, the court refused to receive a book in the
French language, purporting to contain the commercial code
of France, and which was produced by the Chancello1· of
the French Consulate at :New York, who testified that it was
an exact copy of the laws furnished by the French government to its consul in New York. 6 And in New Jersey, prior
to the adoption of any statutory provision regulating the
matter, the co.urts held that parol proof by an attorney,
that the book was read and received in the courts of the
other State as an authentic copy of their statutes, was not
1

Biesenthrall v. Williams, 1 Durnl (Ky.), 330. And see Chamberlain
v. Maitland, 5 B. Monroe (Ky.), 4.J.8.
2
Kopke v. People, 43 l\lich . 41.
8
Spaulding v. Vincent, 24 Vt. 501, 505.
4 Jone Y. Maffett. 5 S. & R. 523.
5
La.con v. Higgin 3 Starkie(~. P.) 17 . See also, Mhldleton v. Janverin, 2 lfag. Cons. R. 437.
6 Chanoiue v. Fowl er, ·3 Wenu. 173.
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sufficient, but that it should be authenticated according to

the Act of Congress, or by sworn copies from the original

statutes. 1

95. Presumption that the Law remains Unchanged.

When a witness testifies as to the foreign law, the question

has been raised whether it is sufficient for him to show the law

as it existed at a period prior to the time of which the trial

court is inquiring, or whether it is necessary that his testi-

mony should be addressed directly to the very time of the

transaction in question. It has been held, that where the

statute of a sister State is shown to have existed at a time

prior to that of the transaction in question, it will be pre-

sumed, in absence of proof to the contrary, that it continued

unchanged to the period in controversy. 2 In a recent case

in New York, when a printed copy of the French Code was

presented, a witness testified that at the time he prac-

ticed in France, the book was commonly received by the

judicial tribunals of that country as evidence of the existing

law. The witness was licensed to practice in France in

1837, and ceased to practice in 1862. The period for the
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existing law of which the trial court was seeking, was in

1871, and the question was raised whether the law having

been shown as it existed in 1862, could be presumed to have

continued the same until the year 1871. This was not de-

termined, but the court evidently had a serious doubt

whether such presumption could be entertained. 8

96. Who are Qualified to Testify as Experts in

Foreign Law. In order to prove the law of a foreign

country, it is necessary that the witnesses produced to tes-

tify in respect to it, should be more than ordinarily capable

of speaking upon the subject. It does not, however, appear

to be essential that the witnesses should in all cases be law-

yers, and it has even been held to be unnecessary that they

should have held an official appointment, in which it has

1 Van Bnskirk v. Hillock, 18 X. J. Law, 184, overruling, Hale v.

Ross, 3 X. J. Law, 373. See Condit v. Blackwell, 19 N. J. Eq. 193, 196.

8 Peck v. Hibbard, 26 Vt. 69S; Raynham v. Canton, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 29.

8 Hynes v. McDermott. 82 X. Y. 41.

sufficient, but tha.t it should be authenticated according to
the Act of Congress, or by sworn copies from the original
statn tes .1
§ 95. Presumption that the Law remains Unchanged.When a witness testifie.s as to the foreign law, the question
has been raised whether it is sufficient for him to show the law
as it existed at a period prior to the time of which the trial
court is inquiring, or whether it is uecessary that his testimony should be addressed directly to the very time of the
transaction in question. It has been held, that where the
statute of a sister State is shown to have existed at a time
prior to that of the transaction in question, it will be presumed, in absence of proof to the contrary, that it continued
unchanCYed
to the period in- controver~y. 7 In a recent case
0
in New York, when a printed copy of the French Code was
presented , a witness testified that at th~ time he practiced in France, the book was commonly received by the
judicial tribunals of that country as evidence of the existing
law. The witness was licensed to practice in France in
1837, and ceased to practice in 1862: The period for the
existing law of which the trial court was seeking, was in
1871, and the question was raised whether the ]aw having
been shown as it existed in 1862, could be presumed to have
continued the same until the year 1871. This was not determined, but the court evidently bad a. serious doubt
whether such presumption could be entertained. 3
§ 9 6. Who are Qualified to Testify as Experts in
Foreign Law.-In order to prove the law of a foreign
country, it is necessary that the witnesses produced to testify in respect to it, should be more than ordinarily capable
of speaking upon the subject. It does not, however, appear
to be essential that the witnesses should in all cases be lawyers, and it has even been held to be unnecessary that they
should have held an official appointment, in which it has
1 Van Buskirk v. Mulock,
8 "N. J. La.w, 184, overrnling, Ha.le v.
Ross, 3 N. J. IJaw, 373. ."'ee Condit v. Blackwell, ]!) N. J. Eq. 193, 196.
2 Peck v. Hibbard, 26 Vt. 69" ; Raynham v. C a11 to 1!_: 3 Pick. p!ass.) 29 ,
s Hynes v. UcDermo tt. 15:3 N. Y. 4 I.
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been necessary for them, in the discharge of their official

duties, to make themselves acquainted with the law. It has

been declared that " all persons who practice a busines or

profession which requires them to possess a certain knowl-

edge of the matter in hand, are experts so far as expertness

is required." 1 The question which this case involved, re-

lated to the Belgian law on the subject of the presentment

of promissory notes, and the point raised was whether a wit-

ness called as an expert to testify as to such law, must be

a professional man, one who, by virtue of his office, might

be said to be peritus. It was held not, and one who had

been a merchant and stock-broker at Brussels, was per-

mitted to testify as an expert. " I think," said Mr. Justice

MAULE, '* that inasmuch as he had been carrying on a busi-

ness which made it his interest to take cognizance of the

foreign law, he does fall within the description of an expert."

And in a case recently decided in the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania, it was held that the law of a foreign country

on a given subject might be proven by any person, who,

though not a lawyer, or not having filled any public office,
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was or had been in a position to render it probable that he

would make himself acquainted with it. And a pastor of a

church in a foreign country was permitted to testify that the

church records had been kept according to the laws of that

country. 2

i) 7 . Who are Qualified to Testify as Experts in For-

eign Law The Suhject Continued. So it has been held

in England that a Kornan Catholic bishop holding the office

of coadjutor to a vicar-apostolic in England, was to be con-

sidered, by virtue of his office, as a person skilled in the mat-

rimonial law of Rome, and, therefore, competent as a wit-

ness to prove that law. 3 And in this country it is held that

a priest or minister of another State is a competent witness

to prove the laws of such State as to marriage. 4 In another

1 Vander Donckt v. Thellusson, 8 Man. G. & S. (65 E. C. L.) 812.

2 American Life Ins. Co. v. Rosenagle, 77 Penn. St. 507.

s Sussex Peerage Case, 11 Cl. & F. 85.

< Bird v. Commonwealth, 21 Grattan (Va.) 800, 808. And in Phillips

been necessary for them, in the discharge of their official
duties, to make themselves acquainted with the law. It has
been declared that " all persons who practice a busines or
profession which requires them to possess a certain knowledge of the matter in hand, are experts so far as expertness
is required." 1 The question which this case iuvolved, related to the Belgian law on the subject of the presentment
of promissory notes, and the point raised was whether a witness called as an expert t'o testify as to such law, must be
a professional man, one who, by virtue of his office, might
be said to he peritus. It was held not, and one who had
been a merchant and stock-hroker at Brussels, was permitted to testify as an expert. "I think," said l\fr. Justice
l\IAuLE, "that inasm uch as he had been carrying on a bu.siness which made it his interest to t&.ke cognizance of the
foreign law, he does full within the description of an expert. "
And in a case recently decided in the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, it was held that the law of a foreign country
on a given subject might be proven by any person, who,
though uot a lawyer, or not having fi~led any public office,
was or had been in a position to render it probable that he
would make himself acquainted with it. And a pastor of a
church in a foreign country was permitted to testify that the
church records had been kept according to the Jaws of that
country. 2
§ ~ 7. "\Vho are Qualified to. Testify as Experts in Foreign Law - The Subject Continued.- So it has been held
in England · that a Roman Catholic bishop holdi~g the office
of coadjutor to a vicar-apostolic in England, was to be considered, by virtue of his office , as a person skilled in the matrimonial law of Rome, and, therefore, competent as a witness to prove that law. 3 And in this country it is held that
a priest or minister of another State is a co mpetent witness
to prove the laws of such State as to marriage. 4 In another
I
2

3
4

Vander Donckt v. Thelln s~ on, S Man. G. & S. (65 E. C. Jj.) 12.
American Life Ins. Co. v. Rosenagle, 77 Penn. St. 507.
Sussex Peerage Case, 11 Ul. & F. 85.
Bird v. Commonwealth , 21 Grattan (V:i.) 800, < 08. And in Phillips
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case it is said that the foreign law " may be proved by pro-

fessional men, or others conversant with, and having the

means of knowledge." l In Texas the practice has long

prevailed of receiving the evidence of intelligent Mexicans,

not lawyers, as to the laws of Spain and Mexico in litiga-

tion pertaining to lands, and such evidence is pronounced

by the courts of that State to have been " valuable in giv-

ing information as to the construction given to the laws of

Spain and Mexico by the officers who executed them." 2

In New Hampshire the court declares that in proving the

laws of a foreign country, the testimony of any person,

whether a professional lawyer or not, is competent, pro-

vided he appears to the court to be well informed on the

subject. 3 And in that State it has been held that a witness

who was not a lawyer, but who for several years had acted

as a magistrate in Canada, and had long been engaged in

mercantile business there, and had become acquainted with

the law in relation to notarial instruments, was competent

to testify that according to the law of that country general

powers of attorney must be executed before a notary, and
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that it was part of the sworn duty of every notary not to

suffer any original paper executed before him to be taken

out of his custody, and that notarial copies of such instru-

ments are received in all the courts of Canada, without

further proof of the execution of the original. 4 In an early

case in New York Mr. Justice SPEXCER declares that

" courts of law will receive evidence of the common law,

from intelligent persons of the country whose laws are to be

proved," ' And in Illinois it is said that it may be proven

by the testimony of competent witnesses instructed in its

v. Gregg, 10 Watts (Perm.), 158, 169, witnesses who were not lawyers,

were received to testify as to what constituted a lawful marriage in Mis-

sissippi a half century before.

1 Jones v. Maffett, 5 Serg. & E. (Fenn.) 523, 532.

* State v. Cuellar, 47 Texas, 304.

3 Hall v. Costello, 48 X. H. 179.

<Pickard v. Bailey, 6 Foster (Jf. H.), 169.

* Kenney v. Van Home, 1 Johns. (X. Y.) 394.

case it is said that the foreign law "may be proved by professional men, or others conversant with , and having the
means of knowledge." 1 In Texas the practice bas long
prevailed of receiving the evidence of intelligent Mexicans,
not lawyers, as to the laws of Spain and Mexico in litiga. tion pertaining to lands, and such evidence is pronounced
by the courts of that State to have been " valuable in giving information as to the construction given to the laws of
Spain and Mexico by the officers who executed them .'' 2
In New Hampshire the court declares that in proving the
laws of a foreign country, the testimony of any person,
whether a professional lawyer or not, is competent, provided he appears to the court to be well informed on the
subject. 3 And in that State it bas been held that a witness
who was not a lawyer, but who for several years had acted
as a magistrate in Canada, and had long been engaged in
mercantile business there, and had become acquainted with
the law in relation to notarial instrumei1ts, was competent
to testify that according to the law of that country general
powers of attorney must be executed before a notary, and
that it was part of the sworn duty of every notary not to
suffer any original paper executed before him to be taken
out of his custody, and that notarial copies of such instruments are received in all the courts of Canada, without
further proof of the execution of the original. 4 In an early
case in New York Mr. Justice SPENCER declares that
"courts of law will receive evidence of the common law,
from intelligent persons of the country whose laws are to be
proved," 5 And in Illinois it is said that it may be proven
by the testimony of competent witnesses instructed in its
v. Gregg, 10 ·w atts (Penn.), 158, 169 witne~~ e who were not lawyer,,
were received to testify as to what constituted a ln.wfnl marriage in Mi "i ippi a half century before.
1
Jone v. Maffett, 5 Serg. & R. (Fenn .) 523 532.
t State v. Cuellar, 47 Texa , 304.
3 Hall v. Co tello, 4 N. H. 179.
4 Pickard v. Bailey 6 Fo ter (N. H.) 169.
5
Kenney v. Van Horne 1 John . . ('N'. Y.) 39±.
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laws. 1 Ill Tennesse, that it may be proven by jurists and

legal characters experienced therein. 2 In Arkansas, it may

be proven by witnesses skilled therein. 3

98. Who are Qualified to Testify as Experts in For-

eign Law The Subject Continued. In the light of the

foregoing decisions it must be regarded as the rule in this

country, at least, that it is not necessary that an expert in

foreign law should have been a member of the bar in the

foreign State whose laws he is called to prove. This pre-

cise question was recently raised in the United States Court

of Claims, where a witness who bad never been admitted

to the French bar, was held competent to testify as to the

law of France. 4 But it appeared that the witness had

studied the law as a profession, had been graduated at the

University of Paris, had since then been engaged in

legal pursuits, and was then employed by the French

government as legal adviser of the legation at Wash-

ington. In a still more recent case in England the

Persian ambassador at Vienna was allowed to testify as

an expert in the law of Persia ; but this was after he
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had testified that in Persia there were no professional law-

yers ; that the administration of the law was left entirely

to ecclesiastics, and that all persons in the diplomatic ser-

vice of that country were required to be thoroughly versed

in the law ; and that he had, therefore, studied and become

acquainted with it. 5 And it is, undoubtedly, true, that in

England a somewhat more rigid rule is applied, than is in-

sisted on in this country, in determining who are qualified

to give testimony as experts in foreign law. In one case

the Master of the Rolls refused to act on the affidavit

of one describing himself as a " Solicitor practising in the

Supreme Courts of Scotland, Edinburgh," and required the

opinion of an advocate as to the Scotch law. 6

1 Milwaukee & St. Paul K. Co. v. Smith, 74 111. 107.

2 Wilson v. Smith, 13 Teun. 399.

3 McNeill v. Arnold, 17 Ark. 154, 167.

4 Diiuphin v. United States, 6 Ct. of Claims, 221.

5 The Goods of Dost Aly Khan, 6 Prob. Div. (L. R.) 0.

6 In >vTodd, 19 Beavan, 582. The opinions of Scotch advocates were

laws .1 In Tenne 'e, that it may be proven by j nrist and
legal characters experienced therein. 2 In Arkan a , it may
be proven by w"itnes...,es skilled therein. 3
§ 98 . "\Vho are Qualified to Testify as Experts in For-eign Law -The Subject Continued.- In the light of the
foregoing deci ·ions it mu -t be regarded as the rule in this
country, at least, that it is not nece sary that an expert in
foreign law should have been a member of the bar in the
foreign State \\rhose laws he is called to prove. This precise question was recently rai ed in the United States Court
of Claims, where a witnes · ·who had never been admitted
to the French bar, was held competent to testify as to the
bw of France. 4 But · it appeared that the witness had
studiQd the law as a profes ~ ion, had .been graduated at the
U niver ity of Paris, had since then been engaged in
legal pursuits, and was then employed by the French
government as legal adviser of the legation at Washington.
In a. still more recent case in England the
Persian amba ~, ador at Vienna wa allowed to testify us
an expert in the law of Persia; but this was after he
L.ad testified that in Persia there were no professional lawyer ; that the administration of the law was left entirely
to ecclesiastics, and that all persons in the diplomatic service of that country were required to be thoroughly versed
in the law ; and that he had, therefore, studied and become
acquainted with it. 5 Antl it is, undoubtedly, true, that in
Englanfl a somewhat more rigid rule is applied, than is insiste<l on in this country, in determining who are qualified
to give testimony as experts in foreign law. In one case
the :Jfaster of the Rolls refused to act on the affidavit
of one describing himself as a " Solicitor practising in th.e
' upremc Courts of Scotland, Edinburgh," and required the
opinion of an advocate as to the Scotch bw .G
1 )Iilwankee

& St. Paul R. Co. Y. Smith 'i-1 Ill. 197.
'Vilson v. Smith, 13 Tenn. i$99.
3 "McXeill v. Arnold,] 7 Ark. 154, 167.
4 Dauphin v. United State , 6 Ct. of Claims, 221.
5 The Goods of Dost Aly Khn.n. 6 Prob. Div. ( L. TI.) ti.
6 In re Todd, 19 Beavnn, u82.
The opinions of cotch adYocates were
2
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In 1861, the British Parliament passed a very wise and

useful act, by which it was intended that all questions of

foreign law should be referred to the courts of the foreign

country to be there decided and certified back. The act as

yet remains a dead letter, no action having been taken in

accordance with its provisions for carrying it into effect.

We give the enactment in the note below. 1

99. Mere Knowledge of Foreign Law is Insuffi-

cient. It was held in an English case that one who was

not a lawyer, and who had no special qualifications, but

who had resided in Scotland for twenty years, and who

swore that he was acquainted with the law of marriage, was

competent to state what the Scotch law of marriage was. 2

It did not appear that the witness had any peculiar means

of information as to the law. This case has been disap-

also received in Williams v. Williams, 3 Beavan. 547; and in Hitchcock

v. Clendinen, 12 Beavan, 534.

1 "If, in any action depending in any court of a foreign country, or

State / with >\hose government Her Majesty shall have entered into a

convention as above set forth (i.e., for the purpose of mutually ascertain-
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ing the law), such court shall deem it expedient to ascertain the law ap-

plicable to the facts of the case as administered in any part of Her

Majesty's dominions, and if the foreign court in which such action may

depend, shall remit to the court in Her Majesty's dominions whose opin-

In 1861, the British Parliament· passed a very wise and
useful act, by which it was intended that all quesHons of
foreign law should be referred to the courts of the foreign
country to be there decided and certified back. The act as
yet remains a dead letter, no action having been taken in
accordance with its provisions for carrying it into effect.
We give the enactment in the note below .1
§ 99. Mere Knowledge of Foreign Law is Insufficient.- It was held in an English case that one who was
not a lawyer, and who had no special qualifications, but
who had resided in Scotland for twenty years, and who
swore th~t he was acquainted with the law of marriage, was
competent to state what the Scotch law of marriage was . 2
It did not appear that the witness had any peculiar means
of information as to the law. This case has been di3ap-

ion is desired, a case setting forth the facts and questions of law arising

out of the same, on which they desire to have the opinion of a court

within Her Majesty's dominions, it shall be competent to any of the

parties to the action to present a petition to such last mentioned court,

whose opinion is to be obtained, praying such court to hear parties or

their counsel, and to pronounce their opinion thereon in terms of this

act, or to pronounce their opinion without hearing parties or counsel;

and the court to which such petition shall be presented shall consider

the same, and if they think fit, shall appoint an early day for hearing

parties or their counsel on such case, and shall pronounce their opinion

upon the questions of law, as administered by them, which are submitted

to them by the foreign court; and in order to their pronouncing such

opinion, they shall be entitled to take such further procedure thereupon

as to them shall seem proper, and upon such opinion being pronounced,

a copy thereof, certified by an officer of such court, shall be given to each

of the parties to the action by whom the same shall be required." 24 &

25 Viet., c. 11 . See Law Magazine and Review, London, May, 1882, and

8 Southern Law Review, 153.

z Regina v. Dent, 1 Car. & K. (47 E. C. L.) DC.

also received in Williams v. Williams, 3 Bea van, 547; and in Hitchcock
v. Clendinen, 12 Beavan, 534.
·
I "If, in any action depending in any court of a foreign country, or
State, with "llose government Her Maje ty shall ha ye entered into
convention as above set forth (i.e., for the purpose of mutually ascertaining the law), such court shall <leem it expedient to ascertain the law ap- .
plicable tu the facts of the case as administered in any part of Her
Majesty's dominions, and if the foreign court in which such action may
depend, shall remit to the court in Her Majesty s dominions whose opinion is desired, a case setting forth the facts and qne tions of law arising
out of the same, on which they desire to have the opinion of a court
within Her Majesty's dominions, it shall be competent to any of the
parties to the action to preLent a petition to such last mentioned court,
whose opinion is to be obtained, praying such court to bear parties or
their counsel, and to pronounce their opinion tberegn in term of thi N
act, or to pronounce their opiniou without hearing parties or coun el;
and the court to which such petition shall be pre ented shall consider
the same, and if they think fi t, shall appoint an early day for hearing
parties or their counsel on such case, and shall pronounce their opinion
upon the questions of law, as administered by them," bich are submitted
to them by the foreign court; and in order to their pronouncing uch
opinion, they shall be entitled to take such further procedure thereupon
as to them shall seem proper, and upon such opinion being pronounced,
a copy thereof, certified by an officer of such court, shall be given to each
of the parties to the action by whom the ame shall be required." 24 &
25 Viet., c. 11. See Law 1tfa2"s.zine and Revie"·, J,ondon , May, 18 2, and
8 Southern Law Review, 153.
2 Regina v. Dent, 1 Car. & K. (47 E. C. L ) 96.

EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE SCIE~CE OF LAW.

137

EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE SCIENCE OF LAW. 137

proved, and cannot be regarded as the law. In the /Sussex

Peerage Case, in the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor,

in speaking of this case, said ; "I ought to say at once that

it is the universal opinion both of the Judges and the Lords

that the case is not law." 1

100. Knowledge of the Foreign Law must have been

Acquired where. It has been held in several cases, that

where the knowledge of a witness produced as an expert in

foreign law, has not been acquired in the foreign country,

such person is not to be regarded as competent, and his

testimony cannot be received. Thus, it has been held in

England, that a witness was incompetent to testify, who

stated that he was a jurisconsult, and adviser to the Prussian

Consul in England, and had studied law in the University

of Leipsic, and that from his studies there, he was able to-

say that the Code Napoleon was the law of Cologne. The

court declared, that one who never had been in the foreign

state, and whose knowledge of the law was not derived

there, was incompetent to testify as an expert in the foreign

law. 2 And where one described himself as " a certified
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special pleader, and as familiar with Italian law," he was

not allowed to testify that the office of curator in Italy was

as nearly as possible identical with that of an administrator

in England, the ground for his exclusion being that there

was nothing *' to show that he had any knowledge of Italian

law, but from the study of it in this country," (England). 3

So an English barrister practicing in Canadian Appeals

before the Privy Council, has been held incompetent in

England, to give evidence as an expert as to the validity,

according to the law of Canada, of a marriage solemnized

in that country. 4 But in this country, a witness who showed

himself to be instructed in the laws, customs and usages of

Spain, and who was a legal practitioner in the Island of

1 11 Cl. & F. 85, 134. And sec Vander Donckt v. Thellnsson, 8 Man.

G. & S. (65 E. C. L.) 812, where Regina. v. Dent, supra, is distinguished.

2 Bristow v. Sequeville, 5 Excheq. 272.

3 The Goods of Bonnelli, 1 Prob. Div. (L. R.) C9.

< Cartwright v. Cartwright, 2G W. R. 684.

proved, and car1not be regarded as the law. In the Sussex
Peerage Uase, in the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor,
in speaking of thi case, "aid; "I ought to ay at once that
it is the univer.,al opinion both of the J udgcs and the Lord ·
that the case is not law. " 1
§ 100. Knowledge of the Foreign Law must have been
Acquired where.-It has been held in several cases, that
where the knowledge of a witness produced as an expert in
foreign law, has not been acquired in the foreign country,
such person is not to be regarded ns competent, and his
testimony cannot be received. Thu , it has been held in
England, that a witne s was incompetent to testify, who
stated that he was a jurisconsult, and advi. er to the Prussian
Consul in England, and had studied law in the University
of Leipsic, and thn.t from his studies there, he was able to
say that the Code Napoleon was the la.w of Cologne. The
court declared, that one who never had been in the foreign
state, and whose knowledge of the law was not derived
there, was incompet('nt to testify as an expert in the foreign
law. 2 And where one described himself as "a certified
special pleader, and as familiar with Italian law," he wa"'
uot allowed to testify that the office of curator in Italy was
us nearly as possible identical with that of an administrator
in England, the ground for his exclusion being that there
was nothing "to show that he had any knowledge of ltitlian
law, but from the study of it in this country," (England). a.
So an English barrister practicing in Canadian Appeals
before the Privy Council, has been .held incompetent in
:England, to give evidence as an expert as to the validity,
according to the law of Canada, of a marriage solemnized
in that cou11try .4 But in this country, a witness who showecl
himself to he instructed in the laws, cu::;toms and usages of
Spa.in, and who was a legal practitioner in the Island of
11 Cl. & F. 5, 13-!. An<l uec Vander Doackt v. Thellns on, 8 ~lun.
G. & S. (65 E. C. L.) 12, where Regin~ v. Den.t, supra, is distiugni hed.
2 Bri tow v. Sequeville, 5 Excheq. 272.
3 The Goods of Bonnelli, 1 Prob. Div. (L. R.) (i!).
• Cal'twright v. Cartwl'ight 2G W.R. 6 -:L
1
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Cuba, which is governed by Spanish law, was held competent

to prove the law of Spain, although he never resided or prac-

ticed in the latter country. 1

101. Right of Expert to Cite Text Books, Decisions,

Codes, etc. Where a lawyer or expert in foreign law is

allowed to testify as to the law, assuming it to be a re-

sultant of the lex scripla and the lex non-scripta , he may

confirm his recollection of the law, or assist his own knowl-

edge by reference to text books, decisions, statutes, codes,

or other legal documents. And if he describes them as

truly stating the law, they may be read, not as evidence per

se, but as part and parcel of his testimony. 2

102. How these Citations are to be Regarded. It is

said that in the first instance, at least, the judge can only

regard the citations of the laws and authorities contained in

the opinions of the experts, as connected with the testi-

mony, and that he cannot consider them as at all important,

except with regard to the degree of weight given by the

testimony. That if he reads them, they may appear to him

to accord with the testimony, or to differ from it. " Jf, in
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his view, they accord with it, nothing is gained. If, in his

view, they differ from it, he, being ignorant of the foreign

law, cannot weigh his opinion against the clear and imcon-

tradicted opinion of the witness, whose opinion ought to be

derived, not only from the citation in question, but from all

the sources of his knowledge of the law of which he is

speaking." 3 In the Duchess Di Siora's case in the House

of Lords, Lord CHELMSFORD declares that it seems contrary

to the nature of the proof required, that the judge should

be at liberty to search for himself into the sources of

knowledge from which the witnesses have drawn, and

produce for himself the fact which is required to be proved

-as a part of the case. 4 But where the opinions of the ex-

1 Molina v. United States, 6 Ct. of Claims, 260.

- 2 Taylor on Evidence, 1423; Xelson v. Bridport, 8 Beavan. 527, 538;

Sussex Peerage Case. 11 Cl. & Fin. 114, 117.

3 .Nelson v. Bridport, 8 Beavaw, 527, 541.

4 10 House of Lords Cases, 640.

Cuba, which is governed by Spanish law, was held competent
t o prove the law of Spain, although he never resided or pract iced in the latter country .1
§ 101. Right of Expert to Cit~ TeA'ii Books, Decisions,
Codes, etc.-\Vhere a lawyer or expert in foreign law i
allowed to testify as to the law, assuming it to be a i~c
sultant of the lex sc1·ipta and the lex non-scripta, he may
confirm his r ecollection of the law, or assist bis own knowledge by reference to text books, decisions, statutes , codes ,
or other legal documents . And if he describes them as
truly stating the law, they may be read, not a evidence p e1·
.se, but as part and parcel of his testimony .2
§ 102. How these Citations are to be Regarded.-lt is
said that in the first instance, 3:t least, the judge can only
regard the citations of the laws and authorities contained in
t he opinions of the experts , as connected with the testi- ,
mony, and that he cannot consider them as at all important,
except with regard to the degree of weight given hy the
t estimony. That if he reads them, they may appear to him
t o accord with the testimony, or to differ from it. "lf, in
his view, they accord with it, nothing is gained. If, in hi s
view, they differ from it, he, being ignorant of the foreign
law, cannot weigh his opinion against the clear and uncon-tradicted opinion of the witness, whose opinion ought to be
derived, not only frnm the citation in que tion, but from all
he sources of bis knowledge of the law of which he is
·peaking. " 3 In the Duchess Di Siora' s case in the House
·<>f Lords, L ord CHELMSFORD decla1:es that it seems contrary
to the nature of the proof required, that the judge should
be at libert y to search for himself into the ources of
k nowledge from whi ch the witnes es have drawn, and
p roduce f or himself the fact which is r equired to be proved
.as a part of the case .4 But where the opinions of the ex1

)foli na v. U ni ted States, 6 Ut. of Cla im , 2G9.
2 Taylor on E vidence,§ 1-123; X el on v. Bridport,
· ""ussex P eerage Case. 11 Cl. & Fin. 114, 117.
8 ~ e l so n v. Bridpo rt,
Beava1'l , 527 5.JJ.
• 10 H onse of L ord s Ca es, 6-10.
2

Bea\'a n, 527, 538 ;
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perts are contradictory, the court is at liberty to examine

for itself, the laws and authorities cited by the witnesses as

the basis or foundation for their opinions. 1 Where the

jury are the judges of the law, they, of course, are not at

liberty to enter upon any independent investigation, and

must of necessity, weigh the evidence of the experts when

it is conflicting, giving to it such consideration as they deem

it deserves. In some cases it has been held that the foreign

law is a question of fact for the jury, 2 but the weight of

authority in this country seems to be in favor of the theory

that it is a question for the court, and not for the jury. 3

But a distinction has been made between the written and

unwritten law ; and it has been held, that where the law is

unwritten, it is a question of fact for the jury, but where a

statute or judicial decision is involved, the question of con-

struction and effect is for the court. 4

103. Testimony as to Usage and Practice of Courts of

Another State. Lawyers are permitted to testify in the

courts of another State, as to the usage and practice of the

courts in the State in which they practice. 5 In the case cited,
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the depositions of lawyers and judges of Rhode Island were

received in the courts of Massachusetts, to show that the

service of a writ of arrest in the manner set forth in the

officer's return, was a good and valid service under the

practice and usage of the courts of Rhode Island, giving

the courts of that State jurisdiction, and that a judgment

concluded on such service would be valid there. It amounted

to proof of the unwritten law. But the rule allowing

1 Trimbey v. Viguier, 1 Bingham (N. s.;,'15S; Bremer v. Freeman, 10

Moore, P. C. 306.

2 De Sobry v. Laistre, 2 II. & J. 191; Ingham v. Hart, 11 Ohio, 255;

Holman v. King, 7 Met. 384.

3 Sichvell v. Evans, 1 P. & W. (Penn.) 383; Ripple v. Ripple. 1 Rawle

(Penn.), 3SG; Bock v. Lauman, 12 Harris (Penn.). 435; Inge v. Murphy,

10 Ala. 885; Hooper v. Moore, 5 Jones Law (X. C.) 130; Newell v.

Xewell, 9 Miss. 58.

4 Ely v. James, 123 Mass. 30; Kline v. Baker, 90 Mass. 254. See Moore

v. Gnyner, 5 Me. 187.

"> Mowry v. Chase, 100 Mass. 79.

perts are contradictory, the court is at liberty to examine
for itself, the laws and authorities cited by the witnesses a '
the basis 01· foundation for their opinions. 1 Where the
jury are the judges of the law, they, of course, are not at
liberty to enter upon any independeut investigation, and
must of necessity, weigh the evidence of the experts when
it is conflicting, giving to it such consideration as they deem
it deserves. In some cases it has been held that the foreign
law is a question of fact for the jury, 2 but the weight of
authority in this country seems to be in fa.vor of the theory
that it is a question for the court, and not for the jury. 3
But a di stinction has been made between the written and
unwritten law; and it has been held, that where the law i
unwritten, it is a question of fact for the jury, hut where a
statute or judicial decision is involved, the question of constniction and effect is for the court. 4
§ 103. Testimony as to Usag·e ancl Practice of Courts of
Another State. -Lawyers are permitted to testify in the
courts of another State, as to the usage and ·practice of the
courts in the State in which they prac~ice. 5 In the case cited,
the depositions of lawyers and judges of Rhode I sland were
received in the courts of :Massachusetts , to show that the
service of a writ of arrest in the manner set forth in the
officer' s return, was a good and va.lid service under the
practice and usage of the courts of Rhode I sland, giving
the courts of that State jurisdiction, and that a judgment
concluded on such service would be valid there. It amounted
to p roof of the unwritten law.
But the rule allowing
1 T r im bey v. Vignie r, 1 Bingham (N. s .; ; 15 ; B rem er v. F ree ma n, 10
)Ioore , P. C. 306 .
2 D e Sobry v. J,a istre, 2 H. & J. 191 ; Ingh am v. Hart, 11 Ollio, 255;
H olm a n v. King , 7 Met. 384.
3 S id well v. Evans, 1 P. & ·w. (P e nn.) 383; Rippl e v. Ripple, 1 R awle
( P e nn. ) , 3SG; Bock v. L a nm a n, 12 Harris (Penn. ) . 435; Inge v. Murph y,
J 0 Ala . 885; Hooper v. l\foore, 5 Jones L ~nv (N. C.) 130; N ewell v.
X e well, 9 Miss. 58.
4 Ely v . J a mes, 123 l\fass. 3G; Klin e v. B aker, 90 }[a.,,· . 254. See Moore
v. Gnyn er, 5 .Me . 1 7.
5 l\Iowry v. Chase, 100 Mass . 7!).
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experts to testify, does not enable a party to call lawyers to

testify what is the practice of the profession, under a cer-

tain statute of the State, for the purpose of guiding the

judge in the construction to be given to it, the question

arising in the courts of the State which enacted the statute. 1

104. Testimony as to Powers and Obligations of an

Attorney in his Relations to his Clients. It is error to re-

ceive the opinions of lawyers as to the rights and duties of an

attorney as between himself and his client. 3 In the partic-

ular case, it was held error to receive the opinions of such

witnesses as to whether, in a certain stato of facts, an

attorney should, as a matter of course and of duty, have

moved for a reference, and whether he had or had not a

right, in the discharge of his legal and proper duty, to open

a default.

1 Gaylor's Appeal, 43 Conn. 82.
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2 Classman v. Merkel, 3 Bosw. 402, 409.

experts to testify, does not enable a party to call lawyers to
testify what is the practice of the profe~sion, under a certain statute of the State, for the purpose of guiding the
judge in the construction to be given to it, the question
arising in the courts of the State which enacted the statute. 1
§ 104. Testimony as to Powers and Obligations of an
Attorney in his Relations to his Clients.-It is error to re-

ceive the opinions of lawyers as to the rights and duties of an
attorney as between himself and his client. 2 In the particular case, it was held error to receive the opinions of such
witnesses as to whether, in a certain stato of facts , an
attorney should, as a matter of course and of duty, have
moved for a reference, and whether he had or had not a
right, in the discharge of his legal and proper duty, to open
a default.
1

2

Gaylor's Appeal, 43 Conn. 82.
Clnssman v. Merkel, 3 Bosw. 401, 409.
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CHAPTER VI.

EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE TRADES AND ARTS.

SECTION.

105. Nautical Experts.

106. Nautical Experts The Subject Continued.

107. Railroad Experts.

108. Railroad Experts The Subject Continued.

109. Experts in Insurance.

110. Experts in Insurance The Subject Continued.

111. Gardeners, Farmers and Stock Raisers.

1 12. Millers and Millwrights.

113. Surveyors and Civil Engineers.

CHAPTER VI.

114. Surveyors and Civil Engineers The Subject Continued.

115. Machinists.

116. Mechanics, Masons and Master Builders.

117. Experts in Patent. Trade Mark and Copyright Cases.

EXPERT TESTDIONY IN THE TRADE::i AXD ARTS .

118. Painters and Photographers.

119. Lumbermen.

120. Translation by Experts of Writings from a Foreign Language.

121. Expert Testimony as to Technical Terms and Unusual Words.
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122. Expert Testimony as to Technical Terms and Unusual Words

The Subject Continued.

123. Expert Testimony as to Usage.

S ECTION.

105.
J06.

107.

124. Opinions of Experts in Miscellaneous Cases.

125. Opinions of Experts in Miscellaneous Cases The Subject Con-

tinued.

126. Opinions of Experts in Miscellaneous Cases The Subject Con-

tinued.

105. Nautical Experts. The opinions of persons en-

gaged in the navigation of vessels and boats are received on

questions pertaining to nautical science. "Such men form

their opinions from facts within their own experience, and

not from theory or abstract reasoning. They come, there-

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
11-1.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

120.
121.
122.

123.
124.
1~5.

126.

Nau ti cal Experts.
Nautical Experts-The Subject Continued.
Railroad Experts.
Hailroad Experts-1'he Subject Continued.
Experts in Insurance.
Experts in Insurance-The Subject Continued.
Gardeners, Farmers and Stock Raisers.
Millers and Millwrights.
Surveyors and Civil Engineers.
Surveyors and CiTil Engineers-The 8ubject Continued.
Machinists.
Mechanics, Masons and }faster Builders.
Experts in Patent~ Trade Mark antl Copyright Cases.
Painters and Photographers.
Lumbermen.
'l'ranslation by Experts of Writings from a Foreign Language.
Expert Testimony as to Technical Terms and Unusual Words.
Expert 1'estimony as to 'fechnical Terms and Unusual WordsThe Subject Continued.
Expert Testimony a to Usage.
Opinions of Experts in Miscellaneous Ca es.
Opinions of Experts in Miscellaneous Cases-The Subject Continued.
Opinions of Experts in Miscellaneous Case -The Subject Con tinueu.

§ 105. Nautical Experts.-The opinions of persons engaged in the navigation of vessels and boats are received on
questions pertaining to nautical science . "Such men form
their opinion::; from facts within their own experience, and
not from theory or abstract rea ' oning. They come, there-
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fore, even more properly within the definition of expert*

than men of mere science." 1 Their opinions have been

received as to the seaworthiness of vessels ; 2 as to what

caused a vessel to leak ; 3 as to the soundness of, a chain

cable ; 4 as to the possibility of avoiding a collision by the

use of proper care on the part of the officers and crew of

one of the vessels ; 5 as to whether a port could have been

made by skillful management ; 6 as to whether a vessel was

stranded through unskillful and careless management, or

inevitable accident; 7 as to the proper mode and time of

changing the fastening of boats in a tow ; 8 as to whether it

would be safe or prudent for a tugboat, on any wide water,

to tug three boats abreast, with a high wind ; 9 and also as

to the practical effect produced on a ship by cross seas and

heavy swells, shifting winds and sudden squalls. 10 Experi-

enced river navigators, who knew both boats, have been

allowed to testify as to what would be the probable effect

on one boat of the waves or swells of another and very large

boat that it would have a tendency to open the seams of

the outriggers, and cause the caulking to fall out, which
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Avould have a tendency to let water in. 11 The opinions of

1 Delaware etc. Steam Towboat Co. v. Starrs, 69 Perm. St. 36, 41.

2 Beckwith v. Sydebotham, 1 Camp. 117; Baird v. Daly, 68 N. Y. 548;

Patchin v. Astor Mutual Ins. Co., 13 N". Y. 268; Western Ins. Co. v,

Tobin, 32 Ohio St. 77, 94. The certificate of a marine surveyor and in-

spector, made in the course of his business, is competent evidence of

seaworthiness at that time, if supported by his oath that he examined the

vessel, and has no doubt that the facts stated in it are true, although he

has no independent recollection of the facts. Perkins v. Augusta Ins,

Co., 10 Gray, 312.

3 Parsons v. Manuf. etc. Ins. Co., 16 Gray. 463. See too, Zugasti v.

Lamer, 12 Moore, P. C. 331, 336.

* Reed v. Dick, 8 Watts (Penn.), 479.

6 Jameson v. Drinkald, 12 Moore, 148; Femvick v. Bell, 1 Car. & Kir.

fore, even more properly within the <:tefinition of expert1'
than men of mere science.'' 1 Their opinions have been
received as to the seaworthiness of vessels; 2 as to what
caused a vessel to leak ; 3 as to the soundness of, a chain
cable; 4 as to the possibility of avoiding a collision by the
use of proper care on the part of the officers and crew of
one of the vessels; 5 as to whether a port could have been
made by skillful management ; 6 as to whether a vessel wasstranded through unskillful and careless managemeJ.t, or
inevitable accident; 7 as to the proper mod~ and tim e of
changing the fastening of boats in a tow; 8 as to whether it
would be safe or prudent for a tugboat, on any wide water 1
to tug three boats abreast, with a high wind; 9 and also as
to the practical effect produced on a ship by cross seas and
heavy swells, shifting winds and sudden squalls. 10 Experi- ·
enced river navigators, who knew both boats , have been
allowed to testify as to what would be the probable effect
on one boat of the waves or swells of another and very large
boat-that it would have a tendency to open the seams of
the outriggers, and cause the caulking to fall out, which
would have a tendency to let water in.11 The opinions of

(47 Eng. C. L. 311,) 312; Carpenter v. Eastern Transportation Co., 71

N. Y. 574.

6 Dolz v. Morris, 17 X. Y. Sup. Ct. 202, 203.

7 New England Glass Co. v. Lovell, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 319, 322.

8 Delaware etc. Steam Towboat Co. v. Starrs. 69 Penn. St. 36, 41,

9 Transportation Line v. Hope, 95 U. S. 297.

10 Walsh v. Washington Marine Ins. Co., 32 X. Y. 427.

".Western Ins. Co. v. Tobin, 32 Ohio St. 77, 97.

D elaware etc. Steam Towboat Co. v. Starrs, 69 Penn. St. 36, 41.
Beckwith v. Sydebotham, 1 Camp.117; Baird v. Daly, 68 ~. Y. 54 1
Patchin v. Astor Mutual Ins. Co., 13 N. Y. 268; Western Ins. Co. v.
'l'obin, 32 Ohio St. 77, 94. '.fhe certificate of a marine s urveyor and inspector, made in the conrs.e of his business, is competent evidence of
Eeaworthiness at that time, if supported by his oath that he examined the
vessel, and has no ~oubt that the facts stated in it are true, although h e·
has no independent recollection of the facts. Perkins v. Augusta Ins-..
Co., 10 Gray, 312.
3 Parsons v. Mannf. etc. Ins. ·co., 16 Gray, 463.
See too, Zugasti Vr
J,,amer, 121\foore, P. C. 331, 336.
4 Reed v. Dick, 8 Watts (Penn .), 479.
6 Jameson v. Drinkald, 121\Ioore, 148; Fenwick v. Bell, 1 Car. & Kir.
(47 Eng. C. L. 311,) 312; Carpenter v. Eastern Transportation Co., 71
N. Y. 574.
6 Dolz v. Morris, 17 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 202, 203.
7
New England Glass Co. v. Lovell, 7 Cush: (Ma-::s.) 319, 322.
8
Delaware etc. Steam Towboat Co. v. Starrs, 69 Penn . .St. 36, 41.
9 Transportation Line v. Hope, 95 U. S. 297.
10
Walsh v. Washington ~farine Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 427.
n. W estfrn In s. Co. v. Tobin, 32 Ohio St. 77, 97 .
1
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nautical experts hfave also been received as to the proper

management of a ship. 1 And experienced navigators who

were acquainted with the nature and extent of obstructions

in the waters navigated, and the dangerous character of

their navigation, have been held competent to express an

opinion as to the probable cause of the loss of a vessel. 2 In

cases of collision, where the question is as to the direction

from which the blow appeared to have come, the opinions

of nautical experts have also been received. 3 In the case

cited, the court say: " It may easily be perceived how an

experienced boatman could judge of the direction of the

body in motion, that displaced a portion of the plank and

timbers of the injured vessel, as a surgeon can tell from

what quarter a blow has been aimed that inflicts a wound

upon the person ; but a mere description of the broken frag-

ments, in the one case, or the lacerated integuments in the

other, will seldom, if ever, enable a jury to say how the

disturbing cause made its approach."

106. Nautical Experts The Subject Continued.

Nautical experts may be permitted to testify as to what is a
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full cargo for a ship to carry with safety, 4 and to express an

opinion as to the effect of a deck load upon the safety of a

vessel. 5 They have been allowed to state that the opening

of the garboard seam in a vessel was due to the working of

the stem. 6 Upon the question of negligence in mooring a

vessel, the ship's keeper has been held competent to testify

as an expert, as to the conditions of the fastenings of the-

vessel as to safety. 7 A shipwright who has examined a de-

cayed vessel may give his opinion, founded on the condition

of the timbers at the time of his examination, whether a

person could have removed a part of the "thick streak"

1 Giiitcrman v. Liverpool etc. Steamship Co., 83 N. Y. 358.

51 Western Ins. Co. v. Tobin, 32 Ohio St. 77, 92.

3 Steamboat v. Logan, IS Ohio. 375. And see Zugas i v. Lamer, 12:

Moore, P. C. 331,33ti..

4 Ogden v. Parsons, 23 How. 1 67.

s Lapham v. Atlas Ins. Co. 24 Pick. (Mass.) 1 .

" Paddock v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. ,104 MUSK. 521 r 529-

7 Moore v. Westervelt. 9 Bos. (N. Y.) 55U.

nautical experts ha ve also been received as to the proper
management of a ship. 1 And experienced navigators who
were acquainted with the nature and extent of obstructions
in the waters navigated, and the dangerous character of
their navigation, have been held competent to express an
opinion as to the probable cause of the loss of a vessel. 2 I n
cases of collision, where the question is as to the direction
from which the blow appeared to have come, the opinion . .
of nauticnl experts have also been received. 3 In the case
cited, the court say: "It may easily be perceived how ·a n
experienced boatman could judge of the direction of the·.
body in motion, that displaced a portion of the plank and.
timbers of the injured vessel, as a surgeon can tell from
what quarter a blow has been aimed that iMlicts a wound
upon the person ; hut a mere description of the broken frag-·
ments , in the one case, or the lacerated integ uments in the
other, will seldom, if ever, enable a jury to say bow thedisturhing cause made its approach."
§ lOG. Nautical Experts -The Subject Continued.Nau ti cal experts may be permitted to testify as to what is a
fu 11 cargo for a ship to carry with safety, 4 a.nd to express an·
opinion as to the effect of a deck load upon the safety of a
vessel. 5 They have been allowed to state that the opening
of the garboard seam in a vessel wa.s due to the working of
the stem. 6 Upon the question of negligence in mooring a
vessel, the ship ' s keeper has been held competent to testify
a:-:; an expert, as to the conditions of the fa stenings of th e·
vessel Hi:-5 to safety .7 A shipwright who has examined a decayed ve:-;scl may give Lis opinion, founded on the condition.
of th e timbers at the time of hi s examination, whether a.
person could have removed a part of the "thick streak "
Gni tcr man v. Liverpool etc. Steamship Co., 83 ~. Y. 358.
In s. Co. v. Tobin , 32 Ohio St. 77 , 92.
3 Stea mboat v. J,ogau, 18 Ohio , 375. Aud see Zng as iv. L amer ,
)C oore, P. C. 381 , 336 ..
~ Ogd e n v. P a r ou s, 23 H ow. 167.
5 Laph am v. Atla s Ins . Co. 24 Pick. (MH s._.) 1.
II P addock v. Common wealth Ins. Co., 104 )fa.:- . ;:;21 r TJ2!L
; )loore v. W estervelt, D Bo . ( N. Y. ) 559..
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some months before, without discovering that the timber

under it was decayed. 1 The opinions of nautical experts

are admissible as to the necessity of a jettison, 2 and upon

the question whether an injured boat was worth repairing. 3

But it has been held that one experienced in raising sunken

boats and repairing them, and who was acquainted with the

boat in question, could not express an opinion as to what

would be the expense of raising and repairing it ; that he

might state the particulars, but the jury should compute

the expense, as it was a matter not lying peculiarly within

the knowledge of experts. 4 On the other hand, one who

had worked in a shipyard, and been the owner of vessels,

has been permitted to testify as to the difference in value

of a vessel as repaired, and what her value would have been,

if repaired according to contract. 5 And an expert in the

wrecking business has been allowed to state whether a

sunken tug, which he had examined, could be raised as a

whole, and to express an opinion as to its value when raised

in comparison with the cost of raising it. 6 Sailing rules

and regulations, prescribed by law, of course, furnish the
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paramount rule of decision upon questions of navigation.

But where in any case, a disputed question of navigation

arises, in regard to which neither the law nor the rules of

the court regulating admiralty practice have made provision,

then the evidence of nautical experts is admissible as to the

general usage in such cases. 7 Experienced navigators and

masters of vessels have been permitted to express an opin-

ion that, a deposit of coin under the ballast, or under the

cargo, was unusual, and increased the hazards and risk of

loss to which the coin was exposed. 8 So one who has fol-

1 Cook v. Castner, 9 Cash. (Mass.) 2(56.

1 Price v. Hartshorn, 44 N. Y. 94.

3 Steamboat v. Logan, 18 Ohio. 375.

4 Paige v. Hazard. 5 Hill (X. Y.) 604.

5 Sikes v. Paine. 10 Ired. (X. C.) Law, 282.

6 Blanchard v. Xew Jersey Steamboat Co., 3 X. Y. Sup. Ct. 771.

7 The City of Washington. 92 U. S. 31.

Leitch v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 66 "N". Y. 100, 106; s. c., 5 Ins. L.

J. 775.

some months before, without discovering that the timber
under it was decayed. 1 The opinions of nautical experts
are admissibfo as to the necessity of a jettison, 2 and upon
the question whether an injured boat was worth repairing. 3
But it has been held that one experi~nced in raising sunken
boats and repairing them, and who was acquainted with the
boat in question, could not express an opinion as to what
would be thQ expense of raising and repairing it; that he
might state the particulars, but the jury should compute
the expense, as it was a matter not lying peculiarly within
the knowledge of experts. 4 On the other hand, one who
had worked in a shipyard, and been the ~wner of vessels,
has been permitted to testify as to the difference iu value
-0f a vessel as repaired, and what her value would have been,
if repaired according to contract/> And an expert in the
wrecking business has been allowed to state whether a
sunken tug, which he had examined, could be raised as a
whole, and to expre'3s an opinion as to its value when raised
in comparison with the cost of raising it. 6 Sailing rules
.and regulu.tions, prescribed by law, of course, furnish the
paramount rule of decision upon questions of navigation.
But where in any case, a disputed question of navigation
:arises, in reg:.trd to which neither the law nor the rules of
the court regula.ting admira.lty practice ha.ve made provision,
then the evidence of nautical experts is admissible as to the
general usage in such ea.ses. 7 Experienced navigators and
masters of vessels have been permitted to express an opinion th:tt, a deposit of coin under the ballast, or under the
cargo, was unusual, and iucreased the hazards and risk of
loss to which the coin was exposed .8 So one wbo has fol1

Cook v. Castner, 9 Cush. ('fass.) 26G.
s Price v. Har(shorn,44 N. Y. 9-1.
3 Steamboat v. Logan, 18 Ohio. 375.
4 Paige v. Hazard. 5 Hill(~. Y.) 604.
5 Sikes v. Paine. 10 Ired. (.N". C.) Law, 282.
11
Blanchard v. New Jersey Sten.mboat Co., 3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 771.
1 The City of Washington. 92 U. S. 31.
11
Leitch v. Atlantic Mutual I us. Co., 66 ~. Y. 100 106; s. c., 5 Ins. L .
.J. 775.
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lowed the sea for forty years has been allowed to express an

opinion as to whether an article was properly stowed on a

boat. 1 "What is a competent crew for the voyage; at

what time such crews should be on board ; what is proper

pilot ground ; what is the course and usage of trade in re-

lation to the master and crew being on board, when the

ship breaks ground for the voyage ; are questions of fact

dependent on nautical testimony." 2

A pilot who knew the place of the disaster, and the pilot

in charge of the boat at the time, have been held competent

to testif v as to whether it was proper to suffer the pilot to

pilot the boat at the time and place of the accident. 3 And

a mate of a steamboat who had been engaged eight or ten

years in navigation, and who saw the collision in question,

has been allowed to testify that the sunken boat was not

carrying a proper light at the time of the accident. 4 But

one who is not an expert is incompetent to express an opin-

ion as to the seaworthiness of a floating dock. 8 Where it

was claimed that the length of the shaft caused a boat to

settle by the stern, and the journals to heat and bind, it
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was held that an expert could be asked whether the boat

settled more than it ought to, or than was usual. 6 In the

same case it was held that an expert could not be allowed

to express an opinion as to the course which the owner of a

steamer ought, as a prudent man, to take as to the laying

up for examination and repairs on discovering defects in

the engine.

107. Railroad Experts. The running and manage-

ment of railroad locomotives and trains is said to be so far

an art, outside of the experience and knowledge of ordinary

jurors, as to render the opinions of persons skilled therein

admissible, such opinions being in the nature of expert

1 Price v. Powell, 3 N. Y. 322.

2 McLanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 1 Peters, 170, 183, per Mr. Justice

Story.

3 Hill v. Sturgeon, 28 Mo. 323.

4 Weaver v. Alabama, etc. Co., 35 Ala. 176.

5 Miircy v. Sun Ins. Co., 11 La. Ann. 748.

6 Clark v. Detroit Locomotive Works, 32 Mich. 348.

(10)

lowed the sea for forty years has been allowed to express an
opinion as to \Vhether an article was properly stowed on a
boat. 1 "vVhat is a competent crew for the voyage; at
what time such crews should be on board; what is proper
pilot ground; what is the course and usage of trade in relation to the master an<l crew being on board, when the
ship bre?-ks ground for the voyage; are questions of fact
dependent on nautical testimony.'' 2
A pilot who knew the place of the disaster, and the pilot
in charge of the boat at the time, have been held competent
to testify as to whether it was proper to suffer the pilot to
pilot the boat at the time and place of the accident. 3 And
a mate of a steamboat who had been engaged eight or ten
years in navigation, and who saw the collision in question,
has been allowed to testify that the sunken boat was not
carrying a proper light at the time of the accident. 4 But
one who is not an expert is incompetent to express an opinion as to the seaworthiness of a floating dock. 5 Where it
was claimed that the length of the shaft caused a boat to
settle by the stern, and the journals to heat and bind, it
was held that an expert could be asked whether the boat
settled more than it ought to, or than was usual. 6 In the
same case it was held that an expert could not be allowed
to express an opinion as to the course which the owner of a
steamer ought, as a prudent man, to take as to the laying
up for examination and repairs on discovering defects in
the engine.
•
§ 107. Railroad Experts.-The running and management of railroad locomotives and trains is said to be so far
an art, outside of the experience and knowledge of ordinary
jurors, as to render the opinions of persons skilled therein
admissible, such opinions being in the nature of expert
1

Price v. Powell, 3 N. Y. 322.
McLanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 1 Peters, 170, 183, per Mr. Justice
Story.
a Hill v. Sturgeon, 2B Mo. 323.
4 Weaver v. Alabama, etc. Co., 35 Ala. 176.
5 ~Iarcy v. Sun Ins. Co., 11 La. Ann. 748.
6 Clark v. Detroit Locomotive Works, 32 Mi<:h. 348.
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testimony. 1 Such witnesses have been permitted to tes-

tify within what distance such a train as that in question

could be stopped with ordinary brakes, on an ascending

grade, running at such a rate that a man could run faster

than the train was going. 2 And it has been held that a per-

son not connected with the management of a train of cars,

but who had been for a long time in positions enabling him

to observe the effect of checking a train, is competent to

express an opinion as to how fast a train should have been

moving at a certain point to be stopped at the usual place. 3

A locomotive engineer can testify as to the speed that is

usual and considered safe in " backing" an engine drawing

a train after dark ; that he can state the effect of an engine

striking an animal, when running backward, and that he

may explain the structure of a locomotive tender. 4 An en-

gineer in charge of a train of cars has been permitted to

express an opinion as to the possibility of avoiding an injury

to animals, struck by the locomotive, the opinion being

given in view of the distance between the animals and the

train, when the former came upon the track. 5 One who
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testified that he had charge of a stationary steam engine,

and who did not claim to be a practical engineer, or a first

class locomotive engineer, but who had fired and handled a

locomotive, and understood an engine, has been held com-

petent to testify as an expert, as to the effect of a, leaky

throttle valve upon the handling and operation of a locomo-

tive. 6

108. Railroad Experts The Subject Continued

A machinist connected many years with railroads has been

held competent to express an opinion as to what threvv a

train of cars from the track. 7 Railroad conductors are

competent to testify as to the means of stopping a train of

1 Bellefontaine, etc. R. R. Co. v. Bailey, 11 Ohio St. 333, 335.

2 Mott v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 8 Bos. (X. Y.) 345.

8 Detroit, etc. R. R. Co. v. Van Steinburgh, 17 Mich. 99.

< Cooper v. Central Railroad of Iowa, 44 Iowa, 140.

5 Bellefontaine, etc. R. R. Co. v. Bailey, 11 Ohio St. 333.

6 lirabbitts v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 38 Wis. 289.

3 beaver v. Boston, etc. R. R. Co. 14 Gray (Mass.) 46G.

testimony .1 Such witnesses have been permitted to testify within what distance such a train as that in question
could be stopped with ordinary brakes, on an a cending
grade, running at such a rate that a man could run fa ter
than the train was going. 2 And it has been held that a person not connected with the management of a train of cars,
but who had been for a long time in positions enabling him
to observe the effect of checking a train, is competent to
express an opinion as to how fast a train should have been
moving at a certain point to be stopped at the usual p1ace. 3
A locomotive engineer can testify as to the speed that is
usual and considered safe in " backing'.' an engine drawing
a. train after dark; that he can state the effect of an engine
striking an animal, when running backward, and that he
may explain the structure of a locomotive tender .4 An engineer in charge of a train of cars has been permitted to
.express an opinion as to the possibility of avoiding an injury
to animals, struek by the locomotive., the opinion being
giv.en in view of the distance between the animals and the
train , when the former came upon the track. 5 One who
tes.tilied that he had charge of a stationary steam engine,
and who did not claim to be a practical engineer, or a :first
dass locomotive engi neer, but who had fired and handled a
locomotive, and understood an engine, bas been held competent to testify as an expert, as to the effect of a)eaky
throttle valve upon the handling and operation of a locomotive.6
·
§ 108. Railroad Ei'J)erts - The Subject Continued-A macllinist connected many years with ra.ilroads has beei;i
hehtl competei1t to express an opinion as to what threw a
tr:t.i.n @f cars from the track. 7 Railroad conductors are
co111petent to testify as to the means
stopping a train of
0

of

1

Bellefontaine. etc. R. R. Co. v. Bailey, 11 Ohio St. 333, 335.
Mott v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 8 Bos. ( N. Y.) 345.
3
D etroit etc. R.R. Co. v. Van Steinburgh, 17 Mich. 99.
4 Cooper v. Ueutral Railroad of Iowa, 44 Iowa, 140.
0 Bellefontaine, etc . .R. R. Co. v. Bailey, 11 Ohio St. 333.
6 .llrabbilts v. Chicago & N. W. R y . Co. , 38 Wi . 2 9.
1 :::lea.1ull· "IV•• .Bost@n., et.c. R.R. Co. 1-1 Gray (.Mas .) 466.
2
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cars. 1 Persons skilled in the running of railroad trains may

147

be asked as experts, upon an assumed state of facts,

whether in the case assumed, the brakemen were in their

proper places, 2 The opinion of a railroad superintendent,

upon a matter within the scope of his employment, " stands

upon the footing of an opinion of an expert." 3 The road

master of a railroad, whose duty it was to receive and in-

spect ties, has been allowed to testify as to the quality of

certain railroad ties. 4

Where the question was whether a rail was defective, or

whether it had been maliciously cut, a newspaper editor,

who had visited the scene of the accident for the purpose of

reporting it, and had testified that during a period of twenty

years he had visited " dozens of railroad accidents," and

had examined them for the purpose of reporting the probable

cause of the accident, was asked to state whether he had

arrived at any conclusion as to the cause of the accident.

The court held that it was no error to exclude his opinion. 5

And where the question was whether a certain accident

would have been avoided provided there had been guard
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chains attached to the cars, the opinion of a railroad con-

ductor was rejected, because, so far as the subject matter

of inquiry was concerned, he " was not an expert, and had

no peculiar knowledge on the subject." 6 So it has been held

that a witness of long railroad experience cannot be allowed

to testify whether the blowing of a steam-whistle was, under

the circumstances of the case, prudent. 7 It has been held

no error to refuse the testimony of switchmen to show that

in their opinion it was not necessary for another switchman

to have been where he was when he received the injury

complained of. The opinions of the witnesses, though ex-

perts, were inadmissible as the subject matter of inquiry did

1 Mobile, etc. R. R. Co. v. Blakeley, 59 Ala. 471.

2 Cincinnati, etc. R. R. Co. Smith, 22 Ohio St. 227.

? Mason, etc.R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 38 Ga. 409..

4 Jeffersonville R. R. Co. v. Lanham, 27 Ind. 171.

5 Hoyt v. Long Island R. R. Co., 57 X. Y. 678.

Bixby v. Montpelier, etc. R. R. Co., 49 Vt. 125.

7 Hill v. Portland etc. R. R. Co., 55 Me. 438.

cars .1 Persons skilled in the running of railroad trains muy
be asked as experts, upon an assumed state of facts,
whether in the ea. e assumed, the brakemen were in their
pm per places. 2 The opinion of a railroad superintendent,
upon a matter within the scope of his employment, " stands
upon the footing of an opinion of an expert.' 1 3 The road
master of a railroad, whose duty it was to receive and inspect ties, has been allowed to testify as to the quality of
certain railroad ties. 4
vYhere the question was whether a rail was defective, or
whether it had been maliciously cut, a newspaper editor,
who had visited the scene of the accident for the purpose of
reporting it, and had testified that during a period of twenty
years he had visited "dozens of railroad accidents," and
had examined them for the purpose of reporting the probable
cause of the accident, was asked to state whether he had
arrived at any conclusion as to the cause of the accident.
The court held that it was no error to exclude his opinion .5
And whei·e the question was whether a certain accident
would have been avoided provided there bad been guard
chains attached to the cars, the opinion of a railroad conductor was rejected, because, so far as the subject matter
of inquiry was concerned, he " was not an expert, and had
no peculiar knowledge on the subject." 6 So it has been held
that a witness of long railroad experience cannot be allowed
to testify whether the blowing of a steam-whistle was, under
the circumstances of the case, prudent. 7 It has been held
no error to refuse the testimony of switchmen to show that
in their opinion it was not necessary for another switchman
to have been where he was when he received the injury
complained of. The opinions of the witnesses, though experts, were inadmissible as the subject matter of inquiry did
• l\Iobile, etc. R.R. Co. v.Blakeley, 59 Ala, 471.
Cincinnati, etc. R. R. Co. Smith, 22 Ohio St. ·227.
~ 1\Iason, etc. R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 38 Ga. 409 ..
4 Jeffersonville R.R. Co. v. Lanham, 27 Ind. 171.
5 Hoyt v. Long I land R.R. Co., 57 N. Y. 578.
6 Bixby v. Montpelier, etc. R.R. Co., 4~ Vt. 125.
7 Hill v. Portland etc. R.R. Co., 55 Me. 438.
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not partake of the nature of a science so as to require a course

of previous habit or study to an attainment of a knowledge

of it. 1 Other instances have been elsewhere given, where

the testimony of railroad experts has been rejected for the

same reason. 2 It has been held that railroad engineers or

constructors are not the only persons competent to give an

opinion as to how the running off of cars on the inside of a

curve, instead of the outside, could be accounted for ; but

that prima facie the question could be answered by any

person acquainted with the elementary principles of mechan-

ism, and experts only in that branch of science. 3 One who

had been the president of two or three city railroads, and

had been engaged for some years in building such roads,

has been allowed to give his opinion as to whether a street

rail had been properly laid. 4

109. Experts in Insurance. There has been a de-

cided conflict of authority, both in this country and in

England, on the right of underwriters, and others skilled in

the business of insurance, to testify as to the materiality of

concealed facts in applications for insurance. So marked
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has been the conflict of authority on this question in Eng-

land, that one of the most eminent of the English writers

on the law of evidence declares that no satisfactory answer

can be given to it.* We believe, however, that the better

rule is to consider the admissibility of such evidence as de-

pendent on the nature of the facts concealed. It is evident

that those facts maybe of such a nature that ordinary jury-

men would be perfectly competent to decide the question of

their materiality, in which case there would be no justifica-

tion for the admission of expert testimony. On the other

hand, the facts may be so special and technical in their na-

ture, especially in questions of marine insurance, that per-

sons without previous experience in the business of insur-

1 Pennsylvania Co. v. Conlan, 101 111. 93.

* See 8, p. 14.

3 Murphy v. New York, etc.R. R. Co., 66 Barb. 125.

4 Carpenter v. Central Park etc. R. II. Co., 11 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 416.

2 Taylor's Evid., 1420.

not partake of the nature of a science so as to require a course
of previous habit or study to an attainment of a knowledge
of it. 1 Other instances have been elsewhere given, where
the testim<my of railroad experts has been rejected for the
same reason .2 It has been held that railroad engineers
or
'--"
.
constructors are not the only persons competent to give an
opinion as to how the running off of cars on the inside of a
curve, instead of the outside, could be accounted for; but
that p1·ima facie the question could be answered by any
person acquainted with the elementary principles of mechanism, and experts only in that branch of science .3 One who
had been the president of two or three city railroads, and
had been engaged for some years in building such roads,
has been allowed to give his opiniqn as to whether a street
rail had been properly laid. 4
§ 109. Experts in Insurance.-There has been a decided conflict of authority, both in this country and in
England, on the right of underwriters, and others skilled in
the business of insurance, to testify as to the matedality of
concealed facts in applications for insurance. So marked
has been the conflict of authority on this question in England, that one of the most eminent of the English writers
on the law of evidence declares that no satisfactory answer
can be given to it.~ \.Ve believe, however, that the better
rule is to consider the admissibility of such evidence as dependent on the nature of the facts concealed. It is evident
that those facts may be of such a nature that ordinary jurymen would he perfectly competent to decide the question of
their materiality' in which case there would be
justi1ication for the admissi?n of expert teEtimony . On the other
hand, the facts may be so special and technical in their nature, especially in questions of marine insurance, that persons without previous experience in the business of insur-

no

1

Pennsylvania Co. v. Conlan, 101 Ill. 93.
See § 8, p. 14.
3 Mnrphy v. 'New York, etc. R.R. Co., 6G Barb. 125.
•Carpenter v. Ce ntral Park ete. R. IL Co., 11 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 41G.
6 2 Taylor's Evic.l., 1420.
2

EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE TRADES AND ARTS.

149

EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE TRADES AND ARTS. 149

ance would be unable, from the very nature of the case, to

arrive at any intelligent conclusion, in which case it seems

that there would exist a necessity for the admission of ex-

pert testimony. 1

As Mr. Justice RANNEY expressed it in a case decided in

Ohio as long ago as 1853: " If the answer can be given

from ordinary experience and knowledge, the jury must re-

spond to it unaided ; if the effects of such a cause are only

known to persons of skill, and are to be determined only by

the application of some principle of science or art, such

persons may give the results of their own investigation and

experience to the jury in the way of opinions, the better to

enable them to come to a correct conclusion." 2

So another distinction may be noted. It is held in Mas-

sachusetts that the testimony of experts, skilled in the busi-

ness of insurance, that it increased the risk to allow a

building to stand unoccupied, is inadmissible, as being a

fact within the common experience and knowledge of men

in general, 3 but that whether such a change in the occupa-

tion was material to the risk may be tested by the question
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whether underwriters generally would charge a higher pre-

mium. 4 "That," says Mr. Justice GRAY, " being a mat-

ter within the peculiar knowledge of persons versed in the

business of insurance, testimony of such persons upon that

point is admissible." 5

And when the testimony of underwriters is received as to

the materiality of facts, the question is not as to the effect

which such facts, if disclosed, would have had on the particu-

lar witness, but on underwriters generally. "I do not allow

you to ask the witness what he himself, as an underwriter,

would have done ; but whether, from his knowledge of the

business, he is able to state that the facts in question would

or would not have an influence with underwriters generally

1 See 5 Am. Law Review, 237; 1 Arnold's Ins. 573; 2 Diier's Ins. 780,

n; 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. 490, n; Hill v. Lafayette Iiis. Co., 2 Mich. 476.

2 Hartford Protection Co. v. Harmer, 2 Ohio St. 452, 457.

3 Mulry v. Mohawk Valley Ins. Co., 5 Gray (Mass.), 545.

4 Merriam v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 21 Pick. (Mass.) 162.

* Luce v. Dorchester Ins. Co., 105 Mass. 297.

ance would be unable, from the very nature of the case, to
arrive at any intelligent conclusion, in which case it seems
that there would exist a necessity for the admission of expert testimony .1
As Mr. Justice RANNEY expressed it in a case decided in
Ohio as long ago as 1853: '' If the answer can be given
from ordinary experience and knowledge, the jury must respond to it unaided; if the effects of such a cause are only
known to persons of skill, and are to be determined only by
the application of some principle of science or art, such
persons may give the results of their own investigation and
experience to the jury in the way of opinions, the better to
enable them to come to a correct conclusion." 2
So another distinction may be noted. It is held in Massachusetts that the testimony of experts, skilled in the business of insurance, that it increased the risk to allow a
building to stand unoccupied, is inadmissible, as being a
fact within the common experience and knowledge of men
in general, 3 but that whether such a change in the occupation was material to the risk may be tested by the question
whether underwriters generally would charge a higher premium.4 "That,"
.. says l\fr. Justice GRAY, "being a matter within the peculiar knowledge of persons versed in the
business of insurance, testimony of such persons upon that
point is admissible." 5
And when the testimony of underwriters is received as to
the materiality of facts, the question is not as to the effect
which such facts, if disclosed, would have had on the particular witness, but on underwriters generally. "I do not allow
you to ask the witness what he himself, as an underwriter,
would have done; but whether, from his knowledge of the
business, he is able to state that the facts in question would
-or would not have an influence with underwriters generally
1

See 5 Am. Law Review, 237; 1 Arnold's Ins. 573; 2 Duer'& Ins. 780,
n; 1 Smith's L ead. Cas. 4DO, n; Hill v. Lafayette Ius. Uo., 2 Mich. 476.
2 Hartford Protection Co. v. Harmer, 2 Ohio St. 452, 457.
3 Mulry v. Mohawk Valley Ins. Co., 5 Gray (~lass.), 545.
4 Merriam v. :Middlesex Ins. Co., 21 Pick. (~lass . ) 162.
J Lnce v. Dorchester Ins. Uo., 105 Mass. :297.
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in determining the amount of the premiums. If his knowl-

edge and skill in this particular business does enable him to

state this, I think it is legal evidence. * * * Here the

inquiry is, in substance, whether the market value price of

insurance is affected by particular facts. If the witness,

being conversant with the business, has gained in the course

of his employment a knowledge of the practical effect of

these facts, or similar facts, upon premiums , he may inform

the jury what it is." l

When the question is as to the materiality of concealed facts

other witnesses than those experienced in insurance may be

competent. For instance, in the case of life insurance, if

the fact concealed were some bodily infirmity, it would cer-

tainly be competent to receive the testimony of medical ex-

perts on the question whether such infirmity was calculated

to shorten the life of the insured. Or in the case of marine

insurance it would be proper to receive the testimony of ex-

perienced mariners or ship carpenters on the question

whether the defect was such as to endanger the safety of

the ship. 2 And it has been laid down that insurance agents
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cannot be called as experts to prove what in their opinion

would or would not be an increase of risk in a building,

merely because they are insurance agents, unless it appears

that in the course of their business they have acquired

special knowledge upon the subject. 3

110. Experts in Insurance The Subject Continued.

We have already stated that there is a conflict of authority

as to the right to receive the testimony of experts in insur-

ance, as to the materiality of concealed facts. However

doubtful the question may be in England, we think the weight

of authority is in favor of the reception of such evidence in

this country, at least, in those cases in which the facts are

a Hawes v. N. E. Ins. Co., 2 Curtis C. C. 229. And see Berthon v.

Loughman, 2 Starkie, 258, per Holroyd, J. ; Hartman v. Keystone Ins.

Co., 21Penn. St. 466.

2 Hartford Protection Co. v. Harmer, 2 Ohio St. 452,457; Leitch v. At-

lantic Mutual Ins. Co., 66 N. Y., 100.

8 Schmidt v. Peoria, etc. Ins. Co., 41 111. 296; s. c.. 5 Benn. Fire Ins.

Cases, 90.
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in determining the alllount of the premiums. I:f his knowledge and skill in this particular business does enable him to
state this, I think it is legal evidence. * * * Here the
inquiry is, in substance, whethe1· the market value price· of
insurance is affected by particular facts. If the witness,
being conversant with the business, has gaitied in the course
of his employment a knowledge of the practical effect of .
these facts, or similar facts, upon preminms, he may inform
the jury what it is." 1
When the question is as to the materiality of concealed facts
other witnesses than those experienced in insurance may be
competent. For instance, in the case of life insurance, if
the fact concealed were some bodily infirmity, it would certainly be competent to receive the testimony of medical experts on the question whether such infirmity was calculated
to shorten the life of the insured. Or in the case of marine
insurance it would be proper to receive the testimony of experienced mariners or ship carpenters on the question
whether the defect was such as to endanger the safety of
the ship. 2 And it has been laid down that insurance agents
cannot be called as experts to prove what in their opinion
would or would not be an increase of risk in a building,
merely because they are insurance agents, unless it appears
that in the course of their business they have acquired
special knowledge upon the subject. 3
§ 110. Experts in Insurance-The Subject Continued.
-We have already stated that there is a conflict uf authority
as to the right to receive the ·testimony of experts in i?surance, as to the materiality of concealed facts. However
doubtful the question may be in England, we think the weight
of authority is in favor of the reception of such evidence in
this country, at least, in those cases in which the facts are
1

Hawes v. N. E. Ins. Co., 2 Curtis O. O. 229. And see :Berthon v.
Loughman, 2 Starkie, 258, per Holroyd, J.; Hartman v. Keystone Ins.
Co., 21 Penn. St. 466.
2
Hartford Protection Co. v. Harmer, 2 Ohio St. 452,457; Leitch v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 66 N. Y., 100.
8 Schmidt v. Peoria, etc. Ins. Co., 41 Ill. 296; s. c.. 5 Reran. Fire Ins.
Oases, 90.
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so technical and special, as not to lie within the comm orb
observation of men in general.
e can do no more than
to refer below to the cases in which the testimony of experts in insurance has been held inadmissible, 1 an<l those in
~hich there has been a contrary ruling. 2 'Ve may observe,.
however, that while in J\fassachusetts 3 and in 1Vfaine 4 experts
are not allowed to testify directly to the fact, whether an
unoccupied building is a more hazardous risk than one occupied, yet such testimony
received in New York 5 and
l\lissouri. 6 Underwriters have been allowed to testify in
New York, that the occupation of premises for certain purposes increased the risk,7 and as to whether a livery stable
is more exposed to conflagration, and a more hazardous:
risk, than a tavern barn. 8 So in Massachusetts, evidence
has been received as to whether the existence of a partition
in a story of a building, increased the risk. 9 I n New

so technical and special, as not to lie within the common

°"'. .

observation of men in general. We can do no more than

to refer below to the cases in which the testimony of ex-

perts in insurance has been held inadmissible, 1 and those in

which there has been a contrary ruling. 2 We may observe,,

however, that while in Massachusetts 3 and in Maine 4 experts

are not allowed to testify directly to the fact, whether an

unoccupied building is a more hazardous risk than one occu-

pied, yet such testimony is received in New York 5 and

Missouri. 6 Underwriters have been allowed to testify in

New York, that the occupation of premises for certain pur-

poses increased the risk, 7 and as to whether a livery stable

is

is more exposed to conflagration, and a more hazardous-

risk, than a tavern barn. 8 So in Massachusetts, evidence-

has been received as to whether the existence of a partition

in a story of a building, increased the risk. 9 In New

1 Carter v. Boehm, 2 Burr. 1905; Durrell v. Bederly, Holt, X. P. Cases',

283; Campbell v. Rickards, 5 Barn. & Ad. 840; Milwaukee etc. R. R.

Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469 ; Hartford Protection Ins. Co. v. Harmer, 2

Ohio St. 452; Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Cotheal, 7 Wend. 72; Hill v. Lafayette
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Ins. Co., 2 Mich. 47G; s. c., 3 Benn. Fire Ins. Cas. 325; Summers v. U.

S. Ins. Co., 13 La. Ann. 504; s. c., 1 Bigelow Ins. Cas. 131.

2 Seaman v. Fonerau, 2 Strange, 1183; Chaurand v. Angerstein, Peake

X. P. C. 61; Hay wood v. Rodgers, 4 East. 590; Littledale v. Dixon, I

Bos. & Pul. 151 ; Rickards v. Murdock, 10 B. & C. 527; Elton v. Larkins,

5 C. & P. 385; Berthon v. Loughman, 2 Starkie, 258; Quinn v. National

etc. Ins. Co., 1 Jones & Carey (Ir.) 316; s. c., 1 Benn. Fire Ins. Cas.

689; Hawes v. X. E. Ins. Co., 2 Curtis, C. C. 229; Moses v. Delaware

Ins. Co., 1 Wash. C. C. 385; Marshall v. Union Ins. Co., 2 Wash. C. C.

357; Luce v. Dorchester Ins. Co., 105 Mass. 297; Daniels v. Hudson

River Fire Ins. Co., 12Cush. (Mass.) 416; Kern v. South St. Louis Mutual

Ins. Co., 40 Mo. 19 ; Cornish v. Farm Buildings Fire Ins. Co., 74 X. Y. 295 ;

Hobby v. Dana, 17 Barb. (X. Y.) Ill ; s. c., 3 Benn. Fire Ins. Cas. 581 ;

M'Lanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 1 Peters, 170, 187; Hartman v. Key-

stone Ins. Co., 21 Penn. St. 466. ,

3 Mulry v. Mohawk Valley Ins. Co., 5 Gray, 545.

* Cannell v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 59 Me. 582; Joyce v. Maine Ins. Co., 45

Me. 168; State v. Watson, 65 Me. 74, 77; Thayer v. Providence Ins. Co.,

70 Me. 539.

s See Cornish v. Farm Buildings Ins. Co., 74 X. Y. 295.

6 Kern v. South St. Louis Mutual Ins. Co., 40 Mo. 19.

7 Appleby v. Astor Fire Ins. Co., 54 X. Y. 253.

8 Hobby v. Dana, 17 Barb. 111.

9 Daniels Y. Hudson River Fire Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 416.

'

1 Carter v. Boehm, 2 Burr. 1905; Durrell v. Bederly, Holt, N. P. Oases',
283; Campbell v. Rickards, 5 Barn. & Ad. 840 ; :Milwaukee etc. R . R ..
Co . v. Kellogg, 94 U . S. 46!:>; Hartford Protection Ins. Co. v . H armer, 2
Ohio St. 452; J efferson Ins. Co. v. Ootheal, 7 Wend . 72; Hill v. Lafayette
In s. Co., 2 Mich . 476 ; s. c., 3 Benn. Fire Ins. Oas. 325; Summers v. U~
S. Ins. Co., 13 La. Ann. 504.; s. c., 1 Bigelow Ins. Oas. 131.
2 Seaman v. Fonerau, 2 Strange, 1183; Chaurand v. Anger~tein, Peake
N. P. C. 61; Haywood v. Rodgers, 4 East. 590; Littledale v. Dixon, 1
Bo . & PuJ. 151; Rickards v. Murdock, 10 B. & O. 527; Elton v. Larkins,.
5 0 . & P. 385; Berthon v. Loughman, 2 Starkie, 258; Quinn v. National
etc . Ins. Co., 1 Jones & Carey (Ir.) 316; s. c., 1 Benn. Fire Ins. Cas.
G89; Hawes v. N . E. Ins. Co., 2 Curtis, C. C. 229; Moses v. Delaware
Ins. Co., 1 Wash . O. C. 385; Marshall v. Union Ins. Co ., 2 Wa sh. O. C.
357; Lnce v. Dorchester Ins. Co ., 105 Mass. 297; Daniels v. Hudgon
River Fire Ins. Co., 12 Cnsh. (Mass.) 416; Kern v. South St. Louis Mutual
Ins. Co ., 40 :Mo. 19; Cornish v. Farm Buildings Fire Ins. Co., 74 N . Y. 295;:
Hobby v. Dana, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 111; s. c., 3 Benn. Fire Ins. Cas. 581 ;
M'Lanahan v. Uniyersal Ins. Co., 1Peters,170, 187; Hartman v . Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Penn. St. 466.
•
s Mulry v. Mohawk Valley Ins. Co., 5 Gray, 545.
• Cannell v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 59 Me. 582 ; J oyce v. Maine Ins. Co., 45
Me. 168; State v. Watson, 65 Me. 74, 77; Thayer v. Providence Ins. Co.,.
70 Me. 539.
o See Cornish v. Farm .Buildings Ins. Co., 74 N . Y. 295.
6 Kern v. South St. Louis Mutual las. Co., 40 Mo. rn·.
1 Appleby v. Astor Fire Ins. Co., 54 N . Y. 253.
s Hobby v. Dana, 17 Barb. 111.
9 D aniels v. Hudson River Fire Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 416.

152

EXPERT TESTIMONY.

152 EXPERT TESTIMONY.

Jersey, it has been held that a witness who was an experi-

enced and practical fireman, could testify, whether in his

opinion, the risk from fire was increased by certain altera-

tions in a building. 1 In Pennsylvania, an insurance com-

pany's clerk has been allowed to testify that a risk would

not be taken at any premium, on the life of one known to

be engaged in a certain occupation. ' 2 In the case last cited,

Mr. Chief Justice BLACK said : " But though the cases con-

flict seriously, I think none of them go so far as to say that

one who knows the practice, not only of the particular office,

but of insurance offices generally, may not give his opinion

of the influence which a given fact would have had as an

element in the contract. Certainly this is the opinion sup-

ported by the strongest authority and the best reasons."

But in New York it has been held improper to prove by

experts, that a person who was in the habitual use of intoxi-

cating liquors, would not be considered an insurable subject. 3

It has been held in the Supreme Court of the United States,

that experts in fire insurance, accustomed to estimating and

calculating the hazard and exposures to fire from one build-
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ing to another, could not testify that, owing to the distance

between an elevator and a mill, and the distance between

an elevator and some lumber piles, the elevator would not

be considered as an exposure to the mill, and would not be

considered in fixing a rate thereon, or in measuring the

hazard of the mill or lumber. 4 In New York, it has been

held that a medical examiner of an insurance company could

not be asked as to what effect certain assumed facts would

have had upon his answer to the propriety of taking the

risk, if he had been advised of them. 5 And in a recent case

in Indiana, it was held that insurance agents, being experts

in the business of insurance, could be asked as to what

1 Schenck v. Mercer Co. Mutual Ins. Co., 24 N". J. Law, 451 ; s.c., 3

Benn. Fire Ins. Gas. 714.

2 Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Penn. St. 466.

3 Kawls v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 282.

4 Milwaukee etc. K. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469. And see State v.

Watson, 65 Me. 74.

6 Higbie v. Guardian Mutual Life las. Co., 53 N. Y. 603.

Jersey, it hBs been held that a witness who was an experienced and practical fireman, could testify, whether in his
opinion, the risk from fire was increased by certain alterations in a building. 1 In Pennsylvania, an insurance company's clerk has been allowed to testify that a risk would
not be taken at any premium, on the life of on~ known to
be engaged in a certain occupation. \I In the case last cited,
Mr. Chief Justice BLACK said: " But though the cases conflict seriously , I think none of them go so far as to say that
one who knows the practice, not only of the particular office,
but of insurance offices generally, may not give bis opinion
of the influence which a given fact would have had as an
element in the contract. Certainly this is the opinion supported by the strongest authority and the best reasons."
But in New York it has been held improper to prove by
experts, that a person who was in the habitual use of intoxicating liquors, would not be considered an insurable subject. 3
It has been held in the Supreme Court of the United States,
that experts in fire insurance, accustomed to estimating and
calculating the hazard and exposures to fire from one building to another, could not testify that, owing to the distance
between an elevator and a mill, and the distance between
an elevator and some lumber piles, the elevator would not
be considered as an exposure to the mill, and would not be
considered in fixing a rate thereon, or in measuring the
hazard of the mill or lumber. 4 In New York, it has been
held that a medical examiner of an insurance company could
not be asked as to what effect certain assumed facts would
have had upon his answer to the propriety of taking the
risk, if he had been advised .of them. 5 And in a recent case
in Indiana, it was held that insurance agents, being experts
in the business of insurance, could be asked as to what
1
Schenck v. Mercer Co . .Uutua.l Ins. Co., 24 N. J. Law, 451; s. c., 3
Benn. Fire Ins. Cas. 714.
2
H artman v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Penn. St. 466.
8 Rawls v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 282.
4
Milwaukee etc. R.R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469. And see State v.
Watson, 65 Me. 74.
6
·
Higbie v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 53 N. Y. 603.
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would be a reasonable time for an insurance agent to hold

an agency for which he paid a consideration, no time having

been fixed at the date of the appointment. 1

111. Gardeners, Farmers and Stock Raisers. A wit-

ness who had used guano on all kinds of garden and field

plants and crops, and who had closely and critically watched

its effects, has been held competent to testify as to the

proper method of using such fertilizers, and as to what

would prevent them from acting beneficially. 2 A gardener

and a farmer, who had attended to and practiced the drain-

ing of lands for the purpose of making them productive,

have been held competent to testify to their opinion as ex-

perts, whether a certain piece of laud, examined by and

known to them, required draining to put it in fit condition for

cropping. 3 The opinion of a gardener has been received as

to the damage done to a garden and nursery by the smoke

from a brick kiln. 4 The opinion of a farmer that a wagon

loaded with hay in a certain manner was not safe to ride

upon over ordinary roads, has been held inadmissible. The

jury were competent to determine the question from the
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facts stated. 6 But the opinions of farmers have been re-

ceived as to how many bushels of corn there would have

been on certain laud on which cattle had trespassed, had

it not been for such trespass. 6 So it has been held that a

farmer could be asked, " taking that hay as it stood then,

what would it yield to the acre? " " A person," said the

court, " conversant with the growth of grass, and accus-

tomed to compare its appearance in different stages of such

growth with its ultimate yield to the acre, may well be said

to have such knowledge of that subject as to make him

competent to testify how much, i his opinion, a given piece

examined by him, will yield per acre. * * * The principle

1 Niagara Ins. Co. v. Greene, 77 Ind. 595.

2 Young v. O'Neal, 57 Ala. 566.

8 Buffiun v. Harris, 5 R. I. 250.

4 Vandine v. Burpee, 13 Met. (Mass.) 288.

5 Bills v. City of Ottawa, 35 Iowa, 109.

6 Sickles v. Gould, 51 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 25; Searaans v. Smith, 46

Barb. (N. Y.) 320; Keith v. Tilford, 12 Neb. 271, 275.

would be a reasonable time for an insurance agent to hold
an agency for which he paid a consideration, no time having
been fixed at the date of the appointment. 1
§ 111. Gardeners, Farmers and Stock Raisers.-A witness who had used guano on all kinds of garden and field
plants and crops, and who had closely and critically watched
its effects, has been held competent to testify as to the
proper method of using such fertilizers, and as to what
would prevent them from acting beneficially .2 A gardener
and a farmer, who had attended to and practiced the draining of lands for the purpose of making them productive,
have been held competent to testify to their opinion ns experts, whether a certain piece of land, examined by and
known to them, required draining to put it in fit condition for
cropping. 3 The opinion of a gardener has been received as
to the damage done to a garden and nursery by the smoke
from a brick kiln. 4 The opinion of a farmer that a wagon
loaded with bay in a certain manner was not safe to ride
upon over ordinary roads, has been held inadmissible. The
jury were competent to determine the question from the
facts stated/' But the opinions of farmers have been re.
" of corn there would have
ce1vetl
as to how many bushels
been on certain laud on which cattle had trespassed, had
it not been for such trespass.6 So it has been held that a
farmer could be asked, '' taking that hay as it stood then,
what would it yield to the acre? " " A person," said the
court, " conversant with the growth of grass, and accustomed to compare its appearance in different stages of such
growth with its ultimate yield to the acre, may well be said
to have such knowledge of that subject as to make him
competent to testify how much, itt his opinion, a given piece
examined by him, vlill yield per acre. * * * The principle
:Niagara Ins. Co. v. Greene, 77 Ind. 595.
Young v. O'Neal, 57 Ala. 566.
Buffum v. Harris, 5 R. I. 250.
4 Vandine v. Burpee, 13 Met. (Mass.) 288.
s Bills v. City of Ottawa, 35 Iowa, 109.
6 Sickles v. Gould, 51 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 25; Seamans v. Smith, 46
Barb. (N. Y.) 320; Keith v. Tilford, 12 Neb. t71, :&75.
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is the same as that on which the opinion of an expert is re-

ceived. The farmer, acquainted with the subject matter of

such an inquiry as this under consideration, is an expert, and

unless the witness has the peculiar knowledge which consti-

tutes him an expert, his opinions would be excluded." l

Farmers and dairymen have been held competent to express-

an opinion as 'to the adulteration of milk. 2 A farmer ex-

perienced in clearing up land has been allowed in New York

to testify whether a fire was set on land at a proper time. 5

But in Vermont the court has held that the opinions of far-

mers who saw the tire set, and testified to its position, and

to the force and direction of the wind, were inadmissible on

the question whether the day on which the fire was set was

a suitable and safe day.* It has been held in Minnesota

that the opinion of a farmer experienced in clearing land

was admissible, where the question was as to how many

feet in width it would be necessary to plow to stop a fire on

stubble land. 5 It has been held in Massachusetts that the

opinion of a farmer was inadmissible on the question

whether there was a liability that a fire set under certain
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circumstances would have spread to adjoining land. 6

One who had experience as an overseer of a plantation,,

for some five or six years, has been held qualified as an ex-

pert to express an opinion that the overseer of another

plantation had "managed pretty well." 7 And one who

had served as overseer of a plantation for sixteen months,

has been held competent, as an expert, to testify as to

the amount of food which was sufficient for a plantation

slave. 8

The opinions of men, engaged in raising stock, and ac-

customed to riding through the same range in quest of

1 Phillips v. Terry, 3 Abb. N. Y. Decis. 607, 609.

2 Lane v. Wilcox, 55 Barb. (X. Y.) 615.

8 Ferguson v. Hubbell, 26 Him (N. Y.), 250.

4 Fraser v. Tupper, 29 Vt. 409.

. * Kipner v. Biebl (Sup. Ct. of Minn.), Alb. L. J., Sept. 3d, 1881.

6 Higgins v. Dewey, 107 Mass. 494.

7 Spivav. Stapleton, 38 Ala. 171.

8 Cheeky. State, 38 Ala. 227.

is the same as that on which the- opinion of an expert is received. The f armer, acquainted with the subject matter of'
such an inquiry as this under consideration , is an expert, and
unless the witness has the peculiar knowledge which constitutes him an- expert, bis opinions would be excluded ." I:
Farmers and dairymen have been held competent to expres
an opinion as ' to the adulteration of milk. 2 A farmer experienced in c:earing up land has been allowed in NE-w York
to testify whether a fire was set on land at a proper time .3
But in Vermont the court has held that the opinions of farmers who saw the fire set, and testified to its position , and
to the force and direction of the wind, were inadmissible on
the question whether the day on which the :fire was set was
a suitable and safe day .4 It has been held in Minnesota
that the opinion of -a f armer experienced in clearing land
was admissible, where the question was as to how many
feet in width it would be necessary to plow to stop a fire on
·stubble land. 5 It has been held in Massachusetts that the·
opinion of a f~rmer was inadmissible on the question
whether there was a liability that a fire set under certain
circumstances would have spread to adjoining land .6
One who had experience,. as an overseeJ; of a plantation,
for some :five or six years, has been held qualified as an ex- .
pert to express an opinion that the overseer of another
plantation had " managed pretty well ." 7 And one who
had served as overseer of ·a plantation for sixteen months ,
has been held competent, as an expert, to testify as to
the amount of food which was sufficient for a plantation
slave .8
The opinions of men, engaged in raising stock, and accustomed. to riding throqgh the same range in quest of
1

Phi11ipsv. Terry, 3 Abb. N . Y . Decis. 607, 609.
Lane v. Wilcox, 55 Barb. (N. Y.) 615.
3
Ferguson v. Hubbell, 26 Hnn (N. Y .) , 250.
4 Fraser v. Tupper, 29 Vt. 409 .
• b Kipner v. Biebl (Sup. Ct. of Minn.), Alb . L . J ., Sept. 3d, 1881.
6 Higgins v. Dewey, 107 Mass. 494.
7 Spiva v. Stapleton, 38 Ala. 171.
8 Cheekv. State, 38 Ala. 227.
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stock, have been received as to the number of stock of a

particular brand running in the range. 1 And in a recent

case in Texas it was held that an expert could testify as to-

the topography of the country, the number of cattle fre-

quenting it, and whether they were wild or gentle, but that

he could not testify as to the length of time which would be

required to gather a certain number of citttle within the

limits of a given range. 2 The opinions of experienced

graziers have been received as to the condition of cattle ,

and as to the causes which affect their health and weight. 3

Persons experienced in weighing cattle are permitted to ex-

press an opinion as to the weight of cattle. 4 A stock raiser

has been allowed to testify as to the damage done to cattle

by falling through a wharf. 5 And a shepherd will be per-

mitted to give an opinion as to the age of a sheep, judging

from its teeth, 6 and so in respect to the age of a horse, or

other animal, experienced persons will be permitted to ex-

press an opinion as to his age, from an examination of his

mouth and the observation of other signs. 7

112. Millers and Millwrights. Persons who have for
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many years been engaged in building and carrying on mills

are qualified as experts, and entitled to give an opinion

touching matters connected with their experience. 8 The

opinions of millers and millwrights have been received as to

the quantity of grain a certain mill was capable of grinding,

as to the value of the water for milling purposes, and as

to the accuracy of the method of weighing and measuring

adopted in the mill. 9 A practical and professional mill-

wright, who had taken the levels of the water and the

1 Albright v. Corley, 40 Texas, 105.

2 Tyler v. State, 11 Texas Ct. of App. 388.

3 Baltimore, etc. R. R. Co. v. Thompson, 10 Md. 76.

McCormick v. Hamilton, 23 Gratt. (Va.) 561 ; Carpenter v. Wait, 11

Gush. (Mass.) 257.

5 Polk v. Coffin, 9 Gal. 56.

6 Clague v. Hodgson, 16 Minn. 329.

7 See Moreland v. Mitchell County, 40 Iowa, 401.

8 Hammond v. Woodman, 41 Me. 177.

9 Read v. Barker, 30 X. J. Law, 378; s. c., 32 ib. 477.

stock, have been received as to the number of stock of a
particular brand running in the range. 1 And in a recent
case in Texas it was held that an expert could testify as tothe topography of the country, the number of cattle frequenting it, and whether they were wild or gentle, but that
he could not testify as to the length of time which would be
required to gather a certain number of cattle within the
limits of a given range. 2 The opinions of experienced
graziers have been received as to the condition of cattle,.
and as to the causes which affect their health and weight. 3
Persons experienced in weighing cattle are permitted to express an opinion as to the weight of cattle. 4 A stock raiser
bas been allowed to testify as to the damage done to cattle
by falling through a wharf .5 And a shepherd will be permitted to give an opinion as to the age of a sheep, judging
from its teeth, 6 and so in respect to the age of a horse, 01·
other animal, experienced persons will be permitted to express an opinion as to his age, from an examination of his
mouth and the observation of other signs .7
§ 112. l\lillers and Millwrights.- Persons who have for
many years been engaged in building and carrying on mills
are qualified as experts, and entitled to give an opinion
touching matters connected with their experience. 8 The
opinions of millers and millwrights have been received as to
the quantity of grain a certain mill was capable of grinding,
as to the value of the water for milling purposes, and as
to the accuracy of the method of weighing and measuring
adopted in the mill. 9 A practical and professional millwright, who had taken the levels of the water and the
Albright v. Corley, 40 Texas, 105.
Tyler v. State, 11 Texas Ct. of App. 388.·
3
.
Baltimore, etc. R.R. Co. v. Thompson, 10 Md. 76.
• McConnick v. Hamilton, 23 Gratt. (Va.) 561; Carpenter v. Wait, 11
Cush. (Mas . ) 257.
5 Polk v . Coffin, 9 Cal. 56.
G Clague v. Hodgson, 16 Minn. 329.
1 See Moreland v. l\Iitchell County, 40 Iowa, 401.
s Hammond v. ·w oodman, 41 Me. 177.
9 R ead v. Barker, 30 .N. J. Law, 378; s. c., 32 ib. 477.
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water-wheel, has been permitted to testify that if the mill

dam was a foot lower than it was, it would be impossible

for the mill to grind in a proper manner. 1 Upon an issue

as to the fitness of a shoal for a mill site, the opinions of

millwrights have been received. 2 But it has been held

that a witness may testify to the existence of a mill site

without being an expert. 3 Where the identity of wheat was

material, a miller and grower of wheat who was familiar

with the different varieties, was permitted to testify that

when his wheat was cut early it had a peculiar smell ; that

the wheat stolen had been cut early ; that the grain found

in the possession of the defendant had the same odor as

that in the hogshead from which the grain had been stolen ;

and therefore that his opinion was that the wheat alleged to

have been stolen was pirt of the wheat originally in his pos-

session. 4 But where the question related to the freezing up

of a mill, the court excluded the opinion of a millwright

and a tender of mills, who had an experience of fourteen

years, that a mill dam on one side of the river being some

twenty rods further up the stream than the dam upon the
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other side, would " make it bad as regards anchor ice,"

and " that the dams being situated as they are, the anchor

ice would naturally fall into the dead or still water." The

court thought that it did not appear that his calling gave

him means not ordinarily possessed by other persons of

forming the opinion expressed. 5 Where the question was as

to the skillfulness of work done on a mill, it was held that

the opinion of a millwright was admissible, but not that of

a miller. 6 And in an action for the rent of a mill, under a

lease which provided that the lessor should put the mill in

good running order, it was held competent to inquire of a

millwright whether certain additions and repairs were neces-

1 Detweiler v. Groff, 10 Penn. St. 376.

2 Haas v. Choussard, 17 Texas, 592.

3 Claggett v. Easterday, 42 Md. 617.

* Wa.ker v. State, 58 Ala. 393.

5 Woods v. Allen, 18 1ST. H. 28.

Walker v. Fields, 28 Ga. 237.

water-wheel, has been permitted to testify that if the mill
dam was a foot lower than it was, it would be impossible
for the mill to grind in a proper manner. 1 Upon an issue
as to the fitness of a shoal for a mill site, the opinions of
millwrights have been received. 2 But it has been held
that a witness may testify to the existence of a mill site
without being an expert. 3 Where the identity of wheat was
material, a miller and grower of wheat who was familiar
with the different varieties, was permitted to testify that
when his wheat was cut early it had a peculiar smell; that
the wheat stolen had been cut early; that the grain found
in the possession of the defendant had the same odor as
that in the hogshead from which the gr:.iin had been stolen;
.and therefore that his opinion was that the wheat alleged to
have been stolen was pl.rt of the wheat origina11y in his possession.4 But where the question related to the freezing up
of a mill, the court excluded the opinion of a millwright
.and a tender of mills, who had an experience ot fourteen
years, that a mill dam on one side of the river being some
twenty rods further up the stream than the dam upon the
other side, would " make it bad as regards anchor ice,"
and "that the dams being situated as they are, the anchor
ice would naturally fall into the dead or still water.'' The
court thought that it did not appear that his calling gave
him means not ordinarily possessed by other persons of
forming the opinion expressed. 5 "'\Vhere the question was as
to the skillfulness of work done on a mill, it was held that
the opinion of a mill wright was admissible, but not that of
a miller. 6 And in an action for the rent of a mill, under a
lease which provided that the lessor should put the mill in
good running order, it was held competent to inquire of a
mill wright whether certain additions and repairs were neces1

Detweiler v. Groff, 10 Penn. St. 376.
Haas v. Chonssard, 17 Texas, 592.
3 Claggett v. Easterday, 42 Md. 617.
4 Wa1ker v. State, 58 Ala. 393.
ll Woods v. Allen, 18 N. II. 28 .
.i Walker v. Fields, 28 Ga. 237.
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sary to put the mill in such condition. 1 One who for a

number of years had been the owner of mills has been per-

mitted to give his opinion as to the capacity of a person as a

millwright. 2

113. Surveyors and Civil Engineers. A surveyor,

who is familiar with the peculiar marks used by the govern-

ment surveyors in their public surveys, may give his opin-

ion as an expert whether a particular line was marked by

them . 3 The opinion of a practical surveyor has been re-

ceived as to whether certain piles of stones, and marks on

trees were monuments of boundary. 4 And in a contest as

to the true location of lines between adjacent lot owners, a

practical surveyor, who has made an actual survey and plat

of the lots, has been allowed to testify as to the correctness

of the plat, and to state the result of his survey as to the

location of the lines, and of the buildings and fences on the

lots with reference to such lines. 8 Upon a question as to

the boundary line between two counties, which had never

been officially located, 6 it has been held that while the

opinion of a surveyor was competent evidence to show that
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certain marks on a tree, claimed as a corner, were corner or

line marks, yet it could not be received for the purpose of

showing that the tree was the corner of a particular grant. 7

While in an early case it was held that the opinion of a sur-

veyor was admissible as to a mistake in a survey, 8 and

where he would locate a warrant similar to that under

which a person held, 9 yet the rule is that the opinion of a

surveyor is not evidence as to the construction to be given

to a survey ; 10 that he cannot be permitted to give his

1 Taylor v. The French Lumbering Co., 47 Iowa, 662; Cooke v. Eng-

land, 27 Mil. 14.

2 Doster v. Brown, 25 Ga. 24.

8 Brantly v. Swift, 24 Ala. 390.

Davis v. Mason, 4 Pick. 156; Knox v. Clark, 123 Mass. 216.

Messer v. Reginnitter, 32 Iowa, 312.

6 Kinlcy v. Crane, 34 Penn. St. 146.

7 Clegg v. Fields, 7 Jones (X. C.) Law, 37.

8 Forbes v. Caruthers, 3 Yeates, 527.

9 Fiirr v. Swan, 2 Penn. St. 245.

10 Ormsby v. Ihinsen, 34 Penn. St. 462.

sary to put the mill in such condition. 1 One who for a
number of years had been the owner of mills has been permitted to give his opinion as to the capacity of a person as a
millwright. 2
§ 110. Surveyors and Civil Engineers.-A surveyor,
who is familiar with the peculiar marks used by the government surveyors in their public surveys, may give bis opinion as an expert whether a particular line was marked by
them .3 The opinion of a practical surveyor bas been received as to whether certain piles of stones, and marks on
trees were monuments of boundary. 4 And in a contest as
to the true location of lines between adjacent lot owners, a
practical surveyor, who has made an actual survey and plat
of the lots , has been allowed to testify as to the correctness
of the plat, and to state the result of his survey as to the
location of the lines, and of the buildings and fences on the
lots with reference to such lines./} Upon a question as to
the boundary line between two counties, which had never
been officially located, 6 it has been held that while the
opinion of a surveyor was competent evidence to show that
certain marks on a tree, claimed as a corner, were corner or
line marks, yet it could not be received for the purpose of
showing that the tree \Vas the corner of a particular grant. 7
vVhile in an early case it was held that the 9pinion of a surveyor was admissible as to a mistake in a survey, 8 and
where he would locate a warrant similar to that under
which a person held, 9 yet the rule is that the opinion of a
surveyor is not evidence as 'to the construction to be given
to a survey; 10 that he cannot be permitted to give his
1 T aylor v. The French Lumbering Co., 47 Iowa, 662; Cooke v. England, 27 Md. U.
2 Doster v. Brown, 25 Ga. 24.
s Brantly v. Swift, 24 Ala. 390.
•Davis v. Mason, 4 Pick. 156; Knox v. Clark, 123 Mass. 216.
')lesser v. Reginnitter, 32 Iowa, 312.
6 Kinley v. Crane, 34 P enn. St. 146.
7 Clegg v. Fields, 7 Jones (N. C.) Law, 37.
8 Forbes v. Caruthers, 3 Yeates, 527.
9 Farr v. Swan, 2 Penn. St. 245.
10 Orm:.'by v. l hm .~en, 3-! P enn . St. 4G2.
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opinion as to what are the controlling calls of a deed, 1 the

proper location of a grant. 2 The title to property claimed

under a recorded plat cannot be unsettled by the testimony

of a surveyor who has scaled the plat, that the scale is in-

correct. 3 Nor is the opinion of an examiner of titles ad-

missible to fix the location in case of conflicting and doubt-

ful lines. 4 " Experts cannot be called to give their opinions

on a subject of this character. Witnesses are competent to

show lines and measurements, but the construction of writ-

ten instruments is for the court alone." 5 It has been held

that one who had been occasionally employed as a surveyor

in laying out and grading, but not in constructing highways

was not competent to testify as an expert as to the safety

of a highway. 6

114. Surveyors and Civil Engineers The Subject

Continued. The opinion of civil engineers, experienced in

the construction of bridges, has been received as to the

strength of construction and safety of a bridge. 7 And a

civil engineer, experienced in judging of the soundness of

timbers in bridges, has been allowed to express an opinion
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.as to whether one of the sleepers in a bridge had rotted re-

cently, or whether the decay was of some length of time. 8

A civil engineer and surveyor, who had made a survey and

map of the land in question has been allowed to testify

'how much ground would be overflowed at a given height of

water. 9 Such witnesses have also been permitted to state

the rules for the construction of cuts and embankments. 10

While in a controversy as to what constituted an approach

1 Whittlesey v. Kellogg, 28 Mo. 404.

2 Schultz v. Lindell, 30 Mo. 310; Blumenthal v. Roll. 24 Mo. 113; Ran-

dolph v. Adams, 2 W. Va. 519.

3 Twogood v. Hoyt, 42 Mich. 609.

4 Public Schools v. Risley's Heirs, 40 Mo. 356.

5 Normentv. Fastnaght, 1 McArthur, 515.

* Lincoln v. Inhabitants of Barre, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 590.

7 Hart v. Hudson River Bridge Co., 84 N. Y. 56, 60.

8 City of Indianapolis v. Scott, 72 Ind. 196, 203.

9 Phillips v. Terry, 3 Abb. N. Y. Decis. 607.

10 Central R. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 63 Ga. 173; s. c., 1 Am. & Eiig. R. R.

'Cases, 145.

'°pinion as to what are the controlling calls of a deed,1 the
proper location of a grant. 2 The title to property claimed
1Under a recorded plat cannot be unsettled by the testimony
<0f a surveyor who has scaled the plat, that the scale is in.correct. 3 Nor is the opinion of an examiner of titles admissible to fix the location in case of conflicting and doubtful lines. 4 "Experts cannot be called to give their opinion.s
-on a subject of this character. Witnesses are competent to
show lines and measurements, but the construction of written instruments is for the court alone.'' 6 It has been held
that one who had been occasionally employed as a surveyor
un laying out and grading, hut not in coustr~cting highways
was not competent to testify as an expert as to the safety
-0f a highway. 6
§ 114. Surveyors and. Civil Engineers - The Subject
Continued.-The opinion of civil engineers, experienced in
the construction of bridges, has been received as to the
strength of construction and safety of a bridge. 7 And a.
·civil engine.er, experienced in judging of the soundness of .
timbers in bridges, has been allowed to ~xpress an opinion
:as to whether one of the sleepers in a bridge had rotted re·cently, or wh_e ther the· decay was of some length of time. 8
A civil engineer and surveyor, who had made a survey and
•map of the land in question has been allowed to testify
ihow much ground would be overflowed at a gi'!en height of
·water. 9 Such witnesses have also been permitted to state
the rules for the Construction Of CUtS and embankments.IO
'"\Yhile in a controversy as to what constituted an approach
Whittlesey v. Kellogg, 28 Mo. 40-1.
Schultz v. Lindell, 30 Mo. 310; Blumenthal v. Roll, 2:1 Mo. 113; Ran-dolph v. Adams, 2 W. Va. 519.
s Twogood v. Hoyt, 42 Mich. 609.
4 Public Schools v. Risley's Heirs, 40 Mo. 856.
5 :Norment v. Fastnaght, 1 McArthur, 515.
11 Lincoln v. Inhabitants of Barre, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 590.
7
Hart v. Hudson River Bridge Uo., 8-1: N. Y. 56, 60.
8 City of Indianapolis v. Scott, 72 Ind. 196, 203.
9 Phillips v. Terry, 3 Abb. N. Y. Decis. 607.
1
Central R.R. Co. v. Mitchell, 63 Ga. 173; s. c., 1 Am. & Eng. R.R.
~oases, U;>.
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to a railroad bridge, where the land adjoining the river

bank was low and often overflowed, and the track was, in

consequence, elevated and rip-rapped, and as to whether

such rip-raps and dikes constituted such an approach, the

opinions of experienced engineers have been admissible. 1

So engineers have been permitted to testify, judging from

the situation of the banks, the course of the winds and

tides, and the shifting of the sand, that a certain bank was

not the occasion of a harbor's choking and filling up by

stopping the back water. 2 And engineers who had taken

the comparative levels of a fountain of water, and of cer-

tain agricultural drains in the same lot, and who had exam-

ined the intervening subsoil, .have been allowed to express

iin opinion that the drains did not lessen the quantity of

water in the fountain. 3 An engineer and landscape gar-

dener has been permitted to express an opinion as to what

certain laud was suitable for. 4 The opinion of an expert

has been held admissible as to the liability of a city to inun-

dation, as well as to the injury to a harbor by the removal

of the sand along the shore. 5 But a civil engineer is not
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necessarily an expert as to the construction of a highway. 6

It is well known that the declarations of persons, since de-

ceased, are received in evidence as to the boundaries of

lands, where from their situation they had the means of

knowing where the boundaries were. In a case in New

Hampshire it was sought to extend the principle to the

declarations made by a surveyor since deceased. But the

court held that the principles on which such evidence was

admitted would not comprehend the declarations of a de-

ceased expert. It was not necessary that such declarations

should be received, inasmuch as other experts could be

1 Union Pacific R. E. Co. v. Clopper, U. S. Sup. Ct., 1880; s, c. 2 Am.

& Eng. K. K. Cases, 649.

2 Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Douglas (26 Eng. C. L. 63) , 157. See also Grigsby

\. Clear Lake Water Works Co., 40 Cal. 396.

3 Bnffuni v. Harris, 5 li. I. 250.

4 Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct, 125 Mass. 544, 551.

5 Clasou v. City of Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316.

6 Benedict v. City of Fond du Lac, 44 Wis. 495.

to a railroad bridge, where the land adjoining the river
bank was low and often overflowed, and the track was, in
<:!onsequence, elevated and rip-rapped, and as to whether
:such rip-raps and dikes constituted such an approach, the
.opinions of experienced engineers have been admil:lsible .1
.So engineers have been perrnitted to testify, judging from
the situation of the banks, the course of the wind5 and
tides , and the shifting of the sand, that a certain bank was
i10t the occasion of a harbor's choking and filling up by
stopping the hack wuter. 2 And enginecr.:3 who had taken
the comparative levels of a fountain of water, and of certain agricultural drains in the same lot, and who had examiined the intervening subsoil,. have been allowed to express
;an opinion that the drains did not lessen the quantity of
water in the fountaiu. 3 An engineer and landscape gardener has been permitted to express an opinion as to what
-certa in land was suitable for. 4 The opinion of an expert
bas been held admissible as to the liability of a city to inundation, as well as to the injury to a harbor by the removal
·Of the sand along the shore .5 But a civil engineer is not
necessarily an expert as to the construction of a highway .6
It is well known that the declarations of persons, since deceased, are received in evidence a to the boundaries of
lands, where from their situation they had the means of
knowing where the boundaries were. In a case in New
Hampshire it was sought to extend the principle to the
declarations made by a surveyor since deceased. But the
.court held that the principles on which such evidence was
admitted would not comprehend the declarations of a _d eceased expert. It was not necessary that such declarations
should be received, inasmuch as other experts could be
1

Union Paeifie R.R. Co. v. Clopper, U.S. Sup . Ct., 1880; s. c. 2 Am •

.& Eng. H. R. Cases, 649.
2

"I/.

Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Douglas (26 Eng. C. L. 63), 157. See also Grigsby
Clear Lake Water "\Yorks Co., 40 Cal. 396.
a Buffum v. Harris, 5 R. I. 250.
4 Chandler v. Jamaica Pond .Aqueduct, 125 Mass. 54.4, 551.
5 Clason v. City of :\lilwaukee, 30 Wis. 316.
6 Benedict v. City of Fond du Lac, 44 Wis. 495.
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called, whose testimony would be equally valuable. 1 The

opinion that the surveyor had expressed was that a certain

tree was not an original monument, because the marks on it

were not old enough.

115. Machinists. A machinist is competent to give

an opinion as an expert, in relation to the construction of

machinery. 2 The evidence of such experts has been received

to show that a machine was not constructed in a workman-

like manner. 3 So where the question involved related to

the merits of various machines, as whether one machine

was equal in all respects to another machine of different

make, persons having superior knowledge and experience

with such machines have been permitted to express an opin-

ion as to whether a certain cotton gin was equal in all re-

spects to the best saw gin then in use. 4 And a witness who

had knowledge of the mechanism and working of knitting

machines, and who was familiar with the operation of a

needle called the latch needle, but who had no experience in

the use of the spring needle, and did not know of its opera-

tion, has been permitted to show the facility and perfection
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of operation of the latch needle to the jury, to testify to its

merits, and to express an opinion that its use could not be

superseded by the spring needle, giving his reasons there-

for. 5 It is not necessary in all cases that the witness should

be a machinist by trade ; if he has had practical experience

in operating a particular machine, or machines of a similar

character, he is competent to express an opinion as to the

kind of work such machine can perform. 6 Where the ques-

tion was as to the proper mode of testing the strength of

leathern fire hose, a manufacturer of steam gauges, who had

repeatedly tested hose, was held competent to express an

opinion, and to state what constituted " a fair and satisfac-

1 Wallace v. Goodall, 18 N. H. 439, 453.

2 Sheldon v. Booth, 50 Iowa, 209.

8 Curtis v. Gano, 26 N. Y. 426.

4 Scattergood v. Wood, 79 N. Y. 263.

5 James v. Hodsdea, 47 Vt. 127.

6 Sheldon v. Booth, 50 Iowa, 209.

called, whose testimony would be equally valuable. 1 The
opinion that the surveyor had expressed was that a certain
tree was not an original monument, because the marks on it
were not old enough.
§ 115. Machinists.-A machinist is competent to give
au opinion as an expert, in relation to the construction of
machinery. 2 The evidence of such experts has been received
to show that a machine was not constructed in a workmanlike manner. 3 So where the question involved related to
the merits of various machines, as whether one machine
was equal in all respects to another machine of different
make, persons having superior knowledge an<l experience
with such machines have been permitted to express an opinion - as to whether a certain cotton gin was equal in all respects to the best saw gin then in use. 4 And a witness who
ha<l knowledge of the mechanism and working of knitting
machines, and who was familiar with the operation of a
needle called the latch needle, but who had no experience in
the use of the spring needle, and did not know of its opera-·
tion, has been permitted to show the facility and perfection
of operation of the latch needle to the jury, to testify to its
merits, and to express an opinion that its use could not be
superseded by the spring needle, giving his reasons therefor .5 It is not necessary in all cases that the witness should
be a machinist by trade; if he bas had practical experience
in operating a particular machine, or machines of a similar
character, he is competent to express an opinion as to the
kind of work such machine can perform. 6 Where the question was as to the proper mode of testing the strength of
leathern fire hose, a manufacturer of ste~m gauges, who had
repeatedly tested hose, was held competent to express an
opinion, and to state what constituted " a fair and satisfacWallace v. Goodall, 18 N. H. 439, 453.
Sheldon v. Booth, 50 Iowa, 209.
s Curtis v. Gano, 26 N. Y. 426.
4 Scattergood v. Wood, 79 N. Y. 263.
s James v. HodsdeH, 47 Vt. 127.
6 Sheldon v. Booth, 50 Iowa, 209.
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tory test," such as was provided for by the contract. 1 And

where an issue involved the question of how much work a

machine could do, a person acquainted with the machine

and its construction was allowed to express an opinion. 2

One employed in a railroad machine shop as a master

mechanic, has been permitted to express an opinion that a

certain spark-arrester was the best known. 3 So machinists

and brass finishers of large experience have been allowed to

state, that from common observation and without close in-

spection, it could not be told whether certain brass couplings

were perfect or imperfect, and whether they were of any

use for the purpose for which they were intended. 4

116. Mechanics, Masons and Master Builders. A

mechanic has been permitted to testify as to the injury done

to a house by defects in the construction of the cellar under

it. 5 So where a contract for the construction of a building

stipulated that it should have a wood cornice with brackets,

but failed to specify whether the cornice should be placed

on the wall above the upper joist or below that point, or

what width of cornice or length of bracket there should be,
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it was held competent to admit the testimony of house

builders and mechanics as to these matters, and to show by

them, that in order to properly place a cornice of a proper

width on the building according to contract, it was necessary

that the walls should have been built up to the point they

were built to, and for which the contractor and builder

claimed extra compensation. 6 And in an action for labor

and materials in erecting a house, the testimony of master

builders who had examined the building and made an esti-

mate of the cost, has been held admissible for the purpose

of ascertaining the amount of the damages. 7 The testimony

of practical mechanics, who show themselves fully acquainted

1 Chicago v. Gr*er, 9 Wallace, 726, 733.

2 Burns v. Welch, 8 Yerger, (Term.) 117.

3 Great Western R. R. Co. v. Haworth, 39 HI. 349.

4 Jupitz v. People, 34 111. 516, 521.

8 Moulton v. McOwen, 103 Mass. 587.

6 Haver v. Tenney, 36 Iowa. 80.

7 Tebbetts v. Haskins. 16 Me. 283.

tory test," such as was provided for by the contract. 1 And
where an issue involved the question of how much work a
machine could do, a person acquainted with the machine
and its construction was allowed to express an opinion. 2
One employed in a railroad machine shop as a master
mechanic, has been permitted to express an opinion that a
certain spark-arrester was the best known. 3 So machinists
and brass finishers of large experience have been allowed to
state, that from common observation and without close inspection, it could not be told whether certain brass couplings
were perfect or imperfect, and whether they were of any
use for the purpose for which they were intended. 4
§ 116. Mechanics, :Masons and Master Builders. -A
mechanic has been permitted to testify as to the injury done
to a house by defects in the construction of the cellar under
it/' So where a contract for the construction of a building
stipulated that it should have a wood cornice with brackets,
but failed to specify whether the cornice should, be placed
on the wall above the upper joist or below that point, or
what width of cornice or length of bracket there should be,
it was held competent to admit the testimony of house
builders and mechanics as to these matters, and to show by
them, that in order to properly place a cornice of a proper
width on the building according to contract, it·was necessary
that the walls should have been built up to the point they
were b.uilt to, and for which the contractor and builder
claimed extra compensation. 6 And in an action for labor
and materials in erecting a house, the testimony of master
builders who had examined the building and made an estimate of the cost, has been held admissible for the purpose
of ascertaining the amount of the damages. 7 The testimony
of practical mechanics, who show themselves fully acquainted
Chicago v. GrPer, l) Wallace, 726, 733.
Burns v. Welch, 8 Yerger, (Tenn.) 117.
3 Great Western R. R. Co. v . llaworth, 39 Ill. 349.
4 Jupitz v . People, 3-± Ill. 516, 521.
& Moulton v . .McOwen, 103 Mass. 587.
6 Haver v. 'l'enney, 36 Iowa, 0.
1 Tebbetts v. Haskins, 16 l\I e . 283.
(11)
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with the custom as to measuring, have been allowed to

testify as to the measurement of masonry, 1 and as to the

proper mode of measuring the angles of an octagonal cellar. 2

And a practical brick mason, who had aided in the construc-

tion of the plaintiff's wall, was allowed to express an

opinion as an expert, as to whether the quantity of rain

which fell on the premises within the wall was sufficient to

wash it down. 3 So the opinions of masons have been re-

ceived as to the length of time required to dry the walls of

a house so as to make it fit for habitation. 4 But it has been

held that the effect of water in disintegrating the mortar of

a wall is not a matter of science, and that other persons than

masons, who have had an occasion to observe it, are com-

petent to express an opinion concerning it. 5 The opinion of

one having a long and thorough acquaintance with the con-

struction of berths on steamboats, has been received as to

whether the berths on a certain steamboat were constructed

in the manner usual upon the best boats built at the time of

its construction. 6 When an application for insurance con-

tained a warranty that the buildings insured were brick, and
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in an action on the warranty it was contended that the

buildings were partly brick and partly wood, it was held

that an experienced builder might be asked whether such

buildings would be properly denominated "brick" build-

ings. 7 Builders and contractors have been held equally com-

petent with architects, to .show that the employment of an

architect to make plans and designs for a building, carried

with it an employment to superintend its construction. 8

117. Experts in Patent, Trade Mark and Copyright

Cases. It has been laid down that in actions for the in-

1 Shulte v. Heunessy, 40 Iowa, 352.

2 Ford v. Tirrell, 9 Gray (Mass.), 401.

3 Montgomery v. Gilmer. 33 Ala. 116.

4 Smith v. Gngerty, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 619.

6 Underwood v. Waldron, 33 Mich. 232.

6 Tinney v, New Jersey Steamboat Co., 12 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 1.

7 Mead v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 3 Selden (N. Y.) 530; s. c.,3Benuett

Fire Ins. Cas. 483.

8 Wilson v. Bauman, 80 111. 4f 3.

with the custom as to measuring, have been allowed to
testify as to the . measurement of masonry ,1 and as to the
proper mode of measuring the angles of an octagonal cellar. 2
~nd a practical brick mason, who had aided in the construction of the plaintiff's wall, wa'3 allowed to express an
opinion as an expert, as to whether the quantity of rain
which fell on the premises within the wall was sufficient to ·
wash it down. 3 So the opinions of masons have been received as to the length of time require·d to dry the walls of
a h<mse so as to make it fit for habitation. 4 But it has been
held that the effect of water in disintegrating the mortar _o f
a wall is not a matter of science, and that other persons than
masons, who have had an occasion to observe it, are competent to express an opinion concerning it/> The opinion of
one having a long and thorou.g h acquaintance with the construction of be~ths on steamboats, has been received as to
whether the berths on a certain steamboat were constructed
in the manner usual upon the best boats built at the time of
its construction. 6 'Vhen an application for insurance contained a warranty that the buildings insured were brick, and
in an action on the warranty it was contended : that the
buildings were partly brick and partly wood, it was held
that an exper~enced builder might be asked whether such
buildings would be properly denominated ',· brick'' buildings.7 Builders and contractors have been held equally competent with architects, to .show that the employment of an
architect to ·make plans and designs for a building, carried
with it an employment to superintend its construction. 8
§ 11 7. Experts in Patent, Trade Mark and Copyright
Cases . - It has been laid down that in actions for the in1

Shulte v. Hennessy, 40 Iowa, 352.
Forrl v. Tirrell, 9 Gray (Mass.), 401.
3 Montgomery v. Gilmer, 33 Ala. 116.
4 Smith v. Gngerty, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 619.
5 Underwood v. Waldron, 33 Mich. 232 . .
6 Tinn ey v . New Jersey Steamboat Co., 12 4.-bb. Pr. (N. s.) 1.
1
Mead v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 3 Selden (N. Y.) 530; s. l'.., 3 Bennett
Fire Ins. Cas. 483.
s Wilson v. Bauman, 8'.) IJJ. 4f3.
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friugement of patent rights, the testimony of experts is

admissible for the purpose of explaining the drawings,

models and machines exhibited, as well as for the purpose

of explaining their operation, and pointing out the resem-

blance or difference in the mechanical devices involved in

their construction. 1 But the court cannot be compelled

to receive the evidence of experts as to how a patent

ought to be construed, and whether it has been violated. 2

Neither will an expert be allowed to testify, that from inves-

tigations made by him in scientific works, he has ascertained

that an invention patented long before, was well known

prior to the application for letters patent thereon. 3 " The

question," said the court, "proposed to the defendant, as

an expert, sought to establish an historical fact, under the

guise of a scientific opinion. It was properly excluded."

In actions for the infringement of trade marks, it is said

that the probability of deception is generally shown by re-

semblance, and by the opinions of experts. 4 And in the

case of an alleged violation of a copyright, it.has been held

that experts could testify, and state the results of compar-
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isons made by them of the notes and citations of authorities

contained in the two law books in qujpstion, together with

their opinion as to whether the several notes and citations

were of the same character. 5

118. Painters and Photographers. The opinion of an

artist in painting is competent evidence as to the genuine-

ness of a painting. 6 An ambrotypist and daguerreotypist has

been held competent to express an opinion as to whether

photographs were well executed. 7 And an expert in photog-

raphy has been allowed to testify, from what he knew and

1 Abbott's Trial Evicl. 760; Corning v. Burden, 12 How. 252; Hudson

v. Draper, 5 Fisher's Pat. Gas. 256, 259; s. c., 4 Clifford, 181 ; Gaboon v.

King, 1 Clifford, 592; Winans v. X. Y. & Erie R. R. Co., 21 How. 88.

2 Waterbury Brass Co. v. X. Y. etc. Co., 3 Fisher Pat. Cas. 43, 54.

3 McMahon v. Tyng, 14 Allen, 1G7.

4 Abbott's Trial Evidence, 752.

5 Lawrence v. Dana, 4 Clifford, 1, 72.

Folkes v. Chadd, 4 Dongl. 157.

7 Barnes v. Ingalls, 39 Ala. 193.

fringement of patent rights, the testimony of experts is
admissible for the purpose of explaining the drawings,
models and machines exhibited, as well as for the purpose
of explaining their operation, and pointing out the resemblance or difference in the mechanical devices involved in
their construction. 1 But the court cannot be compelled
to receive the evidence of experts as to how a patent
ought to be construed, and whether it has been violated. 2
Neither will au expert be allowed to testify, that from investigations made by him in scientific works, he has ascertained
that an invention patented long before, was wen known
prior to the application for letters patent thereon. 3 "The
question," said the court, "proposed to the defendant, as
an expert, sought to establish an historical fact, under the
guise of a scientific opinion. It was properly excluded."
In actions for the infringement of trade marks, it _is said
that the probability of deception is generally shown by resemblance, and by the opinions of experts. 4 And in the
case of an alleged violation of a copyright, it.has been held
that experts could testify, and state the results of comparisons made Ly them of the notes aud citations of authorities
contained in the two law books in qu,rtion, together with
their opinion as to whether the several notes and citations
were of the same character.5
§ 118. Painters and Photographers.-The opinion of au
artist in painting is competent evidence as to the genuineness of a painting. 6 An ambrotypist and daguerreotypist has
been held competent · to expre:;;s an opinion as to whether
photographs were well executed.7 And an expert in photography has been allowed to testify, from what he knew and
1 Abbott's Trial Evid. 760; Corning v. Burden, 12 How. 252; Hudson
v. Draper, 5 Fisher's Pat. Cas. 256, 259; s. c., 4 Clifford, 181; Cahoon v.
Ring, 1 Ulifford, 592; Winans v. N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co., 21 How. 88.
2
Waterbury Brass Co . v. N . Y. etc. Co., 3 Fisher Pat. Cas. 43, 5.J.
s McMahon v. Tyng, 14 Allen, 167.
4 Abbott's Trial Evidence, 752.
5 Lawrence v. Dana, 4 Clifford, l, 72.
Folkes v. Chadd, 4 Dongl. 157.
7 Barnes v. Ingalls, 30 Ala. 193.
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saw of a photograph painter's work and capacity, how many

photographic pictures such person could paint in the course

of a month. 1 In the same case it was announced, that

although experts might be alone competent to testify whether

a photograph was well executed, yet it required no special

skill in or knowledge of the photographic art to determine

whether the picture resembled the original, and any person

for whom the picture was taken could testify that it was a

good likeness.

119. Lumbermen. One employed in getting out log&

has been permitted to testify as an expert, whether a per-

son \vith the force of men he had employed could have

continued to deliver a certain amount of logs per day. 2

One who had experience in floating logs in a certain stream

has been allowed to express an opinion as to the proper

manner of floating logs through a dam and flume. "The

running of the logs in that stream, and through that bulk-

head, was not a matter of common knowledge, nor of ade-

quate commoii'judgment upon the facts shown by the other

evidence. The experience and observation of the plaintiff
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gave him the grounds and faculty of an opinion peculiar to

himself, and not common to men who had no such expe-

rience or observation. In a substantial sense he may be

regarded as an expert having peculiar knowledge and skill,

which renders his opinion worthy of consideration as the

ground of judgment and opinion in others who have not

such knowledge and skill." 3 The opinion of a lumber

dealer has been received as to the quality of certain lum-

ber.* And one engaged in lumbering has been permitted to

state whether a raft was properly moored. 5

120. Translation by Experts of Writings from a For-

eign Language. The rule is that when an instrument i*

written in a foreign language, one skilled in such language

1 Barnes v. Ingalls, supra.

2 Salvo v. Duncan, 49 Wis. 157.

8 Dean v. McLean, 48 Vt. 412.

4 Moore v. Lea's Admr. 32 Ala. 375,

6 Hayward v. Knapp, 23 Minn. 430.

Raw of a photograph painter's work and capacity, how m~ny
photographic pictures such person could paint in the course
of a month. 1 In the same case it was announced, that
although experts might be alone competent to testify whether
a photograph was well executed, yet it required no special
skill in or knowledge of the photographic art to determine
whether the picture resembled the original, and any person
for whom the picture was taken could testify that it was a
good likeness.
§ 119. Lumbermen.- One employed in getting out logs.
has been permitted to testify as an expert, whether a person with the force of men he had empl,oyed c0uld have
continued to deliver a certain amount of logs per day :z
One who had experience in floating logs in a certain stream
has been allowed to express an opinion as to the proper
manner of floating logs through a dam and flume. "-The
running of the logs in that stream,. and through that bulkhead, was not a matter of common knowledge, nor of adequate common•judgm,e nt upon the facts shown by the other
evidence. The experience and observation of the plaintiff
gave him the grounds and faculty of an opinion peculiar to
himself, and not common to men who had no such expe-'
rience or observation. In a substantial sense he may be
regarded as an expert having peculiar knowledge and skill~
which renders his opinion worthy of consideration as the
ground of judgment and opinion h1 others who have not
such knowledge and skill." 3 The opinion of a lumber
dealer has been received as to the quality of certain lumber.4 And one engaged in lumbering has been permitted to
state whether a raft was properly moored. 5
§ 120. Translation by Experts of Writings from a :troreign Language.-The rule is that when an instrument is
written in a foreign language, one s-killed in such language
Barnes v. Ingalls, supra .
Salvo v. Duncan, 49 Wis. 157.
s Dean v. McLean, 48 Vt. 412.
4 Moore v. Lea's Admr. 32 Ala. 3-75 ~
6 Hayward v. Knapp, 23 Minn. 430-.
i
2

EXPERT TESTIMONY 'IN THE TRADES AND ARTS.

165

EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE TRADES AND ARTS. 165

is to be called to translate it. 1 But it is not competent for

a witness called to translate such a writing to give any

opinion as to its construction, that being a question for the

court. 2

If the court, however, should undertake to translate a

writing without the aid of experts, and should translate it

correctly, it is probable that a new trial could not be obtained.

In one of the cases we find the following upon this point :

*' Indeed, if the whole libel had been published in a foreign

language, and the court had assumed to translate and de-

fine its meaning to the jury without the aid of experts, it is

difficult to see how this error could be made the ground for

a new trial. It is only error that prejudices, which justifies

setting aside the verdict ; and if the translation is in fact

correct, it is difficult to see wherein the prejudicial error

lies." 3

121. Expert Testimony as to Technical Terms and

Unusual Words. It is laid down as clearly within the

province of the court to define technical words to the jury.*

The courts take judicial notice of the meaning of words and
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idioms in the vernacular of the language. 5 And where for-

eign words have been so far Anglicized by common use as to

have become substantially a part of our language, it is

within the province of the court to define them to the jury. 6

1 Di Sora v. Phillips, 10 H. L. Cas. 624; Stearine v. Hentzman, 17 C. B.

(N.s.) 56; Sheldon v. Beuham, 4 Hill, 129: Geylin v. Villeroi, 2 Hous-

ton (Del.), 311.

2 A Belgian consul was called to translate the following: " Les infor-

mations sur Gustavo Sichel sont tellesque nous ne pouvons lui livrer les

2500 caisses que contre connalsement. Si vous voulez, nous vous enver-

rons les connaiseraents, et vous ne les lui d livrerez que centre pay-

ment." He was asked to what the article "les" referred, and said it

was applicable to the " connaisements.'" This was held to be error.

Stearine v. Hentzman, supra.

3 Gibson v. Cincinnati Enquirer (U. S. Gir. Ct.), 5 Cent. L. J. 380.

4 Thompson's Charging the Jury, 18.

5 1 Grenl.'s Evidence, 5.

6 Townshend on Slander & Libel, 160, note 2; Homer v. Tauutou, 5

is to be called to translate it. 1 But it is not competent for
a witness called to translate such a writing to give any
opinion as to its construction, that being a question for the
.court. 2
If the court, however, should undertake to translate a
writing withou_t the aid of experts, and should translate it
correctly, it is probable that a new trial could not be obtained.
In one of the cases we find the following upon this point:
'' Indeed, if the whole libel had been published in a foreign
language, and the court had assumed to translate and define its meaning to the jury without the aid of experts, it is
difficult to see how this error could be made the ground for
a new trial. It is only error that prejudices, which justifies
setting aside the verdict ; and if the translation is in fact
correct, it is difficult to see wherein the prejudicial error
lies." 3
§ 121. Expert Testimony as to Technical Terms and
Unusual 'Vords.- It is laid down as clearly within the
Jrovince of the court to define technical words to the jury. 4
The courts take judicial notice of the meaning of words and
idioms in t~e vernacular of the language. 6 And where for€ign words have been so far Anglicized by common use as ta
have become substantially a part Gf our language, it is
within the province of the court to define them to the jury. 6

H. & X. 661, 667; Barnett v. Allen, 3 H. & N. 376; Hoare v. Silverlock,

12 Ad. & El. (N. s.) 624; Gibson v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 5 Cent. L. J.

380 (U. S. Circuit Ct., Southern District of Ohio).

1

Di Sorn.v.Phillips, 10 H. L. Oas. 624; Stearine v. Hentzman, 17 O. B.

( N. s.) 56; Sheldon v. Benham, 4 Hill, 129: Geylin v. Villeroi, 2 Hous-

ton (Del.) , 311.
2 A Belgian consul was called to translate the following: "Les informations sur Gustave Sichel sont telles que nous ne pouvons lui livrer les
2500 caisses que contre connal ement. Si vous voulez, nous vous enverrons les connaisements, et vous ne les lui de livrerez que contre payment." He was ask~d to what the article "les" referred, and said it
was applicable to the "connaisements." This was held to be error.
Stearine v. Hentz man, supra.
s Gibson v. Ginoinnati Enqufre1· (U.S. Oir. Ct.), 5 Cent. L.J. 380.
4 Thompson's Charging the Jury, § 18.
51 Grenl.'s Evidence, § 5.
6 Town bend on Slander & Libel, 160, note 2; Homer v. Tanuton, 5
H. & :N. 661, 667; Barnett v. Allen, 3 H. & N. 376; Hoarev. Silverlock,
12 Ad. & El. (N. s.) 624; Gibson v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 5 Cent. L. J .
.380 (U. S. Oircnit Ot. 1 Sot1thern District of Ohio) .
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Instances of such words are " habeas corpus," " bonafide,"

"prima facie" " a fortiori " " flagrante delicto " The

general rule undoubtedly is that the meaning of an English

word, not a technical terra, cannot be made known to the

jury by an examination of witnesses. It has, therefore,

been held error in an action for libel to allow a physician to

testify as to the meaning of the word " malpractice." x But

this rule does not apply " where a known English word or

phrase has acquired a local meaning different from its or-

dinary acceptation, nor where it has acquired a peculiar

meaning in a particular science, art or trade, or among a

particular sect, and where it seems to have been used in such

local or peculiar sense." 2 Hence it may be laid down that

when a new or unusual word is used in a contract, or when

a word is used in a technical or peculiar sense, as applicable

to any trade or business, or to any particular class of peo-

ple, it is proper to receive the testimony of witnesses having

special knowledge of such words as to the meaning attached

to them. 3 The rule has been well stated by the Supreme

Court of Massachusetts in the following language : "The
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general rule of law is, that the construction of every written

instrument is matter of law, and, as a necessary conse-

quence, that courts must, in the first instance, judge of the

meaning, force and effect of language. The meaning of

words, and the grammatical construction of the English

language, so far as they are established by the rules and

1 Rodgers v. Kline, 56 Miss. 818. See, too, Haley v. State, G3 Ala. 89 ;

Campbell v. Russell, 9 Iowa, 337.

2 Rodgers v. Kline, tupra.

8 Eaton v. Smith, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 156; Daniels v. Hudson River Fire

Ins. Co., 12 Cush. (Mass.) 416, 429; Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y.

200; Sturm v. Williams, 38 N. Y. Superior Ct. 325; Hearn v. New Eng-

land Mutual Ins. Co., 3 Clifford C. C. 318; Prather v. Ross, 17 Ind. 495;

Silverthorne v. Fowle, 4 Jones (X. C.) Law 362; James v. Bostwick,

Wright (Ohio), 142; Harris v. Rathbun, 2 Abbott (Ct. of App. Decis.) r

328; Williams v. Poppleton, 3 Oregon, 139; Pollen v. Le Roy, 10 Bos.

(N. Y.) 38; First Baptist Church v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 28 N. Y.

153, 155; Reynolds v. Jourdan, 5 Cal. 108; Reamer v. Nesmith, 34 Cal.

627; Callahan v. Stanley, 57 Cal. 479; Evans v. Commercial Ins. Co , G

R.I. 47.

>i

Instances of such words are "habeas corpus," "bona fide,"
"prirna facie ," "a fortiori,'' "ftagrante delicto ." The
general rule undoubtedly is that the meaning of an English
word, not a technical term , cannot be made known to the
jury by an examination of witnesses. It has, therefore,
been held error in an action for libel to allow a physician to
testify as to the meaning of the word " malpractice." 1 But
this rule does not apply "where a known English word or
phrase has acquired a local meaning different from its ordinary acceptation, nor where it has acquired a peculiar
meaning in a particular science, art or trade, or among a
particular sect, and where it seems to have been used in such
local or peculiar sense ." 2 Hence it may be laid down that
when a new or unusual word is used in a contract, or when
a word is used in a technical or peculiar sense, as applicable
to any trade or business , or to any particular class of people, it is proper to receive the testimony of witnesses having
special knowledge of such words as to the meaning attached
to them. 3 The rule has been well stated by the Supreme
Cou.r t of Massachusetts in the following language : '' The
general rule of law is, that the construction of every written
instrument is matter of law, and, as a necessary consequence, that courts m'llst, in the first instance, judge of the
meaning, force and effect of language . The meaning of
words, and the grammatical construction of the English
language, so far as they are established by the rules and
1

Rodgers v. Kline, 56 Miss. 818. See, too, Haley v. State, 63 Ala. 9;
Campbell v. Russell, 9 Iowa, 337.
2 Rodgers v. Kline, supra .
3
Eaton v. Smith, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 156; Daniels v. Hudson River Fire
Ins. Co., 12 Cush. (Mass.) 416, 429; Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N . Y.
200; Sturm v . Williams, 38 N . Y. Superior Ct. 325; Hearn v . New England Mutual Ins: Co., 3 Clifford C. C. 318; Prather v. Ross, 17 Ind . 495;
Silverthorne v. Fowle, 4 Jones (N. C.) Law 362; James v. Bostwick,
Wright (Ohio), 142; Harris v. Rathbun, 2 Abbott (Ct. of App. Decis.),
328; Williamsv. Poppleton, 3 Oregon, 139; Pollen v. Le Roy, IO Bos.
(N. Y .) 38; First Baptist Church v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 28 N . Y .
153, 155; Reynolds v. Jourdan, 5 Cal. 108; Reamer v. Nesmith, 34 Cal.
627; Callahan v. 8tanley, 57 Cal. 479; Evans v. Commercial Ins. Co , 6
R . I . 47.
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usages of the language, are, prima facie, matter of law, to

be construed and passed upou by the court. But language

may be ambiguous, and used in different senses ; or general

words, in particular trades and branches of business as

among merchants, for instance may be used in a new,

peculiar or technical sense ; and, therefore, in a few in-

stances, evidence may be received, from those who are con-

versant with such branches of business, and such technical

or peculiar use of language to explain or to illustrate it." J

In that case the court held that the testimony of experi-

enced persons could not be received to show that stones of

a considerable size were universally known as, and called

gravel.

122. Expert Testimony as to Technical Terms and

Unusual Words The Subject Continued. A gas fitter

has been permitted to testify whether gas meters were

usually classified as gas fixtures, in an action for the price

of gas meters alleged to have been furnished to fulfill a con-

tract for gas fixtures. 2 The opinion of one engaged in the

oil business has been received, to show that in a contract
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for the sale of a certain number of " barrels" of petroleum

oil, the word " barrel'' meant a vessel of a certain capacity,

and not the statute measure of quantity. 3 So the opinion

of an expert has been received to show that the meaning of

the term " horn chains," used in a contract, meant chains

made of hoof and horn ; 4 and that the term " port risk," as

used by underwriters in policies of marine insurance, had a

special signification. 5 Where a contract was for the sale of

" one hundred and fifty casks of one ton each, best madder,

12^," dealers in madder were allowed to testify that the

figures as used in the contract, meant 12^ cents per pound. 6

The opinions of stock brokers have been received to

1 Brown v. Brown, 10 Met. 573.

2 Downs v. Sprague, 1 Abbott's Ct. of App. Decis. (X. Y.) 550.

3 Miller v. Stevens, 100 Mass. 518.

4 Sweet v. Shumway, 102 Mass. 365.

* Nelson v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 453.

Dana v. Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40.

usages of the language, are, prinia facie,. matter of law, to
be construed and passed upou by the court. But lapguage
may be ambiguous, and used in different senses; or general
words, iu particular tra<les and branches of business - as
among merchants, for instance - may be used in a new,
peculiar or technical sen e; and, therefore, in a few instances, evi<lence may be received, from those who are conversant with such branches of busines3, and such technical
or peculiar use of language to explain or to illustrate it.'' 1
In that case the court held that the testimony of experience<l persons could not be receive<l to show that stones of
a considerable size were universally known as, and culled
gravel.
§ 12 2. Expert Testimony as to Technical Terms ancl
Unusual Words· The Subject Continued.-A gas fitter
has been permitted to te tify whether gas rneters were
usually classified as gas fixt·ures, in an action for the price
of gas meters alleged to have been furnished to fulfill a contract for gas fixtures. 2 The opinion of one engaged in the
oil business has been received, to show that in a contract
for the sale of a certain number of "barrels" of petroleum
oil, the word ''barrel'' meant a vessel of a certain capacity,
and not the statute measure of quantity. 3 So the opinion
of an expert bas been received to show that the meaning of
the term " horn chains," used in a contract, mea.n t chains
made of hoof and horn; 4 and that the term "port risk," as
used by underwriters in policies of marine insurance, had a
speciul signification. 5 vVhere a contract was for the sale of
" one hundred and fifty casks of one ton each, best madder,
12f," <lea1ers in ma<lder were allowed to testify that the
figures as used in the contract, meant 121 cents per pound. 6
The opinions of stock brokers have been received to
Bro wn v. Brown, 10 ~let. 573.
Downs v. Sprngue, 1 Abbott's Ct. of Apri. Deci::;. (N. Y.) 550.
3 .Miller v. Stevens, 100 Mass. 518.
4 Sweet v. Shumway, 102 .Mass. 365.
s Nelson v. Snn Mutual Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 453.
s Dana v. Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40.
I
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explain the meaning among brokers and dealers in stock

of the words, "settled at the market 72|." x And

the opinion of iron merchants, has been received as to

what was meant by "No. 1 Shott's Scotch pig iron." 2

Persons engaged in the construction and operation of mills

and factories run by water, and acquainted with the appli-

cation of water to machinery, have been permitted to testify

as to the technical meaning of the term "raceway." 3 And

experts may be called to decipher abbreviated and elliptical

entries in the book of a deceased notary. 4

123. Expert Testimony as to Usage. On a question

of usage in a particular trade or business, the opinions of

persons experienced therein will be received in evidence. 5

" Usage is proved," says the court in Massachusetts, " by

witnesses testifying of its existence and uniformity from

their knowledge, obtained by observation of what is prac-

tised by themselves and others in the trade to which it re-

lates. But their conclusions or inferences as to its effect,

either upon the contract or the legal title, or rights of

parties, are not competent to show the character or force of
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the usage." 6 That the opinions of experts in a particular

business as to the existence of a usage in that particular

business, are inadmissible when the effect would be to con-

tradict the express terms of the contract, is well settled

upon the authorities. 7 Neither can such evidence be received

1 Storey v. Salomon, 6 Daly (N. Y.) 532.

8 Pope v. Filley, 9 Federal Keporter, 65, 69.

8 Wilder v. Decou, 26 Minn. 10.

4 Sheldon v. Benham, 4 Hill, 129.

6 Wilson v. Bauman, 80111. 494; Kershaw v. Wright, 115 Mass. 361;

The City of Washington, 92 U. S. 31.

8 Haskins v. Warren, 115 Mass. 514, 535. And see Barnes v. Ingalls,

39 Ala. 193.

7 Malcolmson v. Morton, 11 Irish Law K. 230 (Q. B.) ; Peters v.

Stavely, 15 L. T. (N. s.) 151; Reading v. Menhara, 1 Moo. & R. 234;

Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195, 206; Partridge v. Insurance Co.,

15 Wall. 375; Thompson v. Riggs, 5 Wall. 663, 679; Snelling v. Hall, 107

Mass. 134; Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136; Dickinson v. Gay, 7 Allen,

(Mass.) 29, 31; Randall v. Rotch, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 107; Barlow v. Lam-

bert, 28 Ala. 704; Polhemus v. Heinman, 50 Cal. 438; Bank of Commerce

explain the meaning among brokers and dealers in stock
of the words, " settled at the market 72-9;." 1 And
the opinion of iron merchants . has been received as to
what was meant by "No. 1 Shott's Scotch pig iron." 2
Persons engaged in the construction a~d operation of mills
and factories run by water, and acquainted with the application of water to machinery, have been permitted to testify
as to the technical meaning of the term "raceway." 3 And
experts may be called to decipher abbreviated and elliptical
entries in the book of a deceased notary. 4
§ 123. Expert Testimony as to Usage.-On a question
of usage in a particular trade or business, the opinions of
persons experienced therein will be received in evidence:~
"Usage is proved," says the court in Massachusetts, "by
witnesses testifying of its existence and uniformity from
their knowledge, obtained by observation of what is prac·
tised by themselves and others in the trade to which it relates. But their conclusions or inferences as to its effect,
either upon the contract or the legal title, or rights of
parties, are not competent to show the character or force of
the usage." 6 That the opinions of experts in a particular
business as to the existence of a usage in that particular
business, are inadmissible when the effect would be to contradict the express terms of the contract, is well settled
upon the authorities. 7 Neither can such evidence be received

v. Bissell, 72 N. Y. 615; Colleuder v. Dinsmorc, 55 N. Y. 200; Frith v.

1

Storey v. Salomon, 6 DaJy (N. Y.) 532.
Pope v. Filley, 9 Federal Reporter, 65, 69.
8 Wilder v. Decou, 26 Minn. 10.
4 Sheldon v. Benham, 4 Hill, 129.
6
Wilson v. Bauman, 80 Ill. 494; Ker haw v. Wright, 115 Mas. 361;
The Uity of Washington, 92 U. S. 31.
6
Haskins v. Warren, 115 Mass. 514~ 535. And see Barnes v. Ingalls,
39 Ala. 193.
7
Malcolmson v. Morton, Jl Iri h Law R. 230 (Q. B.); Peters v.
Stavely , 15 L. T. (N. s.) 151 ~ R eading v. Menham, 1 Moo. & R. 234;
Savings Bank v. W ard, 100 U.S. 195, 206; Partridge v. Tnsul'ance Co.,
15 Wall. 375; Thompson v. Riggs, 5 Wall. 663, 679; Snelling v. Hall, 107
Mass. 134; Brown v. Foster, 113 Mas . 136; Dickinson v. Gay, 7 Allen,
(Mass.) 29, 31; Randall v. Rotch, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 107; Barlow v. Lambert, 28 Ala. 704 ; Polbemu v. H ein man, 50 Cal. 438 ; Bank of Commerce
v. Bissell, 72 N. Y. 610; Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y. 200; Frith v.
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when it would result in violating a positive requirement of

law, or some principle of public policy. 1 It is not to be

supposed, however, that a custom or usage cannot be shown

in any case, if it is simply different in its effect from some

general principle of law. To have this effect, it must con-

flict with some rule of public policy, or be unjust and

oppressive in its character. 2

It is held that a witness is competent to testify as to usage

whose only knowledge of it is derived from his own busi-

ness, if that has been sufficiently extensive and long con-

tinued. 8 The testimony of those engaged in a particular

business, that they never heard of such a usage, is admis-

sible. 4 On the issue whether an alleged commercial usage

exists, a witness may be asked to describe how, under the

usages in force, a transaction like the one in question would

be conducted by all the parties thereto, from its inception

to its conclusion. 5 It has been held in England that a

London stock broker is a competent witness as to the course

of business of London bankers* And it is to be observed

that a person may be competent to testify as to the usage
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which prevails in a certain business, without himself being

engaged in that business. So that when the question was as

Barker, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 334; Corbettv. Underwood, 83 111. 324; Wilson

v. Bauinan, 80 111. 493; Dixon v. Dunham, 14 111. 324; Stultz v. Locke, 47

Md. 562, 568; Bodfish v. Fox, 23 Me. 90; Exchange Bank v. Coleman,

1 W. Va. 69; Randolph v. Holden, 44 Iowa, 327; Envin v. Clark, 13

Mich. 10, 18; Bedford v. Flowers, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 242; Atwater v.

Clancy, 107 Mass. 369.

1 Barlow v. Lambert, 28 Ala. 704, 710; Antomarchi v. Russell, 63 Ala.

356; Wilson v. Bauman, 80 111. 493, 495; Bissell v. Ryan, 23 111. 570;

Homer v. Dorr, 10 Mass. 26; Reed v. Richardson. 98 Mass. 216; Lockhart

v. Dewees, 1 Texas, 535; Jackson v. Beling, 22 La. Ann. 377; Barnard

v. Kellogg, 10 Wallace, 383 ; Brown v. Jackson. 2 Wash. C. C. 24 ; South-

western Freight etc. Co. v. Standard, 44 Mo. 71 ; Raisin v. Clark, 41 Md.

158; Minnesota Central R. R. Co. v. Morgan, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 217. 221;

when it would result in violating a positive requirement of
law, or some principle of public policy .1 It is not to be
supp<ised, however, that a custom or usage cannot be shown
in any case, if it is simply different in its effect from some
general principle of law. To have this effect, it must conflict with some rule of public policy, or be unjust and
oppressive in its character. 2
It is held that a witness is competent to testify as to usage
whose only knowledge of it is derived from his own business, if that has been .sufficiently extensive and long continued.8 The testimony of those engaged in a particular
business, that they never heard of such a usage, is admissible. 4 On the issue whether an alleged commercial usage
exists, a witness may be asked to describe how, under the
usages in force, a transaction like the one in question would
be conducted by all the parties thereto, from its inception
to its conclusion. 5 It has been held in England that a
London stock broker is a competent witness as to the course
of business of London bankers. 6 And it is to be observed
that a person may be competent to testify as to the usage
·which prevails in a certain business, without himself being
engaged in that business. So that when the question was as

Inglebright v. Hammond, 19 Ohio. 337.

2 See Lawson on Usages and Customs, Chapter V, 225, 248.

3 Hamilton v. Nickerson, 13 Allen (Mass.) 351.

4 Evansville etc. R. R. Co. v. Young, 28 Ind. 516.

5 Kirshaw v. Wright, supra.

6 Adams v. Peters. 2 Car. & Kir. (61 E. C. L.) 722.

Barker, 2Johns. (N. Y.) 334 ; Corbettv. Underwood, 83 lll. 324; Wilson
v. Bauman, 80 Ill. 493; Dixon v. Dunham, 14 Ill. 324; Stultz v. Locke, 47
Md. 562, 568; Bodfish v. Fox, 23 Me. 90; Exchange Bank v. Coleman,
1 W. Va. 69; Randolph v. Holden, 44 Iowa, 327; Erwin v. Clark, 13
Mich. 10, 18; Bedford v. Flowers, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 242; .Atwater v.
Clancy, 107 Mass. 369.
1 Barlow v. Lambert, 28 Ala. 704, 710; .Antoml'l.rchi v. Russell, 63 Ala.
356; Wilson v. Bauman, 80 Ill. 493, 495; Bissell v. Ryan, 23 ID. 570;
Homer v. Dorr, 10 Mass. 26; Reed v. Richardson. 98 }lass. 216; Lockhart
v. D ewees, 1 Texas, 535; Jackson v. Beling, 22 La.. Ann. 377; Barnard
v. Kellogg, 10 Wallace, 383; Brown v. Jack on, 2 Wa ·h. C. C. 24; South·w estern Freight etc. Co. v, Standard, 44 Mo. 71; Raisin v. Clark, 41 Md.
158; Minnesota Central R. R. Co. v. :Morgan, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 217. 221;
lnglebright v. Hammond, 19 Ohio. 337.
2 See Lawson ou Usages and Customs, Chapter V, §§ 225, 248.
s H amilton v. Nickerson, 13 Allen (l\Iass.) 351.
4 Evansville etc. R.R. Co. v. Young , 28 Ind. 516.
5 Kirshaw v. Wright, supra.
0 Adams v. Pete rs ~ 2 Car. & Ki l'. (61 E. C. L.) 722.
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to the custom of the New York banks in paying the checks

of dealers, it was held proper to call as witnesses persons

who were not employed in banks. "Although not employed

in banking business, the witnesses were dealers with the

banks, and had knowledge of the ordinary course of dealing

with them. There is no necessity for showing a man to be

an expert in banking in order to prove a usage. He should

know what the usage is, and then he is competent to testify,

whether he be a banker, or employed in a bank, or a dealer

with banks. There is no reason why a dealer should not

have as much knowledge on such a subject as a person em-

ployed in a bank." l

124. Opinions of Experts in Miscellaneous Cases.

The opinion of an ethnologist has been received upon the

question of race, 2 the opinions of persons having a peculiar

and special knowledge of iron, upon the question of the

quality and strength of iron, the breaking of which caused

an accident ; 3 the opinion of a paver as to the number of

bricks laid in a pavement, ascertained from a computation

by the square yard according to usage of the craft, without
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reckoning them by tale ; 4 the opinions of witnesses having

knowledge of the geological structure and formation of the

neighborhood, as to the existence of coal seams, and of the

quality and quantity on the lands in question ; 5 the opinions

of persons engaged in the wool trade, as to the liability of

wool waste to ignite spontaneously ; 6 the opinion of a prac-

tical miner as to the safety of a particular blasting powder

which he had used. 7 So one employed in manufacturing-

explosive compounds, and who had made blasts in all kinds

1 Griffin v. Rice, 1 Hilton (N. Y.) 184.

2 White v. Clemens, 39 Ga. 232; Nave's Admr. v. Williams, 22 Ind.

368; State v. Jacobs, 6 Jones (N. C.) Law, 284.

3 Claxtou's Admr. v. Lexington, etc. R. E. Co., 13 Bush (Ky.), 636;

King v. New York Central, etc. R. R. Co., 72 N. Y. 607; Pope v. Filley,

9 Fed. Reporter, 65, 66.

4 Mayor, etc. v. O'Neill, 1 Peian. St. 342.

5 Stambaughv. Smith, 23 Ohio St. 584, 594.

Whitney v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 27 Wis. 327.

7 Snowden v. Idaho Quartz Manuf. Co., 55 Cal. 450.

to the custom of the New York banks in paying the checkS'
of dealers, it was held proper to call as witnesses persons
who were not employed in banks. "Although not employed
in banking bu5iness, the witnesses were dealers with the
banks, and had knowledge of the ordirnl.ry course of dealing
with them . There is no necessity for showing a mun to he
an expert in banking in order to prove a usage . He should
know what the usage is, and then be is competent to testify;
whether he be a banker, or employed in a bank, 01~ a dealer
with banks. There is no reason why a dealer should not
have as much knowledge on such a subject as a person employed in a bank." 1
§ 124. Opinions of Experts in lUiscellaneous Cases.The opinion of an ethnologist has been received upon the
question of race, 2 the opinions of persons having a peculiar
and _special knowledge of iron, upon the question of the
quality and strength of iron, the breaking of which caused
an accident; 3 the opinion of a paver as to the number of
bricks laid in a pavement, ascertai,ned from a com'p utation
by the square yard according to usage of the craft, without
reckoning them by tale ; 4 the opinions of witnesses having
knowledge of the geological structure aqd formation of the
neighborhood, as to the existence of coal seams·, and of the
quality and quantity on the lands in question; 5 the opinions
of persons engaged in the wool trade , as to the liability of
wool waste to ignite spontaneously; 6 the opinion of a practical miner as to the safety of a; particular blastiug powder
which he had used .7 So one employed in man ufacturing
explosive compounds, and who had made blasts in all kinds
1

Griffin v. Rice. 1 Hilton (N. Y.) 18-t-.
White v. Clemens, 39 Ga. 232; Na.ve's Admr. v. Williams, 22 Ind.
368; State v. Jarobs, 6 Jones (N. C.) Law, 284.
.
3 Claxton's Admr. v . Lexington, etc. R . R . Co., 13 Bush (Ky .), 636;
King v. New York Central, etc. R.R . Cq., 72 N . Y. 1307 ; Pope v . Filley,
9 Fed. Reporter, 65, 66.
4 Mayor, etc. v . 0'Neil1, 1 Pean. St. 342.
5 Stambaugh v. Smith, 23 Ohio St. 584, .594.
6 Whitney v. <Jbicago & N . W.R. R. Co., 27 Wis. 327.
7 Snowden v . Idaho Quartz Manuf. Co., 55 Cal. 450.
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of rocks and stones, in every kind of blasting, has been held

qualified "as a most competent expert," to state whether

portions of a rock could have been thrown 280 feet from

the point of discharge, the blast being exploded in the ex-

cavation of a sewer. 1 The opinions of experienced persons

have been received as to whether two pieces of wood were

parts of the same stick of natural growth. 2 And it has been

held that an expert may be asked what the condition of a

water pipe, as described by another witness, indicated as to

the original construction of the joint. 3 A well-digger, who

from the exercise of his busines in the vicinity has become

acquainted with the character of the soil and subsoil, has

been allowed to testify to his opinion, whether a given thick-

ness of subsoil, if undisturbed, was impervious to water. 4

A witness who had been engaged for years in measuring and

selling water to miners, was held sufficiently qualified to

give his opinion as to the effect which a dam across a stream

would have in raising the water in the channel above. 5

When the question was as to the cause of the settling and

cracking of the surface of the earth, the opinions of experts
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were received, they having examined the premises, and

being qualified by learning, observation and experience to

form an intelligent judgment in the matter. 6

125. Opinions of Experts in Miscellaneous Cases

The Subject Continued. The opinion of an expert has

been received as to the quantity of stone furnished for a

water works reservoir, where the average amount could only

be estimated approximately. 7 The testimony of experts

has been received as to whether'it is possible to examine all

the layers in a case of old tobacco without injuring the

tobacco, and as to what is the proper method of examining

such a case for the purpose of determining the kind and

1 Roster v. Noonan, 8 Daly (N. Y.) 232.

2 Commonwealth v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451.

3 Hand v. Brookline, 12G Mass. 324.

4 Buff urn v. Harris, 5 K. I. 250.

Blood v. Light, 31 Cal. 115.

6 Clark v. Willett, 35 Cal. 534, 544.

7 Eyerman v. Sheehan, 52 Mo. 221.

of rocks and stones, in every kind of bla ting, has been held
qualified "as a most competent expert," to state whether
portions of a rock could have been thrown 280 feet from
the point of discharge, the blast being exploded in the excavation of a sewer. 1 The opinions of experienced persons
have been received as to whether two pieces of wood were
parts of the same stick of natural growth. 2 And it has been
held that an expert may be asked what the condition of a.
water pipe, as described by another witness , indicated as to
the original construction of the joint. 3 A well-digger, who
from the exercise of his busines in the vicinity has become
acquainted with the character of the soil and subsoil' bas
been allowed to testify to his opinion, whether a given thickness of subsoil, if undisturbed, ·was impervious to water. 4
A witness who had been engaged for years in measuring and
selling water to miners, was held sufficiently qualified to
give his opinion as . to the effect which a dam across a stream
would have in raising the water in the channel above. 5
vVhen the question was as to the cause of the settling and
ci:acking of the surface of the earth, the opinions of experts
were received, they having examined the premises, and
being qualified by learning, observation and experience to
form an intelligent judgment in the matter. 6
§ 125. Opinions of Experts in l\fis'c ellaneous Cases: The Subject Continued.-The opinion of an expert has
been received as to the quantity of stone furnished for a
water works reservoir, where the average amount could only
be estimated approximately .7 The testimony of experts
has been received as to whether 'it is possible to examine all
the layers in a case of old tobacco without injuring the
tobacco, and as to what is the proper method of examining
such a ·case for the purpose of determining the kind and
Koster v. :Noonan, 8 Daly (N. Y.) 232.
Uommonwen.lth v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451.
a Hanel v. Brookline, 126 Mass. 324.
4 Buffum v. Harris, 5 R. I. 250.
5 Bloocl v. Light, 31 Cal. 115.
6 Clark v. Willett, 35 Cal. 534, 5+!.
1 Eyerman v. Sheehan, 52 Mo. 221.
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quality of the tobacco. 1 Experts have been allowed to tes-

tify that a certain quality of steel was not considered suit-

able for the manufacture of steel .rails. 2 One who had

made and sold railroad ties has been held competent to tes-

tify as to the quality of certain ties. 3 And in general

skilled witnesses are allowed to testify as to the quality of

goods. 4 The testimony of a tailor has been received as to

whether a pocket book could have been taken out through

a cut made by a pickpocket in a coat, it appearing that the

coat had been mended subsequently to his examination of

it. 5 The genuineness of a post mark may be shown by the

testimony of a postmaster, 6 and perhaps by the testimony

of any one who has been in the habit of receiving letters

with that mark. 7 An expert has been permitted to express

an opinion as to the contents of a tree from the size of its

stump. 8

Where books and schedules of the assets and debts of a

party are put in evidence, an accountant may give the re-

sults of computations therefrom. 9 Witnesses who stated

that they were accustomed to handling and driving horses,
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and knew their habits, have been allowed to express an

opinion that certain obstructions on a bridge were of such a

character as would be likely to frighten horses of ordinary

quality of the tobacco. 1 Experts. have been allowed to testify that a certain quality of steel was not considered suit.able for the manufacture of steel . rails. 2 One who had
made and sold railroad ties has been held competent to testify as to the quality of certain ties .3 And in general
skilled witnesses are allowed to testify as to the quality of
goods. 4 The testimony of a tailor has been received as to
whether a pocket book could have been taken out through
a cut II!ade by a pickpocket in a coat, it appearing that the
.coat had been mended subsequently to his examination of
it. 6 The genuineness of a post mark may be shown by the
testimony of a postmaster, 6 and perhaps by the testimony
of any one who has been in the habit of receiving letters
with ·that mark. 7 An expert has been permitted to express
an opinion as to the contents of a tree from the size of its

gentleness. "The nature, habits, and peculiarities of

horses," said the court, " are not known to all men. Per-

sons who are in the habit of handling and driving horses,

from this experience, learn their habits, nature, etc., and

are, therefore, better able to state the probable conduct of

a horse under a given state of circumstances, in which they

have in their experience witnessed their conduct under sinri-

1 Atwater v. Clancy, 107 Mass. 369.

2 Booth v. Cleveland Mill Co., 74 N. Y. 27.

8 Jeffersonville R. R. Co. v. Lanliam,27 lud. 171.

4 Myers v. Murphy, 60 Ind. 232; Brown v. Leach, 107 Mass. 364.

5 People v. Morrigan, 29 Mich. 5.

Abbey v. Lill, 5 Biug. 299, 304,

* Woodcock v. Houldsworth, 16M. & W. 124.

* Frantz v. Ireland, 66 Barb. 3S6.

9 Jordan v. Osgood, 109 Mass. 457.

~tump. 8

.

1-Yhere books and schedules of the. assets and debts of a
party are put in evidence, an accountant may give the results of computations therefrom. 9 Witnesses who stated
that they were accustomed to handling and driving horses,
and knew their habits, have been allowed to express an
<>pinion that certain obstructions on a bridge were of such a
.character as would be likely to frighten horses of ordinary
gentleness.
"The nature, habits, and peculiarities of
horses," said the court, "are not known to all men . Persons who are in the habit of handling and driving horses,
from this experience, learn their habits, nature, etc., and ;:
are, therefore, better able to state the pro\>able co~duct of
a horse under a given state of circumstances, in which they
have in their experience witnessed their conduct under simi1

Atwater v. Clancy, 107 l\lass. 369.
Booth v. Cleveland Mill Co., 74 N. Y. 27.
8 Jeffersonville R.R. Co. v. Lanham, 27 Ind. 171.
4 Myers v. Murphy, 60 Ind. 282; Brown v. Leaeh, 107 Mass. 36-!.
6 People v. Morrigan, 29 Mich. 5.
6 Abbey v. J,ill, 5 Bing. 299, 30-!,
1 Woodcock v. Houldsworth, 16 M. & W . 12-!.
8 F1·antz VI. Ireland, 66 Barb. 3 6.
:9 J ordfl n v. 0$good, 109 Mass. 457.
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lar circumstances, than persons having no experience what-

ever with horses." l

126. Opinions of Experts in Miscellaneous Case*

The Subject Continued. The opinions of persons accus-

tomed to witness the agility and power of certain fish, in

overcoming obstructions in the ascent of rivers, and who

have acquired superior knowledge upon that subject, have

been held admissible for the purpose of showing that a

certain stream, in its natural state, would or would not be

ascendible by such fish. *' The witnesses had acquired from

observation, superior knowledge upon this subject. It

appears to us to fall within that class of cases in which the

opinions of persons skilled in any art, science, trade or

business are received." 2 A brick and tile maker, having

had some years experience in his trade, has been held com-

petent to give an opinion as an expert on the proper mode

of burning tiles, and as to what would be the effect of

burning in one way or another. 3 An architect has been per-

mitted to testify that the work done on a building was per-

formed in compliance with the contract. 4 One who had been
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engaged for over twenty years in the manufacture of paper,

has been held competent to testify as to what the condition of

a paper mill and its machinery was at a certain time. 5 The

opinion of a witness experienced m the use of guns, has

been received as to the length of time since the weapon was

discharged. 6 And it has been held that witnesses who saw

a pistol immediately after it had been discharged, and who

were familiar with such weapons, could be asked their

opinion on the question, whether the appearances indicated

how many barrels had been fired, and which ones. 7 A

witness accustomed to packing marbles for transportation,

has been permitted, against objection, to state whether cer-

1 Moreland v. Mitchell Couuty, 40 Iowa, 401.

2 Cottrill v. My rick, 12 Me. 222, 231.

3 Wiggins v. Wallace, 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 338.

4 Tucker v. Williams, 2 Hilton (X. Y.), 562.

5 Blodgett Paper Co. v. Farmer, 41 N. H. 401.

6 Monghon v. the State, 57 Ga. 102.

7 Wynne v. State, 5G Ga. 113.

lar circumstances, than persons having no experience whatever with horses." 1
§ 126. Opinions of Experts in Miscellaneous CasesThe Subject Continued. -The opinions of persons accustomed to witness the agility and power of certain fish, in
overcoming obstructions in the ascent of rivers, and who
have acquired superior knowledge upon that subject, have
been held admissible for the purpose of showing that a
certain stream, in its natural state, would or would not be
ascendible by such fish. '' The witnesses had acquired from
observation, superior knowledge upon this subject. It
appears to us to fall within that class of cases in which the
opinions of persons skilled in any art, science, trade or
business are received.' ' 2 A brick and tile maker, having
bad some years experience in his trade, has been held competent to give an opinion as an expert on the proper mode
of burning tiles, and as to what would be the effect of
burning in one way or another. 3 An architect has been permitted to testify that the work done on a building was per-·
formed in compliance with the contract. 4 • One who had been
engaged for over twenty years in the manufacture of paper,
has been held competent to testify as to what the condition of
a paper mill and its machinery was at a certain time. 5 The
opinion of a witness experienced ia the use of guns, has
been received as to the length of time since the weapon was
discharge<l. 6 And it has been held that witnesses who saw
a. pistol immediately after it had been discharged, and who
were familiar with such weapons, could be asked their
opinion on the question, whether the appearances indicated
how many barrels had been fired, and which ones. 7 A
witness accustomed to packing marbles for transportation,
has been permitted, against objection, to state whether cer1

Moreland v. Mitchell Cou:mty, 40 Iowa, 401.
Cottrill v. :Myrick, 12 ~le. 222 231.
3 Wiggins v. Wallace, 19 Barb. (N . Y.) 33 .
4
Tucker v. Williams, 2 Hilton (N. Y.), 562.
~Blodgett Paper Co . v. Farmer, 41 N. H. 401.
6 l\Iongbon v. the State, 57 Ga. 102.
7 'vYynne v. State, 5G Ga. 113.
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tain marbles were properly packed, the court declaring that

such a question was a proper one for the testimony of ex-

perts. 1 An expert has been allowed to testify as to the

usual manner in which zinc is imported. 2 A witness who is an

expert in the curing and care of meats, may testify whether

hams prepared in a certain prescribed way and shipped for

transportation to a specified point, if properly stowed and

cared for, "ought to have borne transportation' ' to that point. 3

Such a witness may also be asked whether hams shipped in a

specified condition, would arrive at their destination in as

good condition as when shipped, and as to what would likely

be the effect of the weather upon provisions so shipped. 4

127. Opinions of Experts in Miscellaneous Cases

The Subject Continued. The owner of a tan yard, who

had been engaged in the business of tanning for twenty-

three years, " seeing the work going on and knowing how

it was done," has been allowed to testify as an expert as to

matters connected with such business, although he was not

himself a practical tanner, but employed others to do the

work for him. 5 Where the question was as to the quality
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of the soap stone in a particular quarry, one who had been

engaged for forty years in quarrying soap stone, and who

had been employed in manufacturing soap stone into pipe for

aqueducts for half that time, was allowed in the court below

to testify as an expert as to the quality of the stone. But

on appeal, the court held that his testimony should not have

been received, saying : " It did not appear that he had ever

devoted any time or study to an investigation of the compo-

sition and characteristics of soap stone, or made any partic-

ular observations on that subject, so as to be better qualified

to give an opinion on the scientific question propounded to

him, than any member of the jury." 6 In an action to

1 Shriver v. Sioux City etc. R. R. Co., 24 Minn. 506

2 Richards v. Doe, 100 Mass. 524.

3 Leopold v. Van Kirk, 29 Wis. 648.

Kerehaw v. Wright, 115 Mass. 331

5 .Nelson v. Wood, 62 Ala. 175.

6 Pa^re v.. Parker, 40 X. H. 59

tain marbles were properly packed, the C?urt declaring that
such a question was a proper one for the testimony of experts.1 An expert has been allowed to testify as t o the
usual manner in which zinc is imported. 2 A witness who is an
expert in the curing and care of meats, may testify whether
hams prepared in a certain prescribed way and shipped for
transportation to a specified point, if properly stowed and
cared for., "-'ought to have borne transpor~ation'' to that point. 3
Such a witness may also be asked whether hams shipped in a
specified condition, would arrive at their destination in as
good condition as when shipped, and as to what would likely
be the effect of the weather upon provisions so shipped. 4
.§ 127. Opinions of Experts in Miscellaneous C~ses
The Subject Continued. -The owner of a tan yard , who
had been engaged in the business of tanning for twentythree years, '' seeing the work going on and knowing how
it :was done,'' has heen allowed to testify as an expert as to
matters connected with such business, although he was not
himself a practical tanner, but employed others to do the
work for him.15 \V·h ere the question was as to the quality
of the soap stone in a particular quarry, one who had been
engaged for forty years in quarrying soap' stone, and who
had ·been employed in manufacturing soap stone into pipe for
aqueducts for half that tim~, was allowed in the court below
to testify as an e:x:pert as to the quality of the stone. But
o.n appeal, the court held that his testimony should not have
been received, saying: "It did not appear that he had ever
devoted any time or study to an investigation of the composition and characteristics of soap stone, or made any particular 0bservations on that subject, so as to be better qualified
to give an opinion on the scientific question propounded to
him, than any member of the jury. " 6 Iu an action to
1

Shriver v. Sioux City etc. R.R. Co., 24 Mhrn. 506
Richards v. Doo, 100 Mass. 524.
s Leopold v. Van Kirk, 29 Wis. 548.
,. Kershaw v. W1ight, 115 Mass. 361
5 .Nelson v. Wood 62 Ala. 175..
·6 J>~e v.• Parker, 40 N . .H. 59
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recover compensation for an injury caused by the explosion

of an oil still, a witness who was a steam fitter, and who had

no knowledge of stills except such as he had derived from

working with them, and fitting them up after they were put

up, has been allowed to state whether, in his opinion, the

iron of which the tank was composed was sufficiently

strong." 1 Where the question was whether a sewer con-

structed along the walls of a building was properly con-

structed, the Supreme Court of Indiana, reversing the court

below, held a witness not qualified to testify on that subject,

who, on his preliminary examination, stated: " I have

superintended the laying of some sewer pipe along the sides

of walls. I have noticed some little such work, but have

not specially noticed such work. I have put in sewers here

in streets, and have seen some such work as this done in

Indianapolis." 2 A witness who had on two occasions exam-

ined cotton that had been under water, but who did not

know how long such cotton had been under the water, has

been held incompetent to testify as to the injury which

would probably be done to cotton by remaining from 12 to
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24 hours under water. * In an action against a tender of a

draw bridge, to recover damages by reason of his neglect to

have due regard and caution for public travel, it has been

held improper to receive the opinion of another draw tender

us to the necessity of keeping a gate shut and lanterns

lighted while the draw was open in the night time. The

question was not one of science or skill. 4 For the same

reason, it is error to allow experts to testify whether a cer-

tain cattle guard was suitable and sufficient to prevent cattle

from getting on a railroad track. 5 And for the same reason,

farmers cannot be allowed to express an opinion as to the

sufficiency of a fence to restrain cattle. 6

1 Ardeseo Oil Co. v. Gilsou, 63 Penn. St. 146.

2 Hinds v. Harbon, 58 Ind. 124.

3 Weaver v. Alabama etc. Co., 35 Ala. 176.

* Nowell v. Wright, 3 Allen (Mass.), 166.

5 Swartout v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 14 Hun (N. Y.), 575.

6 Euright v. Railroad Co., 33 Cal. 230.

recover compensation for an injury caused by the explo ion
-0f an oil still, a witness who was a steam fitter, and who ha<l
no knowledge of stills except such as he had derived from
working with them, and fitting them up after they were put
up, has been allowed to state whether, in his opinion, the
iron of which the tank was composed was sufficiently
strong." 1 '\Vhere the question was whether a sewer constructed along the walls of a building was properly constructed, the Supreme Court of Indiana, reversing the court
below, held a witness not qualified to testify on that subject,
who, on his preliminary examination, stated : "I have
superintended the laying of some sewer pipe along the sides
of wall s. I have noticed some little such work, but have
not specially noticed such work. I have put in sewers here
ju streets, and have seen some such work as this done in
Indianapolis." 2 A witness who had on two occasions examined cotton that had been under water, but who did not
know how long such cotton had been under the water, has
been held incompetent to testify as to the injury which
would probably be done to .cotto1i IJy remaining from 12 to
24 hours under water.~ In an action against a tender of a
draw bridge, to recover damages by reason of his neglect to
have due regard and caution for public travel, it has been
held imp1:oper to receive the opinion of another draw tender
.a s to the necessity of kee~ing a gate shut and lanterns
lighted while the draw was open in the night time. The
question was not one of science or skill .4 For the same
reason, it is error to allow experts to testify whether a certain cattle guard was suitable and sufficient to prevent cattle
from getting on a railroad track. 5 And for the same reason,
farmers cannot be allowed to express an opinion as to the
sufficiency of a fence to restrain cattle. 6
Aruesco Oil Co. v. Gilson, 63 Penn. St. 146.
Hinds v. Harbon, 58 Ind. 124.
3 Weaver v. Alabama etc. Co., 35 Ala. 176.
4 Nowell v. Wrigllt, 3 Allen (Mass.), 166.
5 Swartout v. N. Y. Central R.R. Co., 14 Hun (N . Y.), 575.
~Enright v. R ailroad Co., 3~ Cal. 230.
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128. The Scientific Investigation of Handwriting.

Calligraphic experts have for years asserted the possibility

of investigating handwriting upon scientific principles, and

the courts have consequently admitted such persons to tes-

tify in cases of disputed handwriting. Judicial experience

has justified to a certain extent the claims made by the ex-

perts. It may be asserted, therefore, that experiment and

observation have disclosed the fact that there are certain

general principles which may be relied upon in questions

pertaining to the genuineness of handwriting. For instance,

it seems to be established that in every person's manner of

writing, there is a certain distinct prevailing character,

which can be discovered by observation, and being once

known can be afterwards applied as a standard to try other

specimens of writing, the genuineness of which is disputed. 1

Handwriting, notwithstanding it maybe artificial, is always,

in some degree, the reflex of the nervous organization of

the writer. Hence there is in each person's handwriting

gome distinctive characteristic, which, as being the reflex of

lais nervous organization, is necessarily independent of his
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own will, and unconsciously forces the writer to stamp the

writing as his own. Those skillful in such matters state that

it is iinposssble for a person to successfully disguise in a

writing of any length this characteristic of his penmanship ;

that the tendencies to angles or curves developed in the

analysis of this characteristic may be mechanically measured

by placing a fine specimen within a coarser specimen, and

that the strokes will be parallel if written by the same per-

son, the nerves influencing the direction which the will gives

to the pen.

So, too, it is claimed that no two autograph signatures,

written in a natural hand, will be perfect fac similes. In

the famous Howland will case, 2 Prof. Pierce, a very distin-

guished mathematician, at that time the professor of math-

ematics in Harvard University, testified that the odds were

1 See Plunkett v. Bowman, 2 McCorcl, 139.

* 4 Am. Law Review, G25. G49.

(12)

§ 128. The Scientific Investigation of Handwriting.- .
Calligraphic experts have for years asserted the possibility
of investigating handwriting upon scientific principles, and
the courts have consequently admitted such persons to testify in cases of disputed handwriting. Judicial experience
has justified to a certain extent the claims made by the experts. It may be asserted, therefore, that experiment and
observation have disclosed the fact that there are certain
general principles which may be relied upon in questions
pertaining to the genuineness of handwriting. For im;tance,
it seems to be e::stablished that in every perso.n ' s manner of
writing, there is a certain distinct prevailing character,
which can be discovered by observation, and being once
known can be afterwards applied as a :-;tandard to try other
specimens of writing, the genuineness of which is disputed. 1
Handwriting, notwithstanding it may be artificial, is always,
in some degree, the reflex of the nervous organization of
the writer. Hence there is in each person's handwriting
some distinctive characteristic, which, as being the reflex of
}lis nervous organiz.ttion, is necessarily independent of his
own will, and unconsciously forces the writer to stamp the
writing as his own. Those skillful in such matters state that
it is imposssble for a person to successfully disguise in a
writing of any length this charactedstic of his penmanship ;
that the tendencies to angles or qurves developed in the
analysis of this characteristic may be mechanically measured
by placing a fine specimen within a coarser specimen, and
that the strokes will be parallel if written by the same person, the nerves influencing the direction which the will gives
to the pen.
So, too, it is claimed that no two autograph signatures,
written in a natural hand, will be perfect facsimiles. In
the famous Howland will case, 2 Prof. Pierce, a very distinguished mathematician, at that time the professor of mathematics in Harvard University, testified that the odds were
1

i

See Plnokett v. Bowman, 2McCord,139.
4 Am. Law Review, G'25. GJ9.
(12)
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just exactly 2,866,000,000,000,000,000,000 to 1 that an

individual could not with a pen, write his name three times

so exactly alike as were the three alleged signatures of

Sylvia Ann Howland, the testatrix, to a will and two codi-

cils. The experts, therefore, claim, that if, upon super-

imposition against the light, they find that two signatures

perfectly coincide, that they are perfect fac similes, that it is

a probability, amounting practically to a certainty, that one

of the signatures is a forgery.

It thus appears that there is abundant justification for the

holding of the courts that there is a science of handwriting,

and that experts who have qualified themselves by study

and experience, should be received to testify to the genu-

iness and identity of handwriting.

129. Experts in Handwriting Who are such. It is,

of course, error to receive the opinion of any witness, of-

fered as an expert, until he has first been examined touch-

ing his skill and experience in the examination and compar-

ison of handwriting ; to the end that the court may be sat-

isfied that he is really possessed of skill in that department
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of inquiry. 1 The necessity of such a preliminary examina-

tion in all cases, has been elsewhere fully considered. 2

The principle has been laid down in general terms, that

whenever handwriting is a subject of controversy in judicial

proceedings^ the opinions of " witnesses who by study,

occupation and habit have been skillful in marking and dis-

tinguishing the characteristics of handwriting," may be re-

ceived in evidence. 3 Hence writing engravers, accustomed

accurately to examine the formation of letters in different

handwritings, and who had acquired skill from their occu-

pation of making engravings of handwritings, have been

allowed to testify as experts in such cases. 4 In the same

1 State v. Ward, 29 Vt. 225, 236; McCracken v. West, 17 Ohio, 16.

s See 15,.1,6,.17,, 18.

8 Sweetser v. Lowell, 33 Me. 450.

4 Spear v. Bone, MSS. (cited in 5 A. & E. 709) ; Regina v. Williams. 8

Cafe. & P. 34; Norman v. Morell, 4 Vesey Ch. 768; Turnbull v. Dodds,

6I& (Sc.) 901..

just exactly 2,86 6,000,000,000,000,000,000 to 1 that an
individual could not with a pen, write his name three times
so exactly alike as were the three alleged signatures of
Sylvia Ann Howland, the testatrix, to a will and two codi~ils.
The experts, therefore, clair'n, that if, upon superimposition against the light, they find that two signatures
perfectiy coincide, that they are perfect Jae similes, that it is
a proqability, amounting practically to a certainty, that one
of the signatures is a forgery.
It thus appears that there is abundant justification for the
holding of the courts that there is a science of handwriting,
and that experts who have qualified themselves by study
and experience, should be received to testify to the genuiness and identity of handwriting.
§ 129. Experts in Handwriting-who are such.- It is,
@f course, error to receive the opinion of any witness, offered as an expert, until he has first been examined t?uching his skill and experience in the examination and comparison of handwriting; to the end that the court may be satisfied that h.e is really possessed of skill in that department
~:f irnquiry. 1 The necessity of such a preliminary examina·
tion in all cases, has been elsewhere fully considered. 2
The principle has been laid down in general terms, that
whenever handwriting is a subject of controversy in judicial
proceedings,. the opinions of " witnesses who by study,
occupation and habit have been skillful in marking and distinguishing the characteristics of handwriting," may be reeeived in evidence.3 Hence writing engravers, accustomed
soourately to examine the formation of letters in different
handwritings, and who had· acquired skill fro l their occu·
pation of making engravings of handwri ings, have been
allowed to testify as experts in such cases. 4 In the same
1

State v. Ward, 29 V.t. 2'.25, 236; McCracken v. West, 17 Ohio, 16.
See§§ 15,.1.6,.17., 18.
3 Sweetser v. Lowell, 33 Me. 450.
•Spear v. Bone, MSS. ~cited in 5 A. & E. 709); Reginn. v. Williams~
"al'._& P. 3J; NormaR>v. Morell, 4 Vesey Ch. 768; Turnbull v. Dodd
6 Jl>i. (Sc.) 901 •.
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way tellers l and cashiers 2 of banks have been received as

experts, having acquired skill in passing on the genuineness

of signatures to notes and checks. And in general any offi-

cer of a bank whose business it is to examine papers with a

view of detecting alterations and erasures, and ascertaining

genuine from spurious writings, is an expert in questions

pertaining to handwriting. 3 So a clerk in the postoffice,

accustomed to the inspection of franks for the detection of

forgeries, has been deemed to possess the qualifications of

an expert, 4 So has a sheriff of a county, 5 and a county

clerk, 6 each having been accustomed to pass on the genuine-

ness of signatures. One who for some years had been the

bookkeeper and cashier of a commercial house, and as such

had experience in the examination of handwriting to deter-

mine its genuiness, has been held sufficiently qualified to

give evidence as an expert. 7 A writing master has testified

as an expert, the question being whether a writing was in a

natural or simulated hand. 8 A person, by profession a law-

yer, was held a competent witness, his preliminary examina-

tion showing that he had occasion to examine handwriting
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with a view to a comparison of writings ; that he had been

called to the stand as a witness in regard to them, a good

many times ; that he had never made a business of criti-

cising writing, but had been accustomed to do it, and sup-

posed he could identify handwriting pretty well. 9

130. Experts in Handwriting Whoaresuch The

Subject Continued. It is evident from the cases referred

to in the foregoing section that great importance attaches to

the avocation in life of the witness. If it has been such as

1 Speideti v. State, 3 Texas Ct. of App. 159.

Dubois v. Baker, 30 N. Y. 355, 361 ; People v. Hewitt, 2 Parker's Cr.

Cas. 20; State v. Phair, 48 Vt.'366, 369; Lyonv. Lyman, 9 Conn. 59, 60;

Murphy v. Hagerman, Wright (Ohio), 293.

3 Pate v. People, 3 Gilm. 644, 659.

4 Kevett v. Braham, 4 Term, 49.

Yates v. Yates, 76 N. C. 142.

State v. Phair, 48 Vt. 366, 369.

7 State v. Ward, 39 Vt. 225.

8 Moody v.. Rowell, 17 Pick. (Mags.) 490.

9 State v. Phair, 48 Vt. 366, 369.

way tellers 1 and cashiers 2 of banks have been received as
experts, having acquired skill in passing on the genuineness
of signatures to notes and checks. And in general any officer of a bank whose business it is t"> examine papers with a
view of detectmg alterations and erasures, and ascertaining
genuine from spurious writings, is an expert in questions
pertaining to handwriting. 3 So a clerk in the postoffice,
accustomed to the inspection of franks for the detection of
forgeries, has been deemed to possess the qualifications of
an expert. 4 So has a sheriff of a county, b and a county
clerk, 6 each having been accustomed to pass on the genuineness of signatures. One who for some years had been the
bookkeeper and cashier of a commercial house, ~nd as such
bad experience in the examination of handwriting to determine its genuiness, has been held sufficiently qualified to
give evidence as an expert. 7 A writing master has testified
as an expert, the question being whether a writing was in a
natural or simulated hand. 8 A person, by profession a lawyer, was held a competent witness, his preliminary examination showing that he bad occasion to examine handwriting
with a view to a comparison of writings; that he had been
called to the stand as a witness in regard .to them, a good
many times; that he had never made a bu.siness of criticising writing, but had been accustomed to do it, and supposed he could identify handwriting pretty well. 9
§ 130. Experts in Handwriting-Who are such-The
Subject Continued.- It is evident from the cases referred
t-0 in the foregoing section that great importance attaches to
the ayocation in life of the witness. If it has been such as
Speiden v. State, 3 Texas Ct. of App. 159.
Dubois v. Baker, 30 N. Y. 355, 361; People v. Hewitt, 2 Parker's Cr.
Cas. 20; State v. Phair, 48 Vt.-366, 369; Lyon v. Lyman, 9 Conn. 59, 60;
Murphy v. Hagerman, Wright (Ohio), 293.
3 Pate v. People, 3 Gilm. 644, 659.
• Revett v. Braham, 4 Term, 49.
6 Yates v. Yates, 76 N. C. 142.
'6 State v. Phair, 48 Vt. 366, 369.
1 State v. Ward, 39 Vt. 225.
8 Moody v, Rowell, 17 Pick. (Ma~.) 490.
11 State v. Phair, 48 Vt. 366, 369.
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naturally qualifies him to judge of handwriting, the court

will allow him to testify as an expert. If, however, his

business experience has not been such as to give him any

special skill in the examination of disputed writings, he will

not be permitted to testify as an expert, unless it is made

to appear that he has in some other way acquired actual

skill and scientific knowledge. 1 The rule is well laid down

in a recent case in the Supreme Court of California, where

it is said that the witness " must have been educated in the

business about which he testifies ; or it must first be shown

that he has acquired actual' skill and scientific knowledge

upon the subject." 2 If the witness has really acquired ac-

tual skill and scientific knowledge upon the subject of hand-

writing, he is none the less an expert because he has not

happened to have been in situations where his duty required

him to distinguish between genuine and counterfeit hand-

writing. 3

. The fact that the expert has no other knowledge of the

writing in dispute than that derived by a comparison of the

disputed writing with others that are genuine, is not re-
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garded as any disqualification whatever. 4 This must be

regarded as the rule, although it was laid down at one time

in the inferior courts of New York, that an expert who had

never seen the party write could not give his opinion as to

the genuineness of the writing in question based solely on a

comparison of writings, but that he was to testify to the

condition and appearance of the words, and of the letters

and characters contained in the writings, and point out and

explain similarities and differences. 5 When an expert ac-

quires a knowledge of the handwriting of a person by sim-

ply observing him write several times, and this for the pur-

1 State y. Tompkins, 71 Mo. 616; Wagner v. Jacoby, 26 Mo. 530.

2 Goldstein v. Black, 50 Cal. 464.

8 Sweetser v. Lowell, 33 Me. 450.

* Miles v. Loomis, 75 N. Y. 287; State v. Shinborn, 46 N. H. 497; Cal-

kins v. State, 14 Ohio St. 222; Macomber v. Scott, 10 Kans. 335; Moody

v. Eowell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 490.

5 Roe v. Roe, 40 N. Y. Superior Ct. 1 ; Frank v. Chemical National

Bank, 37 ib. 30.

naturally qualifies him to judge of handwriting, the court
will allow him to t estify as an expert. If, however, his
business experience has not been such as to give him any
special skill in the examination of disputed writings, he will
not be permitted to testify as an expert, unless it is made
to appear that he has in some other way acquired actual
skill and scientific knowledge. 1 The rule is well laid down
in a recent case in the Supreme Court of California, where
it is said that the witness "must have been educated in the
business about which he testifies ; or it must first be shown
that he has acquired actual· skill and scientific knowledge
upon the subject.'' 2 If the witness has really acquired actual skill and scientific knowledge upon the subject of handwriting, he is none the less an expert because he has no t
happened to have been in situations where his duty required
him to distinguish between genuine and counterfeit handwriting.3
The fact that the expert has no other knowledge of the
writing in dispute than that derived by a comparison of the
disputed writing with others that are genuine, is not regarded as any disqualification whatever. 4 This must be
regarded as the rule, although it was laid down at one time
in the inferior courts of New York, that an expert who had
never seen the party write could not give his opinion as to
the genuineness of the writing in question based solely on a
comparison of writings, but that he was to testify to the
condition and appearance of the words, and of the letters
and characters contained in the writings, and point out and
explain similarities and differences. 5 When an expert acquires a knowledge of the handwriting of a person by simply observing him write several times, and this for the pur1

State V:· Tompkins, 71 Mo. 616; Wagner v. J acoby, 26 Mo. 530.
Goldstein v. Black, 50 Cal. 464.
a Sweetser v. Lowell, 33 Me. 450.
4 Miles v. Loomis, 75 N. Y. 287; State v. Shin born, 46 N. H. 497; Calkins v. State, 14 Ohio St. 222; Macomber v. Scott, 10 Kans. 335; Moody
v. Rowell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 490.
5 Roe v. Roe, 40 N. Y. Superior Ct . 1; Frank v. Chemical National
Bank, 37 ib. 30.
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pose of testifying, it is laid down that he is incompetent to

give an opinion as to the genuineness of that person's sig-

nature. 1 It is quite possible that the party may have writ-

ten differently through design. 2

Mere opportunity afforded for observation of handwriting

does not of itself qualify one to give testimony as an ex-

pert in the science of handwriting, and the mere fact that a

witness has sometimes compared the signatures of individ-

uals, where disagreements as to their genuineness have

arisen, has been held not sufficient to render him competent

to testify as an expert in disputed writings. 3

131 . Experts in Handwriting The Rule as Stated in

Iowa. In Iowa the court has been somewhat liberal in its

determination of what is necessary to qualify one as an ex-

pert in handwriting. According to the view taken by that

court it would appear that almost any business man is quali-

fied to express an opinion as an expert in such cases. A

witness has there been held competent, who testified on his

preliminary examination that he did not consider himself

an expert in handwriting, and had never made it a business
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to compare or detect feigned or forged handwriting. That

he presumed he had some skill in comparing handwriting,

but did not pretend to any extra skill, simply thinking that

he was as good a judge as business men generally. He had

been a clerk in a store, the editor of a newspaper, and for

the last fifteen years a lawyer. He had examined a good

deal of writing, and said he had been in the habit of examin-

ing bank bills to test their genuineness. So, in the same case,

a merchant was held competent, who did not profess to be

an expert, but had examined bank bills to detect counter-

feits. 4 A witness who merely professed to be as good a

judge of handwriting as business men generally, would

certainly not be regarded in some courts as possessing the

peculiar skill of an expert. But the court say that, " It is

1 Reese v. Reese, 90 Penn. St. 89.

1 Stranger v. Searle, 1 Espinasse, 14.

3 Goldstein v. Black, 50 Gal. 464.

4 Hyde v. Woolfolk, 1 Iowa, 159.

pose of testifying, it is laid down that he is incompetent to
give an opinion as to the genuineness of that person's signaturc.1 It is quite possible that the party may ha.ve written differently through design. 2
Mere opportunity afforded for observation of handwriting
does not of itself qualify one to give testimony as an expert in the science of handwriting, and the mere fact that a
witness has sometimes compared the signatures of individuals , where disagreements as to their genuineness have
arisen, haA been held not sufficient to render him competent
to testify as an expert in disputed writings. 3
§ 131. Experts in Handwriting -The Rule as Stated in
Iowa.- In Iowa the court has been somewhat liberal in its
determination of what is necessary to qualify one as an expert in handwriting. According to the view taken by that
c ourt it would appear that almost any business man is qualified to express an opinion as an expert in such cases. A
witneRs has there been held competent, who testified on his
preliminary examination that he did not consider himsdf
an expert in handwriting, and had never made it a business
to compare or detect feigned or forged handwriting. That
he presumed he had some skill in comparing handwriting,
but did not pretend to any extra skill, simply thinking that
he was as good a fudge as business men generally. He had
been a clerk in a store, the editor of a newspaper, and for
the last fifteen years a lawyer. He had examined· a good
deal of writing, and said he had been in the habit of examining bank bills to test their genuineness. So, in the same ca.se,
a merchant was held competent, who did not profess to be
an expert , but had examined bank bills to detect counterfeits. 4 A witness who merely profe~sed to be as good a
judge of handwriting as husiness men generally, would
certainly not be regarded in some courts us possessing the
peculia.r skill of an expert. But the court say that, " It is
1

R eese v. Reese, 90 Penn. St. 89.
Stra nger v. Searle, 1 E spinasse, 14.
a Goldstein v. Black, 50 Cal. 464.
'Hyde v. Woolfolk, 1lowa,159 .
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true that persons giving evidence on a matter pertaining to

their particular science, trade or art, come most strictly and

technically under the term experts,' but we cannot consent

to the proposition that no others come within it, and are

allowed to be witnesses in any case. It may very probably

be true, that none are to be taken as experts on matters per-

taining to a particular calling, art or science, but those who

are, or have been practiced, in such art or science. But

there are many subjects of inquiry which do not belong to-

a particular art, etc., but on which a greater or less degree

of knowledge is common to many men in different call-

ings." And the court concluded that a comparison of

writings did not present such an inquiry as required a wit-

ness of a particular calling as an expert, but that his com-

petency depended on his means of knowledge as a busi-

ness man and his intelligence.

132. The Testimony of Experts in Handwriting.

Experts in handwriting are permitted to express an opinion

on the question whether a writing is in a natural or a simu-

lated hand ; * whether it appears more cramped and confined
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than the hand which the writer usually wrote ; 2 and as to

which of two instruments exhibits the greater ease and fa-

cility of writing. 3 They have been permitted to testify that

a certain writing bore the appearance of having been touched

by a pen a second time, as if done by some one attempting

to copy or imitate the handwriting of another. 4 And on an

indictment for uttering a forged will, which, together with

writings in support of it, it was suggested had been written

over pencil marks which had been rubbed out, the testi-

1 Queen v. Shepherd, 1 Cox Cr. Cas. 237; Goodtitle v. Braham, 4 Term

497; Bex v. Cator, 4 Esp. 117; Spear T. Bone (MS.) cited in 5 A. & E.

709; Reilly v. Rivett, 1 Cases in Eng. Eccls. Cts. 43, note a; Moody v.

Rowell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 490 ; Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.),

295; Burdick v. Hunt, 43 Ind. 381; Miles v. Loomis, 17 Hun (N. Y.) r

372; Goodyear v. Vosburgh, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 154; People v. Hevritt,

Parker Cr. Cas. 20.

2 Dubois v. Baker, 30 N. Y. 355, 362.

8 Demerritt v. Randall, 116 Mass. 331,

4 Spear v. Bone, supra.

true that persons giving evidence on a matter pertaining to
their p~rticular science, trade or art, come most strictly and
technically under the term ' experts,' but we cannot consent
to the proposition that no others come within it, and are
allowed to be witnesses in any cs.se,. It may very probably
be true, that none are 'to be taken as experts on matters per-taining to a particular calling, art or science, but those who
are, or have been practiced, in such art or science . But
there are many subjects of inquiry which do not belong toa particular art, etc., but on which a greater or less degree
of knowledge is common to many men in different callings." And the court concluded that a comparison of
writings did not present such an inquiry as required a witness of a particular calling as an expert, but that his competency depended on his means of knowledge- as a business man and his intelligence.
§ 132. The Testimony of Exp~rtS' in Handwriting.Experts in handwriting are permitted to express an opinion
on the question whether a writing is in a natural or a simulated hand ; 1 whether jt appears m·o re cramped aud confined
than the hand which the writer usually wrote; 2 and as to
which of two instruments exhibits the greater ease and facility of wri.ting. 3 They have bee-n permitted to testify that
a certain writing bore the appearance of having been touched
by a pen a second time, as if done by- some one attempting
to copy or imitate the handwriting,of another. 4 And on an
indictment for uttering a forged will, which, t9gether with ·
writings in support of it, it was· suggested had been written
over pencil marks which had been rubbed o.ut, the testi1

Queen v. Shepherd, 1 Cox Cr. Oas. 237; Goodtitle v. Braham, 4Term
497; Rex v. Cator, 4 Esp. 117; Spear v. Bone (MS.) cited in 5 A. & E.
709; Reilly v. _Rivett, 1 Cases in Eng. E.ccls. Cts. 43, note a; Moody v.
Rowell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 490; Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.),
295; Burdick v. Hunt, 43 Ind. 381; Miles v. Loomis, 17 Hun (N. Y.))"
372; Goodyear v. Vosburgh, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 154; People v. Hewitt,
Parker Cr. Oas. 20.
2 Dubois v. Baker, 30 N. Y. 355, 362.
a Demerritt v. Randall, 116 Mass. 331~
4 Spear v. Bone, supra.
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inony of an engraver was received, who had examined the

paper with a mirror and traced the pencil marks. 1

It has been held competent to ask an expert whether cer-

tain parts of a writing could have been made with a pen,

but not whether it could have been made with an instru-

ment which was found in the possession of the defendant. 2

So an expert may testify whether two documents were writ-

ten with the same pen and ink, and at the same time. 3 And

when it is alleged and denied that the body and signature of

an instrument are in the same handwriting, he may be asked

to express an opinion whether the two parts were written

by the same person. 4

Where one writing crosses another, an expert may testify

which in his opinion was written first. 6 His opinion has

also been taken on the question, whether certain words on

a paper shown him, were written before or after the paper

was folded. 6 And the judicial committee and lords of the

privy council have called an expert for the purpose of ob-

taining his opinion as to whether a circumflex line, sur-

rounding the names of the witnesses to a will, was made
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before or after the signature. 7

In consequence of a deed having been drawn up "in an

unusual and slovenly manner, and so as at first sight to

cause doubt as to the genuineness of a part of it," Chief

Justice MEREDITH ordered an expertise in the .Quebec Court

of Review, and this course was not disapproved of either by

the Court of Appeals or the Lords of the Privy Council. 8

133. The Testimony of Experts in Handwriting The

Subject Continued. It is well settled that expert testimony

* Regina v. Williams, 8 Car. & P. 34.

2 Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Gush. (Mass.) 295.

3 Fulton v. Hood, 34 Penu. St. 365; Quinsigmond Bank v. Hobbs, 11

Gray (Mass.) 250.

Keese v. Reese, 90 Penn. St. 89.

* Cooper v. Bockett, 4 Moore P. C. 433; Dubois v. Baker, 30 N. Y.

355.

6 Bacon v. Williams, 13 Gray (Mass.), 525.

7 Cooper v. Bockett, 4 Moore P. C. 433.

8 See Hamel v. Panet, 3 Quebec Law R. 173, 175.

mony of an engraver was received, who had examined the
paper with a mirror and traced the pencil marks. 1
It has been held competent to ask an expert whether eertain parts of a writing could have been made with a pen,
but not whether it could have been made with an instrument which was found in the possession of the defendant. 2
So an expert may testify whether two documents were written with the same pen and ink, and at the same time. 3 And
when it is alleged and denied that the body and signat1:1re of
an instrument are in the same handwriting, he may be asked
to express an opinion whether the two parts were written.
by the same person. 4
vVhere one writing crosses another, au expert may testify
which in his opinion was written first. 6 His opinion has
also been taken on the question, whether certain words on.
a paper shown him, were written before or after the paper
wae folded. 6 And the judicial committee and lords of the
privy council have called an expert for the purpose of obtaining his opinion as to whether a circumflex line, surrounding the names of the witnesses to a will, was made
before or after the signature .7
In consequence of a deed having been drawn up "in a11
unusual and slovenly manner, and so as at first sight to
cause doubt as to the genuineness of a part of it," Chief
Ju stice :MEREDITH ordered an expertise in the Quebec Court
of Review, and this course was not disapproved of either by
the Court of Appeals or the Lords of the Privy Council. 8
§ 133. The Testimony of Experts in Handwriting-The
Subject Continued.-It is well settled that expert testimony
Regina v. Williams, 8 Car. & P. 34.
Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295.
3 Fultou v. Hood, 34 PenL. St. 365; Quinsigmond ·Bank v. Hobbs, 11
Gray ( ass.) 250.
4 Reese v. Reese, 90 Penn. St. 89.
6 Cooper v. Bockett, 4 Moore P. C. 433; Dubois v. Baker, 30 N. Y.
355.
6 Bacon v. Williams, 13 Gray (Mass.), 525.
1 Cooper v. Bockett, 4 Moore P. C. 433 .
I! See Hamel v. Panet, 3 Quebec Law R. 173, 175.
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is admissible upon the question of the alteration 1 or erasure

of writings. 2 A holograph will, in which alterations and

interlineations appeared, has been admitted to probate upon

the testimony of an expert, that in his opinion, the altera-

tions were written at the same time as the rest of the will. 8

An expert accustomed to the use of the microscope, having

examined the note in question through that instrument, has

been allowed to testify that the word " year" in the body

of the note had been erased, and the word " day " written

upon the erasure. 4 So an expert has been permitted to ex-

press an opinion, that a note has been altered by the substi-

tution of one figure for another, 5 and whether certain words

in a writing had been cancelled. 6

An engraver has been examined as to an illegible writing, 7

and, in general, the testimony of experts is admissible

whenever the writing is obscure and difficult to be deci

phered. 8 If the writing is ancient, an expert may state his

belief as to the probable period at which it was written. 9

It has been held that an expert could not express an opinion

that certain words were interpolated into a written agree-
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ment after the signature was affixed, if such opinion was

founded on the situation and crowded appearance of the

words. 10 And how much a man can improve his handwriting

in a short time, is not a subject for the testimony of experts.

It has been held, therefore, improper to ask an expert

1 Moye v. Herudon, 30 Miss. 118; Viutcn v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287; Pate

v. The People, 3 Gilm. (111.) 644.

2 Edelin v. Sanders Ex'r. 8 Md. 118; Yates v. Waugh, 1 Jones (N. C.)

Law. 483. See Swan v. O'Fallon, 7 Mo. 231; Wagner v. Jacoby, 26

Mo. 530.

3 In the Goods of Hindmarch, 1 P. & M. 307.

< Dubois v. Baker, 30 X. Y. 355.

* Nelson v. Johnson. 18 Ind. 329.

Beach v. O'Riley. 14 W. Va. 55.

1 Norman v. Morell, 4 Vese}', ch. 768.

8 Masters v. Masters. 1 P. Win. 425; Stone v. Hubbard, 7 Cush. (Mass.)

595. It is a question for the jury and not for the court to decipher illeg-

ible letters or figures, Armstrong v. Burrows, 6 Watts. 266, 268.

9 Tracy Peerage Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 154; Doe v. Suckermore, 5 Ad. &

Ellis, 703, 718, per Coleridge, J.

is admissible upon the question of the alteration1 or erasure
of writings. 2 A holograph will, in which alterations and
interlineations ~ppeared, has been admitted to probate upon
the testimony of an expert, that in his opinion, the alterations were written at the same time as the rest of the will. 3
An expert accustomed to the use of the microscope, having
examined the note in question through that instrument, has
been allowed to testify that the word '' year '' in the body
of the note had been erased, and the word " day" written
upon the erasure. 4 So an expert has been permitted to express an opinion, that a note has been altered by the substitution of one ·figure for another, 5 and whether certain· words
in a writing had been cancelled. 6
An engraver has been examined as to an illegible writing,7
an<l, in general, the testimony of experts is admissible
whenever the writing is obscure and difficult to be dect
phered. 8 If the writing is ancient,. an expert may state his
belief as to the probable period at which it was written. 9
It has been held that an expert could not express au opinion ·
that certain words were interpolated into a written agreement after the signature was affixed, if such opinion was
founded on the situation and crowded appearance of the
words. 10 And how much a man can improve his handwriting
in a short time, is not a subject for the testimony of experts.
It has been held, therefore, improper to ask an expert

10 Jewett v. Draper, 6 Allen (Mass.), 434.

1 ~Ioye

v. Herndon, 30 Miss. 118; Vinton v. Peck, H Mich. 287; Pate
v. 'l'he People, 3 Gilm. (Ill.) 644.
2 Edelin v. Sanders Ex'r. 8 Md. 118 ; Yates v. Waugh, 1 Jones (N. C.)
Law ~ 483. Ree Swan v. O"Fallon, 7 Mo. 231; Wagner v. Jacoby, 26
Mo. 530.
·
s. In the Goods of Hindmarch, 1 P. & M. 307.
•Dubois v. Baker, 30 N. Y. 355.
5 Nelson v. Johnson. 18 Ind. 329.
• Bea:ch v. O'Riley. 1-! W. Va. 55.
r Norman v. Morell , 4 Vesey, ch. 768.
8 Masters v . .Masters, 11'. vVm. 425; Stone v. Hubbard, 7 Uusb. (Mass.)
595. It is a question for the jury and not fort.he court to decipher illeg·
ible letters or fi!?,"mes, Arm strong v. Burrows, 6 Watts. 266, 268.
9 Tracy Peerage Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 154; Doe v. Suckennore, 5 Ad. &
Ellis, 703, 718, per Coleri<lge, J.
10 Jewett v. Draper, 6 Allen (~Jass . ) , 434:.
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whether a man could, within a short time, so improve his

handwriting, as shown by the standard signatures of the

testator, as to make a signature of as good a handwriting as

that of the will. 1

134. The Testimony of Experts Based on tlie Nature

.of the Ink. Where a writing purports to be of ancient or

recent date, the testimony of experts, who have made a

jnicro-chemical examination of the ink in which the instru-

ment is written, is received to show the nature of the ink,

whether it was found fresh or old, and whether it was of

such a nature as to grow old rapidly. 2 Such testimony is

nl so received when the question arises whether a portion of

the writing was made at a time different from that at which

the rest of the instrument was written, or whether different

inks were employed. 3 Cases have been referred to in the

sections immediately preceding this, showing that experts

.are permitted to express an opinion as to the probable time

at which an instrument was written, whether different parts

of the same instrument were written at the same time, and

with the same ink, and where two writings cross each other,
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iis to which was written first. In all these inquiries much

Jight can be obtained from experts skillful in the micro-

1 McKeone v. Barnes, 108 Mass. 344, 317.

2 See 18 Am. Law .Register (N. s), 273, 282.

3 Ibid. 288. A distinguished expert in the scientific investigation of

handwriting, there gives an interesting account of a case of this nature,

which happened to come within his personal experience. It shows how

the difference iu inks may often be ascertained by means of a photo-

graphic copy of the writing. He says; " The photograph is able to dis-

tinguish shades of color which are inappreciable to the naked eye; thus

where there is the least particle of yellow present in a color it will take

notice of the fact by making the picture blacker, just in proportion as

the yellow predominates, so that a very light yellow will take a deep

black. So, any shade of green, or blue, or red, where there is an im-

perceptible amount of yellow, will print by the photographic process

jnore or less black; while either a red or blue, verging to a purple, will

whether a man could, within a short time, so improve his
handwriting, as shown hy the standard signatures of the
testator , a8 to make a signature of as good a handwriting as
that of the will .1
§ 134. The Testimony of Experts Based on the Nature
.of the Ink.- \Vhere a writing purports to be of ancient or
recent <late, the testimony of experts, who ha\'e made a
nlicro-chemical examination of the ink in which the instrument is written, is received to show the nature of the ink,
whether it was found fresh or old, and whether it was of
Buch a nature as to grow old rapidly. 2 Such testimony is
.also received when the question arises whether a portion of
the writing was made at a time different from that at which
the rest of the instrument was written, or whether different
inks were employed. 3 Cases have been referred to in the
sections immediately preceding this, showing that experts
iLre permitted to express an opinion as to the probable time
.at which an instrument was written, whather different parts
of the same instrument were written at the same time, and
with the same ink, and where two writings
,_ cross ea.eh other,
.
.n.s to which was written first. In all these inquiries much
light can be obtained from experls skillful in the micro-

show more or less faint, as the case may be. Here is a method of i :ves-

tigation which may be made very useful in such cases, and which will

give no uncertain answer." In Goodyear v. Vosburgh, 63 Barb. (X. Y.)

154, the difference in the color of the ink used was taken into considera-

tion.

1 ~icKeone

v. Barnes, 108 Mass. 3-1±, 317.
::;ee 18 Am. Law Register (N. s), 273, 282.
3 Ibid. 288 .
A distinguished expert in the scientific investigation of
handwriting, there gives an interesting account of a case of this nature,
which happened to come within his personal experience. It ~hows how
.t he difference in inks may often be ascertained by meam; of a photograp~1ic copy of the writing. He says; "'l'he photograph is n.ble to distinguish shades of color which are inappreciable to the naked eye; thus
where there is the least particle of yellow present in •t ·color it will take
notice of the fact by making the picture blacker. just in proportion as
the yellow predominates, so that a very light yellow will take a deep
black. So, any shade of green, or blne, or red, where there is an imperceptible amount of yellow, will print by the photographic process
more or less black; while either a red or blue, verging to a purple, will
show more or less faint, H S the case may be . Here is a method of i ~. ves
tigation which may be made very useful in such cases, and whkh will
_g·ive no uncertain answer." In Goodyear v . Voslrnrgh, 6;1 Barb. (N. Y.)
15-L the difference in the color of the ink used \va,; takeu into cou::,:idera .tion.
2
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chemical examination of inks. The importance of such tes-

timony, is well illustrated by a case very recently decided int

the Supreme Court of Michigan, where an exact similarity

in the inks used in executing two different instruments,

bearing different dates, was treated in connection with other

suspicious facts, as tending to indicate that both writings

were made at the same time. 1

"When two writings cross each other, if the writing was-

done with a different kind of ink, the question which was-

the superposed ink may be easily determined by wetting a

piece of paper with a compound which acts as a solvent of

ink. By pressing the paper upon the writing in question, a

thin layer of the superposed ink will be transferred to the

prepared paper, thereby furnishing an answer to the ques^

tion propounded. If the same kind of ink was used, the*

case presents greater difficulties, and other methods are re-

sorted to. But to attempt to determine the question, as is

often done, by the aid of the eye or the magnifying glass,

is said to be no better than guess work. 2

135. The Qualifications of Experts in such Cases.
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In all cases where opinions are desired predicated upon the

nature of the ink used, an expert microscopist and chemist,

accustomed to the examination of inks for the purpose of

determining the nature and properties of different inks,

1 Sheldon v. Warner, 45 Mich. 638.

2 18 Am. Law Keg. (N. s.) 273, 287. where R. U. Piper, M. D., of Chi-

cago, a microscopic and chemical expert in the examination of writings,

says : " I took for the purpose of my experiment ten of the most common

kinds of ink found in the market, and drew a series of lines, three in

number, with each kind of ink, across a sheet of paper. This was fol-

lowed by a similar series drawn diagonally across the first, thus forming

a hundred points of crossing, and placing each kind of ink above and

also under all the others. In thirty -seven cases out of the hundred, the

eye. with or without the glass, saw the under ink as if it were on the

surface; in forty cases nothing could be decided in this respect; the

balance told the truth of the matter. By the other method, that is, by

the use of the solvent, the true facts could be made plain in everyone of

these cases. This experiment, as will be seen, was made with ten kinds

of ink more or less differing from each other in color and in chemical

composition, and it certainly proves that all such testimony, as I have

chemical examination of inks. The importance of such te . .,
timony\ is well illustrated by a· case very recentl'y decided iI1
the Supreme Court of Michigan, where an exact similarity
in the inks used in executing two different instruments,
bearing different dates,. was trBated irr connection with other·
suspicious facts, as tending to indicate that both writings·
were made at the same time. 1
When two writiug~ cross each other,. if the writing wa
done with a different kind of ink, the· question which was·
the superposed ink may he easily determined by wetting a
piece of paper with a compound which acts as a solvent of
ink. By pressing the paper upon the writing in question, re.
thin layer of the superposed ink will be transferred to theprepared paper, thereby furnishing an answer to the question propounded. If the same kind of· ink was used, thecase presents greater difficulties, and other methods are resorted to. But to attempt tp determine the question, as isoften done, by the aid of the eye or the magnifying glass,.
is said to be uo better than guess work. 2
§ 135. T11e Qualifications of Experts in such Cases.In all cases where opinions are desired predicated upon the
nature of the ink used, an expert microscopist and chemist,.
accustomed to the examination of inks for the purpose of ·
determining the nature and prqJ~Tties of different ink.;,.

said, has been thus far no better than guess work."

1

Sheldon v. Warner, 45 Mich. 63 .
18 Am. Law Reg. (N. s.) 273, 2 7. where R. U. Piper, M. D. of Chicago, a microscopic and chemical expert in the examination of writings!
says: "I took for the pm:pose of my experiment ten of the mo. t common
kinds of ink found in the market, and drew a series of lines, three in
number, with each kind of ink, aero s a sheet of paper. This wa followed by a similar series drawn diagonally across the fir t, tbu forming
a hundred points of crossing, and placing each kind of ink above and
also under all the others. Iu thirty -seven cases out of the hundred the
eye: with or without the glafls , saw the under iink as if it were on the
surface; in forty cases nothing could be dedded in thi respect; the
b:~.lance told the truth of the m atter.
By the other method, that is, by
the use of the solvent, tlie true facts could be made plain in every one of
the e cases. This experiment, as will be seen , was made ~ith ten kinds
of ink more or less differing from each other in color and in chemical
composition, and it certainly proves that all sHch testimony . as I have
said, ha been thus far no better than gues · work.' ·
2
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and the age of writings, would unquestionably be compe-

tent to express an opinion. But whenever the question re-

lates to the age of a writing, an expert who has simply been

in the habit of studying the genuiness of handwriting, for

the mere purpose of determining whether it was in the

handwriting of the person by whom it purported to have

been written, would not be competent to express an opin^

ion. 1 For that involves a question in a very different de-

partment of inquiry, and it is necessary that the witness

should have made that subject a matter of special study

and investigation. The courts cannot be too careful in

passing on the qualifications of witnesses offered as experts

in this particular line of inquiry. 2

There are two cases to be noticed in this connection.

The first was decided in the Supreme Court of North Caro-

lina in the year 1854. In that case the defendant contended

that although the instrument declared on was in the hand-

writing of his testator, yet the body of it was a forgery,

the original having been removed by some chemical process,

and the age of writings, would unquestionably be competent to express an opinion. But whenever the question relates to the age of a writing, an expert who has simply been
in the habit -of studying the genuiness of handwriting·, for
the mere purpose of determining whether it wa,s in the
handwriting of the person by whom it purported· to· have
been written, would not be competent to express am· opinion.1 For that involves a question in a very different department of .inquiry, and it is necessary that the witness
should have made that subject a matter of speciat study
and investigation. The courts cannot be too caref.ur in
passing on the qualifications of witnesses offered as exp-erts
in this particular line of inquiry .2
There are two cases to be noticed in this conl1'ection.
The first was .decided in the Supreme Court of North Carolina in the year 1854. In that case the defendant contended
that although the instrument declared on was in the handwriting of his testator, yet the body of it was a forgery,
the original having been removed by some chemical process,
and the present writing substituted. To show this a witness was introduced who was not a professed chemist, a;nd
who knew little or nothing ahout the science.
The trial
court permitted him to testify that he had just seen an experiment performed, whereby legible writing with ordinary
ink, had been erased and extracted from a piece of paper
(which he then held in his hand), by the application of certain chernic_a ls. The object of the testimony was to show
that iuk might be removed from paper without injuring 1ts
L'

and the present writing substituted. To show this a wit-
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ness was introduced who was not a professed chemist, and

who knew little or nothing about the science. The trial

court permitted him to testify that he had just seen an ex-

periment performed, whereby legible writing with ordinary

ink, had been erased and extracted from a piece of paper

(which he then held in his hand), by the application of cer-

tain chemicals. The object of the testimony was to show

that ink might be removed from paper without injuring its

1 Clark v. Bruce, 19 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (12 Hun), 271, 273. See, too,

Ellingwood v. Bragg, 52 3J. H. 488.

8 ' I have repeatedly." says Dr. Piper. " examined papers which have

been made to appear old by various methods, such as washing with,

coffee, with tobacco water, and by being carried in the pocket near the

person, by being smoked and partially burnt, and in various other ways.

I have in my possession a paper which has passed the ordeal of many ex-

aminations by experts and others, which purports to be two hundred

years old, and to have been saved from the Boston fire. The hand-

writing is a perfect fac simile of that of Thomas Addington, the town

clerk of Boston two hundred years ago, and yet this paper is not over

two years old." 18 Am. Law Register (N.S.), 273, 289.

I Clark v. Bruce, 19 N. Y. Su~. ()t. (12 Hun), 271, 273.
See, too,
Ellingwood v. Bragg, 52 N. H. 488.
2 "I have repeatedly," says Dr. Piper!" examined papers which have
been made to appear old by various methods_, such as washing with
coffee, with tobacco water, and by being carried in the pocket near the
person, by being smoked and partially burnt, and in various other ways.
I have in my possession a paper which has passed the ordeal of many examinations by experts and others, which purports to be two hundred ·
years old, and to have been saved from the Boston fire. The handwriting is a perfect fac simile of that of Thomas Addington, the town
clerk of Boston two hundred years ago, and yet this paper is not ovev
two year old.'' 18 Am. Law Register (N.s.), 273, 289.
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texture. The Supreme Court held that he was not properly

qualified. 1 That the witness was not qualified to give testi-

mony as an expert is entirely clear, but it is somewhat diffi-

cult to understand why he was not competent to testify in

the character of an ordinary witness, to the fact which he

had observed, namely, that certain effects followed the ap-

plication of the chemicals to the paper in the instances

which he witnessed.

The other is a case decided in the Supreme Court of Cal-

ifornia, which was an indictment for forgery. The testi-

mony showed that a powder, composed of three parts of

hydro-carbonate of soda to one part of chlorate of potash,

was found in the baggage of one of the defendants. And

.a police officer was permitted to testify that he had used a

portion of the powder found by him in the defendant's bag-

gage, in connection with muriatic acid, for the purpose of

extracting ink from paper ; and that, with the use of a

camel's hair brush, he had extracted the ink from two

checks one prepared by counsel of defendant, and the

other written in imitation of the original check and with the
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same kind of ink. That the ink was extracted from the

body of the checks without affecting the signatures, and

leaving the parts where the ink was extracted perfectly

white, the texture of the paper being uninjured. 2 Here the

witness was not an expert, but he was permitted to testify

to the facts which he had observed.

136. Comparison of Writings in Juxtaposition.

There are two distinct methods of judging of the genuine-

ness of handwriting by means of comparison. According

to one method, a witness who has acquired personal knowl-

edge of another's handwriting, by having seen such person

write, or by having received letters from him in due course

of business, may have formed in his mind an exemplar of

the individual's handwriting, so that, upon the presentation

of a signature, he can say, by comparing it with the exem-

plar in his mind, whether it corresponds or not with such

1 Otey v. Hoyt, 2 Jones (X. C.) Law, 70.

2 People v. Brotherton, 47 Cal. 395, 402.

texture. The Supreme Court held that he was not properly
qualified. 1 That the witness was not qualified to give testimony as an expert is entirely clear, but it is somewhat diffi.cult to understand why he was not competent to testify ·in
the character of an ordinary witness, to the fact which he
had observed, namely, that certain effects followed the application of the chemicals to the paper in the instances
which he witnessed.
The other is a case decided in the Supreme Court of California, which was an indictment for forgery. The testimony showed that a powder, composed of three parts of
hydro-carbonate of soda to one part of chlorate of potash,
was found in the baggage of one of the defendants. And
.a police officer was permitted to testify that he had used a
portion of the powder found by him in the defendant's bag_gage, in connection with muriatic acid, for the purpose of
extracting ink from paper; und that, with the use of a
-camel's hair brush, he had extracted the ink from two
checks - one prepared by counsel of defendant: and the
-other written in imitation of the original check and with the
same kind of ink. That the ink was extracted from the
body of the checks without affecting the signatures, and
leaving the parts where the ink was extracted perfectly
white, the texture of the paper being uninjured. 2 Here the
witness was not an expert, but he was permitted to testify
to the facts which he had observed.
§ 136. Comparison of Writings in Juxtaposition.There are two distinct methods of judging of the genuine.irnss of handwriting by means of compari~Oll. According
to one method, a witness who has acquired personal knowledge of another's handwriting, by having seen such person
write, or by having received letters from him in due course
-0f business, may lrnve formed in his mind an exemplar of
the individual's handwriting, so that, upon the presentation
-0f a signature, he can say, by comparing it with the exem!Jlar in hi~ mind, whether it corresponds or not with such
1

2

Otey v. Hoyt, 2 Jones (N. C.) Law, 70.
People v. Brotherton, 47 Cul. 395, 402.
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exemplar. According to the other method, a witness who

has no personal knowledge of another's handwriting, and

therefore no exemplar in his mind, has before him in juxta-

position, the writing in dispute with other writings admitted

or proved to be genuine, and from a comparison of such

writings expresses an opinion whether the writings were

made by the same person. The first is the comparison

which the ordinary witness makes, when testifying from

personal knowledge. The second is the comparison which

an expert makes, testifying without such personal knowl-

edge.

In France, papers admitted to be genuine, and writings

of a public nature, such as signatures written in the pres-

ence of a notary or judge, or written or signed in a public

capacity, are submitted to sworn experts, appointed by the

court, for comparison with the disputed writing. 1

In England, a comparison of handwriting placed in juxta-

position, has always been permitted in the ecclesiastical

courts. 2 But in the common law courts a different rule was

adopted, and experts were not allowed in those courts to
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express an opinion based on a comparison of hands placed

in juxtaposition, 3 until the year 1854, when Parliament

passed an act, hereafter set forth, which authorized such

comparison to be made. But in the case of ancient docu-

ments, so old that they could not be authenticated by living

witnesses, opinions based on a comparison of hands in jux-

taposition, were admitted from necessity, even in the com-

mon law courts. 4

1 Code de Procedure Civile, Part I., 2, tit. 10, 200.

2 Beaumont v. Perkins, 1 Phillitnore, 78; Reilly v. Rivett, Prerog.

1792, 1 Cases in Eng. Ece. Cts. 43, note a; Heath v. Watts Prerog. 1798,

Ibid, note b; Saph v. Atkinson, 2 Eng. Ecc. K. 64, 88, 89; Machin v.

Grindon, 2 Gas. temp. Lee, 335; s. c., 2 Addams, 91, note a; 1 Oughton's

Ordo Judiciorum, tit. 225. De Comparatione Litterarum, etc., 1, 2, 3,

10,11 (1728).

a Doe v. Suckermore, 5 Ad. & Ellis, 703.

4 Morewood v. Wood, 14 East, 327, note a; Howe v. Rawlings, 7 East,

282, note a; Taylor v. Cook, 8 Price. 650; Doe v. Tarver, R. & M. 141;

Doe v. Suckermore, 5 Ad. & Ellis, 703, 717, 724. So in Canada, Thomp-

son v. Bennett, 22 Upper Canada (C. P.) 393, 405, 406.

exemplar. According to the other method, a witness who
has no personal knowledge of another's handwriting, a.nd
therefore no exemplar in his mind, has before him in juxtaposition, the writing in dispute with other writings admitted
or proved to be genuine, and from a comparison of such
writings expres5es an opinion whether the writings were
made by the same person. The first is the comparison
which the ordinary witnese makes, when testifying from
personal knowledge. The second is the comparison which
an expert makes, testifying without such personal knowledge.
In France, papers admitted to be genuine, and writings
of a public nature, snch as signatures written in the presence of a notary or judge, or written or signed in a public
capacity,, are submitted to sworn experts, appointed by the
court, for comparison with the disputed writing. 1
In England, a comparison of handwriting placed in juxtaposition, has always been permitted in the ecclesiastical
courts. 2 But in the common law courts a different rule was
adopted, and experts were not allowed in those courts to
express an opinion based cm a comparison of hands placed
in juxtaposition, 3 until the year 1854, when Parliament .
passed an act, hereafter set forth, which authorized such
comparison to be made. But in the case of ancient documents, so old that they could not be authenticated by living
witnesses, opinions based on a comparison of hands in juxtaposition, were admitted from necessity, even in the common law courts. 4
'
Code de Procedure Civile, Part I., § 2, tit. 10, § 200.
Beaumout v. Perkins, 1 Phillimore, 78; Reilly v. Rivett, Prerog.
1792, 1 Cases in Eng. Ecc. Cts. 43, note a; Heath v. Watts Prerog. 1798,
Ibid. note b; Saph v. Atkinson, 2 Eng. Ecc . .H.. 6±, 88, 89; Machin v.
Grindon, 2 Oas. temp. Lee, 335; s. c., 2 Addams, 91, note a; 1 Oughton's
Ordo Judiciorum, tit. 225, De Comparatione Litterarum, etc., §§ 1, 2, 3,
10, 11 (1728).
3 Doe v. Suckermore, 5 Ad. & Ellis, 703.
4 Morewood v. Wood, 14. East, 327, note a; Rowe v. Rawlings, 7 East>
282, note a; Taylor v. Cook, 8 Price. 650; Doe v. Tarver, R. & M. 141;
Doe v. Suckermore, 5 Ad. & Ellis, 703, 717, 724. So in Canada, Thompson v. Bennett, 22 Upper Canada (C. P.) 393, 405, 406.
I
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In this country a difference of opinion has prevailed, and

some of our State courts have denied, while others have

maintained the right to introduce the testimony of experts

based on a comparison of writings placed in juxtaposition.

But in this country, as in England, there has been unanimity

in holding that such evidence is admissible in the case of

ancient documents. 1

137. Statutory Provisions in England and in the

United States Concerning Comparison of Writings. All

dispute as to the right to receive the testimony of experts

based on a comparison of hands, has been put to rest in

England, and in some of the States of this country by stat-

utory provisions adopted for that purpose. These provi-

sions differ somewhat, some of them being more restricted

In this country a difference of opiuion has prevailed , and
some of our State courts have denied, while others have
maintained the right to introduce the testimony of experts
based on a comparison of writings placed in juxtaposition.
But in this country, as in England, there has been unanimity
in holding that such evidence is admissible in the case of
ancient docmnents .1
§ 137 ~ Statutory Provisions in England and in the
United States Concerning Comparison of W r itings. - All

than others. They are as follows :

England. " Comparison of a disputed writing with any

writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine,

shall be permitted to be made by witnesses, and such writ-

ings, and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same,

may be submitted to the court and jury as evidence of the
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genuineness or otherwise of the writing in dispute." 2

1 West v. State, 22 N. J. Law, 241, 242; Clark v. Wyatt, 15 Ind. 271;

Willson v. Betts, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 201; State v. Givens, 5 Ala. 754; Kirk-

sey v. Kirksey, 41 Ala. 626, 640 ; Strother v. Lucas, 6 Peters, 763, 767.

3 28 and 29 Victoria, ch. 18, 8. In 1854 a similar provision was

passed, but it was confined in its operation to the admission of evidence

in civil cases. 17 and 18 Viet., ch. 125. Bnt in 1865 the provision was

made applicable alike to civil and criminal cases. In reference to this

provision it is laid down as follows : " Under this statutory law it seems

clear, first, that any writings, the genuineness of which is proved to the

satisfaction, not of the jury, but of the judge (see Eagan v. Cowan, 30

Law Times, 223, in Ir. Ex."), may be used for the purposes of compari-

son, although they may noc be admissible in evidence for any other pur-

pose in the cause (Birch v. Eidgway, 1 Fost. & Fin. 270; Cresswell v.

dispute as to the right to receive the testimony of eyperts
based on a comparison of bands, has been put to rest in
England, and in some of the States of this country by statutory provisions adopted for that purpose. These provisions differ somewhat, some of them being more restricted
than others. They are as follows:
England.-" Comparison of a disputed writing with any
writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine,
shall be permitted to be made by witnesses, and such writings, and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same,
may be submitted to the court and jury as evidence of the
genuineness or otherwise of the writing in dispute .'' 2

Jackson, 2 Fost. & Fin. 24) ; and next, that the comparison may be

made either by witnesses acquainted with the handwriting, or by wit-

nesses skilled in deciphering handwriting, or, without the intervention

of any witnesses at all, by the jury themselves (Cobbett v. Kilminster,

4 Fost. & Fin. 490, per Martin, B.), or in the event of there being no

jury, by the court." 2 Taylor's Evidence, 1668. It is to be observed,

however, that this statute expressly provides that it is not to apply to

Scotland.

West v. State, 22 N. J. Law, 241, 242; Clark v. Wyatt, 15 Ind. 271;
Willson v. Betts, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 201; State v. Givens, 5 Ala. 754; Kirksey v. Kirksey, 41 Ala. 626, 640; Strother v. Lucas, 6 Peters, 763, 767.
2 28 and 29 Victoria, ch. 18, § 8.
In 1854 a similar provision was
passed, but it was confined in its operation to the admission of evidence
in civil cases. 17 and 18 Viet .• ch . 125. But in 1865 the provision was
made applicable alike to civil and criminal cases. In reference to this
provision it is laid down as follows: ''Under this statutory law it seems
clear, first, that any writing~,.the genuineness of which is proved to the
satisfaction, not of the jury, but of the judge (see Eagan v. Cowan, 30
Law Times, 223, in Ir. E x .) , may be used for the purposes of comparison, although they may noc be admissible in evidence for any other purpose in the cause (Birch v. Ridgway, 1 Fost. & Fin. 270; Cresswell v.
Jackson, 2 Fost. & Fin. 24); and next, that the comparison may be
made either by witnesses acquainted with the handwriting, or by witnesses skilled in deciphering handwriting, or, without the intervention
of any witnesses at all, by the jury themselves {Cobbett v. Kilminster,
4 Fost. & Fin. 490, per Martin, B .), or in the event of there being no
jury! by the court." 2 Tay1or's Evidence, § 1668. It is to be observed,
however, that this statute expressly provides that it is not to apply to
Scotland.
1
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California. " Evidence respecting the handwriting may

also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the

jury, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the

party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be

genuine to the satisfaction of the judge." *

Qeorgia. " Other writings, proved or acknowledged to

be genuine, may be admitted in evidence for the purpose of

comparison by the jury. Such other new papers, when in-

tended to be introduced, shall be submitted to the opposite

party before he announces himself ready for trial." 2

Iowa. " Evidence respecting handwriting may be given

by comparison made by experts or by the jury, with writ-

ings of the same person which are proved to be genuine." 3

Nebraska. "Evidence respecting handwriting may be

given by comparisons made by experts or by the jury, with

writings of the same person which are proved to be genuine." 4

New Jersey. "In all cases where the genuineness of

any signature or writing is in dispute, comparison of the

disputed signature or writing with any writing proved to

the satisfaction of the court to be genuine, shall be permit-
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ted to be made by witnesses ; and such writings, and the

testimony of witnesses respecting the same, may be submit-

ted to the court or jury as evidence of the genuineness or

otherwise of the signature or writing in dispute, provided,

nevertheless, that where the handwriting of any person is

sought to be disproved by comparison with other writings

made by him, not admissible in evidence in the cause for

any other purpose, such writings, before they can be com-

pared with the signature or writing in dispute, must, if

sought to be used before the court or jury by the party in

whose handwriting they are, be proved to have been written

before any dispute arose as to the genuineness of the signa-

ture or writing in controversy." 5

1 Code of Civil Procedure, 1944.

2 Revised Code (1873), p. 674, 3840.

3 Code (1873) 3655; 2 McClain's Annotated Statutes (1880), p. 922,

3655.

* Compiled Statutes (1881), p. 576, 344.

5 Revision (1877), p. 381, 19.

Oalifornia.- "Evidence respecting the handwriting may
also be given by a comparison, made by the witne ~ s or the
jury, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the
party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge." 1
Qeorgia .-" Other writings, proved 01· acknowledged to
be genuine, may be admitted in evidence for the purpose of
comparison by the jury. Such other new papers, when intended to be introduced, shall be submitted to the opposite
party before he announces himself ready for trial." 2
Iowa .-'' Evidence rdspecting handwriting may be given
by comparison made by experts or by the jury, with writings of the same person which are proved to be genuine." 3
Nebraska.-" Evidence respecting handwriting may be
given by comparisons made by experts or by the jury, with
writings of the same person which are proved to be genuine.'' 4
New Jersey.-" In all cases where the genuineness of
any signature or writing is in dispute, comparison of the
disputed signature or writing with any writing proved to
the satisfaction of the court to be genuine, shall be permitted to be made by witnes~es; and such writings, and the
testimony of wit_nesses respecting the same, may be submitted to the court or jury as evidence of the genuineness or
otherwise of the signature or writing in dispute, p1·ovided,
nevertheless, that where the handwriting of any person is
sought to be disproved by comparison with other writings
made by him, not admissible in evidence in the cause for
any other purpose, such writings, before they can be compared with the signature or writing in dispu'te, must, if
sought to be used before the court or jury-by the party in
whose handwriting they are, be proved to have been written
before any dispute arose as to the genuineness of the signature or writing in controversy." 5
Code of Civil Procedure, § 1944. ·
Revised Code (1873), p. 674, § 3840.
3 Code (1873) § 3655; 2 McClain's Annotated Statut".'s (1880), p. 922,
1
2

_§ 3655.
4 Uompiled Statutes (1881), p. 576, § 344.
5 Revision (1877), p. 381, § 19.
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New York. "Comparison of a disputed writing with

any writing proved to the satisfaction of the court to be

genuine, shall be permitted to be made by witnesses in all

trials and proceedings, and such writings, and the evidence

of witnesses respecting the same, may be submitted to the

court and jury as evidence of the genuineness, or otherwise,

of the writing in dispute." L

Oregon. "Evidence respecting the handwriting may

also be given, by a comparison made by a witness skilled in-

such matters, or the jury, with writings admitted or treated

as genuine by the party against whom the evidence i

offered." 2

Rhode Island. " Comparison of a disputed writing with

any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be

genuine, shall be permitted to be made by witnesses, and

such writings, and the evidence of witnesses respecting the

same, may be submitted to the court and jury as evidence

of the genuineness, or otherwise, of the writing in dis-

pute." 8

Texas. " It is competent in every case to give evidence
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of handwriting by comparison, made by experts or by the

jury ; but proof by comparison only shall not be sufficient

to establish the handwriting of a witness who denies his sig-

nature under oath." 4

138. Comparison of Writings in the absence of Stat-

utory Provisions. Where the question has been decided in

this country independently of any statutory regulation, a

marked difference of opinion has existed as to the rule

which should be adopted.

I. According to one theory comparison of writings placed in

juxtaposition is improper, and the opinions of scientific wit-

1 Laws of 1880, ch. 36, p. 141.

2 General Laws (1843-1872), p. 259, 755.

3 Public Statutes (1882), p. 588, 42.

4 Revised Statutes (1879), Code of Crim. Procedure, Art. 754. This is

construed so as to admit comparison with writings admitted to be genu-

ine or proved to be so. Heard v. State, 9 Texas Ct. of App. 1, 19; Phil-

lips v. State, 6 Texas Ct. of App. 331; Hatch v. State, 6 ib. 384; Eborn

v. Zimmerman, 47 Tex. 503.

New York.-'' Comparison of ·a disputed writing with
any writing proved to the satisfaction of the court to ~e
genuine; shall be permitted to be made by witnesses in au
trials and proceedings, and such writing~, and the evidence·
of witnesses respecting the same, may be submitted to thecourt and jury as evidence of the genuineness, or otherwise,.
of the writing in dispute.'' 1
Oregon.-" Evidence respecting the handwriting may
also be given, by a comparison made by a witness skilled in
such matters, or the jury, with writings admitted or treated
as genuine by the party against whom the evidence isoffered." 2
Rhode Island.-" Comparison of a disputed writing with
any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to begenuine, shall be permitted to be made by witnesses, and.
such writings, and the evidence of witnesses respecting thesame, may be submitted to the court and jury as evidenceof the genuineness, or otherwise, of the writing in dis ...
pute." 3
Texas.-" It is competent in every case to give evidenceof handwriting by comparison, made by experts or by thejury; but proof by comparison only shall not be sufficient
to establish the handwriting of a witness who denies his sig...nature under oath." 4
§ 138. Comparison of Writing·s in the absence of Statutory Provisions.- vVhere the question has been decided in
this country independently of any statutory regulation, a
marked difference of opinion has existed as to the rulewhich should be adopted.
I. According to one theory comparison of writings placed in
juxtaposition is improper, and the opinions of scientific witLaws of 1880, ch. 36, p. 141.
General Laws (1843-1~72), p. 259, § 755.
a Public Statutes (1882), p. 5S8, § 42.
4 Revised Statutes (1879), Code of Crim. Procedure, Art. 754.
This if~
construed so as to admit comparison with writings admitted to be genuine or proved to be so. Heard v. State, 9 Texas Ct. of App. 1, 19; Phillips v. State, 6 Texas Ct. of App. 331; Hatch v. State, 6 ib. 384; Eborrr·
v. Zimmerman, 47 Tex. 503.
i
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nesses based thereon are inadmissible. It is the adoption of

the English rule as finally agreed on before that rule was

changed by the act of parliament already referred to. This

theory has been adopted in the Supreme Court of the United

States, 1 and it has been held in one of the inferior Federal

Courts that the statute of a State permitting a comparison of

writings for the purpose of determining the genuineness of

handwriting, has no effect in a criminal case in the courts of the

United States. 2 It has been adopted also in Alabama, 3 Illinois, 4

Kentucky, 5 Maryland, 6 Pennsylvania, 7 Texas, 8 Virginia 9 and

Wisconsin. 10 This was the theory which was adopted in

New Jersey, 11 and in Rhode Island, 12 by the courts of these

respective States prior to the enactment of the statutory

provisions already set forth, and adhered to by them up

to the time of such enactment.

There are, however, certain exceptions to the rule. For

instance, we find the Supreme Court of the United States

declaring that " the general rule of the common law, disal-

lowing a comparison of handwriting as proof of a signa-

ture, has exceptions equally as well settled as the rule itself.
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One of these exceptions is, that if a paper admitted to be

in the handwriting of the party, or to have been subscribed

by him, is in evidence for some other purpose in the cause,

1 Strother v. Lucas, G Peters, 763; Moore v. United States, 91 U. S.

270.

* United States v. Jones, 10 Federal Reporter, 469.

3 Little v. Beazley, 2 Ala. 703; State v. Givens, 5 Ala. 747; Kirksey v.

Kirksey, 41 Ala. 640.

Jumpertz v. People, 21 111. 374; Kernin v. Hill, 37 111. 209.

5 Hawkins v. Grimes, 13 B. Monr. 267; McAlister v. McAlister, 7 B.

Monr. 270.

6 Miller v. Johnson, 27 Md. 36; Tome v. Parkersburg, etc. R. R. Co.,

39 Md. 36.

7 Aninick v. Mitchell, 82 Penn. St. 211; Haycock v. Greup, 57 Penn.

St. 438; Travis v. Brown, 43 Penn. St. 9, 15; Lodge v. Pipher. 11 S. &

R. 334; Bank of Pennsylvania v. Jacobs, 1 Penn. 178.

B Handley v. Gandy, 28 Texas, 211.

9 Rowt, Adm'x. v. Kile's Adin'r., 1 Leigh, 216.

nesses based thereon are inadmissible. It is the adoption of
the English rule as finally agreed on before that rule was
changed by the act of parliament already referred to. This
theory has been adopted in the Supreme Court of the United
States, 1 and it has been held in one of the inferior Federal
Courts that the statute of a State permitting a comparison of
writings for . the purpose of determining the genuineness of
handwriting, has no effect in a criminal case in the courts of the
United States .2 It has been adopted also inAlabama, 3 Illinois, 4
Kentucky, 5 }faryland, 6 Pennsylvania,7 Texas, 8 Virginia 9 and
"\Visconsin .10 This was the theory which was adopted in
~ew Jersey, 11 and in Rhode Island, 12 by the courts of these
respecti rn States prior to the enactment of the statutory
provisions already set forth, and adhered to by them up
to the time of such enactment.
There are, however, certain exceptions to the rule. For
instance, we find the Supreme Court of the United States
declaring that ''the general rule of the common law, disallowing a comparison of handwriting as proof of a signature, has exceptions equally as well settled as the rule itselL
One of these exceptions is, that if a paper admitted to be
in the handwriting of the party, or to have been subscri'bed
by him, is in evidence fo,r some other purpose in the cause,

10 State v. Miller, 47 Wis. 530; Hazleton v. Union Bank, 32 Wis. 34,

11 West v. State, 22 N. J. Law, 241, 242.

1

Strother v. Lucas, G Peters, 763; Moore v. United States, 91 U. S.

12 Kinney v. Flynn, 2 R. I. 319.

(13)

270 .

Gnitetl Stntes v. Jones, 10 Federal Reporter, 469.
Littl e v. Beazley , 2 Aln.. 703; State v. Givens, 5 Ala. 747; Kirksey v.
Kirksey, -n Ala. 6-!0.
4 Jurnpcrtz v. People, 21 Ill. 374; Kernin v. Hill, 37 Ill. 209.
5 lfa\vkins v. Grimes, 13 B. 1\Ionr. 267; McAlister v. McAlistcr, 7 B .
.:'lfonr. 270.
'6 :M iller Y ••fohnson, 27 ~Ill. 36; Tome v. Parkersburg, etc. R.R. Co.,
:39 )ld. 3G.
7 Anmiek v. -:\1iteh ell , 82 Penn. St. 211; Haycock v. Greup, 57 Penn.
St. 438; Travi s v. Brown, 43 Penn. St. 9, 15; Lodge v. Pipher, 11 S. &
R. 3:3-!; B ::nk of P en nsylvn.nia v. Jacobs, 1Penn.178.
ti Ha11clley v. Gandy, 28 Texas, 211.
9 Rowt., Adm"x. v. Kile's Adin'r., 1 Leigh, 216.
10 State v. ~Iiller, -17 Wi s. 530; Hazleton v. ·(..Tnion Bank, 32 Wis. 3-!.
11 West v. State, 22 N. J. Law, 2-IJ, 242.
12 Kinn ey v. Flynn, 2 H.. I. '319 .
(13)
~
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the signature or paper in question may be compared with it

foy the jury." 1

139. Comparison of Writings in the Absence of Stat-

utory Provisions The Subject Continued. But what is

more to our purpose, there are exceptions to the rule, which

permit the testimony of experts in some cases to be received.

And perhaps we cannot do better than to transcribe the lan-

guage of the Supreme Court of Alabama, which is as follows :

" That the doctrine as to experts, as applicable to signatures

or writings, relates to ancient writings, which are not proved

by their antiquity ; and to giving their opinion as to the

genuineness of a signature or writing, or its being a coun-

terfeit, founded on a knowledge of the handwriting of the

party by whom it is said to be written, or in the case of

bank bills, on a knowledge of the genuineness of bills of

the character in dispute, and some skill and experience that

the witness may possess in detecting counterfeits, not pos-

sessed by the mass of men : and, perhaps, to an opinion as

to whether a signature is genuine or counterfeit, without

having any acquaintance with the hand in dispute, but not
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by comparison." 2

The language of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on

the same genera] subject is as follows :

" 1st. That evidence touching the genuineness of a paper

in suit may be 'corroborated by a comparison, to be made

by the jury, between that paper and other well authenticated

writings of the same party.

2nd. But mere experts are not admissible to make the

comparison, and to testify their conclusions from it.

3d. That witnesses having knowledge of the party's

handwriting are competent to testify as to the paper in suit ;

but they, no more than experts, are to make comparison of

hands, for that were to withdraw from the jury a duty

which belongs appropriately to them.

4th. That test documents to be compared should be

1 -Moore v. United States, 91 U. S. 270.

Mvirksey v. Kirksey, 41 Ala. 626.

the signature or paper in question ·m ay Le compared with it
by the jury ." 1
§ 139 . Comparison of "\Vriting-s in the Absence of Sta tutory Provisions -The Subject Continued.- But what is
more to our purpose, there are exceptions to the rule, which
permit the testimony of experts iu some cases to be received .
And perhaps we cannot do better than to transcribe the language of the Supreme Court·of Alabama, which is as follows :
"That the doctrine as to experts, as at)plicable to signatures
or writings, relates to ancient writings, which are not proved
@y their antiquity; and to giving their opinion as to the
genui11enc~s of a signature or writing, or its bciug a counterfeit, founded on a know]edge of the handwriting of the
party hy wlrnm it is said to be written, or in the case of
bank bills, .on a knowledge of the genuineness of bills of
the character in dispute, and some skill aud experience that
the witness may possess in detecting counterfeits, not possessed by the mass of men; and, perhaps, to an opinion as
to whether a signature is genuine or counterfeit, without'
lrnving any acquaintance with the hand in di pute, but not
hy comparison.'' 2 •
The languuge of the Supreme Court of Penusylvauia on
the same general subject is as follon · :
" 1st. That evidence touching the genuineness of a paper
in suit may be ·corroborated by a comparison, to be made
hy the jury, between that paper and other well authenticated
writings of the same party.
2n<l. But mere experts are not admissible to make the
comparison, and to testify their conclu~ions from it.
3d. That witnesses having knowledge of the party's
liaudwriting are competent to testify as to the paper in suit;
but they, no more than experts, are to make comparison of
bands, for that were to withdraw from the jury a d uty
which belongs appropriately to them .
4th .. That test documents to be compared should be
!.Moore v. United States, 91 U.S . 270.
2-J{irk ~ey '. Kirksey, 41 Ala. 626.
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established by the most satisfactory evidence before being

admitted to the jury.

5th. That experts may be examined to prove forgery or

simulated writings, and to give the conclusions of skill in

such cases as have been mentioned, and their like." l

Although the fourth of the above propositions does not

relate to the particular subject we are considering, it may

be remarked in passing that it goes farther than most of the

cases warrant, which profess to adopt the English rule, and

which limit the comparison to writings already in the case,

and admitted to be genuine. 2 So in many of the States

which receive the testimony of experts based on comparison,

the comparison is limited to papers already in evidence and

admitted to be genuine. 3

140. Comparison of Writings in the Absence of Stat-

utory Provisions Comparison by Experts with Writings

Admitted to be Genuine. II. According to a second the-

ory a comparison of writings placed in juxtaposition is

proper, the writings being in evidence for another purpose

and admitted to be genuine, and the opinions of scientific
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witnesses based on such comparison are admissible in evi-

dence. Such is the theory held by the courts of Colorado, 4

Indiana, 5 Kansas, 6 Michigan, 7 Missouri 8 and New York prior

1 Travis v. Brown, 43 Penn. St. 9, 17 and 18.

2 See Moore v. United States, 91 U. S. 270; Bishop v. State, 30 Ala.

34; Bestor v. Roberts. 58 Ala. 331; Miller v. Jones, 32 Ark. 337; Brob-

ston v. Cahill, 64 111. 358; Hawkins v. Grimes, 13 B. Monr. (Ky.) 267;

Clark v. Rhodes, 49 Tenn. 206; Fogg v. Dennis, 3 Hum. (Tenn.) 47; Ha-

.zleton v. Union Bank, 32 Wis. 34; State v. Miller, 47 Wis. 530; Clay v.

Robinson, 7 W. Va. 348; Clay v. Alderson, 10 W. Va. 49.

3 See the cases cited in succeeding section.

4 Miller v. Eicboltz, 5 Colorado, 243.

4 Hazztird v. Yickery, 78 Ind. 64; Forgery v. First National Bank, 66

Ind. 123, 125 ; Burdick v. Hunt, 43 Ind. 381 ; Chance v. Indianapolis, etc.

o., 32 Ind. 472.

6 Macomber v. Scott, 10 Kans. 335.

7 Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287 ; Matter of Alfred Foster's Will, 34 Mich.

21 ; First National Bank v. Robert, 41 Mich. 709.

-established by the most satisfactory evidence before being
admitted to the jury.
5th. That experts may be· examined to prove forgery or
imulated wrjtmgs, and to give the conclusions of skill in
-such cases a'3 hllve been mentioned;and their like." 1
Although the fourth of the above propositions does not
relate to the particular subject we are considering, it may
be remarked in passing that it goes farther than most of the
·cases warrant., which profess to adopt the English rule, and
which limit the comparison to writings already in the case,
.n nd admitted to be genuine. 2 So in many of the States
whieh receive the testimony of experts based on comparison,
the comparison is limited to papers already in evidence and
admitted to be genuine. 3
§ H .O . Comparison of Writings in the Absence of Statutory Provisions - Comparison by Experts with Writings
Admitted to be Genuine.- II. According to a second the-

ory a comparison of writings placed in juxtaposition is
proper, the writings being in evidence for another purpose
and admitted to be genuine, and the opinions of scientific
·witnesses based on such comparison are admissible in evi<lence. Such is the theory held by the courts of Colorado, 4
Indiana, 5 Kansas, 6 l\fichigan, 7 Missouri 8 and New York prior

8 Corby, Exr. v. Weddle, 57 Mo. 452; State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380;

State v. Tompkins, 71 Mo. 616; Pourcelly v. Lewis, 8 Mo. App. 593.

Travis v. Brown, 43 Penn. St. D, 17 and 18.
See l\Ioore v. United States, 91 U. S. 270; Bishop v. State, 30 Ala .
.34:; Bes tor v. Roberts. 58 Ala. 331; Miller v. Jones, 32 Ark. 337; Brobston v. Cahill, 64 Ill. 358; Hawkins v. Grimes, 13 B. Monr. (Ky.) 267;
Clark v. Rhodes, 49 'I'enn. 206; Fogg v. Dennis, 3 Hum. (Tenn.) 47; Ha.zleton v. Union Bank, 32 Wis. 34; State v. Miller, 47 Wis. 530; Clay v,
Robinsou, 7 W. Va. 3!8; Clay v. Alderson, 10 W. Va. 49.
3 See the cases citec.l in succeeding section.
•Miller v. Eicholtz, 5 Colorado, 243.
b Hazzard v. Vickery, 78 Ind. 64; Forgery v. First National Bank, 66
Ind. 123, 125; Bure.lick v. Hunt, 43 Ind. 381; Chance v. Indianapolis, etc.
•Co., 32 Ind. 472.
6 Macomber v. Scott, 10 Kans. 335.
7 Vinton v. J>eck, 14 Mich. 287; Matter of Alfred Foster·s Will, 34 Mich.
21; First National Bank v. Robert, 41 Mich. 709.
li Corby, Exr. v. "Weddle, 57 :l\fo. 452; State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380;
.State v. 'l'ompkins, 71 :l\lo. 616; Ponrce1ly v. Lewis, 8 Mo. App. 593.
I

2

196 EXPERT TESTIMONY,

196

EXPERT TESTIMONY,

to legislative enactment already noted, 1 and North Carolina. 2

But in this case, as in all others where there is a comparison

of writings, the rule excludes a comparison by ordinary wit-

nesses. If the comparison by juxtaposition of writings is

made by witnesses, it must be by those who are experts. 3

The rule being that a witness who is not an expert must

speak from his knowledge of having seen the party write,

or from authentic papers derived in the course of business.*

141. Comparison of Writings in the Absence of Stat-

utory Provisions Comparison by Experts with Writings

Proved or Admitted to be Genuine. According to the

third theory, experts are permitted to express an opinion,

based not merely on a comparison of writings conceded to-

be genuine, but on writings the genuineness of which ha&

been proved on the trial for the express purpose of com-

parison. Such testimony has been received in Connecticut,*

Maine, 6 Massachusetts, 7 Mississippi, 8 New Hampshire, 9 and

Ohio. 10

The objections to the introduction of specimens of hand-

writing not admitted to be genuine and not otherwise in
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the case, are succinctly stated by the Supreme Court of

Kinsas, and may be repeated here in this connection :

"The principal, if not the only objections urged against

this kind of evidence are as follows : 1st. The writings

1 Dubois v. Baker, 30 N. Y. 355.

2 Yates v. Yates, 76 N. C. 142; McLeod v. Bullard, 84 X. C. 515.

8 Forgery v. First National Bank, 66 Ind. 123, 125; Chance v. Indian-

apolis, etc. Co., 23 Ind. 472; Woodman v. Dana, 52 Me. 9; State v.

Owen, 73 Mo. 440; First National Bank of Omaha v. Lierman, 5 Neb.

247.

4 See Strother v. Lucas, 6 Peters, 763 ; Eogers v. Bitter, 12 Wall. 317.

5 Tyler v. Todd, 36 Conn. 222; Lyon v. Lyman, 9 Conn. 59, 60.

6 Sweetser v. Lowell, 33 Me. 446; Woodman v. Dana, 52 Me. 9; Page-

v. Romans, 14 Me. 478.

7 Moody v. Rowell, 17 Pick. 490; Richardson v. Newcomb, 21 Pick,

315 ; King v. Donahue, 110 Mass. 155, 156 ; Martin v. Wallis, 1 1 Mass. 309 r

312 ; Martia v. Maguire, 7 Gray, 177.

8 Wilson v. Beauchamp, 50 Miss. 24.

9 State v. Hastings, 53 N. H. 452.

to legislative enactment already noted,1 and North Carolina. 2
But in this case, as in all others where there is a comparison
of writings, the rule excludes a comparison by ordinary witnesses. If the comparison by juxtaposition of writings is
made by witnesses, it must be by those who are experts.a.
The rule being ttat a witness who is not au expert must
speak from his knowledge of having seen the party write,
or from authentic papers derived in the course of business. 4
§ 141. Comparison of Writings in the Absence of Statutory Provisions - Comparison by Ei"J)erts with WritingS'
Proved or Admitted to be Genuine.-According to the
third theory, experts are permitted to express an opinion,
base~ not merely on a comparison of .w ritings conceded to
he genuine, but on writings the genuineness of which has
been proved on the trial for the express purpose of comparison. Such testimony has been received in Connecticut,i»
lVfaine, 6 Massachusetts,7 :Nlississippi, 8 New Hampshire, 9 and
Ohio. 10
The objection~ to the introduction of specimens of handwriting not admitted to be genuine and not otherwise in
the case, are succinctly stated by the Supreme Court of
K:insas, and may be repeated here in this connection:
'~The principal, if not the only objections urged against
this kind of evidence are as follows: 1st. The writings

10 Pavey v. Pavey, 30 Ohio St. 600; Bragg v. Colwell. 19 Ohio St. 412;

Calkins v. State, 14 Ohio St. 222; Hicks v. Person, 19 Ohio, 426.

Dubois v. Baker, 30 N. Y. 355.
Yatesv. Yates, 76 N. C.142; McLeod v.Bnllard, 4.N. C. 515.
8 Forgery v. First National Bank, 66 Ind. 123, 125; Chance v. Indianapolis, etc. Co., 23 Ind. 472; Woodman v. Dana, 52 Me. 9; State v.
Owen, 73 Mo. 440; First National Bank of Omaha v. Lierman, 5 Neb.
247.
4 See Strotherv. Luca&, 6 Peters, 7G3; Rogers v. Ritter, 12 Wall. 317.
5 Tyler v. Todd, 36 Conn. 222; Lyon v. Lyman, 9 Conn. 59, 60.
6 Sweetser v. Lowell, 33 Me. 446; Woodman v. Dana, 52 Me. 9; Page
v. Homans, 14 .Me. 478.
7 Moody v. Rowell, 17 Pick. 490; Richard on v. Newcomb, 21 Pick~
315; King v. Donahue, 110 Mn.ss. 155, 156; Martin v. Walli. , 11.Mass.309,.
312; Martin v. Maguire, 7Gray,177.
s Wilson v. Beauchamp GO Miss. 2-l.
9 State v. H::i tings, 53 N. H. 4:52.
10 Pavey v. Pavey, 30 Ohio St. 600; Bragg v . Colwe.ll.19 Ohio St. 412;.
Calkins v. State, 14 Ohio St. 222; Hicks v. Per on, 19 Ohio, 426.
1
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offered in evidence as specimens, may be manufactured
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for the occasion. 2nd. Fraud may be practiced in the

selection of the writings. 3d. ' The other party may be

surprised ; he may not know what documents are to be

produced, and therefore he may not be prepared to meet

the inferences sought to be drawn from them. 4th. The

handwriting of a person may be changed by age, health,

habits, state of mind, position, haste, penmanship, and

writing materials. 5th. The genuineness of the specimens

of handwriting offered in evidence may be contested, and

others successively introduced, to the infinite multiplication

of collateral issues, and the subversion of justice. 6th.

Juries are too illiterate, and are not competent to judge of

this kind of evidence." l

142. Proof of the Genuineness of the Writing Of-

fered for Comparison. In the English statute it is ex-

pressly provided that the writing offered as a standard, if

not admitted to be genuine, must be proved genuine to the

satisfaction of the court. And so it is provided in the stat-

ute of California, of New Jersey, of New York and of
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Rhode Island. But the statutes of the other States contain

no such provision. The question is then presented whether

in such cases the proof of the genuineness of the instru-

ment is addressed to the court or the jury. In New Hamp-

shire it seems the question rests solely with the jury, and if

they determine that the proof is insufficient, it becomes

their duty to lay the writing, and all the evidence of the ex-

perts based on its genuineness, entirely out of the case. 2

But elsewhere the courts have held such proof to be ad-

dressed in the first instance to the court, 3 yet the fact that the

court has adjudged the papers genuine does not debar the jury

from ultimately determining the question for themselves. 4

And the general rule is that the proof of the genuineness

of the instrument thus offered must be positive. It should

1 Macomber v. Scott, 10 Kans. 339.

2 State v. Hastings, 53 X. H. 452, 4G1.

3 Bragg v. Colwell, 19 Ohio St. 412; State v. WnrJ, 39 Vt. 225.

4 State v. Ward, supra.

offered jn evidence as specimen , may be manufactured
for the occasion. 2nd. Fraud may be practiced in the
selection of the writings.
3d. · The other party may be
surprised ; he may not know what documents are to be
produced, and therefore he may not be prepared to meet
the inferences sought to be drawn from them . 4th . The
handwriting of a person may be changed by age, health,
habits, state of mind, position, haste, penmanship , and
writing materials. 5th. The genuineness of the specimens
of handwriting offered in evidence may be contested, and
others successively introduced, to the infinite multiplication
of collateral issues, and the subversion of justice. 6th.
Juries are too illiterate, and are not competent to judge of
this kind of evidence.'' 1
§ 142. Proof of the Genuineness of the Writing Offered for . Comparison.- In the English statute it is expressly provided that the writing offered as a standard, if
not admitted to be genuine, must be proved genl:line to the
satisfaction of the court. And so it is provided in the statute of California, of New Jersey, of New York and of
Rhode Island . But the statutes of the other States contain
no such provision. The question is then presented whether
in such cases the proof _of the genuineness of the instrument is addressed to the court or the jury. In New Hampshire it seems the question rests solely with the jury, and. if
they determine that the proof is insufficient, it becomes
their duty to lay the writing, and all the evidence of the experts based on its genuineness, entirely out of the case. 2
But elsewhere the courts have held such proof to be addressed in the first instance to the court, 3 yet the fact that the
court has adjudged the papers genuine does not debar the jury
from ultimately determining the question for themselves. 4
And the general rule is that the proof of the genuineness
of the instrument thus offered mu t be positive. It should
I.Macomber v. Scott, 10 Kan. 339.
2 State v. Hastings, 53 N. H. 452, 461.
3 Bragg v . Colwell, 19 Ohio ' t. 412; State v. 'VnrJ, 39 Vt. 225.
4 State v. 'Yard, supra .
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be proved either by the admission of the party when the

standard is not offered by himself, or else by the testimony

of persons who testify directly and positively to having

seen the party write the paper. 1 This was the rule, too, in

the English ecclesiastical courts, where the maxim was :

Testes qui poterint deponere, quod viderunt testatorem sub-

scribentem hujus modi scriptis, etc. 2

As the Supreme Court of Massachusetts -has expressed it,

the genuineness of a writing to be used as a standard of

comparison, " must be shown beyond a doubt." 3

And the court in the case last cited held that it could not

be shown by producing a paper which had been witnessed,

and then proving the handwriting of the subscribing wit-

ness, upon due proof being made that such witness resided

out of the State. So the same court in a subsequent case

has held that letters received from the testator in answer to-

letters to him, could not be received as standards. 4 Where

a receipt was offered as a standard, and the witness testified

that the defendant gave him a receipt that looked very sim-

ilar to the one offered, but could not positively say that it
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was the identical one, the Supreme Court of Ohio held the

proof too uncertain to admit of the reception of the paper. 5

143. Expert should have Before him in Court the

Writings Compared. The rule is that an expert in hand-

writing, when speaking as a witness only from a compari-

son, should have before him in court the writings com-

pared. 6 The reason being that their presence is essential to

an intelligent examination in chief, as well as to an intelli-

gent cross-examination ; nor can there be any fair means of

!Hyde v. Woolfok, 1 Iowa, 159; Pavey v. Pavey, 30 Ohio St. 600;

Calkins v. State, 14 Ohio St. 222, 228; Bragg v. Colwell, 19 Ohio 412;

Eborn v. Zimpleman, 47 Texas, 503, 518.

2 Oughton's Ordo Judiciorum, tit. 225; De Comparatione Litterarum,

3; Beaumont v. Perkins, 1 Phillimore, 78.

3 Martin v. Maguire, 7 Gray, 177. And see Baker v. Haines, 6 Whar-

ton (Penn.) 291 ; De Pue v. Place, 7 Penn. St. 429.

4 McKeone v. Barnes, 108 Mass. 344.

6 Pavey T. Pavey, 30 Ohio St. 600.

6 Hynes v. McDermott, 82 X. Y. 41 ; Woodman v. Dana, 52 Me. 9.

be proved either by the admission of the party when the
standard is not offered by himself, or else by the testimony
of persons who testify directly and positively to having
seen the party write the paper. 1 This was the rule, too, in
the English ecclesiastical courts, where the maxim was =
T estes qui poterint deponere, quad vide'r unt testatorem subscribentem liujus modi scriptis, etc. 2
As the Supreme Court of lVIassachu ·etts ·has expres ed it,.
the genuineness of a writing to be used as a standard of
comparison, "must be shown beyond a doubt." 3
And the court in the case last cited held that it could not
be shown by producing a paper which had been witnessed,.
and then proving the handwriting of the subscribing witness, upon due proof being made that such witness resided
out of the State. So the same court in a subsequent case
has held that letters received from the testator in answer te>
letters to him, could not be received as standards .4 Where
a receipt was offered as a standard, and the witness testified
that the defendant gave him a receipt that looked very similar to the one offered, but could not positively say that it
was the identical one, the Supreme Court of Ohio held the
proof too uncertain to admit of the reception of the paper. ts
§ 143. Expert should have Before him in Court the
Writings Compared.-The rule is that an expert .in handwriting, when speaking as a witness only from a comparison, should have before him in court the writings compared.6 The reason being that their presence is essential to
an intelligent examination in ohief, as well as to an intelligent cross-examination; nor can there be any fair means of

.

1 Hyde v. Woolfok, 1 Iowa, 109; Pavey v. Pavey, 30 Ohio St. 600;
Calkins v. State, 14 Ohio St. 222 228; Bragg v. Colwell, 19 Ohio 412;
Eborn v. Zimpleman 47 Texas, 503, 51 .
2
Oughton s Ordo Judiciorum, tit. 225; De Comparntione Litterarum,
§ 3; Beaumont v. Perkins 1 Phillimore, 7 .
3 Martin v. Maguire 7 Gray, li7 . And see Baker v. Haine
6 Wharton (Penn.) 291; De Pue v. Place, 7 Penn. St. 429.
4 McKeone v. Barnes, 108 Ma s. 344.
6 Pavey v. Payey, 30 Ohio
t. 600.
6 Hynes v. McDermott, 82 N. Y. 41; Woodman v. Dana 52 Me. 9.
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meeting the testimony of the witness by that of other wit-

nesses, unless the writings upon which the opinion of the

expert is based are in court to be presented to other experts

for their opinion. But where the original writing is lost,

and the loss has been clearly proved, the opinion of an ex-

pert has been received as to the genuineness of the signa-

ture to the lost instrument, he having examined the signa-

ture prior to its loss, and compared his recollection of such

signature with the admitted genuine signatures of the same

person, on papers already in the case. 1 And an expert has

been allowed to testify that entries upon hotel registers,

which he had seen and examined, were in the handwriting

of the person who wrote certain other signatures, which

were produced and proved or admitted to be genuine, al-

though the entries were not before the jury, the registers

having been destroyed, by the person whose signature was

in question, for the purpose of suppressing the evidence. 2

So where the State, upon an indictment for forgery, was

unable to produce the check alleged to have been forged by

the prisoner, an expert, called by the State, and who had
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seen the alleged forged check several months previously,

was permitted to testify as to the genuineness of the signa-

ture, a genuine signature of the accused having been shown

on the trial. 3

144. The Writing: Compared should be the Original

and not a Photographic Copy. In a late case in New York

the Court of Appeals refused to permit the comparison of a

signature in dispute with photographic copies of other writ-

ings, for the purpose of getting the opinion of an expert as

to whether a signature was real or feigned. 1 But stress

was laid upon the fact that the originals from which the

copies were made were not brought into court, and could

not be shown to other witnesses. And no proof had been

presented as to the manner and exactness of the photo-

1 Abbott v. Coleman, 21 Kan.. 250.

2 State v. Shinborn, 40 N. H. 407.

8 Koons v. State, 30 Ohio St. 195.

4 llynes v. McDermott, 82 X.. Y. 41.

meeting the testimony of the witness by that of other witnes ·es, unle s the writings upon which !he opinion of the
expert i ~ based are in court to be presented to other experts
for their opinion. But where the original writing i ~ lost,
and the lo ~ s Iws been clearly proved, the opinion of an expert has been received as to the genuineness of the signature to the lost instrument, he having examined the ignature prior to its loss, and compared his recollection of euch
signature with the a<lmitted genuine signatures of the same
person, on paper already in the case . 1 And un expert has
been allowed to testify that entries upon hotel registers,
which he had seen and examined, were in the handw~·iting
of the person who wrote certain other ignature , which
were produced and proved or admitted to be genuine, although the entrie were not before the jury, the registers
having been destroyed, by the person whose signature was
in question, for the purpo"Se of suppl'essing the evidence. 2
So where the State, upon an indictment for forgery, was
unable to produce the check alleged to have been forged hy
the prisoner, n.n expert, called by the State, and who ha<!l
seen the alleged forged check several months previously.,
was permitted to testify as to the genuineness of the signature, a genuine ignature of the accused having been shown
on the trial. 3
§ 1 t4. The 'Vriting Compared should be the Original
and not a Photographic Copy.- In a late case in New York
the Court of Appeals refused to permit the comparison of a
sjgnature in di ~ pute with photographic copies of other writings, for the purpose of getting the opinion of an expert as
to whether a signature was real or feigned. 4 But stress
was laid upon the fa.ct that the originals from which the
copies were made were not brought into court, and could
not be shown to other witnesses. And no proof bad been
presented as to the manner and exactne s of the photoAbbott v. Colemnn, 21 Kans. 250.
State v. Shinborn, -l:G N. II. 497 .
s Koon v. State, 3G Ohio St. 195.
4 Hynes v. McDermott, 2 X. Y . 41.
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graphic method used. "We may recognize," said the

court, "that the photographic process is ruled by general

laws that are uniform in their operation, and that almost

Avithout exception a likeness is brought forth of the object

set before the camera. Still somewhat for exact likeness

will depend upon the adjustment of the machinery, upon

the atmospheric conditions, and the skill of the manipula-

tor. And in so delicate a matter as the reaching of judicial

results by the comparison of writings through the testimony

of experts, it ought to be required that the witness should

exercise his acumen upon the thing itself which is to be the

basis of his judgment ; and still more, that the thing itself

should be at hand, to be put under the eye of other wit-

nesses for the trial upon it of their skill. The certainty of

expert testimony in these cases is not so well assured as

that we can afford to let in the errors or differences in

copying, though it be done by howsoever a scientific pro-

cess." The objections to the use of photographic copies in

such cases were very ably stated in a decision excluding the

opinions based on such evidence, in a case decided some ten
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years before in the Surrogate's Court of the county of New

York. It was said that such evidence would raise many col-

lateral issues, as, for instance, the correctness of the lens,

the state of the weather, the skill of the operator, the color

of the impression, the purity of the chemicals, the accuracy

of the focusing, the angle at which the original to be

copied was inclined to the sensitive plate, etc. ** When we

reflect that by placing the original to be copied obliquely to

the sensitive plate, the portion nearest to the plate may be

distorted by being enlarged, and that the portion furthest

from the plate must be correspondingly decreased, whilst

the slightest bulging of the paper upon which the signature

is printed may make a part blurred, and not sharply defined,

we can form some idea of the fallacies to which this subject

is liable. In what manner can photography

make the signature, in any practical sense, more apparent

to the observer than the signature itself? The operator

graphic method used. "vVe may recognize," said the
court, ''that the photographic process is ruled by general
laws that are uniform in their operation, and that almost
without exception a likeness is brought forth of the object
set before the camera. Still somewhat for exact likeness
will depend upon the adjustment of the machinery, upon
the atmospheric conditions, and the skill of the manipulator. And in so delicate a matter as the reaching of judicial
reeults by the comparison of writings through the testimony
of experts, it ought to be required that the witness should
exercise his acumen upon the thing itself which is to be the
basis of his judgment; and still more, that the thing itself
should be at hand, to be put under the eye of other witnesses for the trial upon it of their skiil. The certainty of
expert testimony in these cases is not so well assured as
that we can afford to let in the errors or differences in
copying, though it be done by howsoever a scientific process." The objections to the use of photographic copies in
such cases were very ably stated in a decision excluding the
opinions based on such evidence, in a case decided some ten
years before in the Surrogate's Court of the county of New
York. · It was said that such evidence would raise many collateral iesues, as, for instance, the correctness of the lens,
the state of the weathei:, the skill of the operator, the color
of the impression, the purity of the chemicals, the accuracy
ef the ' focusing, the angle at which the original to be
eopied was inclined to the sensitive plate, etc. " When we
reflect that by placing the original to be copied obliquely to
the sensitive plate, the portion nearest to the plate may be
distorted by being enlarged, and that the portion furthest _
from the plate must be correspondingly decreased, whilst
the slightest bulging of the paper upon which the signature
is printed may make a part blurred, and not sharply defined,
we can form some idea of the fallacies to which this subject
is liable. * * * In what manner can photography
make the signature,, in any practical sense, more apparent
to the observer than the signature itself? The operator
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may, moreover, through fraud or skill, make some particu-

lar lines in the reproduced signature stand forth more prom-

inently than in the original signature. If the photograph

be an absolutely perfect reproduction of the original signa-

ture the former being the same as the latter there can

be no necessity for the study of the reproduction. If,

through the fraud or skill of the operator, some lines be

brought out with undue prominence, then it should not be

considered proper evidence on which to base an opinion, for

it is not a correct reproduction." 1

The right to make a comparison with photographic copies

of handwriting, has also been denied in Maryland, 2 but the

force of these cases is weakened by the fact that a compar-

ison of hands is not permitted in that State, the old English

rule being still adhered to. But the question was fairly

raised in Texas in Eborn v. Zimpelman? where an attempt

was made to introduce in evidence the opinion of a witness,

living in another State, as to the genuineness of a disputed

handwriting, the opinion being based on a photographic

copy of the instrument in dispute, attached to the interrog-
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atories. In support of the admissibility of the evidence, it

was urged that the court should take judicial notice that the

photographic process secured a mathematically exact repro-

duction of the original, and that therefore, evidence as to

the handwriting of such a copy, was as satisfactory as

though it referred to the original. The conclusion reached

by the court was that photographic copies of instruments

sued on, could only be used as secondary evidence, and re-

jected the testimony upon the ground that no foundation

had been laid for it.

The Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking of this kind

of evidence, said in the Matter of Alfred Foster' 's Win,* de-

cided in 187G : " If the court had permitted photographic

copies of the will to be given to the jury, with such precau-

1 Taylor Will Case, 10 Abb. Pr. (K. S.) 300. per Surrogate Hatchings.

2 Miller v. Johnson. 27 Md. 36; Tome v. Parkersburg. 39 Md. 36.

3 47 Texas, 503.

34 Mich. 23.

may, moreover, through fraud or kill, make some particular lines in the reproduced signature stand forth more prominently than in the original signature. If the photograph
be an absolutely perfect reproduction of the original signa··
tu re - the for mer being the same as the latter - there cau
be no necessity for the study of the reproduction. If,
through the fraud or skill of the operator, some lines be
brought out with undue prominence, then it should not be
considered proper evidence on which to base an opinion, for
it is not a correct reproduction." 1
The right to make a comparison with photographic copies
of handwritiug, has also been denied in Maryland, 2 but the
force of these cases is weakened by the fact that a comparison of hands i not permitted in that State, the old English
rule being still adhered to. But the question was fairly
raised in Texas in Eborn v. Zimpelrnan, 3 where an attempt
·was made to introduce in evidence the opinion of a witness,
living in another State, as to the genuineness of a disputed
handwriting, the opinion being based on a photographic
copy of the instrument in dispute, attached to the interrogatories. In support of the admissibility of the evidence, it
was urged that the court should take judicial notice that the
photographic process secured a mathematically exact reproduction of the original, and that therefore, evidence as to
the handwriting of such a copy, was as satisfactory as
though it referred to the original. The conclusion reached
by the court was that photographic copies of instruments
sued on, could only be used as secondary evidence, and rejected the testimony upon the ground that no foundation
had bee1i laid for it.
The Supreme Court of :Michigan, speaking of this kind
of evidence, said in the 1~falter of Alfred Foster's Will, 4 decided in 187G: "If the court had permitted photographic
copies of the will to be given to ·the jury, with such precuuTaylor Will Ca~ e , 10 Abh. Pr. (N. s.) 300. per 8urrogate Hutchings.
Miller v. John on, 27 Md. 36 ; Tome v. Parkersbmg. 39 Md. 36.
a 47 Texas 50:~.
• 3-± )Iich. 23.
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tions as to secure their identity and correctness, it might not,

perhaps, have been error. Nevertheless, it is not always

true that every photographic copy would be safe on any

inquiry requiring minute accuracy. Few copies can be so-

satisfactory as a good photograph, but all artists are not

competent to make such pictures on a large scale, and all

photographs are not absolutely faithful resemblances. It

is quite possible to tamper with them, and an impression

which is at all blurred would be very apt to mislead on

questions of handwriting where forgery is claimed. Whether

it would or would not be permissible to allow such docu-

ments to be used, their use can never be compulsory. The

original, and not the copy, is what the jury must act upon,

and no device can be properly allowed to supersede it.

Copies of any kind are merely secondary evidence, and in

this case they were intended to be used as equivalent to

primary evidence in determining the genuineness of the pri-

mary document."

145. Comparison with Photographic Copies Allowed,

when. In a case where the original papers were on file in
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the War Department, and could not be removed without

public detriment and inconvenience, Mr. Justice BRADLEY

held that photographic copies could be received, as being

the best evidence the case admitted of. 1 A comparison with

photographic copies of handwriting has been held to be

proper in Massachusetts, where the copies had first been

verified by the oath of the photographer as being accurate

in all respects, excepting only in relation to size and color. 2

It was thought to be not dissimilar to an examination of the

writing with a magnifying glass. " Under proper precau-

tions," said the court, " in relation to the preliminary proof

as to the exactness and accuracy of the copies produced by

the art of the photographer, we are unable to perceive any

valid objection to the use of such prepared representations

1 Leathers v. Salvor Wrecking Co., 2 Wood, 680, 682.

2 Marcy v. Barnes, 16 Gray, 161. The photograph ought to be verified

by the oath of the photographer. Holleubeck v. Rowly, 8 Allen, 4Z3.

tions as to secure theil' identity and correctness, it might not,.
perhaps, have been error. Neverthele"s, it is not always
true that every photo~raphic copy would be safe on any
inquiry requiring minute ac0uracy. Few copies can be El<>
satisfactory as a good photograph, but all artists are not
competent to make such pictures on a large scale, and all
photographs are not absolutely faithful resemblances . It
is quite possible to tamper with them, an_d an impression
which is at all blurred would be very apt to mislead on
questions of handwriting w.here forgery is claimed. Whether
it would or would not be permi sible to allo.w such documents to be used, their use can never be compulsory. The
original, and not the copy, is what the jury must act upon,.
and no device can be properly allowed to supersede it.
Copies of any kind are merely secondary evidence, and in
this case they were intended to be used as equivalent to
primary evidence in determining the genuineness of the pr.imary document."
§ 145. Compal'ison with PhotogTaphic Copies Allowed,.
when .- In a case where the original papers were on file in
the War Department, and could not be removed without
public detriment and inconvenience, 1'Ir. Justice BRADLEY
held that photographic cg pies could be received, as being
the best evidence the case admitted of .1 A comparison .with
photographic copies of handwriting has been held to be
proper in Massachusetts, where the copies had first been
verified by the oath of the photographer as being accurate
in all respects, excepting only in relation to size and color. 2
It was thought to be not dissimilar to an examination of the
writing with a magnifying glass. " Under proper precautions," said the court, " in relation to the preliminary proof
as to the exactness and accuracy of the copies produced by
the art of the photogl'apher, we are unable to perceive any
valid objection to the use of uch prepared represen.t ations
1

Leathers v. Salvor Wrecking Co. 2 Wood, 6 0 6 2.
Marcy v. Barnes 16 Gray, 161. The photograph ought to be verified
by the oath of the photographer. Hollenbeck v. Rowly, 8 Allen, 4'"3.
2
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of original and genuine signatures as evidence competent
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to be exhibited and weighed by the jury."

146. Writings Admissible for Comparison in Orthog-

raphy. Although prior to the act of 1854 writings could

not be introduced in evidence in the English courts, for the

purpose of showing a similarity in the formation of letters,,

or figures and modes of writing, yet it was held they could

be introduced for the purpose of proving a particular mode

of spelling. For such a purpose specimens of the party's

handwriting containing that particular orthography were ad-

missible. 1 A peculiar case of this kind occurred at the

Greenwich County Court. The party denied most positively

that a certain receipt was in his handwriting. It read,

" Received the Hole of the above." He was asked to write

a sentence containing the word " whole." He took pains

to disguise his hand, but adopted the above phonetic style

of spelling, even retaining the capital H. 2 But in Wiscon-

sin a different view seems to have been taken of the sub-

ject, although the preceding cases were not brought to the

attention of the court. In that case, which was an indict-
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ment for arson, the prosecution desired to show that a letter,,

containing threats of arson, was written by the prisoner.

It contained words of peculiar form, style and orthography,

and was repeated to him orally and verbally by the police

officers at the station, who requested him to write as they

read. The copy thus made was found to be an exact fac f

simile of the original in the peculiarities above noted. The

court excluded it on the ground that a comparison of hands

was not allowable. The letter, however, might perhaps have

been inadmissible on other grounds, as that it was compelling

the prisoner to give evidence against himself ; but this was

not' referred to by the court.

147. Comparison with Writings made on the Trial.

A party cannot be compelled on cross-examination, to write

his name in court for the purpose of having it compared

1 Brookes v. Tichborne, 5 Exch. 929.

2 Taylor on Evidence, 1552. note .

of original and genuine signatures as evidence competent
to be exhibited and weighed by the jury."
§ 146. 'Vriting·s Admissible for Comparison in Orthog-·
raphy.- Although prior to the act of 1854 writings could
not be intro<luced in evidence in the English courts, for the
purpose of showing a similarity in the formation of letters,..
or figures and modes of writing, yet it was held they could
be introduced for the irmrpose of proving a particular mode
of spelling. For such a purpose specimens of the party's
handwriting containing that_particular orthography were a_d missible.1 A peculiar ca"e of this kind occurred at the
Greenwich County Court. The party denied mo t positively
that a certain receipt was in his handwriting. It read,.
" Received the Hole of the above." He was asked to write
a sentence containing the word " whole." He took pains
to disguise his hand, but adopted the above phonetic style
of spelling, even retaining the capital H. 2 But in 'Visconsin a different view seems to have been taken of the sub-ject, although the preceding cases were not brought to the
attention of the court.. In that case, which was an indictment for arso~, the vrosecution desired to show that a letter,.
containing threats of arson, was written by the prisoner.
It contained words of peculiar form, style and orthography,
and was repeated to him orally and verbally by the police
officers at the station, who requested him to write as they
read.
The copy thus made was found to be an exact fac-·
siniile of the original in the peculiarities above noted. The
court excluded it on the ground that a comparison of hands
was not allowable. The letter, however, might perhaps have
been inadmissible on other grounds, as that it was compelling
the prisoner to give evidence again t him elf; but this was
, not· referred to by the court.
§ 14 7. Comparison with Writing·s made on the Trial.-A party cannot be compelled on cross-examination, to write
his name in court for the purpose of having it compared.
1

2

Brookes v. Tichborne, 5 Exch. 929.
Taylor on Evidence, 1552, note a.
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with the disputed writing. 1 But if he writes his name as
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requested, it has been held that it may be used as a standard

of comparison, for the purpose of contradicting him. 2

Hence in a recent case in Nebraska, where the defend-

ant denied the genuineness of a promissory note, and

called his sou as a witness, who testified in chief that cer-

tain words in the note which his father actually gave were

written by himself, and on cross-examination was requested

to write the same words in the presence of the jury, it was

held that such writing could be used for purposes of com-

parison, the party conducting the examination taking the

risk whether the writing was dissimilar or not. 3 But a

party is not entitled to write his signature in the presence

of the jury for purposes of comparison with a signature

puporting to be his, the genuineness of which he denies. 4

So it has been held error to permit a witness, who confesses

to having written the forged instrument tinder the direction

and request of the prisoner, to write a similar instrument

in the presence of the court and jury, for purposes of com-

parison. 6
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148. Comparison of AVritings Testing Accuracy of

Expert on Cross-Examination. It is not competent, on

cross-examination of an expert in handwriting, who has

testified to the genuineness of a signature, to submit to him

a disputed signature for the purpose of testing his accuracy. 6

That it is not submitted for purposes of comparison, but

simply to test the accuracy of the witness, renders it none

the less inadmissible. 7 And a genuine signature is as inad-

missible for this purpose as a spurious one would be. 8

1 First Xational Bank of Houghton v. Robert, 41 Mich. 709.

2 Cobbett v. Kilrninster, 4 Fos. & Fin. 490; Doe v. Wilson, 10 Moore,

P. C. 502, 530; Chandler v. LeBarron, 45 Me. 534.

3 Huff v. Xims, 11 Neb. 364.

4 King v. Donahue, 110 Mass. 155.

4 Williams v. State, 61 Ala. 33.

Tyler v. Todd, 36 Conn. 222; Bacon v. Williams, 13 Gray, 525;

Howard v. Patrick. 43 Mich. 128.

7 Van \Vyck v. Mclntosh, 14 N. Y. 439; Bank of Commonwealth v.

Mudgett, 44 X. Y. 514.

s Fogg v. Dennis, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 47.

with the disputed writing. 1 But if he writes his name a
requested, it has been held that it may be used as a standard
of comparison, for the purpose of contradicting him. 2
Hence in a recent case in Nebraska, where the defend.ant denied the genuineness of a promissory note, and
called his son as a witness, who testified in chief that cer.t ain words in the note which his father actually gave were
written by himself, and on cross-examination was requested
to write the same words in the presence of the jury, it was
held that such writing could be used for purposes of comparison, the party conducting the ex~mination taking the
risk whether the writing was dissimilar or not. 3 But a
party is not entitled to write his signature in the presence
oQf the jury for purposes of comparison with a signature
puporting to be his, the genuineness of which he denies. 4
So it has been held error to permit a witness, who confe se
to having written the forged instrument under the direction
and request of the prisoner, to write a similar instrument
in the presence of the court and jury, for purposes of comparison/>
§ 148. Comparison of \.Vritings-Testing Accuracy of
Expert on Cross-Examination. - I t is not competent, on
cross-examination of an expert in handwriting, who has
testified to the genuineness of a signature, to submit to him
a disputed signature for the purpose of testing his accuracy. 6
That it is not submitted for purposes of comparison, but
imply to test the accuracy of the witness, renders it none
.the less inadmissible. 7 And a genuine signature is as iuadmis ible for this purpose as a spurious one would be.
1

First :National Ba nk of Houghton v. Robert 41 Mich. 709.
Cobbett v. Kil minster, 4 Fo . & Fin. 490; Doe v. Wil on, 10 Moore
P. C. 502, 530 ; Chandler v. LeBarro.s, 45 Me. 53-!.
3 Huff v. Nims, 11 Neb. 364.
4 King v. Donahue, 110 Man . 155 .
.5 Williams v. State, 61 .A.la. 33.
6
'l'yler v. 'l'odd, 36 Conn. 222; Baco n '" William 13 Gray, ~5;
Howard v. Patrick. 43 :Mich. 128.
7
Vau Wyck v. Mcintosh, 14 N . Y. 439; Ba nk of Commonwealth v.
:Mudgett, J.l :N. Y. 514.
· Fogg v. Dennis 3 Humph. ('l'enn.) 47.
2
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149. Detection of Counterfeit Bank Notes. Books

known as bank note detectors, are not competent evidence

as to the genuineness or worthlessness of bank bills, neither

is the testimony of a witness who does not profess to be an

expert. 1 One who is not acquainted with the handwriting

of the president or cashier of the hank, but who has studied

and learned the system by which it is believed counterfeit

bank notes can be detected, and who has such knowledge

of the marks and devices used in etching and engraving as

enables him to detect gross counterfeits, is competent to-

testify as an expert concerning the genuineness of bank

notes. 2 So where a witness has been in the habit of

receiving and paying out notes of the bank, and believes

that he has thereby become acquainted with the handwriting

of its president and cashier, he is considered qualified by his

experience, although he has never seen these officers write,

to testify as to the genuineness of notes purporting to have

been issued by the bank. 3 One who is a bank officer,

engaged in banking, and a judge of counterfeit money, is

competent to give his opinion as an expert as to the spurious-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 20:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t71v5cx5m
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ness of a bank note. 4 A cashier who has received and passed

a great number of the notes of the bank in question, and.

believes he can distinguish between a genuine and counter-

feit note, is competent to give his opinion as an expert. 5

The same principle governs in the case of tellers. 6 But

bank officers are not the only witnesses who are qualified to

testify in such cases. And it has been said that the opinion

of any one, who is familiar with the notes of the bank in

question, may be received. 7 Hence the testimony of mer-

1 Payson v. Everett, 12 Minn. 216.

2 Jones v. Finch, 37 Miss. 468.

3 Allen v. State, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 367; Commonwealth v. Carey, 2

Pick. (Mass.) 47; State v. Candler, 3 Hawk's Law & Eq. (N. C.) 393;

Sasser v. State, 13 Ohio, 453; Hess v. Ohio, 5 Ohio, 6; Kirksey v. Kirk-

sey, 41 Ala. 626; State v. Allen, 1 Hawk's L. & Eq. (X. C.) 6.

4 May v. Dorsett, 30 Ga. 116; State v. Hooper, 2 Bailey (S. C.) Law..

37; Atwood v. Cornwall, 28 Mich. 339.

5 State v. Harris, 5 Ired. (X. C.) Law, 287.

6 Hess v. Ohio, 5 Ohio, 6 ; Kirksey v. Kirksey, 41 Ala. 626.

7 State v. Hooper, 2 Bailey, (S. C. Law, 37; State v. Tutt, Ib. 44.

§ 149. Detection of Counterfeit Bank Notes. - Books.
known as bank note detectors, are not competent evidence
as to the genuineness or worthlessness of bank bills, neither
is the testimony of a witness who does not profess to be an
expert. 1 One who is not acquainted with the handwriting
of the president or cashier of the hank, but who has studied
and learned the system by which it is believed counterfeit
bank notes can be detecte<l, an<l who has such knowledge
of the marks and devices used in etching and engraving a
enables him to detect gross counterfeits, is competent to.
testify as an expert concerning the genuineness of bank
notes. 2 So where a witness has been in the habit of·
receiving and paying out notes of the bank, and believes.
that he has thereby become acquainted with the handwriting
of its president and cashier, he is considered qualified by his.
experience, although he has never seen these officers write, .
to testify as to the genuineness of notes purporting to baYe
been issued by the bank. 3 One who is a bank officer, .
engaged in banking, and a judge of counterfeit money, is
competent to give his opinion as an expert as to the spuriou ·-·
ness of a bank note .4 A cashier who has received and passed
a great number of the notes of the hank in question, and.
believes he can distinguish between a genuine and counterfeit note, is competent to give bis opinion as an expert. 5
The same principle governs in the case of tellers .6 But
hank officers are not the only witnesses who are qualified to ·
testify in such cases. And it has been said that the opinion
of any one, who is familiar with the notes of the bank in .
question, may be received. 7 Hence the te'3timony of merPayson v. Everett, 12 Minn. 216.
Jones v. Finch, 37 Miss. 468.
3 Allen v. State, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 367; Commonwealth v. Carey, 2 .
Pick. (llass.) 47; State v. Candler, 3 Hawk's Law & Eq. (N. C.) 393;
Sasser v. State, 13 Ohio, 453; Hess v. Ohio, 5 Ohio, 6; Kirksey v. Kirksey, 41 Ala. 6:26; State v. Allen, 1 Hawk's L . & Eq. (N. C.) 6.
~~fay v. Dorsett, 30 Ga. 116; State v. Hooper, 2 Bailey (S. C. ) Law. _
:37; Atwood v. Cornwall, 28 Mich. 339.
•5 State v. Hnl'l'is, 5 Ired. ("X. C.) Law, 287.
6 Hess v. Ohio, 5 Ohio, 6; Kirksey v. Kirkey, 41 Ala. 626.
7 State v. Hooper, 2 Bailey, (S. C. Law, 37; State v. Tutt, lb. 44.
1
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chants, brokers and others, who are in the habit of receiv-

ing, scrutinizing and paying out the notes of the bank, is

received as coming from witnesses whose experience renders

them qualified to express an opinion. 1 In New Hampshire

it is said that a- bill may be proved to be a counterfeit by

persons who know the signatures of the president and

cashier, by having seen the bills in circulation. 2 Experts

are allowed to testify as to the false character of bank bills,

without iirst proving that the bank purporting to issue them

had an existence, 3 or that it had issued genuine bills of

which those in question might be counterfeits. 4 In the case

of bills of exchange, it has been held that one who had

presented to the firm many notes which had been paid by

them, was qualified by his experience to testify, that, in his

opinion, the handwriting of the bill in question was the

same as that upon the bills which the firm had paid. 5 Al-

though it cannot be considered as laying down a correct

principle of law, it is worthy of note that in an early case

in the New York court of sessions, it was ruled that experts

should not be allowed to swear as to the genuiness of bank
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bills, if witnesses could be produced who had seen the

president and cashier write. 6

150. Regulation of such Evidence by Statutory Pro-

vision. In some of the States statutory provision has been

made as to the reception of evidence in the cases considered

in the preceding section. Such provision has been made in

Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Pennsylvania, and perhaps else-

where.

Illinois. "Persons of skill shall be competent to testify

as to the genuineness of any bill, note or other instrument

alleged to be forged or counterfeited." 7

1 State v. Cheek, 13 Ired. (N. C.) 114; Watsou v. Cresap, 1 B. Monr.

<Ky.) 196.

2 State v. Carr, 5 X. H. 369, 373.

3 Joiies v. State, 11 Ind. 357.

4 Crawford v. State, 2 Ind. 132.

5 Gordon v. Price, 10 Ired. (X. C.) 385.

6 People v. Badger, 1 Wheeler, Cr. Cas. 543.

7 Revised Statutes (1880), ch. 38. 109.

-chants, brokers and others, who are in the h-a~it of receiving, scrutinizing a1id payi~g out the note of the ban~, is
received as coming
...... from witnesses whose experience rend~r
them qualified to express an opinion. 1 Iu New Hampshire
it is said that a bill may be proved to be a counterfeit by
persons who know the signatures of the president and
~ashier, by having seen the bills in ciroulation. 2 Experts
· .are allowed to testify as to the false character of bank bill ,
without first proving that the bank purporting to issue them
had an existence, 3 or that it had issued genuine bills of
which those iu question might be counterfeits. 4 In the case
-0f bills . of exchange, it has been held that one who had
presented to the firm ma.ny notes which had been ·paid by
them, _was qualified by his experience to testify, that, in his
·opinion, the handwriting of the bill in question "~s the
same as that upon the bills which the firm had paid .5 Although it cannot be considered as laying down a correct
principle of law, it is worthy of note that in an early case
ju the New York court of se 'sions, it was ruled that experts
should not be allowed to swear as to the genuiness of bank
bills, if witnesse~ co uld be produced who· had seen the
president and ca 'hi er write. 6
§ 150. Reg·ulation of such Evidence by Statutory Prolision.- In some of the States statutory provision has been
made as to the reception of evidence in the cases 9onsidered
in the preceding section. Such provi ion has been made in
lllinoi:::i, Indiana, Kan as, Penn "yl vania, and per hap elsewhere.
Illinois.-'' Per ' ons of skill hall be competent tote tify
as to the genuineness of anv bill, note or other in trument
;alleged to be forged or counterfeited." 7
1
State v. Cheek 1 13 fred. (N. C.) 114· Watson v. Cre ap 1 B. Monr.
' { Ky.) 196.
2 State v. Carr, 5 N. H. 369, 373.
3 Jones v. State l l lnd. 357.
4 Crawford v. State, 2 Ind. 132.
5 Gordon v. Price, 10 Ired. (:N. C.) 3 5.
6
People v. Badger, 1 Wheeler, Cr. Cas. 543.
i Revised .Statutes (1 80) ch. 38~ § 109.
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Indiana. " Persons of skill may be called to prove the

genuineness of a note, bill, draft, or certificate of deposit,

but three witnesses, at least, shall be required to prove the

fact, except in the case of a larceny thereof, the simple ev-

idence of the cashier of a bank purporting to have issued

the same may be received as sufficient." 1

Kansas. " Persons of skill or experts may be called to

testify as to the genuineness of a note, bill, draft, certificate

of deposit, or other writing, but three witnesses, at least,

shall be required to prove the fact, except in the case of a

larceny thereof, the single evidence of the president, cashier,

or teller of the bank purporting to have issued the same, or

the maker thereof, may be received as sufficient." a

Pennsylvania. " Upon the trial of any indictment for

making, or passing and uttering any false, forged or coun-

terfeit coin, or bank note, the court may receive in evidence

to establish either the genuineness or falsity of such coin or

note, the oaths or affirmations of witnesses who may by

experience and habit have become expert in judging of the

genuineness or otherwise of such coin or paper, and such tes-
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timony may be submitted to the jury without first requiring

proof of the handwriting or the other tests of genuineness,

as the -case may be, which have been heretofore required

bylaw." 3

In Maine it is provided that in the case of forged bank

notes, etc., if the president or cashier reside out of the

State, or more than forty miles from the place of trial, the

opinions of other witnesses may be received. 4 And in

Khocle Island it is provided that the opinions of skilled per-

sons may be received in such cases, provided the persons

whose names are forged are out of the State, or reside thirty

miles distant from the place of trial. 5

1 2 Revised Statutes (1876), p. 396, 01.

2 General Statutes (1868). p. 854. 216.

3 1 Brightly ? s Purd. Dig. (1700-1872), p. 631, 63.

4 Revised Statutes. (1871). p. 836, 8.

5 Public Statutes (1882), p. 580, 44.

I ndiana .-" Persons of skill may be called to prove the
genuineness of a note, bill, draft, or certificate of deposit,
but three witnesses, at least, shall he required to prove the
fact, except in the case of a larceny thereof, the simple evidence of the cashier of a bank purporting to have issued
the same may be received as sufficient.'' 1
I{ansas.-" Persons of skill or experts may be called to
t("stify as to the genuineness of a note, hill, draft, certificate
-0f deposit, or other writing, but three witnesses, at lea t,
shall be required to prove the fact, except in the case of a
larceny thereof, the single evidence of the president, cashier,
<H' teller of the bank purporting to have issued the same, or
the maker thereof, may be received as sufficient." 2
Penn."ylvania.-"
.
Upon th~ trial of any indictment for
making, or passing and uttering any false, forged or counterfeit coin,
bank note, the court may receive in evidence
to establish either the genuineness or falsity of such coin or
note, the oaths or affirmations of witnesses who may by
.experience and habit have become expert in judging of the
genuineness or otherwise of such coin or paper, and such testimony may be submitted to the jury without first requiring
proof of the handwriting or the other tests of genuineness,
.as the -case may be, which have been heretofore required
hy1aw." 3
In Alaine it is provjded that in the case of forged bank
notes, etc ., if the president or cashjer reside out of the
State, or more than forty miles from the place of trial, the
(>pinions of other witnesses may be reccived. 4 Aud in
Hhodc Island it is provided that the opinions of skilled per..sons may be received in such cases, provided tl10 persons
\rhosc names are forged are out of the Stat~, or reside thirty
miles di::;tant from the place of trial. 5

or

2 Revised Statutes (1876), p. 39e, § 91.
GenPral Statute (1868), p. 54, § 216.
3 1 Brightly~s Pu rd. Dig. (1700 -1 72), p. 631,
4 Revised Statutes, (1871). p. 836, § 8.
s Public Statutes (18 2), p. 5SD, § 44.
1

2

':i

63 .

208 EXPERT TESTIMONY.

208

EXPERT TESTIMONY.

CHAPTER VIII.

VALUE.

SECTION.

151. Value as a Subject for thq Testimony of Experts.

152. The Amount of Damages.

153. Opinions of Non-Professional Witnesses.

154. Qualifications of the Expert in Values.

155." Not Necessary that Expert should see the Property.

156. Time of Examination of Property by Expert.

157. Competency in Particular Cases.

158. Competency in Particular Cases The Subject Continued.

CHAPTER VIII.

159. Value of Legal Services.

160. Value of Services Rendered by Physicians and Nurses.

161. Value of Services in other Callings.

162. Opinions as to Value of Eeal Estate.

163. Value of Annuities.

VALUE.

164. Value of Foreign Currency and Negotiable Securities.

1G5. Opinions of Merchants and Brokers.

151. Value as a Subject for the Testimony of Experts.

SECTION.
The opinions of experts are received in evidence on the

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 20:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t71v5cx5m
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

question of value. 1 " It is every day's practice," said Mr.

Chief Justice NELSON of New York, "to take the opinion of

witnesses as to the value of property persons who are sup-

posed to be conversant with the particular article in ques-

tion, and of its value in the market: as a farmer, or dealer

1 Brown v. Providence & Springfield R. E. Co.. 12 R. I. 238; Buffum

v. N. Y. Cent. etc. R. R. Co., 4 R. I. 221 ; Forbes v. Howard, 4 R. I. 366 ;

Cant-ling v. Hannibal etc. R. R. Co., 54 Mo. 385; Hough v. Cook, 69 111.

381; Shaw v. City of Chariest own, 2 Gray (Mass.), 109; Edmonds v.

City of Boston, 108 Mass. 535; Dickenson v. Fitchburg, 13 Gray (Mass.),

546; Cobb v. City of Boston, 109 Mass. 438; Burger v. Northern Pacific

R. R. Co., 22 Minn. 343, 347; Crawford v. Wolf, 29 Iowa, 568; Tebbetts-

v. Haskins, 16 Me. 283, 289.
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§ 151. Value as a Subject for the Testimony 9f Experts.
-The opinions of experts are received in evidence on the
question of value. 1 "It is every day's practice," said Mr.
Chief Justice NELSON of New York, "to take the opinion of
witnesses as to the value of property-persons who ·a re supposed to be conversant with the particular article in question, and of its value in the market: as a farmer, or dealer
Brown v. Proviuence & Springfield R.R. Co., 12 R. I. 238; Buffum
v. N. Y. Cent. etc. R. R.Co., 4R. I. 221; Forbesv. Howard,4R. I. 366;
Cantling v. Hannibal etc. R . R. Co., 54 Mo. 385; Hough v. Cook, 69 Ill .
. 381; Shaw v. City of Charlestown, 2 Gray (Mass.), 109; Edmonds v.
City of Boston, 108 Mass. 535; Dickenson v. Fitchburg, 13 Gray (Mass.),
546; Cobb v. City of Boston, 109 Mass. 438; Bnrger v. Northern PacificR.R. Co., 22 Minn . 343, 347; Crawford v. Wolf, 29 Iowa, 568; Tebbett~
v. Haskins, 16 1'Ie. 283 , 289.
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in, or person conversant with the article, as to the value of

209

lands, cattle, horses, produce, etc. These cases all stand

upon the general ground of peculiar skill and judgment in

the matters about which opinions are sought." l This rule

however, did not commend itself to the courts of New

Hampshire, and the practice there was to exclude the opin-

ions of witnesses on questions of value, in cases where it

was customary in the courts of other States to unhesita-

tingly receive them, provided only, the witnesses were duly

qualified to testify in relation to the subject of inquiry.

For example, the practice in that State was to exclude the

opinions of witnesses as to the value of real estate, irrespec-

tive of any question as to their qualifications. 2 The exclusion

was based on the assumption that the ordinary value of

land of a particular description, within the county, was a

matter of public notoriety, and was, therefore, such a ques-

tion as the jury, required by statute to be composed of free-

holders, would be fully conversant with, and abundantly

able to decide. So in the same State the courts have held

that there was nothing in the study, or ordinary observation
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of horses, which entitled a witness to be introduced as an

expert as to their value. 3 This practice of excluding opinions

in such cases, was found not to work well, and was embar-

rassing to the jury, as well as prejudicial to the rights of

the parties interested in the litigation. The legislature

accordingly interfered, and provided as follows: "The

opinions of witnesses as to the value of any real estate,

goods or chattels, may be received as evidence thereof, when

it appears to the court that they are qualified to judge of

such value." 4

The rule that the opinions of witnesses are admissible on

questions' of value, is, of course, inapplicable in those cases

1 Lincoln v. Saratoga etc. R. R. Co., 23 Wend. 425, 433.

2 Rochester v. Chester, 3 X. H. 364; Peterborough v. Jaffrey, 6 X. H.

4G2; Hoitt v. Moulton, 1 Foster, 586; Marshall v. Columbian Mutual

Fire Ins. Co., 7 Foster, 157.

8 Robertson v. Stark, 15 X. H. 109; Low v. Connecticut etc. R. R. Co.,

45 X. H. S70, 381.

4 General Laws of Xew Hampshire (1878), p. 532, 23.

(14)

i n, or person conversant with the article, as to the value of
lands, cattle, horses, produce, etc. These cases all stand
upon the general ground of peculiar skill and judgment in
the matters about which opinions are sought.'' 1 This rule
however, did not commend itself to the courts of New
Hampshire, and the practice there was to exclude the opinions of witnesses on questions of value, in cases where it
was customary in the courts of other States to unhesitatingly receive them, provided only, the witnesses were duly
qualified to testify in relation to the subject of inquiry.
For example, the practice in that State was to exclude the
-0pinions of witnesses as to the value of real estate, irrespective of any question as to their qualifications. 2 The exclusion
was based on the assumption that the ordinary vaiue of
land of a particular deiwription, within the county, was a
matter of public notoriety, and was, therefore, such a question as the jury, required by statute to be composed of freeholders, would be fully conversant with, and abundantly
able to decide. So in the same State the courts have held
that there was nothing in the study, or ordinary observation
of horses, which entitled a witness to be introduced as an
expert as to their value. 3 This practice of excluding opinions
in such cases , was found not to work well, and was embarrassing to the jury, as well as prejudicial to the rights of
the parties interested in the litigation. The legislature
~ccortlingly interfered, and provided as follows:
"The
opinions of witnesses as to the value of any real estate,
goods or chattels, may be received as evidence thereof, when
it appears to the court that they are qualified to judge of
such value." 4
The rule that the opinions of witnesses are admissible on
questions·of value, is, of course, inapplicahle in th6se cases
Lincoln v. Sarato~a etc. R.R. Co., 23 Wend. 425, 433.
Rochester v. Chester, 3 N. H. 364; Petterborough v. Jaffrey, 6 N. H.
4G2; Hoitt v. Moulton, 1 Foster, 586; Marshall v. Columbian Mutual
Fire In . Co., 7 Foster, 157.
8 Robertson v. Stark, 15 N. H. 109; Low v. Connecticut etc. R.R. Co.,
1

2

45 N. H. :170, 381.
4

G<;neral Laws of :New Hampshire (187 ) , p. 532, § 23.
(14)
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in which the subject of value is susceptible of specific proof.

Hence, in a recent case in the United States Court of
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Claims, the court declared that the testimony of experts

could not be received to show the value of a cotton factor's

outlays for insurance, freight, rebating, etc., inasmuch as

specific proof could be given of the outlays actually made

by the factor. 1 And in a case in New York where a witness,

who stated that he knew the effect on fat cattle of getting

out of an inclosure and wandering about, was asked what,

in his opinion, would be the shrinkage of certain cattle,

which he had not seen, resulting from such a tramp, it was

held that he could not answer. The court said : "To admit

this, was to extend the admissibility of evidence by experts

too far. There could be no difficulty, in this case, in show-

ing the actual injury to the cattle which followed their

escape and their wandering about. If they had shrunk in

weight, or had been injured in appearance, these facts could

have been proved by those who saw them. For these were

plain and conspicuous results. To prove what is the usual

effect of such an escape on such cattle, is to substitute con--
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jecture for certainty." 2 The object, of course, was to show

the depreciation in value of the cattle. The opinions of

witnesses will be incompetent wherever the data upon which

the conclusions of the experts are based, do not have that

certainty of relation which entitles them to authority as a

law of science. It has, for this reason, been held that a con-

jectural deduction, or generalization, made by experts upon

the operation of other railroads, was incompetent evidence

for the purpose of showing the worth of the government's

right to use the plaintiff's road. 3 The experts were persons

specially familiar with railroads and railroad accounts, and

the claimants contended that they had proven by them that

20 per cent, of the gross transportation earnings of a rail-

road, was a reasonable and proper deduction for the use of

1 Patten v. United States, 15 Ct. of Cl. 288. See too, Page v. Hazard,

5 Hill (X.Y.), 603.

1 Schernerhorn v. Tyler, 11 Hun, 551.

8 Atchison etc. R. R. Co. v. United States, 15 Ct. of 01. 126.

in which the subject of value is usceptible of specific proof.
Hence} in a r~cent ca e in the United States Court of
Claims, the court declared that the testimony of experts
could not be received to show the value of a cotton factor's
outlays for in m;ance, freight, rebating, etc., inasmuch as
specific proof could be given of the outlays actually made
by the factor. 1 And in a case in New York where a witness,
who stated that he knew the effect on fat cattle of getting
out of an inclosure and wandering about, was asked what,
in his opinion, would be the shrinkage of certain cattle,
which he had not seen, re ulting from such a tramp, it was
held that he could not an wer. The court said: "To admit
this, was to extend the admissibility of evidence by experts
too far. There could be no difficulty, in this case, in showing the actual injury to the cattle which followed their
escape and their wandering a.bout. If they had shrunk in
weight, or had been h1jured in appearance, the ... e facts could
have been proved by those who saw them. For these were
plain and conspicuous results. To prove what is the usual
effect of such an e cape on such cattle, is to substitute con- '
jecture for certainty.'' 2 The object, of c~urse, was to show
the depreciation in value of the cattle. The opinions of
witnesses will be incompetent wherever the data upon which
the conclusions of the experts are based, do not have that
certainty of relation which entitles them to authority as a
law of science. It has, for this reason, been held that a conjectural deduction, or generalization, made by experts upon
the operation of other railroads, was incompetent evidence
for the purpose of showing the worth of the gove1·nment' s
right to use the plaintiff's road. 3 The experts were persons
specially familiar with railroads and railroad accounts, and
the claimants contended that they had proven by them that
20 per cent. of the gro s tran portation earnings of a railroad, was a reasonable and proper deductifJn for the use of
1

Patten v. United tate , 15 Ct. of Cl. 288. See too Page v. H azard,
5 Hill (N. Y.) 603.
2
Schernerhorn v. Tyler 11 Hun 551.
8
Atchi on etc. R. R. Co. v. United State 15 Ct. of Cl. 126.
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a railroad, and that they were, therefore, entitled to recover

VALUE .

80 per cent, of their tariff rates. The court refused to con-

211

sider the evidence, on the ground that inasmuch as rail-

roads differed in their essential features, the data were too

uncertain to entitle them to authority as a law of science.

While, on the other hand, it has been held that the opin-

ions of witnesses specially acquainted with the business of

the railroad in question, and of the expenses of operating it,

would be competent evidence as to the value of the use of

the particular road during a given time. 1 There may be in-

quiries as to value which, from their very nature, cannot be

answered by any one as an expert. Such would be an

inquiry into the value of the reversion of land over which a

railroad is located ; the value of which necessarily depends

on the length of time that the public easement over it may

continue. As the essential element on which the inquiry

turns is one in relation to which there has been no experi-

ence, it follows that an expert could not be heard to express

an opinion thereon. 2

152. The Amount of Damages. We find it laid down

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 20:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t71v5cx5m
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

generally in the authorities, that on questions as to the

amount of damages resulting from a particular transaction^

witnesses are not permitted to express an opinion, but are

confined to a description of the injuries ; it being the duty

of the jury to estimate the damages from the facts proven

as to the nature and character of the injuries. 3 It is, how-

1 Sturgis v. Knapp, 33 Vt. 486.

2 Boston etc. R. R. Co. v. Old Colony etc. R. R. Co., 3 Allen (Mass.) r

142, 147.

3 Lincoln v. Saratoga, etc. R. R. Co., 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 433; Norman v.

Wells, 17 Wend. (X. Y.) 136; Dunham v. Simons, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 609;

Fishv. Dodge, 4 Denio (N.Y.),311; Thompson v. Dickhart, 66 Barb.

(N. Y.) 604; Terpenningv. Corn Exchange Ins. Co.,43N. Y. 279; Whit-

more v. Bischoff, 5 Hun (N. Y.), 176; Fleming v. Delaware, etc. Canal

Co., 8 Hun (N. Y.), 358; Evansville R. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 10 Ind.

120; Sinclair v. Rousrh. 14 Ind. 450; Mitchell v. Allison, 29 Ind.

43; Bissell v. Wert, 35 Ind. 54; Ohio, etc. R. R. Co. v. Nickless, 71

Ind. 271; Pierson v. Wallace, 7 Ark. 282; Central Railroad, etc. Co.

v. Kelly, 58 Ga. 107; Wilcox v. Leake, 11 La. Ann. 178; Atlantic,

etc. R. R. Co. v. Campbell, 4 Ohio St. 583; Cleveland, etc. R. R. Co.

a railroad, and that they were, therefore, entitled to recover
80 per cent. of their tariff rates. The court refused to consider the evidence, on the ground that inasmuch as railroads differed in their essential features , the data were too
uncertain to entitle them to authority as a law of science.
While, on the other hand, it has been held that the opinions of witnes~es specially acquainted with the business of
the railroad in question, and of the expenses of operating it,
would be competent evidence as to the value of the use of
the particular road during a given time. 1 There may be inquiries as to value which, from their very nature, cannot be ·
answered by any one as an expert. Such would be an
inquiry into the value of the reversion of land over which a.
railroad is located; the value of which necessarily depends
on the length of time that the public easement over it may
continue. As the e"sential element on which the inquiry
turns is one in relation to which there has been no experience, it follows that an expert could not be heard to express
an opinion thereon. 2
§ 152. The Amount of Damages.-We find it laid down
generally in the authorities, that on questions as to the
amount of damages resulting from a particular transaction,.
witnesses are not permitted to express an opinion, but are
confined to a description of the injuries; it being the duty
of the jury to estimate the damages from the facts proven
as to the nature and character of the injuries. 3 It is , howSturgis Y. Knapp, 33 Vt. 4 6.
Boston etc . R.R. Co. v. Old Colony etc. R . R. Co., 3 Allen (Mass.),
142, 147.
3 Lincoln v. Saratoga, etc. R.R. Co., 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 433; Norman v.
Well ~ , 17 Wend. (X. Y.) 136; Dunham v. Simons, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 609;
Fish v. D ocJge, 4 Denio (N. Y.),311; Thompson v. Dickhart, 66 Barb.
(N. Y.) 60-1; 'l'erpenningv. Corn Exchange Ins. Co.,43N. Y. 279; Whitmore v. Bischoff, 5 Hun (N. Y. ), 176; Fleming v. Delaware, etc. Canal
Co., 8 Hun CK. Y.), 35 ' ; Evansville R. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 10 Ind.
120; Sinclair v. Romh, 14 Incl. 450; Mitchell v. Allison, 29 Ind.
43; Bissell v. \ ·Vert, 35 Ind. 54; Ohio, etc. R. R. Co. v. Nickless, 71
Ind. 271; Pierson v. Wallace, 7 Ark. 282; Central Railroad, etc. Co.
· v. Kelly, 58 Gn. 107; "\VUcox v. Leake, 11 La. Ann. 178; Atlantic,
etc. R. R. Co. v. Carnnbell, 4 Ohio St. 583; Cleveland, etc. R.R. Co.
I
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ever, well settled that a competent witness may be asked to

state his opinion as to the value of property before and

after the injury complained of. 1 So that practically the

same result is attained, as though the witness expressed an

opinion in answer to a direct inquiry as to the amount of

damages. The only difference seems to be, that in the one

case, the jury make the subtraction, in the other, the wit-

ness. It certainly seems to be a very immaterial distinc-

tion, which is of no consequence whatever. And in some

States witnesses are permitted to express an opinion in

answer to a direct inquiry, in all cases where the value of

property is in issue. Such is declared to be the well settled

law in Massachusetts, 2 and the courts elsewhere are recog-

nizing and asserting the same doctrine. 3 There seems to

be a growing tendency to permit witnesses to express an

v. Ball, 5 Ohio St. 568; Roberts v. Commissioners of Brown County,

21 Kans. 248; Wliitmore v. Bowman, 4 G. Greene (Iowa) 148; Anson v.

Dwight, 18 Iowa, 244.

1 Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Thoburn, 7 S. & R. (Penn.) 411, 422, 423 ;

Watson v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. R. Co., 37 Penn. St. 469, 481 ; East Pennsyl-
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vania R. R. Co. Y. Hottenstine, 47 Penn. St. 30; Shaw v. City of Char-

leston, 2 Gray, 107; Inhabitants of West Newbury v. Chase, 5 Gray

(Mass.) , 421 ; Swan v. Middlesex, 101 Mass. 173 ; Sexton v. North Bridge-

water, 116 Mass. 201; Simmonsv. St. Paul, etc. R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 184,

189, 190; Colvill v. St. Paul, etc.R. R. Co., 19 Minn. 283, 285; Smalley v.

ever, well settled that a competent witness may be asked to
state his opinion as to the value of property before and
after the injury complained of. 1 So that practically the
same result is attained, as though the witness expressed an
opinion in answer to a direct inquiry as to the amount of
damages. The only difference seems to be, that in the one '
case, the jury make the subtraction, in the other, the witness. It certainly seems to be a very immaterial distinction, which is of no consequence whatever. And in some
States witnesses are permitted to express an opinion in
answer to a direct inquiry, in all cases where the value of
property is in issue. Such is declared to be the well settled
law in Massachusetts, 2 and the courts elsewhere are recognizing and asserting the same doctrine. 3 There seems to
be a growing tendency to permit witnesses to express an

Iowa Pacific R. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 571, 574; Snow v. Boston, etc. R. R. Co.,

65 Me. 230, 231; Whiteley v. Inhabitants of China, 61 Me. 199; Haskell

v. Mitchell, 53 Me. 466; Carter v. Thurston, 58 N. H. 104; Houston, etc.

R. R. Co. v. Knapp, 51 Texas, 592; Curtis v. St. Paul, etc. R. R. Co.,

20 Minn. 28; Churchill v. Price, 44 Wis. 542. In Morehouse v.

Mathews, 2 N. Y. 514, it was held improper to permit a witness to state

the amount of damage which cattle suffered by improper feeding, but

the court held that he might state how much less valuable the cattle

were when taken away, than they were when taken to the defendant's.

2 Shattuck v. Stoneham Branch R. R. Co., 6 Allen (Mass.), 116, 117.

3 Rochester, etc. R. R. Co. v. Budlong, 10 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 289 ; Snow

v. Boston, etc. R. R. Co., 65 Me. 230, 231 ; Keithsburg, etc. R. R. Co. v.

Henry, 79 111. 290 ; Cooper v. Randall, 59 111. 317 ; White & Deer Creek, etc.

Co. v. Sassaman, 67 Penn. St. 415, 421; Ottawa Gas Light Co. v.

Graham, 35 111. 346; Curtis v. St. Paul, etc. R. R. Co., 20 Minn. 28;

Snyder v. Western Union R. R. Co., 25 Wis. 60, 66, 70. In Mississippi

River Bridge Co. v. Ring, 58 Mo. 492, witnesses appear to have testified

to the damage, no objection being made thereto.

v. Ball, 5 Ohio St. 568; Roberts v. Commissioners of Brown County,
21 Kans. 248; Whitmore v. Bowman, 4 G. Greene (Iowa) 148; Anson v.
Dwight, 18 Iowa, 244.
i Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Thoburn, 7 S. & R. (Penn.) 411, 422, 4~3;
Watson v. Pittsburgh, etc. R.R. Co., 37 Penn. St. 469, 481; East Pennsylvania R.R. Co. Y. Hottenstine, 47 Penn. St. 30; Shaw v. City of Charleston, 2 Gray, 107; Inhabitants of West Newbury v. Chase, 5 Gray
(Mass.), 421; Swan v. Middlesex, 101 Mass.173; Sexton v. North Bridgewater, 116 Mass. 201; Simmons v. St. Paul, etc. R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 184,
189, 190; Colvill v. St. Paul, etc. R.R. Co., 19Minn. 283, 285; Smalley v.
Iowa Pacific R.R. Co., 36Iowa, 571, 574; Snow v. Boston, etc. R.R. Co.,
65 Me. 230, 231; Whiteley v. Inhabitants of China, 61 Me. 199; Haskell
v. Mitchell, 53 Me. 466; Carter v. Thurston, 58 N. H. 104; Houston, etc.
R.R. Co. v. Knapp, 51 Texas, 592; Curtis v. St. Paul, etc. R.R. Co.,
20 Minn. 28; phurchill v. Price, 44 Wis. 542. In Morehouse v.
Mathews, 2 N. Y. 514, it was held improper to permit a witness to state
the amount of damage which cattle suffered by improper· feeding, but
the court held that he might state how much less valuable the cattle
were when taken away, than they were when taken to the defendant's.
2
Shattuck v. Stoneham Branch R.R. Co., 6 Allen (Mass.), 116, 117.
8 Rochester, etc. R. R. Co. v. Budlong, 10 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 289; Snow
v. Boston, etc. R.R. Co., 65 Me. 230, 231; Keithsburg, etc. R.R. Co. v.
Henry, 79 Ill. 290; Cooper v. R andall, 59 Ill. 317; White & Deer Creek, etc.
Co. v. Sassaman, 67 Penn. St. 415, 421; Ottawa Gas Light Co. v.
Graham,35 lll. 346; Curtisv.St. Paul, etc. R.R. Co.,20 Minn. 28;
Snyder v. Western Union R. R. Co., 25 Wis. 60, 66, 70. In Mississippi
River Bridge Co. v. Ring, 58 Mo. 492, witnesses appear to have testified
to the damage, no objection being made thereto.
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opinion on the amount of damages, where the value of

213

property is in issue. 1 The true principle would seem to be,

and has been so laid down in a carefully considered case,

that whenever the question of value and the question of

damages are identical, that then the opinions of witnesses

may be received as to the amount of damages. That there

is no such inherent distinction between questions of value

and questions of damages, if from the latter is excluded

all idea of any legal rule or measure of damages, as brings

the one within and the other without the province of the

opinions of witnesses. 2 And the rule is that where the in-

jury sustained is of such a nature that only an expert can

properly form an opinion in reference to it, or when the

character of the property is such that only experts can

properly form an opinion as to its value, an ordinary wit-

ness is incompetent to express an opinion as to the amount

of damages, and experts must be called for that purpose.*

153. Opinions of Xon-Profcssioiial AVitnesses. The

opinions of persons acquainted with the value of property

are sometimes received in evidence, although such knowl-
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edge may not be the result of any peculiar skill in any par-

ticular branch of business, or department of science. 4 They

are received upon the ground of necessity. 6 " These opin-

ions are admitted, not as being the opinions of experts,

J See Mills on Em. Domain, 165.

2 Rochester, etc. R. R. Co. v. Budlong, 10 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 289.

3 See 1 Wharton on Evidence, 450.

4 Swan v. Middlesex. 101 Mass. 173; Wyman v. Lexington, ete. R. R,

Co.. 13 Met. (Mass.) 216, 326; Dalzell v. City of Davenport, 12 Iowa, 437 r

440 ; Whitfield v. Whitfield, 40 Miss. 352, 358 ; Cantling v. Hannibal, etc. R.

R. Co.. 54 Mo. 385; Continental Ins. Co. v.Horton. 28 Mich. 173; Prints

v. People. 42 Mich. 144; Richardson v. McGoldrick, 43 Mich. 476; Keables*

v. Christie. 47 Mich. 595; Whitesell v. Crane, 8 W. & S. (Penn.) 372;

McGill v. Rowand. 3 Penn St. 452; Mish v. Wood, 34 Penn. St. 451 T

454; Thatcher v. Kaucher. 2 Col. 698; Cooper v. State, 53 Miss. 393;

Cooper v. Randall, 59111.317, 320; Washington, etc. Co. v. Webster, 68

Me. 449; Anson v. Dwight, 18 Iowa, 244; Foster v. Ward, 75 Ind. 594;

Pittsburgh, etc. R. R. Co. v. Rose, 74 Penn. St. 368, 362; Chamness v.

Chamness, 53 Ind. 304.

5 Wyman v. Lexington, etc. R. R. Co., 13 Met. (Mass.) 316. 326;

Dalzell v. City of Davenport, 12 Iowa, 437, 440.

oprn10n on the amount of damages, where the value of
property is in issue. 1 The true prineiple would seem to be,
and ha'3 been so laid down in a carefully considered case,
that whenever the question of value and the question of
damages are i<lentical, that then the opinions of witnesses
may be received as to the amount of damages. That there
is no such inherent di stinction between question s of value
and question s of damages , if from the latter is excluded
all idea of any legal rule or measure of damages , as brings
the one within and the other without the province of the
opinions of witnesses. 2 And the rule is that where the injury sustainecl is of such a nature that only an expert can
properly f orm an opinion in reference to it, or when the
character of the property is such that only experts can
properly fo r m an opinion a::; to its value, an ordinary witness is incompetent to express an opinion as to the amount
of damages , a nd experts must be called for that purpose. 3'
§ 153. Opinions of Non-Professional Witnesses.-The·
opinions of persons acquainted with the value of property
are sometimes received in evidence, although such knowledge may not be the result of any peculiar skill in any particular branch of business , or department of science. 4 They
are r ecei ved upon t he ground of necessity/' H These opinions are admitt ed, not as being the opinions of experts,.
See ::\! ills on Em . Domain , § 163.
R ochester. etc. R.R. Co. v. B udlong , 10 How. Pr. ( N. Y.) 280.
a See 1 'Vharton on Evide nce, § 450.
-t S'rnn v. )Iid<.llesex. 101 ~lass . 173; Wy man v. L exington , ete . R.R.
Co .. 13 ) let. (:\lass.) 216, 326 ; D alzell v. City of Davenport, 12 Iowa, 437,.
440; " 'hitfield v . W hitfield , 40 "Miss. 352, 358; Cantlingv. Hannibal , etc. R.
R. Co .. 54 )lo. 3 5; Cont ine n tal Ins. Co. v. Horton. 28 .Mich. 173; Print:z;
v. P eople . 42 ~lich . 144; Richardson v. McGoldrick, 43 Mich. 476; Keablesv. Christie , -17 }lich . 595; Whi te ell v. Crane, 8 W. & S. (Penn.) 372;
1.IcGill v. Rowand. 3 P enn St. 452; Mish v. Wood, 34 P e nn. St. 451 ,.
45-!; Thatcherv. K auche r, 2 Col. 698 ; Cooperv. State, 53 Miss.393;
Cooper v. Ran(lall, 5!) Il l. 31 7. 320 ; W ashington, etc. Co. v. Webster, 6
Me. 4-19; Anson v . Dwight 1 Iowa , 244; Foster v. Ward. 75 Ind. 594;
Pittsburgh , etc . R .R. Co. v. R ose, 74 Penn. St. 3GS, 362; Chamness v.
Chamness. 53 Inrl. 30±.
5 'Vyman \". Lexing on . etc. R. R. Co., 13 Met. (~fass . ) 316, 326 ;
D alzell v. City o f Da,·e11porr, 12 Io\va , 437 , 4-!0.
i
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strictly so called, for they are not founded on special study

or training, or professional experience, but rather from ne-

cessity, upon the ground that they depend upon knowledge

which any one may acquire, but" which the jury may not

have, and that they are the most satisfactory, and often the

only attainable evidence of the fact to be proved. 1

A distinguished writer has stated the rule as follows:

" Two essentials, therefore, exist to a proper estimate of

Talue :

"First. A knowledge of the intrinsic properties of the

thing.

** Secondly. A knowledge of the state of the markets.

As to such intrinsic properties as are occult, and out of the

range of common observers, experts are required to tes-

tify : as to the properties which are cognizable by an ob-

server of ordinary business sagacity, being familiar with the

thing, such an observer is permitted to testify." *

But whenever it is desired to have the opinions of a wit-

ness on the subject of value, it is always necessary, whether

the witness is offered as an expert or not, to lay some

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 20:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t71v5cx5m
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

foundation for the introduction of his opinion, by showing

that he has had the means to form an intelligent opinion,

*' derived from an adequate knowledge of the nature and

kind of property in controversy, and of its value." 3

154. Qualifications of 'the Expert in Values. Where

a witness is produced to testify, in the character of an ex-

pert, as to the value of property, it should appear that he

has some special skill or experience, or peculiar knowledge

of the value of the class of property about which it is pro-

posed to question him, such skill or knowledge having been

acquired by him in the line of his business or profession.

1 Swan v. Middlesex, 101 Mass. 173, per Gray. J.

2 1 Wharton's Evidence, 447.

8 Whitney v. City of Boston, 98 Mass. 315. In this case it was held no

error to exclude the opinion of a shoemaker as to the value of land, who

had hired one of several buildings on the land, occupying the upper

stories and underletting the lower. And see Chainbovet v. Cagnet, 3 J.

& S. (N. Y.) 474; Haight v. Kimbak, 51 Iowa, 13.

·strictly so called, for they are not founded on special study
-0r training, or professional experience, but rather from ne·cessity, upon the ground that they depend upon knowledge
which any one may acquire, buf which the jury may not
have, and that they are the most satisfactory, and often the
-0nly attainable evidence of the fact tO be proved. 1
A distinguished writer has stated the rule as follows:
" Two essentials, therefore, exist to a proper estimate of
value:
"First. A knowledge of the inirin ic propertiec:; of the
thing.
"Secondly. A knowledge of the state of the markets.
As to such intriueic properties as are occult, and out of the
range of common observers, experts are requireQ. to tes. tify; as to the properties which are cognizable by an observer of ordinary business sagacity, being familiar with the
thing, such an observer is permitted to testify." 2
But whenever it is desired to have the opinions of a witness on the subject of value, it is always nece sary, whether
the witness is offered as an expert or not, to lay some
foundation for the introduction of hi opinion, by bowing
that he has had the means to form an intelligent opinion,
"'derived from an adequate knowledge of the nature and
kind of property in controver"y, and of its value." 3
§ 154. Qualifications of"the Expert in Values.-"\Vhere
a witnes:s i produced to testify, in the character 'Of an expert, aR to the value of property, it should appear that he
has some special skill or experience, or peculiar knowledge
of the value of the class of property about which it i proposed to question him, such skill or knowledge having been
acquired by him in the line of his bu ine ~~ or profe sion.
Swan v. :Middlesex, 101 ~la ss . 17:l, per Gray. J.
1 Wharton's Evidence, § 447.
8 Whitney v. City of Boston, 98 ~Iass. 315. In thi ' ca..,e it wa held no
-error to exclnde the opinion of a shoemaker as to the value of land wbo
had hired one of several bnildi11g on the land, occupying the upper
·s torie and un<l erletting the lower. And ee Chambovet v. Oagnet, 3 J.
& . (~ . Y.) 474; Haight v. Kimb a.k 51 Iowa, 13.
1
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Where the question was as to the value of a house, a wit-

ness, whose business was the loaning of money on real

estate, was held incompetent to testify as an expert concern-

ing the value of the house, for the reason that it did not

appear that his experience in the matter of houses was such

as to make him from the nature of his profession, an exact

judge in such matters. 1 So it has been held that witnesses

are not competent to testify as experts to the effect of

dampness in the cellar of a store in lessening the value of

the annual rent of the building, whose experience consisted

merely in hiring stores, and being acquainted with their

value. "Two witnesses," said the court, "were allowed

to testify as experts after objection, as to the effect of the

state of the cellar upon the value of the premises in ques-

tion, when their only stock and extent of experience con-

sisted of having hired stores, and being acquainted with

their value. They do not appear to have been acquainted

with the effect on a yearly rent of dampness in a "basement

or water in a sub-cellar. A mere knowledge of the value

of stores which never had a damp basement would not as-
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sist any one in determining the extent of its deteriorating

effects on such value." 2

Where the inquiry related to the value of the services

rendered by a broker in effecting the sale of a colliery, the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has lately held that a real

estate broker, whose business consisted in the sale of

city real estate, and who had no experience in and knew

of no sales of collieries, or of commissions paid on such

sales, was incompetent to testify as to the value of the

services. 3 And in another case, the value of a mill being in

issue, the Supreme Court of Maine held that a witness

could not testify as an expert, where the testimony showed

that he had resided many yars in the vicinity of the mill

privilege ; that he was the owner of real estate in the vicin-

ity ; had been an assessor in the town ; and was something

1 Naughton v. Stagg, 4 Mo. App. 271.

2 Benkard v. Babeock, 2 Robt. (X. Y.) 175, 186.

3 Potts v. Achteruacht, 93 Perm. St. 142.

Where the question was as to the value of a house, a witness, whose business was the loaning of money on real
-estate, was .held incompetent to testify as an expert concerning the value of the house, for the reason that it did not
appear that his experience in the matter of houses was such
as to make him from the nature of his profession, an exact
judge in such matters. 1 So it has been held that witnesses
are not competent to testify as experts to the effect of
<lampness in the cellar of a store in lebsening the value of
the annual rent of the building, whose experience consisted
merely in hiring stores, and being acquainted with their
value. " Two witne~ ses," said the court, " were allowed
to testify as experts after objection, as to the effect of the
state of the cellar upon the value of the premises in question, when their only stock and extent of experience consisted of having hired stores, and being acq·rninted with
their value. They do not appear to have been acquainted
with the .effect on a yearly rent of dampness in a· basement
or water in a sub-cellar. A mere knowledge of the value
-o f stores which never had a damp basement would not assist any one in determining the extent of it1' deteriorating
effects on such value. " 2
Where the inqqiry related to .t he value of the services
rendered by a broker in effecting the sale of a colliery, the
Supreme Court of .Pennsylvania has lately held that a real
estate broker, whose business consisted in the sale of
city real estate, and who had no experience in and knew
-o f no sales of collieries, or of commissions paid on such
sales , was incompetent to testify as to the value of the
services.3 And in another case, the value of a mill being in
i~sue, the Supreme Court of :Maine held that a witness
.could not testify as an expert, where the testimony showed
that he had resided many years in the vicinity of the mill
privilege; that he was the owner of real estate in the vicinity; had been an assessor in the town; and was something
Naughton v. Stagg, 4 ~Io. App. 271.
Benkard v. B abc<ick, 2 R obt. (N . Y. ) 175, 1 6.
JI Potts v. Achternach t, 93 P enn. St. 142.
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of a judge of the value of real estate iu that vicinity ; but

had never bought, sold, owned, or operated a mill, and had

no special knowledge of the value of mills and mill privi-

leges. 1 So, a farmer has been held incompetent to express

an opinion as to the value of a fishing privilege. 2 And such

a person has been held to be incompetent to express an

opinion as to the value of the services rendered by a clerk

in a country store. 3

It is impossible, however, to define with any precision the

degree of special knowledge which the witness should pos-

sess in order to render him competent. 4 The witness should

have peculiar knowledge of the property and of its value,

is the language of the decisions. 5 "The evidence of experts

is received on the ground of science or skill, and witnesses

may speak on the value of property or labor, where it ap-

pears they have peculiar sources of knowledge to guide them

on these subjects, and which are not presumed to be equally

within the reach of the jury." 6

155. Not Necessary that Expert sliould See the Prop-

erty in Question. As experts may testify where they
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have no personal knowledge of the facts in [controversy,

basing their opinions upon the facts which have been testi-

fied to by other witnesses, so the opinion of an expert may

be received as to the value of articles similar to one which

has been described by witnesses having personal knowledge

of it, although such expert has never seen the particular ar-

ticle in question which has been lost or destroyed. No rea-

son is perceived why an expert, testifying in respect to value,

should be governed by a different principle in this respect than

that which applies to experts testifying upon other subjects.

In a case in Pennsylvania this question was considered,,

and the conclusion was reached that it was unnecessary that

1 Clark v. Rockland Water Power Co., 52 Me. 68.

2 Boston, etc. R. R. Ce. v. Montgomery, 119 Mass. 114.

3 Lamoure v. Caryl, 4 Denio (N". Y.), 373.

4 Bedell v. Long Island R. R. Co.. 44 N. Y. 367, 370.

5 Terpenning v. Corn Exchange Ins. Co., 43 N. Y. 279.

6 Lamoure v. Caryl, 4 Denio (X. Y.), 373.

of a ju_d ge of the value of real estate in that vicinity ; but.
had never bought, sold, owned, or operated a mill, and had
no special knowledge of the value of mHls and mill privileges.1 So, a farmer has been held incompetent to express
an opinion as to the value of a fishing privileg!3. 2 And such.
a person has been held to be incompetent to express an
opinion as to the value of the services rendered by a clerk
in a country store. 3
It is impossible, however, to define with any precision the·
degree of special knowledge which the witness should possess in order to render him competent. 4 The witness should
have peculiar knowledge of the property and of its value,.
is the language of the deci~ions. 5 "The evidence of experts
is received on the ground of science or skill, and witnesses
may speak on the value of property or labor, where it appears they have peculiar sources of knowledge to guide them
on these subjects, and which are not presumed to be equally
within the reach of the jury." 6
§ 155. Not Necessary that Expert should See the Property in Question.-As experts may testify where they
have no personal know ledge of the facts in :controversy,.
basing their opinions upon the facts which have been testified to by other witnesses, so the opinion of an expert may
be received as to the value of articles similar to one which.
has been described by witnesses having personal knowledge
of it, although such expert has never seen the particular ar-·
ticle in question which has been lost or destroyed. No reason is perceived why an expert, testifying in respect to value,.
should be governed by a different principle in this respect than
that which applies to experts testifying upon other subjects ..
In a case in Pennsylvania this que tion was considered,.
and the conclusion was reached that it was unnecessary that.
1

Clark v. Rockland Water Power Co., 52 Me. 6 .
Bo ton, etc. R.R. Ce. v. Montgomery, 119 Ma s. 114.
3 L amoure v. Uaryl,4 Denio (N. Y.), 373.
•Bedell v. Long Island R.R. Co.~ 44: N. Y. 367 3"'0.
5 Terpenning v. Corn Exchange Ins. Co., 43 N. Y. 279.
6 L amoure v. Caryl, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 373.
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article. "What is there," asked Mr. Justice THOMPSON,

" to prevent a merchant from testifying, in corroboration

of an invoice, as to values, where no values are given, when

goods are lost? The fact of the existence or loss of the

goods is not touched by such testimony. That remains to

be established by other evidence. I think I have known

many instances of this kind. If a trunk should be packed

by a servant, incapable of placing a value on the wardrotje

of his or her master or mistress, although able to testify to

each article, and describe its quality, yet wholly incompe-

tent to give the slightest idea of the real value of the arti-

cles ; in case of loss how is the value to be ascertained, but

by the testimony of a tradesman acquainted with the value

of such articles, based upon a description of them? So in

regard to furniture insured, and lost by fire, it can hardly

be doubted, but that it would be competent to fix the value,,

by persons acquainted with such matters, and competent as

such to testify, after its quality had been described.

If the rule be, that only persons who have seen the arti-
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cles which have been lost, can give an estimate of their

value, then, in all the cases suggested, there would be a

failure to recover for a loss, or the jury would be left to

guess at their value." l It has been held that a nurseryman

could testify as to the value of trees which had been de-

stroyed, and which he had not seen, but had heard de-

scribed. 2 And the courts elsewhere have taken a similar

view of this question. 3 But where a millwright had neither

seen the mill in question, nor a drawing of it, and where he

testified that it was hard to estimate the cost of the mill

without seeing or knowing what the work was, it was held

1 Mish v. Wood, 34 Penn. St. 451.

2 Whitbeck v. X. Y. etc. R. R. Co., 36 Barb. 644.

3 Orr v. Mayor, etc., 64 Barb. 106; Miller v. Smith, 112 Mass. 470, 475;;

Beecher v. Denniston. 13 Gray (Mass.), 354. In Miller v. Smith, supra, a.

witness possessing special knowledge and experience was permitted to

express an opinion as to the value of fast trotting horses of a certain

age, size, gait, speed, and other qualities, although he had not seen the

horse in question.

the expert should have personal knowledge of the particular
article. "What is there," asked Mr. Justice THOl\IPSON,.
" to prevent a merchant from testifying, in corroboration
of an .invoice, as to 'values, where no values are given, when
goods are lost? The fact of the existence or loss of the
goods is not touched by such testimony. That remains t<>
be established by other evidence. I think I have known
many instances of this kind. If a trunk should be packed.
by a servant, incapable of placing a value on the wardrobe
of his or her master <1r mistress, although able to testify to
each article, and describe its quality, yet wholly incompetent to give the slightest idea of the real value of the arti-cles; in case of loi:;s how is the value to be ascertained, but
by the testimony of a tradesman acquainted with the value
of such articles, based upon a description of them? So in,
regard to furniture insured, and lost by fire, it ean hardly
be doubted, but that it would be competent to fix the value,..
by persons acquainted with such matters, and competent as.
such to testify, after its quality had been described.
If the rule be, that only persons ,.vh~ have seen the arti-·
cl es which have been lost, can give an estimate of theirvalue, then, in all the cases suggested, there would be a .
failure to recover for a loss, or the jury would be left to
guess at their value.'' 1 It has been held that a nurseryman
could testify as to the value of trees which had been destroyed, and which he had not seen, but had heard described. 2 And the courts ehiewhere have taken a similar·
view of this question. 3 But where a millwright had neither
seen the mill in question, nor a drawing of it, and where he·
testified that it was hard to estimate the cost of the mill
without seeing or knowing wh:.tt the work was, it was held
:Mish v. Wood, 34 Penn. St. 451.
Whitbeck v. :N". Y. etc . R. R. Co., 36 Barb. 644.
8 Orr v. Mayor, etc ., 64 Barb. 106; ~Iiller v. Smith, 112 }fass. 470, 475 ~
B eecher v. Denni ton, 13 Gray pfa, s.), 354. In Miller v. Smith, supra, a.
witness possessing special knowledge and experience was permitted to
expre s an opinion as to the value of fa t trotting hor es of a certain
age, size, gait, speed, and other qualities~ although he had not seen the
horse in question.
i
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that he could not testify to its value, although he stated he

thought he could come within five or ten per cent, of its

Value if he had a right view of the mill. 1

156. Time of Examination of Property by the Ex-

pert. Where an expert testifies as to the value of the

property from a personal examination made of it, the ques-

tion has arisen whether the time of examination was so re-

mote to the time of inquiry as to render the opinion inad-

missible. In the case in question the expert had ex-

.amined the property, real estate, six months before he

was called on to testify, and his knowledge had refer-

ence to that time. The court held his opinion admis-

sible, and Mr. Justice AMES said: "In an inquiry as to

the value of property at any given time, it is impossible to

say that evidence as to its value at an earlier date is incom-

petent and inadmissible, unless that earlier date is so remote

as to have no importance or relevance in the inquiry. It

cannot be said to be too remote in this instance." 2

It is evident that much must depend on the nature of tHe

property. A period of time which would not be remote as
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to real estate might be too remote as to personalty, or what

would be remote as to realty in one part of the country,

would not be remote in another part, where the value of

such property changes slowly.

157. Competency in Particular Cases. The opinion

of an author is received as to the value of his literary pro-

duction, based upon the time and labor employed in its

preparation. 3 An artist may testify as an expert as to

the value of a portrait. 4 Millwrights are competent wit-

nesses as to the value of work done on a mill, 5 and ma-

chinists as to the value of particular machinery. 6 Where

1 Westlake v. St. Lawrence Co. Ins. Co. 14 Barb. (X. Y.) 206: s. c.,

3 Bennett Fire Ins. Cases, 404.

z Cobb v. City of Boston, 109 Mass. 438.

3 Babcock v. Raymond, 2 Hilt. (N T . Y.) 61.

4 Houston etc. R. R. .Co. v. Burke, 55 Texas. 324.

* Adams v. Dale, 29 Ind. 273.

e Steam Packet Co. v. Sickles. 10 Howard (U. S.) 419; Haskins v.

Hamilton ins Co., 5 Gray (Mass.). 432; Winter v. Burt, 31 Ala. 33.

that he could not testify to its value, although he stated he
he could come
within five or ten per cent. of its
thoucrht
e
r
'-value if he had a right view of the mill. 1
§ 156. Time of Examination of Property by the Expert.-Where an expert testifies as to the value of the
property from a personal examination made of it., the question has arisen whether the time of examination was so remote to the time of inquiry as to render the opinion inadmissible. In the case in question the expert had ex.amined the property, real estate, six _months before he
was called on to te.s tify, and his knowledge had reference to that time.
The court held his opinion admis:Sible, and l\fr. Justice Al\rns said: "In an inquiry as to
the value of property at any given time, it is impossible to
:say that evidence. as to its value at an earlier date is incompetent and inadmissible, unless that earlier date is so remote
:as to have no importance or · relevance in the inquiry. It
.cannot be said to be too remote in this in~tance." 2
It is evident that much must depend on the nature of tlie
property. A period of time which would not be remote as
to real estate might be too remote as to personalty, or what
would be remote as to realty in one part of the country,
would not be remote in another part, where the value of
:such property changes slowly. § 1.57. Competency in Particular Cases.-The opinion
of an author is received as to the value of his literary production, based ~pon the time and labor employed in its
preparation. 3 An artist may testify as an expert as to
the value of a portrait. 4 Millwrights are competent witnesses as to the value of work done on ~ mill/ and ma.cbinists as to the value of particular machinery. 6 vVhere
1

Westlake v. St. Lawrence Co. Ins. Co. 14 B arb. (N. Y.) 206; s. c.,
.3 Bennett Fire Ins. Case , 40±.
~ Cobb v. City of .Boston, 109 Ma s . 43 .
s Babcock v. Raymond, 2 Hilt. (~. Y.) 61.
"Houston etc. R.R . .Co . v. Burke, 55 'l'exas, 32±.
6 Adams v. Dale, 29 Ind. 273.
6
Steam Packet Co. v . ...:ickles, 10 Howard (U. B.) 419; Haakins v.
Hamilton Ins Co., 5 Gray (Mass.), 432; Winter v. Burt, 31 Ala. 33.
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the question was as to the value of a particular thresh-

ing machine, a witness who testified that he had run a

threshing machine for six or eight years, and had seen

the particular machine in operation, was adjudged com-

petent to express an opinion as to how much less such ma-

chine was worth than other machines that would run and do

first class work. 1 A superintendent of locomotive works,

who was familiar with the cost of building, rebuilding and

repairing locomotives, and with the value of the materials

used therein, and the labor employed thereon, has been per-

mitted to answer the following question: "Could the en-

gine (which you have seen) by any possibility have been so

damaged by wear and tear, or by accident, that with the

parts or materials as testified to by Mr. F., $20,000 would

have been a reasonable charge for rebuilding her?" 2 So

one who had purchased and sold machinery of a peculiar

kind, and owned and run it, and had made estimates of the

cost of building such machinery, and had procured such

estimates of other machinists for the purpose of having

such machines manufactured, has been held competent to
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testify as to the value of such machinery. 3

A witness who had experience and knowledge of sales by

retail of such articles as sugar, whisky, tobacco and ale,

and of the losses which, according to his own experience in

the course of several years, were the results of sales of

such goods in small quantities, has been allowed to testify

that it would be impossible to realize by small sales, the

amount of the retail prices on the entire quantity of articles

sold, and to give his reasons therefor, and to testify that,

as the result of his own experience, his opinion was that

small retail sales of such articles would cause, in ordinary

cases, a loss of five per cent, upon the total account of

goods so sold. 4 Real estate agents accustomed to value

and sell real estate in the neighborhood or city where the

1 Sheldon v. Booth, 50 Iowa, 200.

2 Tyng v. Fields, 5 Sup. Ct. (N. Y.), 672.

3 Raskins v. Hamilton Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Gray (Mas.O, 4:52.

* MTadden v. Murdoek, 1 Irish K. (C. L.) 211.

'the question wae as to the value of a particular thresh"ing machine, a witness who testified that he had run a
threshing machine for six or eight years, and had seen
the particular machine in operat10n, was adjudged competent to express an O})inion as to how much less such ma-c hine was worth than other machines that would run and do
-first class work. 1 A superintendent of locomotive works,
·who was familiar wit~ the cost of building, rebuilding and
Tepairing locomotives, and with the value of the materials
·used therein, and the labor employed thereon, has been permitted to answer the following question : " Could the engine (which you have seen) by any possibility have been so
damaged by wear and tear, or by accident, that with the
_parts or materials as testified to by Mr. F., $20,000 would
have heen a. reasonable charge for rebuilding her?" 2 So
one who had purchased . and sold machinery of a peculiar
kind, and owned and run it, and had made estimates of the
cost of building such machinery, and bad procured such
estimates of other machinists for the purpose of having
such machines manufactut'ed, has been held competent to
testify as to the value of such machinery .3
A witness who had ~xperience and knowledge of sales by
retail of such articles as sugar, whisky, tobacco and ale,
and of the losses which, according to his own experience in
the course of several years, were the results . of sales of
such goods in small quantities, bas been allowed to testify
that it would be impossible to realize by small sales, the
amount of the retail prices on the entire quantity of articles
sold, and to give bis reaso1~s therefor, and to testify that,
as the result of his own experience, his opinion was that
small retail sales of such articles would cause, in ordinary
.cases, a loss of five per cent. upon the total account of
_goods so sold. 4 Real estate agents accustomed to value
.and sell real estate in the neighborhood or city where the
Sheldon v. Booth, 50 Iowa, 209.
Tyng v. Field ' , 5 Sup. Ct.(~. Y.), 672.
a Ha ~ kins v. Hamilton :Mutual In . . Uo., i5 Gray (\Ia :5."'I, 432.
·4 M'Fadden v. Mui·dock, 1 Irish H. (C. L.) 211.
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land in question is situated, are competent to testify as to-

its value. 1 A real estate agent, engaged in letting houses,

testifying as an expert to rental value, may be asked on

cross-examination as to where the houses were situated which

he had let, what they were, and what rent they were let

for. 2 A real estate expert testifying as to the rental value

of a lot, cannot base his opinion upon a computation of the

annual interest upon what he believes to be the value of the

fee; he must have other means of knowledge. 8 Farmers,

graziers and drovers have been held competent to testify

as to the value of growth and increase of weight which

certain cattle might reasonably have been expected to

attain, but for the over-feeding of the pasture where they

grazed. 4 A farmer has been permitted to testify as to-

the loss in value of a cow by allowing her to become

dry. 5 So he has been held competent to express an opinion

as to the value of a mare of common blood, 6 and as to the

value of grass destroyed by cattle. 7

158. Competency in Particular Cases The Subject

Continued. Persons experienced in building railroads may
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testify what, in their opinion, will be the probable cost of

completing a railroad. 8 An architect is allowed to testify as

to the value of houses ; and in the case cited, such a witness

was permitted to testify as to the depreciation in value

of buildings in a neighborhood, as caused by a nuisance. 9

A carpenter, engaged in buying lumber and building

houses, is a competent witness as to the value of the

lumber in a particular house. 10 And carpenters have been

1 Bristol County Savings Bank v. Keavy, 12S Mass. 298.

2 Druckerv. Simon, 4 Daly (X. Y.), 53.

8 Maguire v. Labeaurae, 7 Mo. App. 185.

Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117.

fi Smith v. Wilcox, 4 Hun (X. Y.), 411.

Brown v. Moore, 32 Mich. 254.

7 Townsend v. Brundage, 6 Thomp. & C. (N . Y.) 527.

Waco Tap R. R. Co. v. Shirley. 45 Texas, 355.

9 Gauntlett v. Whitworth, 2 C. & K. 720.

10 Simmons v. Carrier, 68 Mo. 416; Shepard v. Ashley. 10 Allen (Mass.),

542.

land in question is situated, are competent to te tify as t()
its value. 1 A real estate agent, engaged in letting houses,
testifying a an expert to rental value, may be a ked on
cross-examination as to where the houses were situated which
he had let, what they were, and what rent they were let
for. 2 A real estate expert testifying as to the rental value
of a lot, cannot base hi s opinion upon a computation of the
annual interest upon what he believes to be the value of the
fee; he must have other means of knowledge.:! Farmers,
graziers and drovers have been held competent to testify
as to the value of growth and increase of wejght which
certain cattle might reasonably ha.ve been expected toattain, but for the over-feeding of the pasture where they
grazed. 4 A farmer has been permitted to testify as tOt
the loss in value of a cow hy allowing her to becomedry .6 So he has been held competent to express an opinion
as to the value of a rnare of common blood, 6 and as to the
value of grass destroyed by cattle. 7
§ 158. Competency in Particular Cases-The Subject.
Continued.-Person experienced in building railroad may
testify what, in their opinion, will be the probable cost of
completing a railroad. 8 An architect is allowed tote tify as
to the value of houses; and in the ca e cited, such a witness
was permitted to te tify a to the depreciation in valueof buildings in a ·ueighborhood, as caused by a nui ance.s,
A carpenter, engaged in buying lumber and building
houses, is a competent witne3 a to the value of the
lumber in a particular house. 10 And carpenter"' have been
1

Bristol County Sa\'ings Bank v. Kcavy, 128 Mas . 29 .
Druckerv. Sjmon, 4 Daly ( . . Y.), 53.
8 Maguire v. Labeaume, 7 Mo. App. 1 '5.
4 Gilbert v. Kennedy 22 Mich. 117.
ti Smith v. Wilcox, 4 Hun (N. Y.), 411.
' Brown v. Moore, 32 Mich. 254.
1 Town end v. Brundage, 6 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 527.
8 Waco Tap R.R. Co. v.
hirley. 45 'rexas, 355.
9 Gauntlett v. Whitworth, 2 C. & IC 720.
10
immons v. Carrier, 6 Uo. 416; Shepard v . ..1Lhley, 10 M.len (::\fa .)~
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permitted to testify as to the value of a house which had

221

been destroyed by fire, it appearing that they possessed

a general acquaintance with the house in question, having a

knowledge of its shape, location, external appearance, and

to some extent, its internal condition. 1 Such persons have

also been allowed to express an opinion as to the cost of

building a house in the vicinity of the town where they

worked, their opinions being based on an examination of the

plans and specifications of the house. 2 In a recent case in

New York, it is laid down that a carpenter and builder, an

architect, or an insurance and real estate agent engaged in

appraising similar property, would be competent to express

an opinion as to the value of replacing a house destroyed

by fire, their opinion being based on knowledge which they

had acquired as dealers or builders. 3 So, too, it has been

held that a carpenter and builder who had seen the build-

ings in question, and knew the kind and quality of lumber

put into them, was qualified to testify what it was reason-

ably worth to put the lumber into the buildings. 4 Dealers

in articles are competent witnesses as to the value of such
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articles. 5 "When persons are engaged in any particular

trade, the presumption is, that they are acquainted with the

value and intrinsic worth of the articles which they are

engaged in buying and selling." 6 For this reason, in the

case cited, it was said that bankers and brokers were pre-

sumed to be better acquainted with the genuineness and

value of the circulation of banks, than the community

generally. "Their opportunities are better, and the interest

of their business necessarily leads them to inform themselves

in this respect, beyond other persons." So a dealer in hay

1 Bedell v. Long Island R. R. Co., 44 X. Y. 367.

2 Hills v. Home Ins. Co., 129 Mass. 345.

3 Woodruff v. Imperial Fire Ins. Co., 83 X. Y. 133, 138; s. c. 10 Ins.

Law J. 125. See also Tebbetts v. Haskins, 16 Me. 283.

Hough v. Cook, 69 111. 581.

5 Cantling v. Hannibal etc. R. R. Co., 54 Mo. 385; Luse v. Jones, 39 N.

J. Law, 708; Sturm v. Williams. 38 N. Y. Superior Ct. 325; Illinois Cen-

tral R. R. Co. v. Copeland, 24 111. 33G.

6 Hiuckley v. Kersting, 21 111. 247.

permitted to testify as to the value of a house wpich had
been destroyed by fire, it appearing that they possessed
general acquaintance with the house in question, having a
knowledge of its shape, location, external appearance, and
to some extent, its internal condition. 1 Such persons have
also been allowed to express an opinion as to the cost of
building a house in the vicinity of the town where they
worked, their opinions being based on an examination of the
plans and specifications of the house. 2 In a recent case in
New York, it is laid down that a carpenter and builder, an
.a rchitect, or an insurance and real estate agent engaged in
appraising similar property, would he competent to express
an opinion as to the value of replacing a house destroyed
by fire, their opinion being based on knowledge which they
had acquired as dealers or builders. 3 So, too, it has been
held that a ca1:·penter and builder who had seen the buildings in question, and knew the kind and quality of lumber
put into them, was qualified to testify what it was reasonably worth to put the lumber into the buildings. 4 Dealers
in articles are competent witnesses as to the value of such
articles. 5 "When persons are engaged in any particular
trade, the presumption is, that they are acquainted with the
value and intrinsic worth of the articles which they are
engaged in buying and selling." 6 For this reason, in the
case cited, it was said that bankers and brokers were presumed to be better acquainted with the genuineness and
value of the circulation of banks, than the community
generally . ''Their opportunities are better, and the interest
of their business necessarily leads them to inform themselves
in this respect, beyond other persons.'' So a dealer in hay
Bctlell v. Long Island R.R. Co., 44 N. Y. 367.
Hills v. Home Ins. Co., 129 Mass. 345.
3 Woodruff v. Imperial Fire Ins. Co., 83 ~. Y. 133, 138; s. c. 10 Ins.
Law J. 125. See also Tebbetts v. Haskins, 16 Me. 283.
4 Hough v. Cook, 69 Ill. 581.
5 Cantling v. Hannibal etc. R.R. Co., 54 Mo. 385; Luse v. Jones, 39 N.
J. La.w, 708; Sturm v. Williams. 38 N. Y. Superior Ct. 325; Illinois Cen·
tral R.R. Co. v. Copeland, 24 Ill. 336.
~Hinckley v. Kersting, 21 Ill. 247.
1
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may testify as to the value of hay. 1 And one who had been 1

engaged for many years in sawing, buying and selling box

222
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board logs, and who had erected a mill for the purpose of

sawing them, has been held a competent witness as to their

value. 2 A gunsmith is, by reason of his acumen and knowl-

edge of firearms, a competent witness as to the value of a

gun. 3 A broker is competent to testify to the value of

stocks. 4

159. The Value of Legal Services. At common law

the rewards of an advocate's services were deemed, not

merces, but honoraria, and could not be recovered by means

of legal proceedings. 5 But in this country the rule of the

common law does not prevail, and a right of action exists

for the recovery of counsel fees. 6 In the absence of some

express contract fixing the amount of the attorney's com-

pensation, if an action is instituted to enforce payment, it

is necessary to determine the value of the services rendered.

The rule therefore is that in such an action an attorney

may be called as an expert to testify as to the value of the

services in question. 7 It has been well said, that " the very
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best means of adjusting this value are the opinions of those

who, in earning and receiving compensation for them, have

1 Burger v. Northern Pacific K. K. Co., 22 Minn. 343.

2 Lawton v. Chase, 108 Mass. 238.

3 Cooper v. State, 53 Miss. 393; Beecherv. Denniston,13 Gray (Mass.),

354.

4 Jonan v. Ferrand, 3 Rob. (La.) 366.

5 Kennedy v. Brown, 13 C. B. (N. s.) 677; 32 L. J. 137. And see Brown

v. Kennedy, 33 L. J. Ch. 71 : 33 Beav. 133; 4 D. J. & S. 217.

6 See 13 Central Law Journal, 43, where the subject is considered and

the cases collected. The English rule, however, is still recognized in New

Jersey. Seeley v. Brown, 15 X. J. L. 35; Van Atta v. McKinney, 16 X.

J. L. 235; Schoup v. Schenck, 40 X. J. L. 195. And counsel fees cannot

be recovered unless an express contract fixing the fees is shown. Hopper

v. Ludlum, 41 N. J. Law, 182 (1879).

7 Harnett v. Garvey, 66 N. Y. 641 ; Williams v. BroAvn, 28 Ohio St.

547, 551; New Orleans etc. R. R. Co. v. Albreton, 38 Miss. 242, 246, 273;

Allis v. Day, 14 Minn. 516 ; Anthony v. Stinson, 4 Kans. 211 ; Ottawa

may testify as to the value of hay. 1 And one who had beern
engaged for many years in sawing, buying and selling bo~
board logs, and who had erected a mill for the purpose of
sawing them, has been held a competent witness as to their·
value. 2 A gunsmith is, by reason of his acumen apd knowledge of firearms, a competent witness as to the value of a
gun. 3 A broker is competent .to testify to the value ofstocks.4
.
§ 159. The Value of Legal Services.-At common law
the rewards of an advocate's services were deemed, not
merces, but lwnoraria , and could not be recovered by mean&·
of legal proceedings. 5 But in this country the rule of the
common law does not prevail, and a righ..t of action 'e xists.
for the recovery of counsel fees. 6 In the absence of some ·
express contract ·fixing the amount of the attorney's compensation, if an action is instituted to enforce payment, it
is necessary to determine the value of the services re!ldered ..
The rule · therefore is that in such an action an attorney
may be called as an expert to testify as to the value of the·
• services in question. 7 It has been well said, that "the very
best means of adjusting this value are the opinions of those
who, in earning and receiving compensation for them, have ·

University v. Parkinson, 14 Kans. 159; Head v. Hargrave, 14 Cent. L.

J. 388 (Sup. Ct. of U. S.); Llussman v. Merkel, 3 Bos. (N. Y.) 402;

Beekman v. Platner, 15 Barb. (N". Y.) 550; Jevne v. Osgood, 57 111. 340.

1

Burger v. Northern Pacific R.R. Co., 22 Minn. 343.
Lawton v. Chase, 108 Mass. 238.
3 Cooper v. State, 53 Miss. 393; Beecherv. Denniston, 13 Gray (Mass.),.
354.
4 Jonan v. Ferrand, 3 Rob. (La.) 366.
.
5 Kennedy v. Brown, 13 C. B. (N. s.) 677; 32 L . .J.137. And see Brown
v. Kennedy, 33 L. J. Ch. 71: 33 Beav. 133; 4 D. J. & S. 217.
6 See 13 Central Law Journal, 43, where the subject is considered and
the cases collected. The English rule, however, is still recognized in New
Jersey. Seeley v. Brown, 15 N. J. L. 35; Van Atta v. McKinney, 16 N.
J. L. 235; Schoup v. Schenck, 40 N. J. L. 195. And counsel fees cannot
be recowred unless an express contract fixing the fees is shown. Hopper
v. Ludlum, 41 N. J. Law, 182 (1879) .
7 Harnett v. Garvey, 66 N. Y. 641; Williams v. Brown, 28 Ohio St.
547, 551; New Orleans etc. R. R. Co. v. Albreton, 38 Miss. 242, 246, 273;
Allis v. Da:r, 14 Minn. 516; Anthony v. Stinson, 4 Kans. 211; Ottawa
University v. Parkinson, 14 Kans. 159; Head v. Hargrave, 14 Cent. L.
J. 388 (Sup. Ct. of .U. S.); Llussman v. Merkel, 3 Bos. (N. Y.) 402; ,
Beekman v. Platner.15 Barb. (N'. Y.) 550: Jevne v. Osg-ood. 57 Ill. 340 ..
2
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learned what legal services in their various grades are
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VALUE.

worth." l And the opinion has been expressed that one

who is not an attorney is incompetent to prove the value of

an attorney's services. 2 But it does not seem to be neces-

sary that the attorney should be at the time, actually

engaged in the active practice of his profession. 3 The

witness may base his opinion in part on his personal knowl-

edge, and in part on the testimony of others ; 4 and if he has

no personal knowledge of the services rendered, his testi-

mony must be based upon a hypothetical question submitted

to him. 5 In determining the value of the attorney's ser-

vices, it is proper to show by the witness, the character and

professional standing of the person rendering the services

in question, 6 as well as the nature and importance of the

services rendered. 7 And it has been held proper to pro-

pound the following inquiry : " From the character of the

case set out in the complaint filed, what would be a reason-

able fee for defending said suit?" { The value of the ser-

vices of counsel under circumstances of general similarity to

those under which the services in question were rendered,
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may also be shown. 9 But what an attorney receives in a

case is no criterion of the value of the services of another

attorney in the same case, in the absence of any showing

that the services were similar, the skill equal, and the time

spent the same. 10 It has been held, that upon the cross-

examination of an attorney testifying as* an expert in such

cases, it is within the discretion of the trial court to reject a

1 Thompson v. Boyle, 85 Penn. St. 477.

2 Hart v. Vidal, 8 Cal. 56.

3 See Blizzard v. Applegate, 61 Ind. 371.

* Garfield v. Kirk, 65 Barb. (X. Y.) 464; Brown v. Huffard, 69 Mo.

305.

Williams v. Brown, 28 Ohio St. 547, 551 ; Central Branch etc. R. R.

Co. v. "Nichols, 24 Kans..242.

6 Jackson v. X. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 2 Sup. Ct. 653.

7 Harland v. Lilienthal, 53 N. Y. 438; Garfleld v. Kirk, 65 Barb.

(X. Y.) 464.

8 Covey v. Campbell, 52 Ind. 158.

9 Thompson v. Boyle, 85 Penn. St. 477.

10 Ottawa University v. Parkinson, 14 Kans. 160.

learned what legal services in their various grades are
worth." 1 And the opinion has been expressed that one
who is not an attorney is incompetent to prove the value of
an attorney's services. 2 But it does not seem to be neces-·
sary that the attorney should be at the time, actualiy
engaged in the active practice of his profession. 3 The
witness may base his opinion in part on his personal knowledge, and in part on the testimony of others·; 4 and if he has
no personal knowledge of the services rendered, his testimony must be based upon a hypothetical question submitted
to him. 5 In determining the value of the attorney's services, it is proper to show by the witness_, the character and
professional standing of the person rendering the services
in questfon, 6 as well as the nature and importance of the
services rendered. 7 And it has been held proper to propound the following inquiry: "From the character of the
case set out in the complaint filed, what would be a reasonable fee for defending said suit?'' 8 The value of the ser- ·
vices of counsel under circumstances of general similarity to
those under which the services in question were rendered,.
may also be shown. 9 But what an attorney receives in a
case is no criterion of the value of the services of another
attorney in the same case, in the absence of any showing
that the services were similar, the skill equal, and the t-i me
spent the same. 10 It has been held, that upon the crossexamination of an attorney testifyi'ng as· an expert in such
cases, it is within the discretion of ~he trial court to reject a
Thompson v. Boyle, 85 Penn. St. 4i7.
Hart v. Vidal, 8 Cal. 56.
a See Blizzard v. Applegate, 61 Ind. 37L
4 Garfield v. Kirk, 65 Barb. (~. Y.) 46J; Brown v. Huffarcl, 69 Mo.
305.
0 Williams v. Brown, 28 Ohio St. 5J7, 551; Central Branch etc. R.R.
Co. v. Nichols, 24 Kans .. 242.
6 Jackson v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 2 Sup . Ct. 653.
7 Harland v. Lilienthal, 53 N. Y. 438; Garfield v. Kirk, 65 Barb.
(:N". Y.) 464.
8 Covey v. Campbell, 52 Ind. 15 .
9 Thompson v. Boyle, 85 Penn. St. 417.
i
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question as to the income derived by the witness from th e

practice of his profession. 1

160. The Value of Services Rendered by Physicians

and Nurses. In a case decided as early as 1791, Lord

EJENYON declared that he understood that the fees of phy-

sicians and surgeons were merely honorable and not de-

maudable of right. 2 And such was undoubtedly the law of

England. 3 In this country the courts, however, have not

recognized the English rule, and physicians may recover for

the value of their services. 4 And this right is now secured

to them in England by statute adopted in 1858. 5

As the value of services rendered by lawyers may be

shown by the testimony of those engaged in the same pro-

fession, so the value of the services rendered by physicians

and surgeons in the practice of their profession, is to be

shown by the testimony of their professional brethren. And

it has been laid down that one who is not a physician, is in-

competent to testify as to the value of medical services. 6

But it seems it is not necessary that the witness should know

just what physicians were in the habit of charging for services
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similar to those in question, and for what such services could

be procured. 7 In the Indiana case last cited the facts were as

1 Harland v. Lilienthal, 53 N. Y. 438.

2 Chorley v. Bolcot, 4 Term, R. 317.

3 Lipscombe v. Holmes, 2 Camp. 441.

* Judah v. MoNamee, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 269; Mooney v. Lloyd, 5 S. &

R. (Penn.) 416; Eouse v. Morris, 17 S. & R. (Penn.) 328; Simmons v.

Means, S S. & M. (Miss.) 397; Mock v. Kelly, 3 Ala. 387; Smith v.

Watson, 14 Vt. 332.

5 21 and 22 Viet. Ch. 90, 31. See too, Gibbon v. Budd, 32 L. J. Ex.

182; s. c., 2H. &C. 92.

6 Mock v. Kelly, 3 Ala. 387. And see Wood v. Brewer, 57 Ala. 515.

7 Board of Commissioners v. Chambers, 75 Ind. 409. In this connec-

tion it is interesting to note the language of the Supreme Court of Min-

nesota in Elfelt v. Smith, 1 Minn. 126 : " The value of services upon a

quantum meruit stands in regard to the proof, upon the same principle as

·question as to the income derived by the witness from the
· p ractice of his profession. 1
§ 160. The Value of Services Rendered by Physicians
-and Nurses.- In a case decided as early as 1791, Lord
KENYON declared that he understood that the fees of physicians and surgeons were merely honorable and not demandable of right. 2 And such was undoubtedly the law of
England. 3 In this country the courts, however, have not
recognized the English rule, and physicians may recover for
the value of their services. 4 And this right is now secured
to them in England by statute adopted in 1858. 5
. As the value of services rendered by htwyers may be
·shown by the testimony of those engaged in the same profession, so the value of the services rendered by physicians
'.'3.nd surgeons in the practice of their profession, is to be
shown by the testimony of their professional brethren. And
it has been laid down that one who is not a physician, is incompetent to testify as to the value of medical services.6
But it seems it is not necessary that the witness should know
just what physicians were in the habit of charging for services
.similar. to those in question, and for what such services could
>be procured. 7 In the Indiana case last cited the facts were as

the value of chatties upon a quantum valebant. The value of chattels in

such a case is always regulated by the usual or market value of such

chattels, of like quality, at the time and place of sale ; and before a wit-

ness can, in such a case, be permitted to testify to such value, it must

appear by his own, or other competent evidence, that he knows with

Harland v. Lilienthal, 53 N. Y. 438.
Chorley v. Bolcot, 4 Term, R. 317.
s Lipscombe v. Holmes, 2 Camp. 441.
•Judah v. McNamee, 3 Bfackf. (Ind.) 269; Mooney v. Lloyd, 5 S. &
R. (Penn ~) 416; Rouse v. Morris, 17 S. & R. (Penn.) 328 ; Simmons v.
Means, 8 S. & M. (Miss.) 397; Mock v. Kelly, 3 A.la. 387; Smith v.
Watson, 14 Vt. 332.
5 21 and 22 Viet. Oh. 90, § 31.
See too, Gibbon v. Budd, 32 L. J. Ex.
182; s. c., 2 H. &O. 92.
6 Mock v. Kelly, 3 A.la. 387.
And see Wood v. Brewer, 57 A.la. 515.
7 Board of Commissioners v. Chambers, 75 Ind. 409.
In this connection it is interesting to note the language of the Supreme Court of Minnesqta in Elfelt v. Smith, 1 Minn. 126: "The value of services upon a
.quantum rneruit stands in regard to the proof, upon the same principle as
the value of chattles upon a quanturn valebant. The value of chattels in
such a case is always regulated by the usual or market value of such
chattels, of like quality, at the time and place of sale; and before a witness can, in such a case, be permitted to testify to such value, it must
.appear by bis own, or other competent evidence, that he know~ with
i
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follows : Certain physicians were called to testify as to the

VALUE.

225'-

value of the services of a physician in making a post mortem,

examination under the employment of a coroner. The wit-

nesses testified on their direct examination that they were

physicians and surgeons, and considered themselves compe-

tent to testify as to the value of services rendered in mak-

ing post mortem examinations. But it appeared on their

cross-examination that they did not know what physicians

had charged for making such examinations, and that they

knew nothing of the prices at which such services could be

procured, but formed their judgment of the value of the

services from what they thought such services would be

worth. The 'court held it proper that their testimony

should be received, saying: "The testimony was compe-

tent, for the witnesses were shown to be experts, and to

possess such knowledge, skill and acquaintance with the

subject under investigation as entitled them to express their

opinions to the jury. They may have had some knowl-

edge of the value of such services, without knowing any-

thing at all about what others were charging for like ser-
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vices."

In an action by a physician to recover for medical ser-

vices, it is competent for him to prove the nature of the dis-

ease, and the character of the treatment given ; and such

evidence is not rendered incompetent by the provision of

the statute, forbidding the disclosure of confidential com-

munications made by a patient to his physician. 1 As to the

value of services rendered in nursing and caring for the sick,,

the rule is that the witnesses should be persons who have hadi.

experience in nursing and caring for the sick. Physicians*

reasonable certainty what such usual or market value is. lie then testi-

fies to the value as a fact, and not as a mere matter of opinion. So in.

regard to services: it must appear that the witness knows the usual

value of, or rate of compensation paid for such or the like services at

the time when, and place where, they were rendered, before he can be

properly permitted to testify what such value or rate is."

1 Kendall v. Gray, 2 Hilton (X. Y.), 302.

2 Woodward v. Bugsbee, 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 393; Reynolds v. Robinson,.

64 X. Y. 589; Shafer v. Dean's Adm'r., 29 Iowa, 144.

(15)

follows: Certain pbysiciaus were called to testify as to the
value of the services of a physician in making a post rnortem
examination under the employment of a coroner. The witnesses testified on their direct examination that they were ·
physicians and surgeons, and coni;;i<lered themselves compe-·
tent to testify as to the value of services rendered in making post mortem examinations . But it appeared on their·
cross-examination that they did not know what physicians·
had charged for making such examinations, and that they
knew nothing of the prices at which such services could be·
procured, but formed their judgment of the value of the·
services from what they thought such services would be,
worth. The 'court held it proper that their testimonyshould be received, saying: '' The testimony was competent, for the witnesses were shown to be experts, and tt>·
possess such knowledge, skill an<l acquaintance with the·
subject under investigation as entitled them to express their ·
opinions to the jury. They may ha\·e had some knowledge of the value of such services, without knowing anything at all about what others were chargiug for like services.''
In an action h.v a physician to recover for medical se1~
vices, it is competei1t for him to prove the nature of the dis-,
ease, and the character of the treatment given ; and such·
evidence is not reu<lered incompetent by the provision of
the statute, forbidding the disclosure of confidential communications made by a patient to bis physician. 1 As to the
value of services rendered in nursing and caring for the sick-,,
the rule is. that the witnes"' es should be persons who have had
experience in nursing and caring for the sick . Pbysiciuns 2:
reasonable certainty what such uisual or market value is.. He then testi-fies to the value as a fact, and not as a mere matter of opinion. So in1
regard to services : it must appear that the ·witness knows the usual
value of, or ra te of compensation paid for Ruch or the like services at
the time whPn, find place where, they were rendered, before he can b
properly permitted to testify what such value or rate i . "
1 Kendall v. Gray. 2 Hilton (N. Y.) , 302.
2 Woodward v. Bugsbee, 4 N. Y. Sup. Qt. 393; Reynold s v. Robinson ~
G-t- N. Y. 589; Shafer v. Dean's Adm'r., 2D Iowa, 14:!.
(li'\l
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and 'nurses 1 are competent witnesses in such cases. And

it has been held that one who had long had the care

of an insane person, and provided for his- table, and who

had been for a considerable period of time in another

family while such person was boarding there, was qualified

to express an opinion as to the value of taking care of

him and boarding him in the latter place. 2

161. Value of Services in other Callings. The

general rule is that it is competent for a witness to state

the value of another's services in all cases where he has

knowledge of the matter in controversy, and is acquainted

with the value of services such as those rendered in the par-

ticular case. 3 For instance, an expert accountant may tes-

tify as to what would be a fair compensation for the ser-

vices of a competent accountant in keeping the account

books of a business of a certain character, and as to the

usual charge per day for the services of an accountant in

fixing up complicated accounts. 4 And where the plaintiff,

who was not a real estate broker, sued for services rendered

in effecting the purchase of a mill, the evidence of a real
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estate broker was held admissible as to the commissions

which he charged for such services, and as to what he would

have charged in the case in question. 5 Elsewhere it has

been held that the statements of what the witness himself

would have charged for similar services, were inadmissible. 6

In a case in Indiana, it was held no error on the cross-exam-

ination, to ask the witness what he Avould have undertaken,

the work for. 7

But if the witness is unacquainted with the value of ser-

vices such as those rendered in the particular case, he is not

an expert in that particular matter of inquiry, and cannot

1 Shafer v. Dean's Adm'r., supra.

2 Kendall v. May, 10 Allen (Mass.), 59.

3 Bowen v. Bowen, 74 Ind. 470; Johnson v. Thompson, 72 Ind. 167 ; Par-

ker's Heirs v. Parker's Adrar., 33 Ala. 459.

4 Shattuck v. Train, 116 Mass. 296.

5 Elting v. Stnrtevant, 41 Conn. 176.

6 Fairchild v. M. C. R. JK. Co., 8 Bradw. (lil.) 591.

7 Oilman v. Gard, 29 Ind. 291. 293.

and · nurses 1 are competent witnesses in such cases . And
it has been held that one wh~ had long had the care
of an insane person, and provided for his· table, and who
had been for a considerable period of time in another
family while such person was boarding there, was qualified
to express an opinion as to the value of takiqg care of
him and boarding him in the latter place.\!
§ 161. Value of Services in other Callings.-The
general rule 1s that it is competent for a witness to state
the value of another's services in all cases where he has
knowledge of the matter in controversy, and is acquainted
with the value of services such as tho e rendered in the particular case. 3 For instance, au expert accountant may te8tify us to what "·ould he a fair com pen ··a ti on for the ser-vices of a competent accountant in keeping the account
books of a husiness of a certain charncter, and as to the
usual charge per day for the services of an accountant in
:fixing up complicated accounts. 4 And where the plaintiff,
who was not a real estate broker, sued for ervices rendered
iu effecting the purchase of a mill, the evidence of a real
~state broker was held ad mis ible as to the com mis ion'
which he charged for such services, and :i , to what he woulrl
bave charged in the case in questiOn. 5 El ewhere it h~8
Leen held that the statement::, of what the witness himself
would have charged for similar service~, were inadmi sible .6
In a case in Indiana, it was held no error 011 the cros -examination, to ask the witness what he would ha\e undertaken.
the work for. 7
But if the witness is unacquainted with the value of services such as those rendered jn the particular ca 'e , he is not
au expert in that particular matter of inquiry, auu cannot
00

1

Shafer v. Dean's Adm'r., supra.
K endall v. May,
,
10 Allen ( Mass.), 59.
~ Bowen v. Bowen, 74 Ind. 470· Johnson v. Thompso n 72 Ind.167; Parker's Heirs v. Parker's Admr., 33 Ala. 459.
4
Shattuck v. Train, 116 Ma s. 296.
6 Elting v. Sturtevant. 41 Conn. 176.
6
Fairchild v. M. C. R. R. Co., 8 Bradw. (W.) 5Dl.
7
Gilman v. Gard, 29 lnd. 2Dl. :293.
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testify as such. Hence, in a suit by a broker to recover

227

commissions for the sale of a colliery, a broker whose busi-

ness was the sale of real estate in Philadelphia, and who

had no experience and knew of no sales or commissions paid

on sales of colleries, was held an incompetent witness as to

the value of the services rendered. 1 In an action brought for

services in planning, preparing and organizing for the erec-

tion of a factory, and in superintending the mounting and

putting in operation of its machinery, the Supreme Court

of Georgia has permitted witnesses, who were not experts,

and who knew nothing of the particular services sued for,

except from a general description of the same contained in

the interrogatories in answer to which their evidence was

given, to testify as to what in their opinion would be a rea-

sonable salary for the services performed. The court held

that witnesses who had employed the person rendering the

services, or who had been employed with him, and who had

seen the results of his skill, and who knew his professional

standing, could testify in such cases. 2 It was conceded,

however, that the evidence was barely admissible. So it
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has been held that neighbors, who have employed servants

to do like work, are competent to testify to the value of

services of a girl employed to do housework. 3 And the

value of the services of a farm laborer may be shown by the

testimony of those who had employed him. 4

162. Opinions as to the Value of Real Estate. On

questions of the valuations of real property it is frequently

found necessary to take the opinions of witnesses who are

not experts. The market value of land is not a question

of science or skill, upon which only an expert can give an

opinion." 5 But a strange inconsistency is seemingly found

in the rules laid down in the different courts as to the qual-

ifications of those who may express opinions in such cases.

1 Potts v. Aechternacht, 93 Penii. St. 142.

2 Eagle & Phoenix Manuf. Co. v. Browne, 58 Ga. 240.

3 Carter v. Carter, 36 Mich. 207.

4 Ritter v. Daniels, 47 Mich. G17.

5 Pennsylvania, etc. R. R. Co. v. Bnnnell, 81 Penn. St. 426.

testify as such. Hence, in a suit by a broker to recover
commissions for the sale of a colliery, a broker whose business was tlie sale .of real estate in Philadelphia, and who
had no experience and knew of no sales or commissions paid
on sales of colleries, was held an incompetent witness as to
the value of the services rendered. 1 In an action brought· for
services in planning, preparing and organizing for the erection of a factory, and in superintending the mounting and
putting in operation of its machinery, the Supreme Court
of Georgia has permitted witnesses, who were not experts,
and who knew nothing of the particular services sued for,
except from a general description of the same contained in
the interrogatories in answer to which their evidence was
given, to testify as to what in their opinion would be a reasonable salary for the services performed. The court held
that witnesses who had employed the person rendering the
services, or who had been employed with him, and who had
seen the results of his skill, and who knew his professional
standing, could testify in such cases. 2 It was conceded,
however, that the evidence · was barely admissible. So it
has been held that neighbors, who have employed servants
to do like work, are competent to testify to the value of
services of a girl employed to do housework. 3 And the
value of the services of a farm laborer may be shown by the
testimony of those who had employed him. 4
§ 162. Opinions as to the Value o:f Real Estate.- On
questions of the valuations of real property it is frequently
found necessary to take the opinions of witnesses who are
not experts. "The market value of land is not a question
of science or skill, upon which only an expert can give an
opinion." 5 But a strange iucon8istency is seemingly found
in the rules laid down in the different courts as to the qualification.s of those who may express opinions in such cases.
1

Potts v. Aechternacllt, 93 Pemi. St. 142.
Eagle & Ph re nix Manuf. Co. v. Browne, 58 Ga. 240.
3 Carter v. Carter, 36 Mich. 207.
4 Ritter v. Daniels, 47 Mich. 617 .
.5 Pennsylvania, etc. R.R. Co. v. Bunnell, 81 Penn. St. 426 .
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Ill Illinois it is said that the value of real estate is to be as-
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certained from the opinions of those who profess to be

familiar with the subject of inquiry, and whose business in

life has afforded them an opportunity of acquiring informa-

tion and of judging accurately on such questions. 1 While

in Massachusetts witnesses are competent to testify as to

the value of land, whose knowledge is derived from sales

or purchases made by themselves, or by others, although

upon their cross-examination they say they know no more

concerning the value of land than citizens generally. 2 In

Pennsylvania it is said that, " Persons living in the neigh-

borhood may be presumed to have a sufficient knowledge of

the market value of property with the location and charac-

ter of the land in question. Whether their opinion has any

proper ground to rest upon, or is mere conjecture, can be

brought out upon cross-examination." 3 , And in Missouri it

is said that, " Property holders and residents in the neigh-

borhood where land is situated are competent witnesses to

iix the price of land in that neighborhood." 4 While in

Rhode Island the court say opinions are not admissible
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simply because the witness resides near the land and is ac-

quainted with it. 5 Then again we find the rule laid down in

general terms, that witnesses having a personal knowledge

of the property, and who possess the necessary information

to enable them to form a proper estimate of the value of

the land, are competent to express the opinion which they

have formed. 6 However differently the rule may be laid

down, the inconsistencies of expression are more apparent

than real. And it is believed that the courts are practically

unanimous in holding that residents in the immediate

vicinity, who are acquainted with the property in question,

and know the value of land in that neighborhood, are com-

1 Green v. City of Chicago, 97 111. 372.

2 Swan v. Middlesex, 101 Mass. 173.

3 Pennsylvania, etc. K. R. Co. v. Bunnell, 81 Penn. St. 426.

4 Thomas v. Mallinckrodt, 43 Mo. 65.

5 Bnffum v.N. Y., etc. R. R. Co., 4. R. I. 221.

6 Frankfort, etc. R. R. Co. v. Windsor, 51 Tnd. 238; Ferguson v. Staf-

ford, 33 Ind. 1G2; Grouse v. Holmnn, 19 Ind. 30.

In Illinois it is said that the value of real estate is to be ascertained from the opinions of those who profes'3 to be
familiar with the subject of inquiry, and whose business in
life has afforded them an opportunity of acquiring information and of judging accurately on such questions. 1 While
in Massachusetts witnesses are competent to testify as to
the · value of land, whose knowledge is derived from sales
or purchases made by themselves, or by others, although
upon their cross-examination they say they know no more
concerning the value of land than citizens generally. 2 In
Pennsylvania it is said that, " Persons living in the neighborhood may be presumed to have a sufficient kno~ledge of
the market value of properly with the location and character of the lnnd in question. '\Thether their opinion has any
proper ground to rest upon, or is mere conjecture, can be
brought out upon cross-examination." 3 , And in :Missouri it
is said that, '' Property holders and residents in the neighborhood where land is situated are competent witnesses to
fix the price of land in that neighborhood." 4 V\Thile in
Rhode Island the court say opinions are not admissible
simply because the witnes5 re ·ides near the land and i acquainted with it. 5 Then again we find the rule laid down in
geneml terms, that witnesses having a per onal knowledge
of the property, and who possess the neces ary information
to enable them to form a proper e timate of the value of
the land, are competent to express the opinion which they
have formed. 6 However differently the rule may be laid
down, the inconsistencies of ex~1ressi0n are more apparent
than real. And it is believed that the courts are practically
unanimou~ in holdinothat re itlent8 in the immediate
0
vicinity, who are acquainted with the property in question,
and know the value of land in that neighborhood, are comGreen v. City of Chica~o, 97 Ill. 372 .
S wan v. Mi1ldlcsex, JOI Mass. li3.
:i Pennsylvania, etc. R. R. Co. v. Bnnnell, 81 Penn.
t. 426.
4
Thoma v. l\Iallinckrodt, 43 .Mo. 6:).
5
Ilnffum v. N . Y., etc. H.. R. Co., 4. R. I. 221.
6
Frankfort, etc. R.R. Co. v. Wiudsor, 51 Tud. 2;~ ; F e rguson v. S taffo rd, 33 Ind. 1G2; Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 30.
1
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petent to testify as to the value of the land in controversy.

229

This is the principle in accordance with which farmers and

residents in the neighborhood of the property, have been

held qualified in many cases to testify as to the value of the

laud in their vicinity. 1 It is not necessary that the witness

should have bought or sold land in that vicinity, 2 or should

have known of sales of exactly such tracts as the one in

question, 3 or that his knowledge of sales should have been

personal, 4 or that it should have been derived from the

buyer or seller of the land sold. 5 And it has been laid

down that, "The knowledge requisite to qualify a witness

to testify to his opinion of the value of lands may either be

acquired by the performance of official duty, as by a county

commissioner or selectman, whose duty it is to lay out pub-

lic ways, or by an assessor, whose duty it is to ascertain the

value of lands for the purpose of taxation ; or it may be

derived from knowledge of sales and purchases of other

lands in the vicinity, either by the witness himself, or by

other persons." 6

In a recent case in Rhode Island the court holds that
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while a farmer living in the vicinity of farming land, and

familiar with it, may, as an expert, give his estimate of its

1 Robertson v. Knapp, 35 X. Y. 91; Snyder v. Western Un. R. R.

Co., 25 Mo. 60; West Xewbury v. Chase, 5 Gray (Mass.), 421; Clark v.

Baird, 9 X. Y. 183; Lelmiicke v. St. Paul, etc. R. R. Co., 19 Minn. 464;

Simmons v. St. Paul, etc. R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 184; Crouse v. Holman.

19 Ind. 30; Thomas v. Mallinckrodt, 43 Mo. 58; Brainard v. Boston, etc.

R. R. Co., 12 Gray (Mass.) , 407 ; Hayes v. Ottawa, Oswego, etc. R. R. Co. %

54 111. 373 ; Galena, etc. R. R. Co. v. Haslem, 73 111. 494 ; Wallace v. Finch,

24 Mich. 255; Hanover Water Co. v. Ashland Iron Co., 84 Penn. St.

284; Keithsburg, etc. R. R. Co. v. Henry, 79 111. 290; Selma, etc. R. R.

Co. v. Keith, 53 Ga. 178; Hudson v. State, 61 Ala. 334; Milwaukee, etc.

R. R. Co. v. Eble,4 Chand. (Wis.), 72; Erd v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co.,

41 Wis. 64; Ferguson v. Stafford, 33 Ind. 162; Tate v. M. K. & T. R. R.

Co., 64 Mo. 149; Russell v. Horn Pond, etc. R. R. Co., 4 Gray (Mass.),

607; Stone v. Covell, 29 Mich. 362.

2 Whitman v. Boston, etc. R. R. Co., 7 Gray (Mass.), 313; Lehmicke

petent to testify as to the value of the land in controversy.
This is the principle in accordance with which farmers and
residents in the neighborhood of the property, have been
held qualified in many cases to testify as to the value of the
1and in their vicinity .1 It is not necessary that the witness
should have bought or sold land in that vicinity, 2 or 8l.10ul<l
have known of sales of exactly such tracts as the one in
question, 3 or that his kno1vledge of sales should have been
personal, 4 or that it should have been derived from the
buyer or seller of the land so1d. 5 Aud it has been laid
down that, "The knowledge requisite to qualify a witness
to testify to his opinion of the value of lands may either be
acquired by the performance of official duty, as by a county
commissioner or selectman, whose duty it is to lay out public ways, or by an assessor, whose duty it is to ascertain the
value of lands for the purpose of taxation' ; or it may be
derived from knowledge of sales and purchases of other
lands in the vicinity, either by the witness himself, or by
-0th er persons.'' 6
In a recent case in Rhode Island the court holds that
while a farmer li.ving in the vicinity of farming land, and
familiar with it, may, as an expert, give his estimate of its

v. St. Paul, etc. R. R. Co., 19 Minn. 464, 482.

8 Frankfort, etc. R. R. Co. v. Windsor, 51 Ind. 240.

4 Hanover Water Co. v. Ashland Iron Co., 84 Penn. St. 284.

6 Whitman v. Boston, etc. R. R. Co., 7 Gray (Mass.), 313.

* Swan v. Middlesex, 101 Mass. 177, per Mr. Justice Gray.

Robertson v. Knarp, 35 N . Y. 91; Snyder v. Western Un. R. R.
Co., 25 Mo. 60; West Newbury v. Chase, 5 Gray (Mass.), 421; Clark v.
Bairu, 9 K. Y. 183; Lebmicke v. St. Paul, etc. R.R . Co., 19 Minn. 464;
Simmons v. St. Paul, etc. R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 184; Crouse v. Holman,
19 Ind. 30; Thomas v. Mallinckrodt, 43 Mo. 58; Brainard v. Boston, etc.
R.R. Co., 12 Gray (Mass.),407; Hayes v. Ottawa, Oswego, etc. R.R. Co.\
54 Ill. 373; Galena, etc. R.R . Uo. v. Haslem, 73 Ill. 494; Wallace v. Finch,
24 Mich. 255; Hanover Water Co. v. Ashland Iron Co ., 84 Penn. St.
284; Keithsburg, etc. R.R. Co. v. Henry, 79 Ill. 290; Selma, etc. R.R .
Co. v. Keith, 53 Ga. 178; Hudson v. State, 61 Ala. 334; Milwaukee, etc.
R.R. Co. v. Eble, 4 Chand. (Wis.), 72; Erd v. Chicago, etc. R . R. Co.,
41 Wis . 6-±; Ferguson v. Stafford, 33Ind . 162; 'l'ate v. M. K. & T. R.R .
Co., 64 Mo. 149; Russell v . Horn Pond, etc. R . R. Co., 4 Gray (Mass.),
607; Stone v. Covell, 29 Mich . 362.
2 Whitman v. Boston, etc. R . R. Co ., 7 Gray (Mass.), 313; I.ehmicke
v. St. Paul, etc. R. R. Co., rn Minn . 464, 482.
3 Frankfort, etc. R . R. Co. v. Windsor, 51 Ind. 240.
4 Hanover Water Co. v. Ashland Iron Co., 84 Penn . St. 284.
5 Whitman v. Boston, etc. R.R . Co., 7 Gray (Mass.), 313.
~Swan v. :Middlesex, 101Mass.177, per Mr. Justice Gray .
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value as farm land, yet that his opinion generally of the

value of such realty would be inadmissible, since the market

230
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value of such realty might be much greater than its agricul-

tural value. 1

While a real estate agent accustomed to value and sell

real property in the city or neighborhood where the land is

situated, is competent to testify in reference to its value,

although he may never have sold land on the particular

street upon which the land is located, 2 yet it is essential

that he should be acquainted with the value of land in the

vicinity of the property in question. 3 And it is said that a

speculator in real estate, who buys and sells real property

for himself, is competent, provided he is conversant with

the property in question, and with other property of the

same character in the vicinity, and knows at what prices

such property is held by persons owning and controlling it. 4

Where it was desired to show a depreciation in the value of

certain real property, it was held that the secretary of an

insurance company, who had been in the habit of examin-

ing buildings in reference to insurance, might express the
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opinion that the passage of locomotive engines within a cer-

tain distance of a building, would diminish the rent and

increase the rate of insurance against fire, and that he

might state that his company had declined to take the risk

at any rate of insurance on applications for insurance on

buildings in that vicinity. 5

163. Value of Annuities. Stock brokers who have

been engaged in buying and selling life annuities, and who

have thereby become acquainted with the value and market

price of annuities, have been allowed to testify as to the

market price of an annuity for the life of a person of a cer-

tain age. 6 So, actuaries, experienced in the business of

1 Brown v. Providence, etc. K. K. Co., 12 R. I. 23S.

2 Bristol County Savings Bank v. Keavy, 128 Mass. 298.

3 Haulenbeck v. Cronkright, 23 N. J. Eq. 413.

4 Jarvis v. Furman, 25 Hun (N". Y.) , 393.

5 Webber v. Eastern R. R. Co., 2 Met. (Mass.), 147.

6 Heathcote v.Paignon, 2 Brown's Ch. 167, 169.

value as Jann land, yet that his opi~ion generally of the
value of such realty would be inadmi~sible, since the market
value of such realty might be much greater than its agricultural value. 1
While a real estate agent accustomed to value and sell
real property in the city or neighborhood where the land is
situated, is competent to testify in reference to its value,
although he may never have sold land on the particular
street upon which the land is located, 2 yet it is essential
that he should be acquainted with the value of land in the
vicinity of the property in question. 3 And it is said that a.
speculator in real estate, who buys and sells real property
for himself, is competent, provided he is conversant with
the property in question, and with other property of the
same character in the vicinity, and knows at what prices
such property is held by persons owning and controlling it. 4
vVhere it was desired to show a depreciation in the value of
certain real property, it was held that the seeretary of an
insurance company, who had been in the habit of examining buildings in reference to insurance, might express the
opinion that the passage of locomotive engines within acer- ·
tain distance of a building, would diminish the rent and
increase the rate of insurance against fire, and that he
might state that his company had declined to take the risk
at any rate of insurance on applications for insurance Off
buildings in that vicinity. 5
§ 163. Value of Annuities.-Stock brokers who have
been engaged in buying and selling life anriuities, and who
have thereby become acquainted with the value and market
price of annuities, have been allowed to testify as to the
market price of an annuity for the life of a person of a certain age. 6 So, actuaries, experienced in the busine s of
1

Brown v. Providence, etc. R.R. Co., 12 R. I. 23 .
Bristol County Savings Bank v. Keavy, 12 Mas . 298.
3 Haulenbeck v. Cronkright, 23 N. J. Eq. 413.
•Jarvis v. Furman, 25 Hun (N. Y.), 393.
5 Webber v. Eastern R.R. Co., 2 Met. (Ma .), 147.
6 Heathcote v. Pai!!'non. 2 Browns Ch. 167. 169.
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life insurance, are permitted to testify as to the value of

VALUE.

an annuity. 1 And an accountant, who was acquainted with

231

the business of insurance companies, has been examined as

to the average duration of human lives. 2 With the view of

ascertaining the probable duration of a particular life at a

given age, it is material to know what is the average dura-

tion of the life of a person of that age. * The particular

life on which an annuity is secured may be unusually

healthy, in which case the value of the annuity would be

greater than the average, or it may be unusually bad, in

which case the value would be less than the average ; but it

must be material to know what, according to the experi-

ence of insurance companies, the value of an annuity se-

cured on an average life of that age would be." For the

purpose of determining this, the witnesses are permitted to

refer to standard tables used by insurance companies in the

course of their business. 3 And it has been held that the

Carlisle Tables of Mortality, being standard tables on this

subject, are admissible evidence for the purpose of shoAving

the expectation of life at a particular age. 4 The Northamp-
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ton Tables have been received for the same purpose. 5 And

in a recent case in Kentucky, in determining the value of

the potential right of dower, the court adopted the table

prepared by Professor Bowditch, on that subject, declaring

that it furnished a safer and more convenient guide than the

1 Exparte Whitehead, 1 Merivale, 127, 128; Ex parte Thistlewood, 19

Vesey, 235; Heathcote v. Paignon, 2 Brown's Ch. 167, 169; Griffith v.

Spratley, 1 Cox Ch. 389.

2 Rowley v. London, etc. K. R. Co., 8 Exch. (L. R.) 221. In the case

cited Brett, J., did not think it necessary to say whether such a witness

was competent, but thought it doubtful, as he was not an actuary.

Blackburn, J., said that as he gave evidence that he was experienced in

the business of life insurance, his opinion was admissible.

3 See Davis v. Marlborough, 2 Swanston, 113, 150; Nichols v, Gould,

2 Vesey, 423; Rowley v. London, etc. R. Co., supra.

4 Donaldson, v. Mississippi, etc. R. R. Co., 18 Iowa, 281.; Simonsonv.

C., R. I. & P. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 87.

Schell v. Plumb, 55 X. Y. 598; Sauter v. X. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co.,

13 X. Y. Sup. Ct. 451 ; Wager v. Schuyler, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 553 ; Jackson

v. Edwards, 7 Paige Ch. (X. Y.) 386, 408.

life insurance, are permitted to testify as to the value of
an annuity .1 And an accountant, who was acquainted with
the business of insurance companies, has been examined as
to the average duration of human lives. 2 With the view of
ascertaining the probable duration of a particular life at a
given age, it is material to know what is the average duration of the life of a person of that age. "The particular
life · on which an annuity is secured may be unusually
healthy, in which case the value of the annuity would be
greate1· than the average, or it may be unusually bad, in
which case the value would be less than the average; but it
mu st be material to know what, according to the experience of insurance companies, the value of an ann".lity se:cured on an average life of that age would be.' ' For the
purpose of determining this, the witnesses are permitted to
refer to standard t ables used by insurance companies in the
course of their business.3 Aud it has been held that the
Carlisle Tables of :M ortality, being standard tables on this
subj ect, are admissible evidence for the purpose of showing
the expectation of life at a particular age. 4 The Northampton Tables ha.vo been received for the same purpose. 5 And
in a r ecent case in Kentucky, in determining the value of
the potential right of dower, the court adopted the table
prepared by Professor Bowditch, on that subject, declaring
that it furnished a safer and more convenient guide than th e
E x parte Whitehead , 1 Meri vale, 127, 128 ; Ex parte T hist.lewood, 19
Vesey, 235 ; H eath cote v. P aignon, 2 Brown's Ch. 167, 169 ; Griffith v.
Spratley, 1 Cox Ch. 389.
2 Rowley v. L ondon, etc. R.R. Co., 8 E xch. (L. R. ) 221.
In the case
citecl Brett, J. , did not think it necessary to say whether such a witness
was competent, but though t it doubtful, as h e was n ot an actuary.
Blackburn, J. , said t hat as h e gave evidence that he was experienced in
the busi ness of life insurance, his opinion was admissible.
3 See Davis v. Marlbor ougfi, 2 Sw anston , 113, 150; Nichols v. Gould,
2 Vesey, 423 ; R owley v. London, etc. R. Co., supra.
4 Donaldson, v. Mississippi, etc. R.R. Co., 18 Iowa, 281.; Simonson v.
C., R. I. & P.R. Co., 49 Iowa, 87.
5 3ch ell v. Plumb, 55 N. Y. 598; Sauter v. N. Y. Cent. &H. R.R. Co.,
13 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 451; Wager v. Schuyler, l Wend. (N. Y.) 553; Jackson
v. Edwards, 7 Paiire Ch. (N. Y.) 386. 408.
1
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opinions of witnesses. 1 For the purpose of determining the
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value of the life of a decedent, an expert may be asked,

" From your knowledge of the decedent's age, habits,

(health, and physical condition," how long, in your opinion,

would he have been useful to his family? 2 And an expert

in life insurance may be asked as to the relative hazard of

^different occupations. 3

164. Value of Foreign Currency and Negotiable Se-

curities. In order to ascertain what is the lawful money

of a foreign country it is considered unnecessary that the

law of such country, regulating the subject, should be pro-

duced. 4 And witnesses who have had business transactions

in such country, having had occasion in that way to learn

the value of the currency in common use, are competent to

testify as to such value, and to state its equivalent in our

own currency. 5 So it has been held that the value of the

stock of a railroad company at a specified date, could be

shown by the testimony of one who dealt in such stock at

-or near that date. 6 And it has even been held that the tes-

timony of a witness as to the market value of negotiable
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securities, at a somewhat remote period, was competent and

sufficient prima facie evidence, although it was founded on

a general recollection based on his keeping the run of the

market price in consequence of being very much interested

in the company which issued the securities. 7

165. Opinions of Merchants and Brokers. The ex-

.perience which merchants and brokers acquire in the ordi-

nary conduct of their business is such as qualifies them to

testify as to the value of articles with which they are re-

iquired by the necessities of their business to be familiar.

And if in the course of their business they are kept in-

iformed as to the market value of any particular thing, by

J Lancaster v. Lancaster's Trustees, 78 Ky, 200.

' 2 Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Henderson, 51 Penn St. 320.

3 Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Penn. St. 478.

' Comstock v. Smith, 20 Mich. 338.

3 Kermott v. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181; Comstock v. Smith, supra.

16 Noonan v.. Ilsley, 22 Wis. 27.

' 7 Smith v. Frost, 42 N. Y. Superior Ct. 87.

·opinions of witncsse .1 For the purpos0 of determining the
·value of the life of a decedent, an expert may be asked,
"''From your knowledge of the decedent's age, habits,
Uiealtb, and physical condition," bow long, in your opinion,
would he have been useful to his family? 2 And an expert
:in life insurance nrnv Le asked as to the relative hazard of
.
'di fferent occupation s.3
§ 164. Value of Foreig·n Currency and Negotiable Se<Curities.- In order to ascertain w bat is the lawful money
of a foreign country it is considered unnecessary that the
law of such country, regulating the subject, should be produced.4 And witnesses who have had business transactions
in such country, having had occasion in that way to learn
the value of the currency in common use, are competent to
t estify as to such value, and to state its equivalent in our
<0wn currency :5 So it has been held that the value of the
stock of a railroad company at a specified ·date, could be
.s hown by the testimony of one who dealt
in such stock at
,
6
·or near that date. And it has even been held that the tes·tirnony of a witness as to the market value of negotiable
..securities, at a somewhat remote period, was competent and
:sufficient prinia fa cie evidence, although it was founded on
.a general recollection based on his keeping the run of the
·market price in consequence of being very much interested
.in the company which issued the securitjes. 7
§ 165. Opinions of Merchants and Brokers.-Tbe ex1perience which merchants and brokers acquire in the ordi111ary conduct of their business is such as qualifies them to
testify as to the Yal ue of articles with which they are re,.q uired by the necessities of their business to be · familiar .
.And if in the course of their business they are kept in- _
iforrned as to the market value of any particular thing, by
~

(

Lancaster v. Lancaster's Trustees, 78 Ky, 200.
Pennsylvania R ailroad Co. v. Henderson, 51 Penn St. 320.
'8 Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Penn. St. 478.
• 4 Comstock v. Smith, iO Mich . 338.
· 5 Kermott v. Ayer, 11Mich.181; Comstock v. Smith, supra.
16 Noonan v Ilsley, 22 Wis. 27.
1
~ 1 Smith v. Frost, 42 N. Y. Superior Ct. 87.
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price current lists duly furnished them for use in their busi-

YALGE.
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ness, opinions derived from such information will be re-

ceived in evidence. 1 But in an action for work and labor

done, and materials furnished, it was held that the price list

itself could not be received in evidence. 2 And there is no

error in excluding the testimony of a witness, whose knowl-

edge as to market price was derived wholly from statements

of his partner as to the prices at which his firm had sold,

entries of which it was his duty to make in the books of the

firm. 3

1 Whitney v. Thacher, 117 Mass. 526. In re Cliquot's Champagne,

3 Wall. 114; In re Fennerstein's Champagne, 3 Wall. 145; Sisson v.

Toledo R. R. Co., 14 Mich. 489; Cleveland, etc. R. R. Co. v. Perkins,

17 Mich. 296; Sirrine v. Briggs, 31 Mich. 443; Lush v. Druse, 4 Wend.

(X. Y.) 317; Terry v. McNeil, 58 Barb. (X. Y.) 241. See Whelan v.

Lynch, 60 N. Y. 469, and Schmidt v. Herfurth, 5 Robertson (X. Y.) 124,

145.

2 County of Cook v. Harms, 10 Brad\v. (111.) 24.

price current list duly furni hed them for u e in their bu ines , opinions derived from uch information '"'ill be received in evidence. 1 But in an action for work and labor
done, and material furni hed it wa held that the price Ii t
it elf could not be received in evidence. 2 And there is no
error in excluding the te timony of a witne , whose knowledge a to market price was derived wholly from ... tatement
of hi. partner a to the price at which his firm had· old,
entries of which it wa hi ~ duty to make ~n the books of the
firm. 3
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3 Flynn v. Wohl, 10 Mo. App. 582.

i W"hitney v. Tbacber 117
Ia~ . -26.
I n re liquot' Champagne
3 Wall. 114; In 1·e Fenner tein's Champagne 3 Wall. 1±5; L on v.
Toledo R.R. Co. 14 Mich. 4 9; leveland tc. R. R. (Jo. v. Perkin ,
17 Mich. 296; irrine v. Brig()' 31 Mich. 443; Lush v. Drue, 4 Wencl.
( N. Y.) 317· Terry v. Mc eil 5 Barb. ( . . :r. Y.) 241. ee Whelan v.
Lynch 60 N. Y. 469 and chmidt v. Herfurtb 5 Robert on ( .......... Y.) 12-!
145.
2
ounty of Cook v. Harm , 10 Bracl\Y. (Ill.) 24.
a Flynn v. Wohl 10 Mo. App. 5 2.

234 EXPERT TESTIMONY.

CHAPTER IX.

THE RELATION OF SCIENTIFIC BOOKS TO EXPERT TESTIMONY.
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183. Views of "Writers on Medical Jurisprudence as to the Exclusion

of Medical Treatises.
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166. The Relation of Scientific Works to Expert

Testimony. As we have already seen, 1 experts are per-

mitted to express opinions on subjects connected with their

particular departments of science, or of art, although their

opinions are based on information derived by them from

1 19, 20.
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the study of books, and not from their own experience or

observation. They are also permitted to refresh their mem-

235

ories by the use of standard authorities. 1 But a marked

distinction exists between permitting a witness to refresh

his memory by reference to an authority or writing, and

the introduction of the writing itself in evidence. It may

be wholly improper that the writing should be Introduced

in evidence, and yet entirely proper for the witness to re-

fresh his recollection by a reference to it. An equally well

marked distinction exists between the admissibility of opin-

ions based on a study of authorities, of standard writings,

and the reception of the writings themselves in evidence.

It is fair to assume that the expert has weighed the asser-

tions and opinions of the different authorities, and that he

has reached an independent judgment thereon. The opin-

ion which he expresses is given in a court of justice, and

under the solemnity of an oath. While it can hardly be

presumed that a standard writer would give expression in

his public writings to a dishonest opinion, yet the fact re-

mains that the opinion was not expressed under oath, and
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may have subsequently been modified. The writer is not

presented in court. No opportunity is given for his cross-

examination, and the jury cannot observe the witness.

The question, therefore, arises are scientific works admis-

sible in evidence? Can the opinions of scientific writers, as

expressed in their writings, be received in evidence as the

opinions of experts, or must the writers themselves be

called as witnesses, and give expression to their opinions

under oath, in the presence of the court, the jury, and the

parties? This is an important question, which we are now

to consider.

167. The Admissibility of Scientific Works in Evi-

dence. Attention has elsewhere in this work been called

to the fact that standard tables of mortality have been re-

ceived in evidence for the purpose of showing the expecta-

1 Taylor on Evidence, 1230; 1 Wharton's Evicl. 438 ; People v. Wheeler,

9 Pac. Coast L. J. 584 ; Hoffman v. Click, 77 N. C. 555.

the study of books, and not from their own experience or
observation. They are also permitted to refresh their memories by the use of" tandard authorities. 1 But a marked
distinction exists between permitting a witness to refresh
his memory by reference to an authority or writing, and
the introduction of the writing itself in evidence. It may
be wholly improper that the writing should be .introduced
in evidence, and yet entirely proper for the witness to refresh his recollection by a reference to it. An equally well
marked distinction exists between the admissibility of opinions based on a study of authorities, of standard writings,
and the reception of the writings themselves in evidence.
It is fair to assume that the expert has weighed the assertions and opinions of the different authorities, and that he
has reached an independent judgment thereon. The opinion which he expresses is given in a court of justice, and
under the solemnity of an oath. 'Vhile it can hardly be
presumed that a tandard writer would give expression in
his public writings to a dishonest opinion, yet the fact remains that the opinion was not expressed under oath, and
may have subsequently been modified.
The writer is not
presented in court. No opportunity is given for his crossexamination, and the jury cannot observe the witness.
The question, therefore, arises are scientific works admissible in evidence? Can the opinions of scientific writers, as
expressed in their writings, be received in evidence as the
opinions of experts, or must the writers themselves be
called as witnesses, and give expression to their opinions
under oath, in the presence of the court, the jury, and the
parties? This is an important question, which we are iww
to consider.
§ 167. The Admissibility of Scientific Works in Evidence.-Attention has el cwhere in this work been called
to the fact that standard tables of mortality have been recei,yed in evidence for the purpose of showing the expecta1

Taylor on Evidence, 1230; 1 W'barton's Evid. 438; People v. Wheeler,

9 Pac. Coast L .•T. 5 J: Hoffman v. Click. 77 N. C. 555.
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tioii of life at a particular age. 1 There are other instances

in which scientific tables and works have been received in

evidence, and which remain for us briefly to notice. Thus

in a case in the Mayor's court of New York, in the year

1816, it was held that tide tables could be received for the

purpose of showing that the time of high water at New

York and New London was the same. 2 So in a case in Mary-

land in 1880, the court held that an almanac was admissible

in evidence for the purpose of proving at what hour the

moon rose on a certain night. "An almanac," said the

court, " forecasts with exact certainty planetary move-

ments. We govern our daily life by reference to the com-

putations which they contain. No oral evidence or proof

which we could gather as to the hours of the rising or set-

ting of the sun or moon, could be as certain or accurate as

that which we may obtain from such a source.'' 3 So in

Connecticut and California it has been held that an almanac

may be used for this purpose. 4 But whether it could be re-

ceived in England for such a purpose may be somewhat

doubtful. 5 It has been said by one of the most distin-
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guished writers on the law of evidence that " The hour at

which the moon rose is a fact, and it can fairly be argued

upon the general principles of the law of evidence, that the

best evidence of that fact is the testimony of some one who

observed its occurrence." 6

It has been held, too, in this country, that a record of

the weather, kept for a number of years at the State Insane

Asylum, was competent evidence to prove the temperature

of the weather on a given day included in such record. 7 Are

1 163, and Donaldson v. Mississippi, etc. R. R. Co., 18 Iowa, 281;

Schell v. Plumb, 55 X. Y. 598; Sauter v. X. Y. Cent. t H. R. R. Co., 13

X. Y. Sup. Ct. 451; Wager v. Schuyler, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 553; Jackson

v. Edwards, 7 Paige Ch. 386, 408.

2 Green v. Aspimvall, 1 City Hall Recorder, 14.

3 Munshower v. State, 55 Md. 11.

4 State v. Morris, 47 Conn. 179; People v. Cheekee, 14 Rep. 582.

* See Suttoii v. Darke, 5 H. & W. 647.

6 Taylor on Evidence, 1230.

7 Da Arnvmil v. N r easmith, 32 Mich. 2:31.

tiou of life at a particular age. 1 There are other in tances
in which scientific tables and works have been received in
.evidence, and which remain for us briefly to notice. Thus
in a case in the Mayor's court of New York, in the ybar
1816, it was held that tide tables could be received for the
purpose of showing that the time of high water at New
York and New London was the same. 2 So in a case in :Maryland in 1880, the court held that an almanac was admissible
in evidence for the purpose of proving at what hour the
moon rose on a certain night. "An almanac," said the
court, "forecasts with exact certainty planetary movements. We govern our daily life by reference to the computations which they contain. No oral evidence or proof
which we could gather as to the hours of the rising or setting of the sun or moon, could be as certain or accurate as
that which we may obtain from such a source .'; 3 So in
Connecticut and California it has been held that au almanac
may be used for this purpose. 4 But whether it could be received in England for such a purpose may be somewhat
doubtful. 5 It has been said by one of the mo"t distinguished writers on the law of evidence that "The hour at
which the moon ro e i a fact, and it can fairly be argued
upon the general principles of the law of evidence, that the
best evidence of that fact is the te timony of some one who
observed its occurrence.'' 6
It has been held, too, in this country, that a record of
the weather, kept for a number of years at the State Insane
A ylum, was competent evidence to prove the temperature
of the weather on a given day included in such record .7 Are
1

Y. ~Iis~i

sippi, etc. R. R . Co. 18 Iowa 281;
Schell v. Plumb, 55 X. Y. 59 ; Sauter v. N . Y. Cent. & H. R.R. Co . 13
~- Y. Sup. Ct. 451; Wager v. Schuyler, 1 Wend. (N . Y.) 553; Jack on
v. Edwards, 7 Paige Ch. 386, 40 .
2
Green v. A pinwall, 1 City Hall Recorder 14.
s Mun_hower v. State, 55Md. ll.
4 State v. Morri 47 Conn. 179; People v. Cheekee, 1-! Rep. 5 2.
6
ee Sutton v. Darke, 5 H . & .W . 647 .
6 Taylor 011 E\'idence, 1230.
1 D ~ A.rm:tnu v. ~ea"mith, 32 Mich. 231.
§ 163, and Donald on
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these cases in accordance with the general rule, or do they

constitute an exception to the rule? Do they establish the

principle that scientific treatises may be received in evidence ?

168. The Tnadmissibility of Medical Treatises in Evi-

dence The Rule in England. The question whether

scientific treatises may be read in evidence, has generally

been raised in cases where an effort has been made to intro-

duce as evidence the opinions expressed in medical treatises.

And it is in this connection that we shall now consider the

question. So far as England is concerned the rule was

definitely settled in that country in the year 1831, and in

the well known case of Collier v. Simpson. 1 The action

was one of slander, the defendant having charged that the

plaintiff, who was a physician, had prescribed improper

medicines for a child suffering from water on the brain.

The question being whether certain prescriptions Avere

proper under the circumstances of the case, counsel pro-

posed to put in evidence certain medical books of recog-

nized authority, to show the received opinion of the medi-

cal profession on the subject. But Mr. Chief Justice TIN-
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DAL held that medical treatises could not be thus received.

So more recently, as late as 1875, the question was again

raised when counsel proposed to read to the jury a case

from Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence. Mr. Justice BRETT

refused, however, to allow counsel to proceed with the read-

ing, and said: "That is no evidence in a court of justice.

It is a mere statement by a medical man of hearsay facts of

cases at which he was in all probability not present. I can-

not allow it to be read." 2

109. Their Admissihility in Alabama. Such treatises

are considered in this State as admissible in evidence, such a

conclusion having been reached in the year 1857, 3 and subse-

quently adhered to, once in 1801, 4 and again in 1879 .*

1 5 Can- v. Payne, 73 (24 Eng. C. L. 219).

2 Regu.a v. Thomas, 13 Cox's Cr. Cases, 77.

3 Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558, 565.

4 Merkle v. State, 37 Ala. 139.

5 Bates v. State, 63 Ala. 30.

these cases in accordance with the general rule, or do they
constitute an exception to the rule? Do they establish the.
principle that scientific treatises may be received in evidence?
§ 168. The Inadmissibility of Medical Treatises in Evidence -The Rule in England.- The question whether
scientific treatises may be read in evi<lence, has generally
been raised in cases where an effort has been made to introduce as evidence the opinions expressed in medical treafo3es ..
And it is in this connection that we shall now consider the
question. So far as England is concerned the rule wa ·
definitely settled in that country in the . year 1831, and it
the well known case of Gollie1~ v. Simpson. 1 The action
was one of slander, the defendant h'a ving charged that thP,
plaintiff, who was a physician, had prescribed i:nproper
medicines for a child suffering from water on the brain.
The question being whether certain prescriptions were
proper under the circum~tances of the case, counsel proposed to put in evidence certain medical books of re<;og-·
nized authority, to show the received opinion of the medical profession on the subject. But ~fr. Chief Justice TINDAL held that medical treatises could not be thus received.
So more recently, as late as 187 5, the question wns again
raised when counsel proposed to read to the jury a case
from Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence . l\Ir. Justice BRETT
refused, however, to a1low counsel to proceed with the reading, and said: "That is no evidence in a court of justice.
It is a. mere statement by a. medical man of hearsay fa~ts of
cases at which he was in all probability not present. I c~u 
not allow it to be read." 2
§ Hi9. Their Admissibility in Alabama.- Such treati es
are considered in this State as admissible in evidence, such a
conclusion having been reached in the year 1857 / and suh ·equently adhered to, once in 1861, 4 and again in 1879. 5
1

5 Carr v. Payne, 73 (24 Eng. C. L. 219).
Regil.a v. Thomas, 13 Cox' Ur. Ca es, 77.
s Stoudenmeier v. William on, 29 Ala. 558, 565.
4 Merkle v.
late, 37 Ala. 130.
5 Bates v.
tate, 63 Ala. 30.
2
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The court concluded that inasmuch as judges in determin-

ing matters of law, could consult legal treatises of author-

ity, the jury should have the same right to consult medical

The court concluded that inasmuch as judges in determin- ·
in(}
o mutters of law, could consult legal treatises of authority, the jury should have the same right to consult medical
treatises laid hefore them in evidence, for the purpose of
enabling them to determine matters of fact. The book.
themselves were said to be as safe guides for the jury as
the opinions derived from their perusal and deposed to by
witnesses.
§ 170. Their Inadmissibility in lndiana.-Twenty years
after Oollie1· v. Simpson was decided in England, the question came up in Indiana, and the authority of that case was
fully recognized and followed. The circumstances were as
follows: It was proposed to have a physician testify as to
the effects of poison upon the human sy tern, his information being derived from standard medical treatises. Thereupon the objection was made that bis evidence was not
admissible, but that the authors themselves should be produced as witnesses, or if dead, that their books should be
offered in evidence. The court held that the bo9ks could
not be received, but that the opinions of a physician based
on them, were admissible. 1
§ 1 71. Their Admissibility in Iowa. - The earlies L case
recognizing the right. to introduce medical treatises in evidence, so far as we have been able to discover, is that of
Bownian v. Woods, 2 .decided in the Supreme Court of Iowa
in 1848. The reasoning by which the court reached its
conclusion · was quite similar to that, which, as we have
seen, subsequently induced the Supreme Court of Alabama
to lay down the same rule; In an action for malpractice,
the defendant offered certain medical books in evidenee
which competent witnesses bad pronounced standard works,
and from which they declared they had derived much of
their knowledge.
The court said it saw no reason for their
'exclusion. "The opinions of an author as contained ·iii his
works, we regard as better evidence than the mere state~

treatises laid before them in evidence, for the purpose of

enabling them to determine matters of fact. The books

themselves were said to be as safe guides for the jury as

the opinions derived from their perusal and deposed to by

witnesses.

170. Their Inadmissibility in Indiana. Twenty years

after Collier v. Simpson was decided in England, the ques-

tion came up in Indiana, and the authority of that case was

fully recognized and followed. The circumstances were as

follows : It was proposed to have a physician testify as to

the effects of poison upon the human system, his informa-

tion being derived from standard medical treatises. There-

upon the objection was made that his evidence was not

admissible, but that the authors themselves should be pro-

duced as witnesses, or if dead, that their books should be

offered in evidence. The court held that the books could

not be received, but that the opinions of a physician based
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on them, were admissible. 1

171. Their Admissibility in Iowa. The earliest case

recognizing the right, to introduce medical treatises in evi-

dence, so far as we have been able to discover, is that of

Bowman v. Woods, 2 decided in the Supreme Court of Iowa

in 1848. The reasoning by which the court reached its

conclusion was quite similar to that, which, as we have

seen, subsequently induced the Supreme Court of Alabama

to lay down the same rule. In an action for malpractice,

the defendant offered certain medical books in evidence

which competent witnesses had pronounced standard works,

and from which they declared they had derived much of

their knowledge. The court said it saw no reason for their

exclusion. " The opinions of an author as contained in his

works, we regard as better evidence than the mere state-

1 Carter v. State, 2 Carter, 619. See, too, Jones v. Trustees, etc. Ind.

R. 47.

2 1 G. Greene, 441.

1

C:utcr v. State, 2 Carter, 619. See, too, Jones v. Trustees, etc. Ind.

R. 47.
2 1 G. Greene, 441.
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ment of those opinions by a witness, who testifies as to his

recollection of them from former reading." In 1865 tho

court again announce the same rule. 1 In a more recent case

a Herd Book was held inadmissible, as there was no evi-

dence by experts that its correctness was recognized by

cattle breeders. 2

172. Their Inadmissihility in Maine. The question

was first considered in this country in the Supreme Uourt

of Maine, and it is somewhat curious that the subject was

disposed of in this State in the same year in which Collier

v. Simpson was decided in England, and that a similar con-

clusion was reached in both cases, each court being ignorant

of the ruling of the other. The question was carefully

considered, and much stress was laid on the fact that the

reception of such works would be to receive evidence not

sanctioned by an oath, without any opportunity for cross-

examination, which was justly deemed a matter of great

importance in any search after truth. " The practice if by

law allowed, would lead to endless inquiries and contradic-

tory theories and speculations. In a word, if one book is
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evidence, so is another, and if all are admitted, it is to be

feared that truth would be lost in the learned contest of dis-

cordant opinions." 3

173. Their Inadmissihility in Maryland. The rule

that medical treatises are inadmissible in evidence was

adopted in Maryland in 1873, when it was held that the

rules prescribed by medical authors for making post-mortem

examinations could not be received in evidence. It was

said that if it was desired to, show that an examination had

not been made by the physicians in a skillful and proper

manner, it could .be done only through the testimony of

witnesses competent to testify on that subject. 1 And the

doctrine was broadly laid down that medical treatises could

not be received to sustain or contradict an expert. The

1 Donaldson v. The Mississippi, etc. E. K. Co., IS Iowa, 291.

Crawford v. Williams, 48 Lo\va, 249.

3 Ware v. Ware, 8 Maine, 42.

< Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15, 36.

ment of those opinions by a witness, who testifie~ as to his
recollection of them from former reading." In 1865 the
court again announce the same rule. 1 In a more recent case
a Herd Book was held inadmissible, as there was no evidence by experts that its correctne s was recognized by
cattle breeders. 2
§ 172. Their Inadmissibility in :Maine.- The question
was first considered in this country in the Supreme .Court
of :Maine, and it is somewhat curious that the subject was
disposed of in this State in the same year in which Gollier
v. Simpson was decided in England, and that a similar conclusion was reached in both cases, each court being ignorant
of the ruling of the other. The question ··was carefully
considered, and much stress was laid on the fact that the
reception of such works would be to receive eYidence not
sanctioned by an oath, without any opportunity for crossexamination, which was justly deemed a matter of great
importance in any search after truth. "The practice if by
law allowed, would lead to endless inquiries and contradictory theories and speculations. In a word, if one book is
evidence, so is another, and if all are admitted, it is to be
feared that truth would ue lost in the learned contest of discordant opinions.'' 3
§ 173. '!'heir Inadmissibility in Maryland.-The rule
that medical treatises are inadmi"sible in evidence was
adopted in 1\iaryland in 1873, when it was held that the
rules prescribed by medical authors for makiag post-nwrteni
examinations could not he received in evidence. It was
said tlrnt if it was de ·ired to .show that an examination had
not been made by the physicians in a skillful and proper .
manner, it could ·be done only through the testimony of
witnesses competent to testify on that subject} And the
doctrine was broadly laid down that medical treatises could
not be received to sustain or contradict an expert. The
<...;

1

Donaldson Y. The ::\Iississippi, etc. R.R. Co., 1 Iowa, ;.(91.
v. ·wmiam , 4 lowa, 2-±D.
3 Ware v. Ware, 8 Maine, 42.
4 Davis v. State, 3 Md. 15, 36.
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court has in a case lately decided held that a book en-

titled "The Principles and Practice of Life Insurance, "

containing the rules and modes of adjusting life insurance,

was not admissible in evidence. 1

174. Their Inadmissibility in Massachusetts. A wit-

ness who had expressed an opinion as an expert that it was

impossible to distinguish human blood from the blood of

animals, was asked whether he concurred with the views ex-

pressed in Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence on that subject,,

the book being passed to him, counsel proposing that the

witness should read therefrom to the jury a certain para-

graph with which he coincided in opinion. The court held

that this could not be done. 2 In a subsequent case counsel

again claimed the right to read to the jury books of medi-

cal authority, as to any matter of which medical experts

might testify, but the court again denied the right. 3 These

cases were in accordance with an earlier case in the same

court in which Mr. Chief Justice SHAW, in denying the

right to read from medical treatises, had stated that facts

or opinions could not be laid before a jury "except by the
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testimony under oath of persons skilled in such matters." 4

175. Their Inadmissibility in Michigan. There is no

doubt that medical treatises cannot be introduced in evi-

dence in Michigan. 6 "Medical writers are by no means a

unit upon the various questions of medical jurisprudence.

A passage may be found in some work favorable to a par-

ticular opinion, which in another may be successfully con-

troverted and overthrown, although not known to counsel

or the court, who are not presumed to be particularly

versed in that branch of science, and, therefore, the coun-

sel should have the opportunity of eliciting from an expert

upon the witness stand, that peculiar information which he

1 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bratt, 55 Md. 200.

2 Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122.

8 Commonwealth v. Brown, 121 Mass. 69, 75.

4 Commonwealth v. Wilson, 1 Gray, 337.

5 SeeFraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 200, 214; Pinney v. Cahill, 12 X.

W. Rep. 8G2.

court has in a cn.se lately decided held that a book entitled "The Principles and Practice of Life Insurance,"
containing the rules and modes of adjusting life insurance,.
was not admissible in evidence. 1
§ 174. Their Inadmissibility in Massachusetts.- A witne s who had expressed an opinion as an expert that it was.
impossible to distinguish human blood from the blood of
animals, was asked whether he concurred with the views expressed in Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence on that subject,.
the book being passed to him, counsel proposing that the
witness should read therefrom to the jury a certain para-·
graph with which he coincided in opinion. The court held
that this could not be done. 2 In a subsequent case counsel
again claimed the right to read to the jury books of medi-·
cal authority, as to any matter of which medical experts.
might testify, but the court again denied the right. 3 These
cases were in accordance with an earlier case in the same
court in which :Mr. Chief Justice SHAW, in denying the
right to read from medical treatises, had stated that fact&
or opinions could not be laid before a jury " except by the
testimony under oath of persons skilled in such matters.' ' 4
§ 175. Their Inadmissibility in Michigan.-There is no
doubt that medical treatises cannot be introduced in evidence in :Michigan. b ' ' Medical writers are by no means a
unit upon the various questions of medical jurisprud~nce .
.A paseage may be found in some work favorable to a par- ,
ticular opinion, which in another may be successfully controverted and overthrown, although not known to counse\
or the court, who are not presumed to be particularly
versed in that branch of science, and, therefore, the counsel should have the opportunity of eliciti g from _an expert
upon the witne. s stand, that peculiar information which he
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bratt, 55 Md. 200.
Coli'.lmonwealth v. Stnrtivant, 117 Ma . 122.
3 Commonwealth v. Brown, 121 Mas . G9, 75.
4 Commonwealth v. Wilson 1 Gray, 337.
5 See Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 20(), 2.1-!; Pinney v. Cahill 12 N ~
W. Rep. G2.
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alone is presumed to possess, and which would be imparted

in language easily understood, and not in those technical

terms so common in medical books, where even common

words are sometimes used in a peculiar manner, distinct

from their received meaning in the general use of the lan-

guage." 1

176. The Doctrine in New York. In New York the

question does not appear to have been ruled on in either the

Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court. The New

York Superior Court, however, as early as 1858, laid down

the rule that the matters alleged in standard treatises, must

be proved in the same manner as any other facts, and that

the books themselves were no evidence of the truth of the

assertions of fact contained in them. 2

177. Their Inadmissibility in North Carolina. The

subject has been twice considered in this State, and in each

instance a conclusion was reached adverse to the admissibil-

ity of such treatises in evidence. It was first presented in

1854, and the conclusion was grounded upon the fact that

the writers had not been sworn and could not be cross-
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examined. 3 It was again before the court in 1877, when

much importance was attached to the fact that medicine is

an inductive science, and that medical treatises are based on

data constantly shifting with new discoveries and more ac-

curate observation. "The medical work which was a

* standard ' last year becomes obsolete this year. Even a

second edition of the work of the same author is so changed

by the subsequent discovery and grouping together of new

facts, that what appeared to be a logical deduction in the

first edition, becomes an unsound one in the next. So that

the same author at one period may be cited against himself

at another." 4

178. Their Inadmissibility in Rhode Island. In

holding such treatises inadmissible in Rhode Island, the

1 Barrick v. City of Detroit, 1 Mich. N. P. 135.

2 Harris v. Panama R. R. Co., 3 Bosvv. 1, 18.

8 Melvin v. Easley, 1 Jones Law, 338.

4 Huffman v. Click, 77 N. C. 55.

(16)

.alone is presurued to possess, and which would be imparted
in language easily understood, and not in those technical
terms so common in medical books, where even common
words are sometimes used in a peculiar manner, distinct
from their received meaning in the general use of the language.'' 1
§ 176. The Doctrine in New York.- In New York the
<JUestion does not appear to have been ruled on in eith~r the
Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court. The New
York Superior Court, however, as early as 1858, laid down
the rule that the matters alleged in standard treatises, must
be proved in the same manner as any other facts, and that
the books themselves were no evidence of the truth of the
assertions of fact contained iu them. 2
§ 177. Their Inadmissibility in North Carolina.-The
subject has been twice considered in this State, and in each
instance a conclusion was reached adver§e to the admissibility of such treatises in evidence. It was first presented in
1854, and the conclusion was grounded upon the fact that
the writers ha.cf not been sworn and could not be cross·examined. 3 It was again before the court in 1877, when
rr...uch importance was attached to the fact that medicine is
an inductive science, and that medical treatises are based on
data constantly shifting with new discoveries and more ac"The medical work which was a
.curate observation.
" standard' last year becomes obsolete this year. Even a
second edition of the work of the same author is so changed
by the subsequent discovery and grouping together of new
facts, that what appeared to be a logical deduction in .the
first edition, becomes an unsound one in the next.. So that
the same author at one period may be cited against himself
at another.'' 4
§ 178. Their Inadmissibility in Rhode Island.- In
holding such treatises inadmissible in Rhode Island, the
1
2

3
4

Barrick v . City of Detroit, 1 Mich. N. P. 135.
Hanis v. Panama R.R. Co., 3 Bosw. 1, 18.
Melvin v. Easley, 1 Jones Law, 338.
Huffman v. Click, 77 N. C. 55.
(16)
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court remarked that, " scientific men are admitted to give

their opinions as experts, because given under oath ; but

the books which they write containing them, are, for want

of such an oath, excluded." l It was said that such books

were not rendered any the more admissible by the fact that

the experts had read passages from them, to which in cross-

examination they had been referred, and in relation to which

they had answered questions. And counsel cannot read

from them for the purpose of contradicting the experts.

, 179. Tlieir Inadinissibility in Wisconsin. In a case

decided in 1848, counsel had proposed to read to the jury

certain standard medical works " as evidence, or by way of

instruction to the jury." Objection was made, which the

trial court sustained. "This is a matter," said the Supreme

Court, "generally within the discretion of the court, and,

therefore, not a subject of a writ of error. In many cases,

no doubt, it would be proper to allow books of science

to be read, though generally, such a practice would lead to

evil results." 2

But in a very recent case the same court has overruled its
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earlier decision that the adinissibility of such treatises is dis-

cretionary with the trial court ; and placed itself in line

with the weight of authority on this subject, and declared

the rule to be that medical books cannot be read to the

jury as evidence, although such books have been shown

by expert testimony to be standard works in the medical

profession. 3

180. Dicta in California and Xew Hampshire The

Result of the Authorities. In a case in California Mr.

Justice McKixsTRY, in delivering the opinion of the court,

declared that medical treatises were not admissible in evi-

dence, and said that if such treatises were to be held admis-

sible, the question at issue might be tried, not by the testi-

mony, but upon excerpts from works presenting partial

1 State v. O'Brien, 7 R. I. 336, 338.

2 Luniiig v. State, 1 Chandler, 178.

3 Stilling v. Town of Thorp, to appear in 54 Wis. ; Knoll v. State,

The Reporter, Sept. 20th, 1882, p. 381.

court remarked that, '' scientific men are admitted to give
their ·opinions as experts, beoause given under oath; but
the books which they write containing them, are, for want
of such an oath, excluded.'' 1 It was said that such books
were not rendered any the more admissible by the fact that
the experts had read passages from them, to which in crossexamination they had been referred, and in relation to which
they had answered questions. And counsel cannot read
from them for the purpose of contradicting the expert... .
_§ 179. Their Inadmissibility in Wisconsin. - In a case
decided in 1848, counsel had proposed to read to the jury
certain standard medical works " as evidence, or by way of
instruction to the jury." Objection was made, which the
trial court sustained. "This is a matter,n said the Supreme
Court, "generally 'Yithin the discretion of the cou~·t, and,
therefore, not a :subject of a writ of error. In many ca.. , e t
no doubt , it would be proper to allow books of cience
to be read, though generally, such a practice would lead to
evil results." 2
But in a very recent case the ame court ha overruled its
earlier decision that the admis ·ibility of such treatises is discretionary with the trial court; and placed it elf in line
with the weight of authority on this subject, and declared
the rule to be that medical books cannot be read to the
jury as evidence, although such books have been shown
by expert testimony to be standard works in the m~dical
profession. 3
§ 180 . Dicta in California and New Hampshire -The
R esult of the Authorities.-In a case in California :Mr.
Justice :i\fcKINSTRY, in delivering the opinion of the court,
declared that medical treatises were not admi sible in evidence, and said that if such treatises were to be held admis·ible, the question at issue might be tried, not by the testimony, but upon excerpts from works presenting partial
1

State v. O'Brien, 7 R. I. 336 33 .
J,uniug v. State, 1Chandler,17 .
3 Stilliug v. Town of Thorp
to appear in 5J Wis.; Knoll v. State,
T he R eporter Sept. 20th, 1 2 p. 3 'l.
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views of variant and perhaps contradictory theories. 1 The

question in the case, however, was whether counsel had a

right to read from such treatises in argument, so that the

above expression of opinion must be regarded as dica. In

another part of this work, and in another connection, we

have had occasion to quote dicta to the same effect from an

opinion of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. 2 The

result of the cases on this subject shows clearly that the

very decided weight of authority is against the admissibility

in evidence of standard medical treatises. Such is the rule

in England, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,

Michigan, North Carolina, Rhode Island and Wisconsin,

supported by dicta in California and New Hampshire, and

opposed by decisions in Alabama and Iowa.

The objections to the reception of such books in evidence

have been concisely and forcibly stated by a distinguished

writer as follows: "In the first place, a sound induction

last year is not necessarily a sound induction this year, and

as a matter of fact, works of this class, when they do not

become obsolete, are. altered, in material features from
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edition to edition, so that we cannot tell, in citing from even

a living author, whether what we read is not something that

this very author now rejects. In the second place, if such

book? are admitted as a class, those which are compilations

must be admitted as well as those which contain the result

of original research ; the purely speculative must come in

side by side with the empirical ; so that if such treatises are

admitted at all, it will be impossible to exclude those which

are secondary evidence of the facts they state. In the

third place, such books, without expert testimony, cannot

generally be pointed to the concrete case ; with expert tes-

timony, they become simply part of such testimony, and

lose their independent substantive character as books.

" In the fourth place, the authors of such books do not

write under oath, and hence the authorities on which they

1 People v. Wheeler, 9 Pacific Coast Law J., 581, 583. (1882.)

2 See pp. 31 ami 33, for an extract from Dole v. Johnson, 50 X. II.

432. And see Ordway v. Haynes, 50 X. H. 159.

views of variant and perhaps contradictory theories. 1 The
question in the case, however, was whe~her counsel had a
right to read from such treatises in argument, so that the
above expression of opimon must be regarded as die a. In
another part of this work, and in another connection, we
have had occasion to quote dicta to the same effect from an
I
·opinion ?f the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. 2 The
result of the cases on this subject shows clearly that the
very decided weight of authority is against the admissibility
in evidence of tandard medical treatises.
Such is the rule
in England, Indiana, Maine, :Maryland, ·M assachusetts,
Michigan, North Carolina, Rhode Island and Wi sconsin,
supported by dicta in California, and New Hampshire, and
opposed by decisions in Alabama nnd Iowa.
The objections to the reception of such books in evidence
have bee.n concisely and forcibly stated by a distinguishetl
writer as follows: '' In the fir.st place , a sound induction
last year is not necessarily a sound iuduction this year, ano
as a matter of fa.ct, works of this cla::;s, when they do not
become obsolete, are . altered, in material features from
edition to edition, so that we cannot tell, in citing from eyen
a Ii ving author, whether what we read is not something that
this very author now rejects . In the second place, if such
book8 are admitted as a class, those which are compilations
must Le admitted as well as those which contain the result
of original research; the purely speculative must come in
side by side with the empirical ; so tpat if such treatises are
admitted at all, it will be impossible to exclude those which
are secondary evidence of the facts they stnte. In the
thil'd place, such books, without expert testimony, cannot
generally be pointed to the concrete case; with expert testimony, they become simply part of such testimony, and
lose their independent substantive character as books.
''In the fourth place, the authors of such books do not
write under oath, and hence the authorities on which they
1

People v. Wheeler, 9 Pacific Coast Law J., 581, 583. (1882.)
See pp. 31 and 33, for an extract from Dole v. Johnson, 50 N. H.
452. Anu see Ordway v. Haynes, 50 N. H. li'>9.
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rest cannot be explored, nor their processes of reasoning

tested.

" Lastly, such books are at best hearsay proof of that

which living witnesses could be produced to prove." l

181. The Contradiction of Experts by Medical Treat-

ises. It is clear then, that the weight of authority is against

the admission of medical treatises iu evidence. And we

think it equally clear that the weight of authority is sus-

tained by the better reason. The Supreme Court of North

Carolina, which, as we have seen, holds medical treatises in-

admissible in evidence, nevertheless recognizes an exception

to the rule. It is there laid down that if a physician has

cited such works in his testimony, those works may be put

in evidence for the purpose of discrediting him. 2 Such a

conclusion has also been reached in Wisconsin, on principle

and without affirming the correctness of a former decision

of the same court, holding the admission of s'uch treatises

discretionary with the trial court. 3 So in a case decided in

Michigan iu 1882, there was a similar ruling, and the court

said: "He (the expert) borrowed credit for the accuracy
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of his statement on referring his learning to the books

before mentioned, and by implying that he echoed the

standard authorities like Dodd. Under the circumstances

it was not improper to resort to the book, not to prove the

facts it contained, but to disprove the statement of the wit-

ness, and enable the jury to see that the book did not con-

tain what he had ascribed to it. The final purpose was to

disparage the opinion of the witness, and hinder the jury

from being imposed urjon by a false light. The case is a

clear exception to the rule which forbids the reading of

books of inductive science as affirmative evidence of the

facts treated of." 4

These cases are certainly distinguishable from the case in

Massachusetts, in which it was held that an expert could not

1 Wharton 's Evidence, 665.

2 Huffman v. Click, 77 X. C. 55.

3 City of Kipon v. Bittel, 30 Wis. 614.

* Pinney v. Cahill, 14 The Eeporter,337; s. c., 12 N. W. Reporter, SG2.

rest cannot be expl9red, nor their processes of reasoning
tested.
"Lastly, such books are at best hearsay proof of that
which living witnesses could be produced to prove." 1
§ 181. The Contradiction of Experts by Medical Treatises.-It is clear then, that the weight of authority is against
the admission of medical treatises in evidence. And we
think it equally clear that the weight of authority is sustained by the better reason. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina, which, as we have seen, holds medical treatises inadmissible in evidence, nevertheless recognizes ari exception
to the rule. It is there laid down that if a physician has
cited such works in bis testimony' those works may be put
in evidence for the purpose of discrediting him. 2 Such a
conclusion has also been reached in 'Yisconsin, on principle
and without affirming the correctness of a former decision
of the same court, holding the admission of S'uch treatises
discretionary with the trial court. 11 So in a case decided in
Michigan in 1882, there was a similar ruling, and tLe court
said: '' He (the expert) borrowed credit for the accuracy
of his statement on referring his learning to the books
before mentioned, and by implying that he ecbued the
standard authorities like Dodd. Under the circumstances
it was not improper to resort to the book, not to prove the
facts it contained, but to <lisprove the statement of the witness, and enable the jury to see that the book did not contain what he had ascribed to it. The final purpose was to
disparage the opinion of the witness, and hinder the jury
from being imposed upon by a false light. The case is a
clear exception to the rule which forbids the reading of
books of inductive science as affirmative evidence of the
facts treated of.'' 4
These cases are certainly distingui$hable from the case iu
Massachusetts, in whieh it \Vas held that an expert could not ·
1

Wharton's Evidence, § 665.
Huffmau v. Click, 77 N. C. 55.
3
City of Ripon v. Bittel, 30 Wis. 614.
•Pinney v. Cahill, 14 The Reporter, 3371; s. c.;12 N. W. Reporter, 8G2.
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read from a treatise a paragraph laying down propositions

in which he concurred. 1 But in Maryland, 2 and also in

Rhode Island, 3 it seems to be laid down that such treatises

cannot be read from to contradict an expert in such cases.

It seems, however, these cases to the contrary notwith-

standing, that an exception should be recognized to the gen-

eral rule, and that medical treatises may be introduced in

evidence for the sole purpose of contradicting an expert who

has been permitted to testify, on his direct examination,

that they contained certain statements, which are not to be

found therein.

182. Testing Knowledge of Experts on Cross-Exam-

ination. Another distinction has been taken in a case de-

cided in Illinois in 1878, in which the right of counsel is

sustained, to read, on the cross-examination of a physician,

paragraphs from standard authors treating of the disease

of which he had stated the deceased died, at the same time

asking him whether he agreed with the statements therein

contained. 4 This the court considered to be different from

reading the books to the jury as evidence in the case.
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Counsel had a right, said the court, to test the knowledge

of the expert by any fair means that promised to elicit the

truth. "It will be conceded it might be done by asking

proper and pertinent questions, and what possible difference

could it make whether the questions were read out of a

medical book, or framed by counsel for that purpose. * *

Assuming to be familiar with standard works that treat of

delirium tremens, it was not unfair to the witness to call his

attention to the definitions given in the books, of that par-

ticular disease, and ask him whether he concurred in the

definitions. How could the knowledge of the witness of

such subjects be more fully tested? That is in no just

sense reading books to the jury as evidence, or for the pur-

pose of contradicting the witness." It seems doubtful

1 Commonwealth v. Stuvtivant, 117 Mass. 122.

2 Davis v. State, 38 Mil. 15.

State v. CTBrien, 7 R. I. 336, 338.

4 Conn. M. L. Ins. Co. v. Ellis, Adm'r., 89 111. 516.

read from a treatise a paragraph laying down propositions
in which be concurred . 1 But in MRryland, 2 and also in
RhodA Island, 3 it seems to be laid down that such treatises
cannot be read from to contradi.c t an expert in such cases.
It seems, however, these cases to the contrary notwithstanding, that an exception should be recognized to the general rule, and that medical treatises may be introduced in
evidence for the sole purpose of contradicting an expert who
has been permitted to testify, on bis direct examination,
that they contained certain · statements, which are not to be
found therein.
§· 1s2·. Testing Knowledge of Experts on Cross-Examination.-Another distinction has been taken in a case decided in Illinois in 1878, in which the right of counsel is
sustained, to read, on the cross-examination of a physician,
paragraphs from standard authors treating of the disease
of which he had stated the deceased died, at the same time
asking him whether he agreed with the ·statements therein
contained. 4 This the court considered to be different from
reading the books to the jury as evidence in the case.
Counsel had a right, said the court, to test the knowledge
of the expert by any fair means that promised to elicit the
truth. "It will be conceded it might be done by asking
proper and pertinent questions, and what possible difference
could it make whether the questions were read out of a
medical book, or framed by counsel for that purpose. * *
Assuming to be familiar with standard works that treat of
delirium treniens, it was not unfair to the witness to call his
attention to the definitions given in the books, of that particular disease, and ask him whether he concurred in the
definitions. How could the knowledge of the witness of
such subjects be more fully tested? That is in no just
sense reading books to the jury as evidence, or for the purpose of contradicting the witness." It seems doubtful
Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. ]22.
Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15.
s State v. O'Brien, 7 R. I. 336, 338.
4 Conn. l\f. L. Ins. Co. v . Ellis, Adm'r., 89 Ill. 516.
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whether the distinction which the court undertook to draw

in this case was not, after all, a distinction without a differ-

ence. For how was the knowledge of the witness tested,

but by comparing his answers with the statements read

from the book in the presence of the jury? And what was

this but practically introducing the book in evidence as a

standard to discredit the witness if he disagreed therewith?

The recognition of such a principle enables counsel, under

the color of a cross-examination of an opposing witness, to

practically introduce affirmative evidence in his own behalf

from medical authorities. For while the books are not for-

mally offered in evidence, an impression may be made on

the minds of the jury which will be equally effective.

183. Views of AVriters on Medical Jurisprudence as

to the Exclusion of Medical Treatises. The medical ex-

perts seem to have been inclined to disprove, if not to actu-

ally resent, the exclusion of medical treatises from the

evidence. In the famous case of Spencer Cowper, when

objection was made to a reference to medical authorities,

Dr. Crell, a witness in the case, is reported to have ex-
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claimed : " My lord, it must be reading, as well as a man's

own experience, that' will make any one a physician ; for

without the reading of books in that art, the art itself can-

not be attained to. I humbly conceive, that in such a diffi-

cult case as this, we ought to have a great deference for the

reports and opinions of learned men ; neither do I see any

reason why I should not quote the fathers of rny profession in

this case, as well as you, gentlemen of the long robe, quote

Coke upon Littleton in others." l

In Beck's Medical Jurisprudence the learned author stren-

uously maintains the right of the professional witness to

refer to medical treatises. He has manifestly fallen into

error in laying down the following proposition :

"In this country, I believe, the objection to medical

fcooks has never been made. There is scarcely a case of

any note, where testimony has been required, in which fre-

1 2 Beck's Med. Jurisprudence, 919; Hargrave's St. Trials.

whether the di tinction which the court undertook to draw
fn this case was not, after all, a distinction "ithout a difference. For how "as the knowledge of the 1 itness tested ,
l)ut by comparing his answers "ith the statements read
from the book in the presence of the jury? And what was
this but practic-ally introducing the book in evidence as a
standard to discredit the witness if he disagreed therewith?
_T he recognition of such a principle enables counsel, under
the color of a cro -examination .of an opposing wituess, to
practically iutroduce affirmative evidence in his .own behalf
from medical authoritie. . For while the books are not formally offered iu evidence, an impression may be made on
the minds of the jury which will be equally effective.
§ 183. Views of Writers on Medical Jurisprudence as
to the Exclusion of Medical Treatises.-The medical experts seem to have been iuclined to disprove, if not to actually resent, the exclusion of medical treatises from the
evidence. In the famous ca e of Spencer Cowper, when
objection was made to a reference to medical authorities,
Dr. Crell, a witness in the .case, is reported to have exclaimed: "~ify lord, it must be reading, as well as a man's
ewu experience, that· will make auy one a physician; for
·w ithout the reading of books iu that art, the art it elf cannot he attained to. I humbly conceive, that in such a diffi€ult case as this, we ought to have a great deference for the
reports and opinions of learned men; neither do I ee any
reason why I should not quote the fathers of my profe . ion in
this case, as well as you, gentlemeu of the long robe, quote
Coke upon Littleton in others." 1
In Beck's :Medical Jurisprudence the learned author streu11ou ly maintains the right of the profes"'ional witness to
refer to medical treatises. He has manifeutlv fallen into
error in la3 ing down the following proposition:
'' In this country, I believe, the objection to medical
l>ooks has never been made. There is scarcely a case of
any note, where testimony has been required, in which fre1

2 Beck' Med. Jmi prudence 919; Hargrave' St. Trials.
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quent reference has not been had to medical works. They

are quoted and commented on by the bench and bar, and by

the professional witnesses." 1

The later writers on medical jurisprudence have taken a

more just view of this question, and appreciate the reason-

ableness and justice of the rule. In Elwell's Medical

Jurisprudence we find that distinguished writer saying : "The

medical witness, therefore, has no just grounds of com-

plaint, because his books are not received in evidence. The

<?ourt honors his individual opinion as of higher value than

that of an outside author. The court presumes, that from

reading these authors, close thought and actual observation

and experience, the witness under oath, subject to cross-

examination, will more certainly enlighten the case than if

it depends upon the published opinions of authors, who

perhaps had a favorite theory to support, or an old preju-

dice to influence them, on a question or subject constantly

advancing. Then the author himself may have changed his

opinions since the book was written." 2

So in Ordonaux's Jurisprudence of Medicine it is said :
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"The reason of this rule is founded, in the principle, that

the expert is called to express a personal opinion upon a

state of facts of variable interpretation, and if a book

could pronounce it as well, it would be superfluous to call

him. * * * The justice of excluding scientific books

from. the field of evidence becomes immediately apparent,

when we reflect that they deal necessarily only with univer-

sal propositions, and inasmuch as every particular case

wears a complexion of its own, it is indispensable to its cor-

rect interpretation that some living witness, skilled in expe-

rience, and able to detect laws of common agreement,

should be called in as an expert umpire. As no dictionary

of human thoughts will ever be written, so no dictionary of

physical laws will ever be compiled, that shall provide with

strictest fidelity, the necessary interpretation for all the

variously complex and conflicting manifestations of muta-

1 2 Beck's Mecl. Jurisprudence, 919.

2 Elwell's Mecl. Jurisprudence, 335.

quent reference has not been had to medical woi'ks. They
are quoted and commented on by the bench and bar, and by
the professional witnesse . '' 1
The later writers on medical jurisprudence have taken a
more just view of this question, and appreciate the reasonableness and justice of the rule.
In Elwell's :Medical
.Jurisprudence we find that distinguished writer saying: "The
medical witness, therefore, has no just grounds of complaint, because his books are not received in evidence. The
-court honors his individual opinion as of higher value than
that of an outside author . The court presumes, that from
reading these authors, close thought and actual observation
and experience, the witness undPr oath, subject to crossexamination, will more certainly enlighten the case than if
it depends upon the publi hed opinions of authors, who
perhaps had a favorite theory to support, or an old preju<lice to influence them, on a question or subject constantly
advancing. Then the author himself may have changed his
-o pinions since the book was written.'' 2
So in Ordonaux' s Jurisprudence of ~1edicine it is said :
"The reason of this rule is founded, in the principle, that
the expert is called to express a personal opinion upon a
state of facts of variable interpretation , and if a hook
·Co uld pronounce it a well, it would be superfluous to call
him. * * * The justice of excluding scientific books
from . the field of evidence becomes immediately apparent,
when we reflect that they deal nece arily only with universal propositions, and inasmuch a every particular case
1\·ear, a complexion of its own, it is indispensable to its correct interpretation that so me living witness, skilled in experience, and able to detect laws of common agreement,
.s hould be called in as an expert 'umpire. As no dictionary
of human thoughts will ever be written , rn no dictionary of
phy ical laws will ever be compiled, that shall provide with
stricte.., t fidelity, the necessary interpretation for all the
variously complex and conflicting manifestations of muta1

2

2 Beck's Med. Jurisprudence, 919.
Elwell's Med. Jurisprudence, 335.
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tional phenomena, not to speak of the more puzzling sphere

of antinomies and apparent contradictions." l

184. Reading from Scientific Books in Argument.

The same objections which have been deemed sufficient to

exclude scientific treatises as evidence, would seem to be

equally potent against the right of counsel to read extracts

therefrom as a part of their argument to the jury. It is.

difficult to see how any just distinction can be made between,

the two cases. And it is not believed that any such right

will be recognized by any court which maintains the inad-

missibility of the treatises in evidence. We think the better

rule is not to allow counsel to read to the jury as a part of

their argument extracts from scientific works, though shown

to be standard authorities. Such is the rule in England, as

we shall presently see, and such is the rule in this country

as recognized by the better authorities. There are, how-

ever, some cases to the contrary, which we shall first con-

sider.

Iii Connecticut, where the question of the admissibility

of treatises in evidence has not yet been determined, the
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right of counsel is- recognized to read extracts from such

treatises as by the testimony of experts have been accepted

as authority. 2 Counsel it seems had been permitted by tacit

consent for a long series of years, in that State, to exercise

that right. The court, therefore, decided, when the right

was formally questioned, that the practice must be regarded

as having, by repetition, hardened into a rule.

In Indiana the doctrine was stated in an early case as fol-

lows : "It would, no doubt, be improper to permit matters

which are objectionable as evidence, to be introduced in evi-

dence in that way. That is, if the extracts referred to con-

tained the opinions or expositions of learned or scientific

witnesses upon a point in issue, and such extracts were in-

admissible when offered as evidence during the introduction

of testimony by the parties, the court should not have per-

1 Ordonanx's Jurisprudence of Medicine, 153, 154.

2 State v. Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330.

tional phenomena, not to. speak of the more puz~ling sphere
of antinomies and apparent contradictions." 1
§ 184. Reading from Scienti,fic Books in Argument.The same objections which have been deemed sufficient to
exclude scientific treatises as evidence, would seem to be
equally potent against the right of counsel to read extracts
therefrom as a part of their argument to the jury. It is
difficult to see how any just distinction can be made betweellt
the two cases. And it is not believed that any such right
will be recognized by any court which maintains the inadmissibility of the treatises in evidence. We think the better
rule is not to allow cou.nsel to read to the jury as a part of
their argument extracts from scientific works, though shown
to be standard authorities. Such is the rule in England, as
we shall presently see, and such is the rule in this country
as recognized by the better authorities. There are, however, some cases to the contrary, which we shall first consider.
Iii Connecticut, where the question of the admissibility
of treatises in evidence has not yet been determined, the
right of counsel isr recognized to read extracts from such
treatises as by the testimony of experts have been accepted
as authority. 2 Counsel it seems had been permitted by tacit
consent for a long series of years, in that State, to exercise
that right. The court, therefore, decided, when the right
was formally questioned, that the practice must be regarded
as having, by repetition, hardened into a rule.
In Indiana the doctrine was· stated in an earlv
., case as follows: "It would, no doubt, be improper to permit matters
which are objectionable as evidence, to be introduced in evidence in that way. That is, if the extracts referred to cont ained the opinions or expositions of learned or scientific
witnesses upon a point in issue., and such extracts were inadmissible when offered as evidence during the introduction
of testimony by the parties, the court should not have peri
2

Ordonahx's Jurisprudence of Medicine, 153, 154.
State v. Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330.
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mitted them to be read at any time. But if the extracts

were merely argumentative and contained no opinions or ex-

positions, which could be regarded as properly matters of

'evidence, we cannot perceive any valid objection to their

being read or adopted as argument, subject, of course,

to the instructions of the court as to the law of the

case." 1 To the same purpose are the decisions in Ohio 2

and Texas, 3 as we understand them. In a subsequent case

in Indiana, 4 and another in Delaware,* it has been held *

proper to allow counsel to read from standard medical

authorities, the jury being instructed that the extract was not

to be regarded as evidence. The objections to the prac-

tice pointed out in the later and better considered cases do

not seem to have occurred to the courts announcing these

opinions.

185. Keading from Scientific Books in Argument

The Subject Continued. In a case in England, where

counsel in his address to the ]'ury attempted to quote from a

work on surgery, it was held he was not justified in doing

so, and ALDERSON, B., said ; You surely cannot contend
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that you may give the book in evidence, and if not, what

right have you to quote from it in your address, and do

that indirectly which you would not be permitted to do in

the ordinary course? " 6

In Massachusetts when counsel for the defendant in

his opening to the jury, contending that cribbing was not

an unsoundness in a horse, but a habit, proposed to read

from a work on Veterinary Surgery, a description of the

habit "as a better mode of showing what cribbing was,

but not as evidence in the case," it was held no error to

refuse to allow him to proceed. 7 So in an earlier case

1 Jones v. Trustees, etc., Indiana R., 47.

2 Legg v. Drake, 21 Ohio, 286.

3 Wade v. De Witt, 20 Texas, 398.

4 Harvey v. State, 40 Ind. 516.

5 State v. West, 1 Houston Cr. Gas. 371.

6 The Queen v. Crouch, 1 Cox Cr. Cas. 94. And see Regina v. Taylor,

13 Cox Cr. Cases, 77.

7 Washburn v. Cuddihy. 8 Gray, 430.

mitted them to be read at any time. But if the extracts
were merely argumentative and contained no opinions or expositions, which could be regarded as properly matters of
·evidence, we cannot perceive any valid objection tq their
being read or adopted as argument, subject, of course,
to the instructions of the court as to the law of the
case.'' 1 To the same purpose are the decisions in Ohio 2
and Texas, 3 as we under tand them. In a subsequent case
in Indiana, 4 and another in Delaware/ it has been held '
proper to allow counsel to read from standard medical
authorities, the jury being instructed that the extract was not
to be regarded as evidence. The obje~tious to the practice pointed out in the later and better considered cases do
not seem to have occurred to the courts announcing these
opinions.
§ 185. Reading from Scientific Books in ArgumentThe Subject Continued.-In a case in England, where
counsel in his address to the jury attempted to quote from a
work on surgery, it was held he was not j ust.ified in doing
so, and ALDERSON, B., said; ''You surely cannqt contend
that you may give the book in evidence, and if not, what
right have you to quo~e from it in your address, and do
that indirectly which you would not be permitted to do in
the ordinary course? " 6
In :l\Iassachusetts when counsel for the defendant in
his opening to the jury, contending that cribbing was not
an un oundness in a horse, but a habit, proposed to read
from a work on Veterinary Surgery, a description of the
habit '' as a better mode of showing what cribbing was,
but not as evidence in the case," it was held no error to
refuse to allow him to proceed. 7 So in an earliet· case
Joneis v. Trustees, etc., Indiana R., 47.
Legg v. Drake, 21 Ohio, 2 6.
3 Wade v. De Witt, 20 Texas, 398.
4 Harvey v. State, 4.0 Ind. 516.
ti State v. West, 1 Houston Cr. Cas. 371.
6 The Queen v. Crouch, 1 Cox Cr. Ca . 94.
And ee Regina v. Taylor,
13 Cox Cr. Cases, 77.
7 Washburn v. Cnddihy! 8 Gray, 430.
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the same court denied the right, on the ground that the

extracts would, in effect, be used as evidence. 1

In North Carolina the question has been carefully consid-

ered, and the language of the court in denying the right,

warrants repetition in this connection. " It sounds plausi-

ble to say, you do not read it as evidence, but that you

adopt it as part of your argument. But in so doing the

counsel really obtains from it all the benefits of substantive

evidence fortified by its ' standard ' character. He first

proves by the medical expert that the work is one of high

character and authority in the profession, and then he says

to the jury, ' here is a book of high standing, written by

one who has devoted his talents to the study and explana-

tion of this special subject of nervous diseases. He ex-

presses my views with so much more force than I can, that

I will read an extract from his work and adopt it as a part

of my argument.' It is evident that the effect of this

manoeuvre is to corroborate the evidence of the medical ex-

pert, or other witnesses, by the authority of a great name

testifying, but not under oath, to the same thing as the ex-
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pert, but with this difference, that the author has not heard

the evidence upon which the expert based his opinion." 2

And in Michigan the Supreme Court has lately sustained

the trial court in refusing to allow counsel in his opening to

read a passage from Griesenger on Mental Diseases, to the

effect that grief, loss of fortune and disappointed ambition

were among the causes of insanity. 3

So in a recent case in the Circuit Court of the United

States for the Northern District of New York, when coun-

sel stated that he desired to read from Ericson on Railway

Injuries, as a part of his argument, Mr. Justice WALLACE

declared that he could not read any portion or extract from

the book. 4

1 Ashworth v. Kittridge, 12 Gush. 194.

2 Huffman v. C'ick, 77 N". C. 54.

8 Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 314.

4 Robinson v. New York Central, etc. R. R. Co., Albany Law .!., Oct.

29th, 1881, p. 357.

the same court denied the right, on the ground that the
extracts would, in effect, be used as evidence. 1
In North Carolina the question has been carefully considered, and the language of the court in denying the right,
warrants repetition in this connection. "It sounds plausible to say, you do not read it as evidence, but that you
adopt it as part of your argument. But in so doing the
counsel really obtains from it all the benefits of substautive
evidence fortified by its ' standard ' character. He first
proves by the medical expert that the work is oue of high
character and authority in the profession, and then he says
to the jury, 'here is a book of high standing, written by
one who has devoted his talents to the study and explanation of this special subject of nervous di. ea es. He expresses my views with so much more force than I can, that
I will read an extract from his work and adopt it as a part
of my argument.' It is evident that the effect of this
manreuvre is to corroborate the evidenre of the medical expert, or other witnesse~, by the authority of a great name
testifying, but not under oath, to the same thing as the expert, but with this difference, that the author has not heard
the evidence upon which the expert based his opinion.'' 2
And in Michigan the Supreme Court has lately sustained
the trial court in refusing to aliow counsel in his opening to
read a passage from Griesenger on Mental Diseases, to the
effect that grief, loss of fortune and disappointed ambition
were among the causes of insanity. 3
So in a recent case in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Northern District of New York, when counel stated that he desired to read from Ericson on Railway
Injuries, as a part of his argument, Mr. Justice WALLACE
declared that he could not read any portion or extract from
the book. 4
1

Ashworth v. Kittridge, 12 Cush. 19-!.
Huffman v. Click, 77 N. C. 54.
3
Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, !H4.
4
Robinson v. New York Central, etc. R.R. Co., .Albany L :1\\· .r., Oot.
29th, 1881, p. 357.
2
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The latest case in which the subject has been considered

was decided in the Supreme Court of California in 1882.

Counsel in the trial court was permitted, against objection,

to read as a portion of his argument from a book called

*' Browne's Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity." No testi-

mony was introduced to show that this was a standard

authority, and while stress was laid on this fact, the reason-

ing of the court leads to the conclusion that had such testi-

mony been introduced it could not have affected the judg-

ment announced. Judgment was reversed, and a new trial

granted. 1 It seems difficult to understand why any stress

should be laid on the fact that the work was not shown to

be a standard authority. The right to read from the work

at all is predicated upon the fact that counsel has adopted

the extract as his own, and made it a part of his argument.

The theory is that it comes before the jury, not as the opinion

of the writer, for as such it would be inadmissible, but as

the opinion or argument of counsel. The right of counsel,

therefore, to make the argument cannot depend upon the

fact that it is sustained by standard authorities, or by any
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authorities at all. This fact the court overlooked, although

it reached a correct conclusion on the facts.

18(5. Reading the Testimony of Experts as Contained

in Official Reports. It sometimes happens that expert

testimony given in another case is set out at length in the

official reports, appearing either in the decision of the court,

or in the statement of the case by the reporter. While the

opinions of the experts have in such cases been expressed

under oath, counsel have no right to make use of them in

another case, as no opportunity is afforded in such case for

any cross-examination. Such a case arose in Illinois, where

the State's attorney undertook to read to the jury on a

murder trial, the testimony of a professor of chemistry, as

found in an official report of another case, concerning the

symptoms of poisoning by arsenic. This was pronounced

to be the height of injustice, and judgment was reversed. 2

1 People v. Wheeler, 9 Pac. Coast Law J. 581.

2 Yoe v. People, 49 111. 410, 412.

The latest case in which the subject has been considered
was decided in the Supreme Court of California in 1882.
Counsel in the trial court was permitted, against objection,
to read as a portion of his argument from a book called
" Browne's Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity." No testimony was introduced to show that this was a standard
authority, and while stress was laid on this fact, the reasoning of the court leads to the conclusion that had such testimony been introduced it could not have affected the judgment announced . Judgment was reversed, and a new trial
granted .1 It seems difficult to understand why any stress
should be laid on the fact that the work was not shown to
be a standard authority. The right to read from the work
at all is predicated upon the fact that counsel has adopted
the extract as his own , and made it a part of his argument.
The theory is that it comes before the jury, not as the opinion
of the writer, for as such it would be inadmissible, but as
the opinion or argument of counsel. The right of counsel,
therefore, to make the argument cannot depend upon th~
fact that it is sustained by standard authorities, or by any
authorities at all. This fact the court overlooked, although
it reached a correct conclusion on the fact.s.
§ 186. Reading the Testimony of Experts as Contained
in Official Reports.- It sometimes happene that expert
testimony given in another case is set out at length in the
official reports, appearing either in the decision of the court,
or in the statement of the case by the reporter. While the
opinions of the experts have in such cases been expressed
under oath, counsel have no right to make use of them in
another case, as no opportuuity is afforded in such case for
any cross-examination. Such a case arose in Illinois, where
the State's attorney undertook to read to the jury on a
murder trial, the testimony of a professor of chemistry, as
found in an official report of another ca&e, concerning the
symptoms of poisoning by arsenic. This was pronounced
to be the height of injustice, and judgment was reversed .2
1

2

People v. Wheeler, 9 Pac. Coast Law J . 5 1.
Yoe v. People, 49 Ill. 410, 412.
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187. Statutory Provisions Concerning the Compensa-

tion of Experts. In some of the States the law expressly
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provides that when a witness is summoned to testify as an

expert, he shall be entitled to extra compensation. Such a

provision may be found in the laws of Iowa, of North Car-

olina, and of Rhode Island. They are as follows :

Iowa: Witnesses called to testify only to an opinion

founded on special study or experience in any branch of

science, or to make scientific or professional examinations,

and state the result thereof, shall receive additional com-

pensation, to be fixed by the court, with reference to the

value of the time employed, and the degree of learning or

skill required." i

1 Code of 1873, 3814. See Snyder v. Iowa City, 40 Iowa, 646.

SECTION.

.

187. Statutory Provisions Concerning the Compensation of Experts.
188. The Effect of Making Extra Compensation.
189. Experts need not Make a Preliminary Examination, unless
Special Compensation is Made.
190. Whether Special Compensation must be Made to Experts Testifying as 8uch.
191. Opinions of Writers on Medical Jurisprudence -As to Additional CQmpensation.
192. American Cases Favoring E :d ra Compensation .
. 193. American Cases Denying the Right to Extra. Compensation.
194. Extra Compensation Allowed in England.
195. Special Compensation to Experts Employed ·by the State in
Criminal Cases.
196. · Special Compensation to Experts Summoned for the Defense Paid out of tl;le Public Trea~ury.

§ 18 7. Statutory Provisions Concerning the Compensation of Experts.- In some of the States the law expressly
provides that when a witness is summoned to testify as an
expert, he shall be entitled to extra compensation. Such a
provision may be found in the laws of Iowa, of North Carolina, and of Rhode Island. They are as follows:
Iowa: Witnesses called to testify only to an opinion
founded on special study or experience in any branch of
science, or to make scientific or professional examinations,
and sta.te the result thereof, shall receive additional compensation, to be fixed by the court, with reference to the
value of the time employed, and the degree of 'learning or
skill required." 1
1

Code of 1873, § 3814. See SnyEl.er v. Iowa City, 40 Iowa, 6-!6.
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North Carolina: ''Experts when compelled to attend

and testify, shall be allowed such compensation and mileage

as the court may, in its discretion, order." l

Rhode Island: " In addition to the fees above provided,

witnesses summoned and testifying as experts in behalf of

the State before any justice of the Supreme Court, trial

justice or coroner, may be allowed and paid such sum as

such justice of the Supreme Court, trial justice or coroner

may deem just and reasonable : Provided, that the allow-

ance so made by any trial justice or coroner, shall be sub-

ject to the approval of a justice of the Supreme Court." 2

In Indiana, on the other hand, is has been provided by

statute that experts may be compelled to testify to an opin-

ion without any extra compensation. The provision is as

follows: "A witness who is an expert in any art, science,

trade, profession, or mystery, may be compelled to appear

and testify to an opinion, as such expert, in relation to any

matter, whenever such opinion is material evidence, relevant

to any issue on trial before a court or jury, without payment

or tender of compensation other than the^er diem and mile-
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age allowed by law to witnesses, under the same rules and

regulations by which he can be compelled to appear and tes-

tify to his knowledge of facts relevant to the same issue." 3

In the absence of all statutory provision authorizing

it, the compensation of experts, beyond the regular witness

fees, is not a necessary disbursement, and cannot be taxed

as a part of the costs. It is considered as having been in-

curred for the party's own benefit, and is no more a dis-

bursement in the cause than the fees paid to an attorney." *

188. The Effect of Making Extra Compensation. It

is undoubtedly the practice in all important cases, for the

parties calling experts, or professional witnesses, to pay

them an additional compensation. And it is not considered

1 Laws of 1871, ch. 139, 13. See State v. Dollar, 66 X. C. 626.

* Public Statutes (1882), p. 733, 15.

3 Indiana Kevised Statutes (1881), p. 94, 504.

4 Mask v. City of Buffalo, X. Y. Ct. of App., Dec. 1881, 13 Keporter,

251 . And see Hayues v. Mosher, 15 How. Pr. 216.

North Carolina : " Experts when compelled to attend
and te tify, shall be allowed such compensation and mileage
as the court may, in its discretion, order." 1
Rhode Isla nd : " In addition to the fees above provided,
witnesses summoned and testifying as experts in behalf of
the State before any justice of the Supreme Court, trial
justice or coroner, may be allowed and paid such sum as
such justice of the Supreme Court, trial justice or coroner
may deem just and rea ona.ble: Provided , that the allowance so made by any trial justice or coroner, shall be subject to the approval of a justice of the Supreme Court." 2
In Indiana, on the other band, is bas been provided by
statute that experts may be compelled to testify to an opinion without any extra compeniation. The provision is as
follows: "A witness who is an expert in any art, science,
trade, profession, or mystery, may be compelled to appear
and testify to an opinion, 8.S such expert, in relation to any
matter, whenever such opinion is material evidence, relevaut
to any issue on trial before a court or jury, without payment
or tender of com pen ation other than the p er diem and mileage allowed by law to witnesses, under the same rules and
regulations by which he can be compelled to appear and testify to his knowledge of facts relevant to the same iEisue." 3
ln the absence of all statutory provision authorizing
it, the compensation of experts, beyond the regular witness
fees, is not a necessary disbursement, and cannot be taxed
ns a part of the co ~ ts. It is considered as having been in.curred for the party's own bepefit, and is no more a disbursement in the cause than the fees paid to an attorney.'' 4
§ 188. The Effect of l\'laking Extra Compensation.- It
is undoubtedly the practice in all important cases, for the
parties callii.)g experts, or professional witnesses, to pay
them an additional compensation. And it is not considered
1

La\"VS of 1871, ch. 139, § 13. See State v. Dollar, 66 N. C. 626.
Statutes (1 82), p. 733, § 15.
3 Indiana Rcvi cd Statutk (18 1), p. 94, § 504.
4 Mask v. City of Buffalo . N. Y. Ct. of App. Dec. 1 81, 13 Reporter,
251. And see Haynes v. Mosher, 15 How. Pr. 216.
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contrary to the policy of the law, that these witnesses

should be specially feed. For if special compensation was

not made or permitted, the testimony of such witnesses

could not be procured without great pecuniary loss, and

perhaps could not be secured at all. While the question as

to the amount paid, or agreed to be paid in such cases, can-

not affect in the least the regularity of the trial, yet it is

stated that it may, perhaps, properly affect the credit of the

witness with the jury. 1

189. Experts Need not Make a Preliminary Examina-

tion, unless Special Compensation is Made. An expert

cannot be compelled to make any preliminary investigation

of the facts involved in a case, in order to enable him to

attend on the trial and give a professional opinion. For

instance, if the State desires the opinion of medical experts

as to the cause of death, it cannot compel them to make a

post mortem examination of the body of the deceased, for

the purpose of qualifying them to express an opinion as to

what was the cause of death. 2 And it has been said that an

expert cannot be required to attend during the entire trial,
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for the purpose of attentively considering, and carefully

listening to the testimony, in order that he may be qualified

to express a deliberate opinion upon such testimony. 3 In all

such cases special compensation should be made.

190. Whether Special Compensation Must he Made

to Experts Testifying as Such. There can be no doubt

that professional men are not entitled, in this country, to

claim any additional compensation when testifying as ordi-

nary witnesses to facts which happened to fall under their

observation. 4 But another question arises, when they are

summoned to testify as to facts of science with which they

have become familiar by means of special study and inves-

tigation, and to express opinions based upon the skill

1 See People v. Montgomery, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 207, 240.

2 See Summers v. State, 5 Texas Ct. of App. 374.

3 See People v. Montgomery, 13 Abb. Pr. (X. S.) 220.

4 Snyder v. Iowa City, 40 Iowa, 646. And see Bnchman v. State, 59

Ind. 1.
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contrary to the policy of the law, that these witnesses
should be specially feed . For if special compensation was
not made or permitted, the testimony of ~uch witnesses
could not be procured without great pecuniary loss, and
perhaps could not ·be ecured at all. While the question as
to the amount paid, or agreed to be paid in such cases, cannot affect in the least the regularity of the trial, yet it is
stated that it may, perhaps, properly affect the credit of the
witne s with the jury. 1
§ 189. Experts Need not ll'Iake a Preliminary Examination, unless Special Compensation is llfade.- An expert
cannot be compelled to make any preliminary investigation
of the facts involved in a case, in order to enable him to
attend on the trial and give a professional opinion. For
instance, if the State desires the opinion of medical experts
as to the cause of death, it cannot compel them to make a
post 1no1·tem examination of the body of the deceased, for
the purpose of qualifying them to express an opiuion as to
what was the cause of death. 2 And it ha~ been said that an
expert cannot be required to attend during the entire trial,
for the purpose of attentively con idering, and carefully
listening to the testimony, in order that he may be qualified
to express a deliberate opinion upon such te timony .3 In all
such cases special compensation should be made.
§ 190. Whether Special Compensation Must be l\1ade
to Experts Testifying as Snch.-There can be no doubt
that professional men are not entitled, in this country, to
claim any additional compensation when testifying as ordinary witnesses to facts which happened to fall under their
observation. 4 But another question arises, when they are
summoned to testify as to fact of science with which they
have become familiar by means of special study and in est~gation, and to express opinion
ba ed upon the skill
1

See People v . .Montgomery, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. .) 207 2-!0.
See nmmers v. State, 5 Texas Ct. of App . 374.
3 See People v. Montgomery, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 220.
4 Snyder v. Iowa City, 40 Iowa, 64-6.
And ee Buchman v.
Ind. 1.
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acquired from such researches, as to conclusions which

ought to be drawn from certain given facts. Whether they

can be compelled to testify in such cases, when no other

compensation has been tendered than the usual fees of wit-

nesses testifying to ordinary facts, is a point upon which

the cases are not in harmony. In this country the cases are

so nearly balanced, that the question must be regarded as

still an open one. But in England it seems to be settled that

additional compensation is required. The practical impor-

tance of the question requires that the subject be examined

somewhat at length.

11)1. Opinions of Writers on Medical Jurisprudence

as to Additional Compensation. And before examining

the decisions of the courts, attention is called to the opin-

ions of the writers on Medical Jurisprudence. For, while

these opinions cannot be regarded as authoritative, they are

important, and entitled to the respectful consideration of

the profession and the courts. In Ordonaux's Jurisprudence

of Medicine, 1 that learned and distinguished writer says :

" It is evident that the skill and professional experience of
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a man are so far his individual capital and property, that he

cannot be compelled to bestow it gratuitously upon any

party. Neither the public, any more than a private person,

have a right to extort services from him, in the line of his

profession, without adequate compensation. On the witness

stand, precisely as in his office, his opinion may be given or

withheld at pleasure ; for a skilled witness cannot be com-

pelled to give an opinion, nor committed for contempt if he

refuse to do so. Whoever calls for an opinion from him in

chief, is under obligation to remunerate him, since he has to

that extent employed him professionally ; and the expert, at

the outset, may decline giving his opinion until the party

calling him either pays or agrees to pay him for it. When,

however, he has given his opinion, he has now placed it

among the res gestce, and cannot decline repeating it or ex-

plaining it on cross-examination. Once uttered to the

1 114,115.

acqu ired from such r esearches, as to conclu ions which
(,ught to be drawn from certain given facts. Whether they
can be compelled to testify iu such cases, when no other
compensation has been tendered than the u ual fees of witnesses testifying to ordinary facts, is a point upon which
the cases are not in harmony. In this country the ca es are
so nearly balanced, that the question must he regarded a
still an open one. But in England it seems to be settled that
additional compensation is required . The practical importance of the question requires that the subject be examined
somewhat at length .
§ 191. Opinions of Writers on :M edical Jurisprudence
as to Additional Compensation.-And before examiniug
the decisions of the courts, attentibn is called to the opinions of the writers on 1fedical Jurisprudence. For, while
these opinions cannot be regarded a authoritative, they are
important, and entitled to the respectful consideration of
the profe sion and the courts. In Ordonaux' s J uri ·prudence
of 1ledicine,1 that learned and distingui "hed writer ays:
'' It is evident that the skill and professional experience of
a man are so far his individual capital and property, thnt he
cannot bf. compelled to bestow it gratuitously upon any
party . Neither the public, any more than a private per on,
have a right to extort services from him, in the line of his
profession, without adequate compensation . On the witne s
stand, precisely as in his office, his opinion may be given or
withheld at pleasure; for a skilled witness cannot be compelled to give an opinion, nor committed for contempt if he
refuse to do so. Whoever calls for an opinion from him in
chief, is under obligation to remunerate him , since he ha" to
that extent employed him profe. sionally; and the expert, at
the outset, may decline giving his opinion until the party
calling him either pays or agrees to pay him for it. When,
howe\'er, he has given his opinion, he has now placed it
among the res gestce, and cannot decline repeating it or explaining it on cross-examination. Once uttered to the
1

§§ 1i.±, 110.
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public ear of the court, it passes among the facts in

evidence."

So in Beck's Medical Jurisprudence the eminent author,

in considering this subject, comments as follows :

" If the duties on which I have enlarged are important to

the community, in promoting the proper administration of

justice, ought not the individuals engaged in them to

receive adequate compensation? I advert to this, not only

because it is just in principle, but because it would remove

all imputation of volunteering in criminal cases. No one

can refuse being a witness when legally summoned ; every

one, I presume, may decline the dissection of a dead body,

or the chemical examination of a suspected fluid ; and yet

there is not, I believe, an individual attending on any of our

courts, who is not paid for his time and services, with the

exception of such as are engaged in these investigations.

* * * It is quite time that the medical profession in

this country should rouse itself to a demand of its just

rights." 1

192. American Cases Favoring Extra Compensa-
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tion. The earliest of the American cases upon this subject

seems to have arisen in the District Court of the United

States for the District of Massachusetts, in 1854. The

question came up before SPEAGUE, J., in the following man-

ner : During a trial upon an indictment, a motion for a

capias was made by the district attorney, for the purpose

of bringing in a witness subpoenaed to act as an interpreter

of some German witnesses, but who had refused or neg-

lected to attend. In answer to this application, the court

said : "A similar question has heretofore arisen, and I have

declined to issue process to assist in such cases. When a

person has knowledge of any fact pertinent to the issue to

be tried, he may be compelled to attend as a witness. In

this all stand upon an equal ground. But to compel a per-

son to attend, merely because he is accomplished in a par-

ticular, science, art, or profession, would subject the same

1 Beck's Medical Jurisprudence, 920, 921.

public ear of the court, it passes among the facts in
evidence."
So in Beck's Medical J urisprudeuce the eminent author,
in considering this subject, comments as follows:
."If the duties on which I have enlarged are important to
the community, in promoting the proper admini tration of
justice, ought not the individual engaged in them to
receive adequate compensation? I advert to this, not only
because it is just in principle, but because it would remove
all imputation of volunteering in criminal ca es. No one
can refuse being a witness when legally summoned ; every
one, I presume, may decline the dissection of a dead body,
or the chemical examination of a suspected fluid; and yet
there is not, I believe, an individual attending on any of our
courts, who is not paid for his time and services, with the
exception of such as are engaged in the e investigations.
* * * It is quite time that the medical profe ion in
this country ·should rouse itself to a demand of its just
rights." 1
§ 19 2. American Cas.es Favoring Extra Compensation.- The earliest of the American ca es upon this subject
seems to have arisen in the District Court of the United
States for the District of :Mas"achusetts, in 1854. The
question came up before SPRAGUE, J., in the following manner: During a trial upon an indictment, a motion for a
capfos was made by the district attorney, for the purpose
of bringing in a witness subprenaed to act as an interpreter
of some German witneeses, but who had refused or neglected to attend. In answer to this application, the court
said : " A similar question has heretofore arisen, and I have .
<leclined to issue process to assist in such cases. "\Vhen a
person bas knowledge of any fact pertinent to the issue to
be tried, he may be compelled to attend as a witness. In
this all stand upon an equal ground. But to compel a person to atteud, merely because he is accomplished in a particular, science, art, or profession, would subject the same
1

1

•

Beck's Medical Jurisprudence, 920, 921.
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individual to be called upon in every cause in which any

question in his department of knowledge is to be solved.

Thus, the most eminent physician might be compelled,

merely for the ordinary witness fees, to attend from the

remotest part of the district, and give his opinion in every

trial in which a medical question should arise. This is so

unreasonable, that nothing but necessity can justify it. The

case of an interpreter is analogous to that of an expert. It

is not necessary to say what the court would do if it ap-

peared that no other interpreter could be obtained by rea-

sonable effort. Such a case is not made as the foundation

of this motion . It is well known that there are in Boston

many native Germans, and others skilled in both the Ger-

man and English languages, some of whom, it may be pre-

sumed, might, without difficulty, be induced to attend for

an adequate compensation." l

The question came before the Supreme Court of Indiana in

1877, in Buchman v. The /State, 2 the statutory provision

above noted not having been enacted at that time, and that

court held that while a physician or surgeon could be required
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to attend as a witness to facts without other compensation

than that provided by law for other witnesses, yet he could

not be required to testify as to his professional opinion,

without the compensation of a professional fee. In the

opinion of the court the professional knowledge of an attor-

ney or physician is to be regarded in the light of property,

and his professional services are no more at the mercy of

the public, as to remuneration, than are the goods of the

merchant, or the crops of the farmer, or the wares of the

mechanic. " When a physician testifies as an expert, by

giving his opinion, he is performing," says the court, "a

strictly professional service. To be sure, he performs that

service under the sanction of an oath. So does the lawyer,

when he performs any services in a cause. The position of

a medical witness, testifying as an expert, is much more

like that of a lawyer than that of an ordinary witness, tes-

1 In the matter of Roelker, 1 Sprague, 276.

a 59 Indiana, 1.

(17)
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individual to be called upon in every cause in which any
question in his department of knowledge is to be solved.
Thus, the most eminent physician might be compelled,
merely for the ordinary witness fee , to attend from the
remotest part of the district, and give his opinion in every
trial in which a medical question should arise. This is so
unreasonable, that nothing but necessity can justify it. The
case of an interpreter is analogous to that of an expert. It
is not necessary to say what the court would do if it appeared that no other interpreter could be obtained by rea~onable effort.
Such a case is not m~de as the foundation
of this motion. It is well known that there are in Boston
many native Germans, and others skilled in both the German and English languages, some of whom, it may be presumed, might, without difficulty, be induced to attend for
an adequate compensation." 1
The question came before the Supreme Court of Indiana in
1877, in Buchman v. The State, 2 the statutory provision
above noted not having been enacted at that time, and that
court held that while a physician or surgeon could be required
to attend as a witness to facts without other compeus:ition
than that provided by law for other witnesses, yet he could
not be required to testify as to his professional opinion,
without the compen ation of a professional fee. In the
opinion of the court the professional knowledge of an attorney or physician is to be regarded in the light of property,
and bis professional services are no more at the mercy of
the public, as to remuneration, than are the goods
the
merchant, or the crops of the farmer, or the wares of the
mechanic.
" Whe~ a physician testifies as an expert, by
giving his opinion, he is performing," says the court, "a
strictly professional service. To he sure, he performs th~t
service under the sanction of an oath. So does the lawyer,
when be performs any services in a cause. The position of
a medical witness, testifying as an expert, is much more
like that of a lawyer than that of an ordinary witness, tes-

of

1
2

In the matter of Roelker 1 Sprague 276.
59 Indiana, 1.
(17)
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tifying to facts. The purpose of his service is not to prove

facts in the cause, but to aid the court or jury in arriving at

a proper conclusion from facts otherwise proved." The

court then goes on to say that if physicians or surgeons can

be compelled to render professional services by giving their

opinions on the trial of causes, without compensation, then

an eminent physician or surgeon my be compelled to go to

any part of the State, at any and all times, to render such'

service without other compensation than is afforded by the

ordinary witness fees. And this the court does not think

he can be compelled. to do. This conclusion is based both

upon general principles of law, and the Constitution of the

State, which provides that " no man's particular services

shall be demanded without just compensation."

The latest case in which this subject has been considered

seems to be the case of the United States v. Howe, recently

decided in the United States District Court for the Western

District of Arkansas. 1 In this case, which was a prosecution

for murder, a physician summoned as an expert, being

sworn refused to testify, unless first paid a reasonable com-
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pensation for giving the results of his skill and experience.

The court declined to regard this refusal as a contempt of

court. The distinction was sustained between a witness

called to depose to a matter of opinion depending on his

skill in a particular profession or trade, and a witness called

to depose to facts which he saw. When he has facts within

his knowledge, the public have a right to those facts, but

the skill and professional experience of a man are so far his

individual capital and property, that he cannot be compelled

to bestow them gratuitously upon any party. That the

public cannot, any more than a private person extort ser-

vices from a person in the line of his profession or trade

without adequate compensation.

193. American Cases Denying the Right to Extra

Compensation. A different conclusion to that reached in

the foregoing cases was arrived at in the Supreme Court of

1 12 Central Law Journal, 193.

tifying to facts. The purpose of his service is not to prove
facts jn the cause, but to aid the court or jury in arriving at
a proper conclusion from facts otherwise proved.''
The
court then goes on to say that if physicians or surgeons can
be compelled to render professional services by giving their
opinions on the trial of causes, without compensation, then
an eminent physician or surgeon my be compelled to go to
any part of the State, at any and all times, to render such •
service without other compensation than is afforded by the
ordinary wjtness fees.
And this the court does not think
he can be compelled t0 do. This conclusion is based both
upon general principles of law, and the Constitution of the
State, which provides that " no man's particular services
shall be demanded without just compensation."
The latest case in which this subject has been considered
seems to be the case of the United States v. Howe, recently
decided in the United States District Court for the vVestern
District of Arkan~as . 1 In this case, which was a prosecution
for murder, a physician summoned as an expert, being
swor~ refused to testify, unless first paid a reasonable eom. pensation for giving the results of his skill and experience.
The court declined to regard this refusal as a contempt of
c·o urt. The distinction was sustained between a witness
called to depose to a matter of opinion depending on his
skill in a particular profession or trade, and a witness called
to depose to facts which he saw. When he has facts within
his knowledge, the public hav·e a right to those facts, but
the skill and professional experience of a man are so far hi~
individual capital and property, that he cannot be compelled
to bestow them gratuitously upon any party. That the
public cannot, any more than a private person extort services from a person in the line of his profession or trade
without adequate compensation.
§ 19 3. American Cases Denying the Rig·ht to E.A."tra
Compensation.- A different conclusion to that reached in
the foregoing cases was arrived at in the Supreme Court of
1

12 Central Law Journal, 193.
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Alabama in 1875, in Ex parte Dement. 1 The prisoner on

trial was charged with murder, and the physician, after tes-

tifying that he had seen the deceased after he had received

the wounds which the prosecution asserted had produced

death, was asked to state the nature and character of the

wound received, and its probable effect. This he declined to

do upon the ground that " he had not been remunerated for

his professional opinion, nor had compensation for his pro-

fessional opinion been promised or secured." A fine was

thereupon imposed upon him for contempt of court. A

motion to have the fine set aside upon the ground that the

court could not compel him to testify as a professional

expert until compensation for his professional opinion had

been first made or secured, having been overruled, the case

was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court, which affirmed

the ruling. In their decision, after nil examination of the

authorities, the court say : "It will be noticed that it has

not been adjudged in any of the cases cited, that a physi-

cian or other person examined as an expert, is entitled to

be paid for his testimony as for professional ojnnions.
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The reports contain nothing to this effect. The English

cases only indicate, and it is implied by the decision of

Judge SPRAGUE (In the matter of Roelker)* that persons

summoned to testify as experts ought to receive compensa-

tion for their loss of time. And it is to be inferred that the

judges delivering some of the opinions thought the time of

such a witness ought to be valued, in the language of the

English statute, ' according to his countenance and calling.'

But it is not intimated by any of them, that a physician,

when testifying, is to be considered as exercising his skill

.and learning in the healing art, which is his high vocation ;

or that a counsellor at law, in the same situation, is exert-

ing his talents and requirements in professionally investi-

gating and upholding the rights of a client. If this were

so, each one should be paid for his testimony as a witness,

1 53 Alabama, 380.

- Sprngue's Beei.ions. 270.

Alabama in 1875, in E x parte Denient. 1 The prisoner on
trial was charged with murder, and the physician, after testifying that he ha<l een the deceased after he had received
the wounds which the prosecution asserted had produced
-d eath, was asked to state the nature and character of the
wound received, and its probable effect. This be declined to
do upon the ground that " he had not been remunerated for
his professional opinion, nor had compensation ~or his professional opinion been promised or secured." A fine wa
thereupon impo ed upon him for contempt of court. A
motion to have the fine set aside upon the ground that the
court could not compel him to testify a a. professional
D:\.1Jert until compensation for his professional opinion had
been first ma<le or ecm·ec~, ·having been ovenulccl, the case
was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court, which atlinncd
the ruling. In their decision, after ~ n examination of the
authorities, the court say: "It will be noticed that it has
not been adjudged in any of the cases cited, that a physi.ciun or other person examined as an expert, is entitled to
be paid for his testimony as for professional opinions.
The reports contain nothing to this effect. The £nglish
cases only indicate, and it is implied by the decision of
Judge SPRAGUE (In the matter of RoelJ.:a),2 that persons
::;ummoned to testify as experts ought to receive compen ation for their loss of tirne. And it is to be inferred that the
judges delivering some of the opinions thought the time of
such a witness ought to be valued, in the language of the
Engli!:ih statute, 'according to his countenance and calling.'
But it i: not intimated by any of them, that a physician,
when testifying, is to be cons-i dered as exercising his skill
.and learning in the healing art, which is hi high vocation ;
or tr.at a counsellor at law, in the same ituation, is exerting his talents and requirement · in profes. ionally investio·ating and upholding the rights of a client. If this were
Bo, each one hould be paid for hi ~ testimony ns a witne -.
1 53 Alabama, 3 "tJ .
2 Spr:igne'~ Deci~ions,
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as he is paid by clients, or patients, according to the impor-

tance of the case and his own established reputation for

ability and skill. But in truth he is not really employed or

retained by any person. And the evidence he is required

to give should not be given with the intent to take the part

of either contestant in the suit, but with a strict regard to

the truth, in order to aid the court to pronounce a correct

judgment." It is to be observed that this case was decided

two years prior to the case of Buchman v. The /State, in

which the right to extra compensation was grounded, not

upon the loss of time, upon which the Alabama court com-

ments disapprovingly, but upon the ground that professional

knowledge constitutes property of which he cannot be de-

prived without just compensation.

In 1879, the question came up before the Court of

Appeals of Texas in Summer v. State. 1 In this case,,

the defendant, being on trial for murder, the State called a

medical practitioner, one Dr. Spohn, who testified that he

had attended the deceased, and had made a post mortem ex-

amination, but declined to state the cause of his death. In
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his testimony he said: "I found the deceased breathing,

but unconscious ; had a contusion upon the left side of the

head, but no exterior evidence of fractured skull ; removed

the patient to town, and attended him until the next day,

when he died ; after death, made a post mortem examina-

tion, but I decline to state the cause of the man's death, as

my knowledge was obtained by professional skill and from

the deductions of experience, which I consider my own,

property, and which the county of Nueces has persistently

refused to pay for. I have no knowledge of the actual

cause of the man's death, save through the post mortem

examination alluded to." The trial court sustained this

refusal to disclose the knowledge thus acquired, upon the

ground that not having been paid, he could not be com-

pelled -to testify as to the same. But the Court of Appeals

viewed the matter in a different light, and expressed itself

1 5 Texas Court of Appeals, 374.

as he is paid by clients, or patients, according to the impor-·
tance of the case and his own established reputation for
ability and skill. But in truth he is not really employed o
retained by any person. And the evidence he is required
to give should not be given with the intent to take the part.
of either contestant in the suit, but with a strict regard to·
the truth, in order to aid the court to pronounce a correct
judgment." It is to be observed that this case was decided
two years prior to the case of Buchman v. Tlze State, in
which the right to extra compensation was grounded, not
upon the loss of time., upon which the Alabama court com-ments disapprovingly, but upon the ground that prof es ional
knowledge constitutes property of which he cannot be deprived without just compensation.
In 1879, the question came up before the Court of·
Appeals of Texas in Summe1· v. State. 1 In this case,.
the defendant, being on trial for murder, the State called a
medical practitioner, one Dr. Spohn, who testified that he
had attended the deceased, and had made a post mo1·tem examination, but declined to state the cau e of his death. In
his testimony he said: " I found the decea ed breathing,..
but unconscious; had a contusion upon the left side of thehead, but no exterior evidence of fractured skull; removed.
the patient to town, and attended him until the next day,.
when he died; after death, made a post mortem examination ; but I decline to state the cause of the man's death, a
my knowledge was obtained by professional skill and from
the deductions of expenence, which I con ider my own.
property, and which the county of Nueces has persi tently
refused to pay for.
I have no knowledge of the actual
cause of the ma.n's death, save through t~e post mortem.
examination alluded to." The trial court sustained thi
refusal to disclose the knowledge thus acquired, upon the
ground that not having been paid, he cou_ld not be compelled .to testify as to the same. But the Court of Appeals.
viewed the matter in a different· light, and expressed itself
1

5 Texas Court of Appeal , 374.
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as follows : " The court may compel a physician to testify

as to the result of a post mortem examination ; and it is to

be regretted that a member of a profession so distinguished

for liberal culture and high sense of honor and duty should

refuse to testify in a cause pending before the courts of his

country, involving the life and liberty of a fellow being, and

the rightful administration of the laws of a common coun-

try. Dr. Spohn has doubtless been misled, in taking the

position he did, by the misconception of certain writers on

medical jurisprudence."

The court then refers to Ex parte Dement, and concludes

as follows : " A medical expert could not be compelled to

make a post mortem examination unless paid for it ; but an

examination having already been made by him, he could be

compelled to disclose the result of that examination."

194. Extra Compensation Allowed in England. In

Betts v. Clifford, 1 Lord CAMPBELL declared that a scientific

witness, or expert, was not bound to attend upon being

served with a subpoena, and that he ought not to be sub-

poenaed. If the witness, however, knew any question of
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fact, he might be compelled to attend, but he could not be

compelled to attend to speak merely to matters of opinion.

The same distinction was also taken in Webb v. Page, 2

which was a case in which a witness had been called by the

plaintiff to testify as to the damage sustained by certain

cabinet work, and the expense necessary to restore or

replace the injured articles. The witness having demanded

compensation, Mr. Justice MAULE said : " There is a dis-

tinction between the case of a man who sees a fact, and is

called to prove it in a court of law, and a man who is

selected by a party to give his opinion on a matter on which

he is peculiarly conversant from the nature of his employ-

ment in life. The former is bound, as a matter of public

duty, to speak to a fact which happens to have fallen within

his own knowledge ; without such testimony the course of

justice must be stopped. The latter is under no such obli-

1 Warwick Lent Assizes, 1858.

2 1 Car. & K. 25.

~s

follows: " The court may compel a physician to testify
.as to the result of a post rnortern examination ; and it is to
be regretted that a member of a profession so distinguished
for liberal culture and high sense of honor and duty should
refuse to testify in a cause pending before the courts of his
·country, involving the life and liberty of a fellow being, and
the rightful administration of the laws of a common country. Dr. Spohn has doubtless been misled, in taking the
position he did, by the misconception of certain writers on
medical jurisprudence.''
The court then refers to E x parte D ement, and concludes
.as follows: "A medical expert could not be compelled to
make a post mortem examination unless paid for it; but an
examination having already been made by him, he could be
·compelled to disclose the result of that examination."
§ 194. Ext1·a Compensation Allowed in Eng'land.- In
Betts v. Uli.iJord, 1 Lord CAMPBELL declared that a scientific
-witness , or expert, was not bound to attend upon heing
served with a subprena, and that he ought not to be subpamaed. If the witness, however, knew any question of
.fact, he might be compelled to attend, but he could not be
compelled to attend to speak merely to matters of opinion.
'The same distinction was also taken in JiVebb v. Page,2
·which was a case in which a witness had been called by the
'plaintiff to testify as to the damage sustained by certain
·Cabinet work; and the expense necessary to restore or
Teplace the injured articles. The witness having demanded
·compensation, J\fr. ,Justice MAULE 8aid: "There is a distinction between the case of a man who ~ees a fact, and is
·called to prove it in a court of law, and a man who is
selected by a party to give his opinion on a matter on which
be is peculiarly conversant from the nature of his employment in life. The former is bound, as a mtltter of public
<luty, to speak to a fact which happens to have fallen within
his own knowledge ; without such testimony the course of
justice must· be stopped. The latter il5 un<lcr no such obliI

2

Warwick Lent A ssizes, 1858.
1 Car. & K. 25.
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gation ; there is no such necessity for his evidence, and the

party who selects him must pay him." According to these-

cases, therefore, an expert is under no obligation to testify

as to matters of opinion, at least in civil cases. If his tes-

timony is desired, the party desiring it must first render him

such compensation as his services are worth. It is also to-

be noticed that, in England, it has been held, in civil cases,,

at least, that a professional man, even though called' to tes-

tify to facts, and not to opinions, is entitled to extra com-

pensation on the higher scale allowed under the statute of

Elizabeth, 1 which provides that the witness must " have

gation; there is no such necessity for his evidence, .a nd the
party who selects him must pay him." According to the ecases, therefore, an expert is under no obligation to te tify_
as to matters of opinion, at least in civil cases. If his testimony is desired, the party desiring it mu t fir ~t render him
such compensation as his services are worth. It is also t(}
be noticed that, in England, it has been held, in civil ca es,.
at least, that a. professional man, even though called' to testify to facts, and not to opinions, is entitled to extra compensation on the higher scale allowed under the statute of
Elizabeth, 1 which provides that the witness mu t " have
tendered to . him, according to his countenance or calling,,
his reasonable charges." In a case decided in 1862, the
expenses of an attorney, called as a witness, but who did,
not give professional evidence, were allowed by the Mas!er,.
on the higher scale allowed professional witnesses. Thi&
allowance was held proper on motion to show cause, and
Mr. Chief Justice EARL said: "We do not approve of the
rule which is said to prevail in criminal cases, that if a sur-geon is called to give evidence not of a professional charac-ter he is only to have the expenses of an ordinary witness.
"\Ve think the Master was quite right in allowing the·
expenses of this witness on the higher scale.'' 2 S_o also in
Turnfr v. T u rner ,3 the same principle was applied by the.·
vice-chancellor in the case of a barrister. The theory
seems to be that the time of professional men is more valuable than the time of non-professional men, and that they
should be compensated accordingly. It has been suggested
that the rule is a, hard one, 4 and it may be considered doubtful whether it can stand the test of examination. It seem&
more correct to regard professional and scientific knowledgein the light of property which the public have no right to.
use without making a proper compensation.
~-

tendered to him, according to his countenance or calling,,

his reasonable charges." In a case decided in 1862, the

expenses of an attorney, called as a witness, but who did

not give professional evidence, were allowed by the Master,,

on the higher scale allowed professional witnesses. This

allowance was held proper on motion to show cause, and

Mr. Chief Justice EARL said : " We do not approve of the

rule which is said to prevail in criminal cases, that if a sur-

geon is called to give evidence not of a professional charac-
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ter he is only to have the expenses of an ordinary witness.

We think the Master was quite right in allowing the

expenses of this witness on the higher scale." 2 So also in

Turner v. Turner? the same principle was applied by the-

vice-chancellor in the case of a barrister. The theory

seems to be that the time of professional men is more valu-

able than the time of non-professional men, and that they

should be compensated accordingly. It has been suggested

that the rule is a hard one, 4 and it maybe considered doubt-

ful whether it can stand the test of examination. It seems

more correct to regard professional and scientific knowledge

in the light of property which the public have no right to-

use without making a proper compensation.

1 5 Eliz. c. 9.

2 Parkinson v. Atkinson, 31 L. J. (x. s.) C. P. 199.

3 5 Jur. (N. s.) 839.

4 See Lonergan v. Royal Exchange Assurance, 7 Blng. 725, 727; Col-

lins v. Godefroy, 1 Barn. & Adol. 930.

5 Eliz. e. 9.
Parkinson v. Atkinson, 31 L. J. ( ~ . s.) C. P. 199.
a 5 Jur. (N. s.) 39.
4 See Lonergan v. Royal Exchange As.,urance, 7 Blng. 725, 727; Collin s v. Godefroy, 1 Barn. & Adol. 930.
1
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195. Special Compensation to Experts Employed by

the State in Criminal Cases. And in the absence of ex-

press statutory provision authorizing it, it has been the

practice in many of the States, in criminal cases, to make a

proper compensation to the experts summoned by the gov-

ernment. As lawyers who are employed by the govern-

ment to assist in the prosecution of the criminal, receive a

special compensation, so the experts receive a special com-

pensation ; and this is allowed under certain statutory pro-

visions authorizing the allowance of accounts for necessary

services and expenses.

196. Special Compensation to Experts Summoned for

the Defence Paid out of the Public Treasury. The Su-

preme Court of Massachusetts, in 1870, had its attention

called to the right to allow the prisoner's counsel, in the

case of an indictment for murder, to tax as a part of the

costs to be paid out of the public treasury, extra compensa-

tion to the experts employed by him, as a part of the neces-

sary expense of the trial, and as such to be allowed under

the statutes referred to in the preceding section. As the
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question is an important one, we quote from the decision,

allowing such taxation, as follows :

" Whenever the prosecuting officer thinks the interests of

justice require it, we do not doubt that he is authorized, by

the statutes above mentioned, to employ experts to make

proper investigations for ascertaining the truth of a case,

and that it is proper for him in some capital cases to enable

the prisoner's counsel to make similar investigations, and

to procure the attendance of experts at the trial, if the pris-

oner is not able to do so ; and the court is authorized to

allow a reasonable compensation to such experts for their

services, both for attending the trial, and for their prior

investigations. This is not on the ground that the statute

has given to a prisoner the right to such aid at the expense

of the public treasury ; but on the ground that it is for the

interest of the Commonwealth, in the case then before the

court, that all proper investigations should be made, in

263

§ 1~5. Special Compensation to Experts Employed by
the State in Criminal Cases .-And in the absence of express statutory provision authorizing it, it has been the
practice in many of the States, ie criminal cases, to make a
proper compensation to the experts summoned by the government. As lawyers who are employed by the government to assist in the pro ·ecution of the criminal, receive a
special compensation, so the experts receive a special compensation ; and this is allowed under certain statutory provisions authorizing the allowance of accounts for neces ary
services and expen es.
§ 196. Special Compensation to Experts Summoned for
the Defence Paid out of the Public Treasury.-The Supreme Court of :Massachusetts, in 1870, had its attention
called to the right to allow the prisoner's counsel, in the
case of an indictment for murder, to tax as ~t part of the
costs to be paid out of the public treasury, extra compensation to the experts employed by him, as a part of the necessary expense of the tri.al, and as such to be allowed under
the statutes referred to in the preceding section. As the
question is an important one, we quote from the decision,
allowing such taxation, as follows:
'' ' iVhenever the prosecuting officer thinks the interests of
justice require it, we do not doubt that he is authorized, by
the statutes above mentioned, to employ experts to make
proper investigations for ascertaining the truth of a case,
and that it is proper for him in some capital cases to enable
the prisoner's counsel to make similar investigations, and
to procure the attendance of experts at the trial, if the prisoner is not able to do so; and the court is authorized to
allow a reasonable compensation to such experts for their
services, both for attending the trial, and for their prior
investigations. This is not on the ground that the statute
has given to a prisoner the right to such aid at the expense
of the public treasury; but on the ground that it is for the
interest of the Commonwealth, in the case then before the
court, that all proper investigations should be made, in
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order to guard against the danger of doing injustice to the

prisoner in a case where he is exposed to so great a penalty.

* * * We do not think the prosecuting officer or the

court would be authorized to allow the charges of all such

persons as the prisoner would have a right to employ as

experts at his own expense, without regard to their charac-

ter, or to the need of employing them in the case. But the

assent of the prosecuting officer should be obtained before-

hand to the employment of such experts as may be selected

and agreed upon, or, in the case of his refusal to assent,

application should be made to the court to appoint the

experts. This would be the more proper course of proceed-

ing, if the prisoner desires to have the experts called by

him paid out of the public treasury." l
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1 Attorney-General Petitioner, 104 Mass. 537.

order to guard against the danger of doing injustice to the
prisoner in a case where he is exposed to so great a penalty.
* * * vV e do not think the prosecuting officer or the
court would be authorized to allow the charges of all such
persons as the prisoner would have a right to employ as
experts at his own expense, without rega'r d to their character, or to the need of employing them in the case. But the
assent of the prosecuting officer should be obtained beforehand t-0 the employment of such experts as may be selected
and agreed upo1~, or, in the case of his refusal to assent,
application should be made to the court to appoint the
experts. This would be the more proper course of proceeding, if the prisoner desires to have the experts called by
·
him paid out of the public treasury." 1
i

Attorney- General Petitioner, 10-1 Mass. 537.

APPENDIX

OF THE OPINIONS OF THE COURTS AS TO THE VALUE OF

EXPERT TESTIMONY.

It has been considered advisable to note the opinions which have been

expressed on the value of expert testimony. Some of these opinions

refer to the value of such testimony in general, and are to be found in

appendix "A"'; others relate to the value of such testimony in the

investigation of handwriting, and are to be found in appendix " B" ; and

APPENDIX

others still refer to the value of the testimony of medical experts, and

are to be found in appendix "C".

While this work has been running through the press, a few additional

cases of value relating to expert testimony have appeared. References to

these cases will be found in apppendix "D", with references to the

appropriate sections in the body of the work.

OF THE OPINIONS OF THE COURTS AS TO THE VALUE OF
EXPERT TESTIMO:NY .

4i A." EXPERT TESTIMONY IN GENERAL.

Taylor on Evidence." Perhaps the testimony which least deserves

credit with a jury is that of skilled witnesses. These gentlemen are

usually required to speak, not to facts, but to opinions] and where this

is the case, it is often quite surprising to see with what facility, and to

what an extent, their views can be made to correspond with the wishes or

the interests of the parties who call them. They do not, indeed, wilfully
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misrepresent what they think, but their judgments become so warped by

regarding the subject in one point of view, that, even when conscien-

tiously disposed, they are incapable of expressing a candid opinion.

Being zealous partisans, their belief becomes synonymous with faith as

denned by the Apostle, and it too often is but 'the substance of things

hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.' " ( 58.)

And " as experts usually come with a bias on their minds to support

the cause on which they are embarked, little weight will, in general, be

attached to the evidence which they give, unless it be obviously based on

sensible reasoning." ( 1877.)

Best on Evidence. There is " no evidence the value of which varies so

immensely as that now under consideration, and respecting which it is

It has been considered advisable to note the opinions which have been
-expressed on the value of expert testimony. Some of these opinions
refer to the value of such teBtimony in general, and are to be found in
appendix "A"; others relate to the value of such testimony in the
investigation of handwriting, and are to be found in appendix" B"; and
others still refer to the value of the testimony of medical experts, and
are to be found in appendix "0".
While this work has been running through the press, a few additional
cases of value relating to expert testimony have appeared. References to
these cases will be found in apppendix "D", with references to the
appropriate sections in tJ;rn body of the work.
';A . "-EXPERT TESTIMONY IN GENERAL.

Trtylo r on E vidence .-" Pei·haps the testimony which least deserves
with a jury is that of skilled witnesses. These gentlemen are
usually required to speak, not to facts, but to opinions; and where this
.is the case, it is often quite surprising to see with what facility, and to
what an extent, their views can be made to correspond with the wishes or
the interests of the parties who call them . '!~hey do not, indeed, wi~fully
misrepresent what they think, but their jt'i.dgrnents become so warped by
regarding the subject in one point of view, that, even when conscientiously disposed, they are incapable of expressing a candid opinion.
Being zealous partisans, their belief becomes synonymous with faith as
defined by the Apostle, and it too often is but 'the substance of thing-s
hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.'" (§ 58.)
And " as experts usually come with a bias on their minds to support
the cause on which they are embarked, little weight will, in general, be
attached to the evidence which they give, unless it be obviously based on
sensible reasoning." (§ 1877.)
B est on Evidence.-There is "no evidence the value of which varies so
immensely as that now under consi<leration, and respecting which it is
~redit
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so difficult to lay down any rules beforehand. * * * It would not be

easy to over-rate the value of the evidence given in many difficult and

delicate inquiries, not only by medical men and physiologists, but by

learned and experienced persons in various branches of science, art and

trade, * * * and there can be no doubt that testimony is daily

received in our courts as 'scientific evidence,' to which it is almost

profanation to apply the term, as being revolting to common sense, and

inconsistent with the commonest honesty on the part of those by whom

it is given/' 514.

Bedfield on Wills. " Medical experts are beginning to be regarded

much in the light of hired advocates, and their testimony, as nothing

more than a studied argument in favor of the side for which they have

been called. So uniformly has this proved true, in our limited expe-

rience, that it would excite scarcely less surprise to tindan expert called

by one side, testifying in any particular, in favor of the other side, than

to find the counsel upon either side arguing against their clients, in favor

of their antagonists." Vol. I., p. 103.

Rolls Court of England. In a case where surve3 r ors were sworn as to

the value of certain real estate, the Master of the Rolls said: "I have

frequently had to comment upon the unsatisfactory nature of the evi-
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dence of value given by surveyors. Men of equal knowledge and

respectability are constantly found giving very contradictory evidence

on this subject, and always more or less favorable to the side on whose

behalf they are adduced. This probably is inevitable, but the conclu-

sion to which 1 hare been compelled to come is, that in all these cases, I

place very little reliance on the evidence of surveyors, who know before-

hand on which side their evidence is intended or desired to be used."

(Waters v. Thorn, 22 Beavan, 547, 556.)

Supreme Court of United States. In a case involving the infringement

of a patent, Mr. Justice Grier declares: '-Experience has shown that

opposite opinions of persons professing to be experts, may be obtained

to any amount; and it often occurs that not only many days, but even

weeks are consumed in cross-examinations, to test the skill or knowledge

of such witnesses, and the correctness of their opinions, wasting the

time and wearying the patience of both court and jury, and perplexing,

instead of elucidating the questions involved in the issue." (Winans v.

N. Y.,etc. R. R. Co., 21 How. 88, 101).

Supreme Court of Michigan.-*-" The experience of Courts with the tes-

timony of experts has not been such as to impress them with the convic-

tion that the scope of such proofs should be extended." (People v.

Morrigan, 29 Mich. 1, 8, per Campbell, J.)

Supreme Court of Maine. "Any one who has listened to the 'vain bab-

blings and oppositions of science so called,' which swell the record of

the testimony of experts when the hopes of a party depend rather upon

mystification than enlightenment, will see the wisdom of the rule (ex-

cluding opinions), and look carefully to the legitimacy of any exceptions

that may be offered." (State v. Watson, 65 Me, 74, per Barrows, J.)

And, " While the opinion of the experienced, skillful and scientific

witness, who has a competent knowledge of the facts involved in
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so difficult to lay down any rules beforehand. * * * It would not be
easy to over-rate the value of the evidence given in many difficult and
delicate inquiries, not only by medical men and physiologists, but by
learned and experienced persons in various branches of science art and
trade, * * * and there can be no doubt that te timony is daily
receiYed in our courts as 'scientific evidence,' to which it i a.Imo t
profanation to apply the term, as being revolting to common sense, and
incon sistent with the commonest honest.yon the part of tho e by whom
it is given." § 514.
R edfield on Wills.-" Medical experts are beginning to l>e regarded
much in the light of hired advocates, and their testimony, as nothing
more than a studied argument in favor of the ide for which they have
been called. Ro uniformly has this proved trne, in our limited experience, that it would excite scarcely less surprise to find an expert called
by one side, testifying in any particular, in favor of the other side, than
to :find the counsel upon either side arguing again t their client , in favor
of their antagonists." Vol. I., p. 103.
Rolls Coiirt of England.- In a case ,,·here urveyors were worn a to
the value of certain real estate, the Master of the Rolls said: "I have
frequently bad to comment upon the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence of value give'n by surveyors. Men of equal knowledge and
respectability are constantly found gil'ing very contradictory evidence
on this subject: and always more or les favorable to the side on whose
behalf they are adduced. 'l' his probably i inevitable, but the conclusion to which 1 ha Te been compelled to come i.,, that in all these cases, I
place very little reliance on the evidence of surveyors, who know beforehand on which side their evidence is intended or desired to be used."
(Waters v. Thorn, 22 Beavan, 547, 556.)
Suprerne Coiirt of U1tited States.-In a case involving the infringement
of a patent, Mr. Jsstice Grier declare~: '·Experience has shown that
opposite opinions of persons professing to be e:xpert , may be obtained
to any amount; and it often occurs that not only many days, but even
weeks are consumed in cross-examinations, to test the skill or knowledge
of such witnesses, and the correctne s of their opinions: "asting the
time and wearying the patience of both court and jury, and perplexiu.g,
instead of elucidating the questions involved in the issue." (Winans v.
N. Y., etc. R.R. Co., 21 How. 8, 101).
S.uprerne 0011.rt of Michigan.~" 'l'he experience of Court with the testimony of experts bas not been such as to impress them with the conviction that the scope of iuch proofs should be extended." (Peopl9 v.
Morrigan, 29 Mich. 1, 8, per Campbell, J.)
Sup1·eme Court of Maine.-"Any one who has listened to the 'vain babblings and oppositions of science so calltd,' which swell the record of
the testimony of experts when tbe hopes of a party depend rather upon
mystifiea~ion than enlightenment, will see the wisdom of the rule (excluding opinions), and look carefully to the legitimacy of any exceptions
that may be offered." (Statev. 1Vatson, 65 Me, 74, per Barrows, J.)
And, " While the opinion of the experience¢!, skillful and spientific
witne. ~, who bas a competent knowledge of the facts ilwolved in
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the case on which he speaks, affords essential aid to courts and juries^

that of unskillful pretenders, quacks and mountebanks, who at times,

assume the character of experts, not unfrequently serves to becloud

and lead to erroneous conclusions. The rules under which this class of

testimony is received should not, in my opinion, be relaxed. Such, I

believe, would be the judgment of every intelligent person who has had

any considerable experience in courts of justice." (Heald v. Thing, 45

Me. 392, 398, per Rice, J.)
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the case on which he speaks, affords essential aid to courts and juries,.
that of unskillful pretenders, quacks and mountebanks, who at time ,
assume the character of experts, not unfrequently serves to becloud.
and lead to erroneous conclusions . The rnles under which this cla s of
testimony is received should not, in my opinion, be relaxed. Such, I
believe, would be the judgment of every intelligent person who has had
any consi<.lerable experience in conrts of justice." (Heald v. Thing, -15
~Ie. 392, 398, per Rice , J.)

Enfjlish and Scotch Courts. Lord Campbell, speaking in the House of

Lords, declares: "Hardly any weight is to be given to the evidence of

1

•
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what are called scientific witnesses; they come with a bias on their

minds to support the cause in which they are embarked." (Tracy Peer-

age, 10 Cl. & Fin. 154, 191.)

And Lord President Boyle in the Scotch courts says : "A set of engra-

vers have b^en examined on both sides, to whose testimony I pay very

little attention, as their opinions are very little to be depended upon. In

this as in all other cases they take different sides. It seems to be a part

of their profession to take different sides." (Turnbull v. Dods, G Dun-

lop, 901.)
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Michigan Supreme Court. " Every one knows how very unsafe it is to-

rely upon any one's opinions concerning the niceties of penmanship.

The introduction of professional experts has only added to the mischief,

instead of palliating it, and the results of litigation have shown that

these are often the merest pretenders to knowledge, whose notions are

pure speculation. Opinions are necessarily received, and may be valu-

able, but at best this kind of testimony is a necessary evil. Those who

have had personal acquaintance with the handwriting of a person, are

not always reliable in their views, and single signatures, apart from some

known surroundings, are not always recognized by the one who made

them. Every degree of removal beyond personal knowledge, into the

domain of what is sometimes called, with great liberality, scientific

opinion, is a step toward greater uncertainty, and the science which is

so generally diffused is of very moderate value." (Foster's Will, 34

Mich. 21, 25.)

Supreme Court of District of Columbia. u The signatures of these

papers are claimed not to be genuine, and here we are treated to the

opinion of half a dozen men who claim to be experts, ami who come up-

and give us their views as to the genuineness of these signatures. Of

all kinds of evidence admitted in a court, this is the most unsatisfactory.

It is so weak and decrepit as scarcely to deserve a place in our system of

jurisprudence." And, notwithstanding the evidence of the experts, the

court declared that it was satisfied as to the genuineness of the signa-

tures. (Cowan v. Beall, 1 McArthur, 270, 274.)

Supreme Court of Vermont, " It would be trite to repeat the very uni-

form expression of judges and the books as to the small value of this

kind of evidence, yet it is warrantable to say that such expression i&

Enijlish and Scotch Courts.-Lord Campbell, speaking in the House of
Lords, declares: "Hardly any weight is to be given to the evidenee of
what are called tscientific witnesses; they come with a bias on their
minds to support the cause in which they are embarked." (Tracy PeerR.ge, 10 Cl. & Fin. 15-1, 191.)
And Lord President Boyle in the Scotch courts says: "A set of engravers have b en examined on bot.Ji sides, to whose testimony I pay very
little attention, as their opinions are very little to be depended upon. In
this as in all other cases they take different sides. 1t seems to be a part
of their profession to take different sides." (Turnbull v. Dods, G Dunlop, 901.)
Michi{Jan Supreme Court.-" Every one knows how very unsafe it is to.
rely upon any one's opinions concerning the niceties of penmanship.
The introduction of professional experts has only acl<led to the mischief,
instead of palliating it, and the results of litigation have shown that
these arc often the merest pretenders to knowledge, \\'hose notions are
pure i"pecnlation . Opinions are necessarily received, and may be valuable, but at best this kind of testimony is a necessary evil. Those \Yho
have had personal acquaintance with the handwriting of a person, are
not always reliable in their views, and single signn.tures, apart from some
known surroundings, are not always recognized by the one who made
them. Every degree of removal beyond personal ktiO\"l'ledge , into the
domain of what is sometimes called, with great liberality, scientific
opinion, is a step toward greater uncertainty, and the science which is
so generally diffused is of very moderate yalue. n (Foster's ·wm, 3±
:Mich. 21, 25.)
Supreme Co7trt of District of Columbia.-" The signatures of these
papers are claimed not to be genuine, and here we are treated to the
opinion of half a dozen men who claim to be experts, and who come up.
and give us their views as to the genuineness of these signatures. Of
all kinds of evidence admitted in a court, this is the most unsatisfactory.
It is so weak and decrepit as scarcely to deserve a place in on,r system of
jurisprudence." And, not\Yithstanding the evidence of the experts, the
court declared that it was satisfied as to the genuineness of the signatures. (Cowan v. Beall, 1 McArthur, 270, 274.)
Supreme C01irt of V ermont.-" It would be trite to repeat the very uniform expression of judges and tlle books as to the small value of this.
kind of evidence, yet it is warrantable to my that such expression i
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corroborated by our own observation and experience in judicial admin-

istration." (Wright v. Williams' Estate, 47 Vt. 222, 234.) In an earlier

case the same court had declared such evidence to be of "but little weight,

AS proof of the disputed fact." (Pratt v. Rawson, 40 Vt. 183, 188.)

United States Circuit Court. " Whether the signatures appear to be

done by the same hand, that, I think, is a question you can put to an

expert. Though the testimony is of rather a dangerous character, and

not much to be relied on." (Grier, J., in U. S. v. Darnaud, 3 Wall. Jr.

143, 183.) And, " Opinions with regard to handwriting are the weakest

and least reliable of all evidence as against direct proof of the execution

of an instrument." (Grier, J., in Turner v. Hand, 3 Wallace Jr., 88,

115.)

Supreme Court of Indiana. "Experience shows that the opinions of

persons of skill, are often more reliable than the judgment of those who

speak from knowledge of having seen the party write.'' (Chance v. In-

dianapolis, etc. R. R. Co., 32 Ind. 472, 474.)

New Jersey Court of Chancery. All doubt respecting the competency

of the opinion of experts in handwriting, based upon mere comparison,

as evidence, have been removed by statute; but it still must be esteemed

proof of low degree. Very learned judges have characterized it as
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much too uncertain, even when only slightly opposed, to be the founda-

tion of a judicial decision." (Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Brown,

30 N. J. Eq. 193, 201.)

Supreme Court of Mississippi. Declares that the evidence of experts

in handwriting "ought to be received and weighed cautiously by the

jury," but adds: "An eye practiced in judging writings, may, at a

glance, detect irregularities or counterfeits about it, which would en-

tirely escape notice or detection from an unpracticed eye. * * To

shut out the evidence which might be afforded by skilful persons in the

art of writing, would be almost equivalent to saying that the law had

provided no means by which well executed forgeries could be detected,

and they must, therefore, be respected as genuine." (Moye v. Herndon,

30 Miss. 118.)

Supreme Court of Iowa. The opinion of this court on the value of

expert testimony in handwriting, may be found on page 63 of this work.

"C." THE TESTIMONY OF MEDICAL EXPERTS.

The Supreme Courts of North Carolina, of Texas and of Pennsylvania.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina says : " The opinion of a well

instructed and experienced medical man upon a matter within tho scope

of his profession, and based on personal observation and knowledge, is

and ought to be carefully considered and weighed by the jury in render-

ing their verdict." (Flynt v. Bodenhamer, 80 N. C. 205.)

The Supreme Court of Texas, in a case involving a person's sanity,

·Corroborated by our own observation and experience in judicial administration." (Wright v . Williams' Estate, 47 Vt. 222, 234.) In an earlier
case the same court had declared snch evidence to be of "but little weight,
.as proof of the disputed fact." -(Pratt v. Rawson, 40 Vt. 183, 188.)
United States Circuit Court.-'' ·w hether the signatures appear to be
done by the same hand, that, I think, is a question you can put to an
·expert. Though the testimony is of rather a dangerous character, and
not much to be relied on." (Grier, J., in U. S. v. Darnaud, 3 Wall. Jr.
143, 183.) And, "Opinions with regard. to handwriting are the weake t
and least reliable of all evidence as against direct proof of the execution
-of an instrument." (Grier, J., in 'furner v. Hand, 3 ·wallace Jr., 88,
115.)
Supreme Court of Indiana.-" Experience shows that the opinions of
persons of skill, are often more reliable than the judgment of those who
.s peak fro111 knowledge of having seen the party write.n (Chance v. Indianapolis, etc. :R. R. Co., 32 Ind. 472, 474.)
New Jersey Court of Chancery.-All doubt r0specting the conipetency
of the opinion of experts in handwriting, based upon mere comparison,
.-as evidence, have been removed by statute; but it still mu t be esteemed
proof of low degree. Very learned judges have characterized it as
much too uncertain, even when only slightly opposed, tQ be the foundat ion of a judicial decision." (Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Brown,
30 N. J. Eq. 198, 201.)
Supreme Co1,t1·t of Mississippi.-Declares that the evidence of experts
in handwriting "ought to be received and weighed cautiously by the
jury," but adds: "An eye practiced in judging writings, may, at a
glance, detect irregularities or counterfeits about it, which would entirely escape notice or detection from an unpracticed eye. * * To
.shut out the evidence which migkt be afforded by skilful persons in the
:art of writing, would be almost equivalent to saying that the law had
provided no means by which well executed forgeries coul<l be detected,
.and they must, th refo1ie, be respected as genuine." (Moye v. Herndon,
30 Mi ss. ll8.)
Supreme Court of Iowa.-'I'he opinion of this court on the value of
·expert testimony in handwriting, may be found on page 63 of this work.

declares : " The opinions of medical men are received with great respect

and consideration, and properly so." (Thomas v. State, 40 Texas, 65.)

To the same effect is the language of the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-

"C. "-THE

TESTIMONY 01!~ l\IEDICAL EXPERTS.

vania: "It is well settled," says that court, " that the knowledge and

The Sup1·eme GoU1·ts of N01·th Carolina, of Texas and of Pennsylvania..The Supreme Uonrt of North Carolina says: '.'The opinion of a well
instructed and experienced medical man upo11 a matter within tho scope
-0f his profession, and based on personal observation and knowledge, is
and ·ought to be carefully considered and weighed by the jury in rendering their verdict." (Flynt v. Bodenhamer, 80 N. C. 205.)
The Supreme Court of Texas, in a case involving a person~s sanity,
declares : "The opinions of medical men are received with great respect
.and consideration, .and properly so." Cfhomas v. State, 40 T exas, 65.)
To the same effect is the htnguage of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: "It is well settled'" says that court, "that the knowledge and

APP~NDIX.
APPENDIX. 269

experience of medical experts is of great value in questions of insanity."

(Pannell v. Commonwealth, 86 Penn. St. 260.)

The Court of Appeals of West Virginia. In a case which involved the

mental capacity of a grantor to make a valid deed, said : " The evidence

of physicians, especially those who attended the grantor, and were with

him considerably during the time it is charged he was of unsound mind,

is entitled to great weight." (Jarrett v. Jarrett, 11 W. Va. 627.)

St. Louis Court of Appeals. In Slais v. Slais, 9 Mo. App. 96, it is said

that the testimony of a physician as to the insanity of a person he did

not know at the time, is entitled to but little weight.

TTie Supreme Court of Mississippi, says : " Prominent among the testi-

mony made use of at this stage of investigation (a dead body having

been found, to show death was caused by criminal act) , is that of medical

and scientific persons, surgeons, physicians and chemists, by whom the

body or its remains have been inspected or examined either at the time

of their discovery or shortly after. The testimony of these witnesses, as

to the appearances observed on such examinations is always of the

greatest value, and their opinions as to the causes of such appearances

are entitled to much consideration." (Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472, 480.)'

The Supreme Court of Georgia, speaking of the value of expert testi-
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mony in cases of insanity, says : " As it respects this species of testimony

generally, the doctrine is this : It is competent testimony, and where

the experience, honesty, and impartiality of the witnesses are undeni-

able, as in this case, the testimony is entitled to great weight and con-

sideration. Xot that it is so authoritative, that the jury are bound to

be governed by it it is intended to aid and assist the jury i coming to-

correct conclusions." (Choice v. State. 31 Ga. 424, 481.)

In the same case, Mr. Justice Lumpkin, speaking for himself, says :

'As for myself, I would rely as implicitly upon the opinion of practi-

cal men, who form their belief from their observation of the appearance,

conduct and conversation of a person, as I would upon the opinions of

physicians, who testify from facts proven by others, or the opinions even,

of the keepers of insane hospitals." (p. 466.)

The Supreme Court of Ohio, in a criminal case involving the sanity of a

person on trial for murder, said : " It would be but a farce to try such a

question upon the strength of medical opinions, and to regard the weight

of evidence always on the side which produced the greatest numbers^

Sir John Xicholl, in Evans v. Knight,! Add. 239, observes that 'experi-

ence in the ecclesiastical courts taught him that evidence on questions

of capacity, being commonly that of opinion merely, was almost always

contradictory.' * * * The difficulties witnessed by Sir J. Xicholl,.

almost always occur when the opinions of physicians are required in

cases of medical jurisprudence. Whenever they have enlisted on the

side of either party, or of some favorite theory, and one portion of the

profession is placed in array against another, the difficulties mentioned

in the passage above quoted, are greatly multiplied, and, however honest

or renowned for professional character the witnesses may be, such will be

the conflict of their testimony, in nine cases out of ten, that it will be

utterly unsafe for a jury or court to follow, or adopt, the conclusions oi
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experience of medical experts is of great value in que ti on ~ of insanity.
(Pannell v. Commonwealth, 86 Penn. St. 260.)
The Court of Appeals of West Virginia.- In a ca e which involved themental ca;>acity of a grantor to make a valid deed , said: "The evidence
of physicians, especially those who llttended the grantor, and were with
him considerably during the time it is charged he was of un ound mind
is entitled to great weight." (Jarrett v. Jarrett, 11 W. Va. 627.)
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be governed by it-it is intended to aid and assist the jury in coming to·
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In the same case, Mr. Justice Lumpkin speaking for himself, say :
"As for myself, I would rely as implicitly upon the opinion of practical men, who form their belief from their observation of the appearance,.
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-either side. * * * Medical testimony is of too much importance to

be disregarded. * * * When delivered with caution, and without

bias in favor of either party, or in aid of some speculation and favorite

theory, it becomes a salutary means of preventing even intelligent juries

from following a popular prejudice, and deciding a cause on inconsistent

and unsound principles. But it should be given with great care and

received with the utmost caution, and, like the opinions of neighbors and

acquaintances, should be regarded as of little weight, if not well sus-

tained by reasons and facts that admit of no misconstructions, and sup-

ported by authority of acknowledged credit. 1 ' (Clark v. State, 12 Ohio,

483.)

The Supreme Court of Illinois. In 1875, the Supreme Court of Illinois

-either side. * * * Medical testimony is of too much importance to
be disregarded. * * * ·when delivered with caution, and without
bias in favor of either party, or in aid of some speculation and favorite
theory, it becomes a salutary means of pr~venting even tntelligent juries
from following a popular prejudice, and deciding a cause on inconsistent
and unsound principles. '.But it should be given with great care and
received with the utmost caution, and, like the opinions of neighbors and
.acquaintances, should be regarded as of little weight, if not well su tained by reasons and facts that admit of no misconstructions, :rnd sup ported by authority of acknowledged credit." (Clark v. 8tate, 12 Ohio,

said : "These doctors were summoned by the contestants as ' experts,'

for the purpose of invalidating a will deliberately made by a man quite

as competent as either of them to do such an act; they were the contest-

ants' witnesses and so considered themselves, Dr. Bassett especially,

whose sole testimony is pregnant with such indications. The testimony

of such is worth but little, and should always be received by juries and

courts with great caution. It was said by a distinguished judge, in a case

before him, If there was any kind of testimony not only of no value, but
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even worse than that, it was, in his judgment, that of medical experts.

They may be able to state the diagnosis of the disease more learnedly,

but, upon the question, whether.it had, at a given time, reached such a

stage that the subject of it was incapable of making a contract, or irre-

sponsible for his acts, the opinions of his neighbors, if men of good com-

mon sense, would be worth more than that of all the experts in the coun-

trv. * * * It must be apparent to every one, but few wills could

stand the test of the fanciful theories of dogmatic witnesses, who bring

discredit on science, and make the name of ' expert ' a by-word and a

reproach. We concur with the judge above referred to; we would not

give the testimony of these common sense witnesses, deposing to what

they know and saw almost every day for years, for that of so-called

experts, who always have some favorite theory to support men often as

presumptuous as they are ignorant of the principles of medical science.,"

(Rutherford v. Morris, 77 111. 397, 404.)

And the same court in a subsequent case of Carpenter v. Calvert, S3 111.

62, 70, expressed itself in somewhat similar language.

The Scotch Courts. The London Lancet, said to be the most eminent

medical journal in the world, says in a .recent issue: "Several cases

which have recently been considered in the higher courts of Scotland

have brought into unfortunate prominence the diversity of opinion

regarding the cases in dispute so frequently manifested, even by the

most distinguished members of our profession. A few months ago, in a

murder trial at Aberdeen, the most contradictory opinions regarding the

mental condition of the culprit were expressed, and Lord Deas signified

his unwillingness to have his mental condition investigated by one of

these medical men, evidently fearing that he himself might be incarcer-

ated." And it quotes Lord Frazer as saying in another case that : " The

evidence was a? unsatisfactory as any he had seen. It left on the mind

483.)

The Supreme Court of Illinois .-In 1875, the Supreme Court of Illinois
s aid: "These doctors were summoned by the contestants as ' experts,'
for the purpose of invalidating a will deliberately made by a man quite
.as competent as either of them to do such an act; they were the c·o ntestants' witnesses and so considered themselves, Dr. Bassett especially,
whose sole testimony is pregnant with such indications. The testimony
of such is worth but little, and should always be received by juries and
-conrts with great caution. It was said by a distinguished judge, in a case
before him, if there was any kind of testimony not only of uo value, but
-even worse than that, it was, in his judgment, that of medical experts.
They may be abl~ to state the diagnosis of the disease more learnedly,
but, upon the question, whether.it had, at a given time, reached such a
stage that the subject of it was incapable of making a contract, or irresponsible for his acts, the opinions of his neighbors, if men of good common sense, would be worth more than that of all th,e experts in the countrv. * * * It must be apparent to every one, but few wills could
stand the test of the fanciful theories of dogmatic witnesses who bring
discredit on science, and make the name of 'expert' a by- word and a
reproach . We concur with the judge above referred to; we would not
_give the testimony of these common sense witne ses, deposing to what
they know and saw almost every day for years, for that of so -called
exp erts, who always have some favorite theory to support- men often as
presumptuous as they are ignorant of the principles of medical science.,"
(Rutherford v. Morris, 77 Ill. 397, 40-!.)
And the same court in a subsequent case of Carp enter v. Galve1·t, 83 Ill.
62, 70, expressed itself in somewhat similar language.
The Scotch Oonrts.-The London Lancet, said to be the most eminent
medical journal in the world, says in a xecent issue : "Several cases
which have recently been considered in the higher courts of Scotland
have brought into unfortunate prominence the diver ity of opinion
Tegarding the cases in dispute so frequently manifested, even by the
most distinguished members of our profession. A few months ago, in a
murder trin.1 at Aberdeen, the most contradictory opinions re~arding the
rpental condition of the culprit were expres!i'ed, and Lord Deas signified
Ms nnwillingness to have his mental condition investigated by one of
these medical men, evidently
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that be himself mio·ht
be incarcer•
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ated." And it quotes Lord Frazer as saying in another case that : ' The
€videnee was a~ l111Satisfaetory as any he had seen. It left on the mind
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the distressing impression, that the science of medicine was simply the

science of guessing and experts. Different doctors with equal confi-

dence and equal dogmatism, expressed contrary opinions upon the same

condition of things. He advised the jury to exercise their common

sense, throw overboard the medical opinions, and go by the facts." (See

15 Central Law J. Gl, July 28th. 1882.)

'I)." ADDITIONAL CASES.

the distres::;ing impre::; iou that the science of medicine wa · imply the
·cience of guessing and expert:-- . Different doctors " ·ith equal confidence and equal dogmati m, expressed contrary opinions upon the same
condition of things. He advised the jury to exercise their common
ense, throw overboard the medical opinions, and go by the fa cts." (See
15 Central Law J. Gl, July 28th. 1 2.)

8. Upon a trial for murder an expert testified that certain hair

which was found on a wheelbarrow and that taken from the skull of the

,; D . ''-ADDITIO

TAL CA E '".

deceased, was from the head of the same person. His conclusion was

reached not from any scientific tests, but from the length, magnitude

§

. Upon a trial for murder an expert te titied that certain lia.ir

and color. It was held that the comparison made required no peculiar

skill nor scientific knowledge, "it was no more in the province of an

expert than of an ordinary person to make it. It related to a matter of

common observation," and the opinion was inadmissible. (Sup. Ct. of

Wisconsin, June, 1882, Knoll v. State, 14 The Reporter, 381.)

75. In an action to recover for personal injuries caused by the

negligence of the defendant, the court has power to require the plaintiff

to submit his person to an examination by physicians and surgeons. On

his refusal to comply with the order, the court may dismiss; the action,
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or refuse to allow him to give evidence to establish the injury. The ap-

plication for an order to submit to such an examination ought to be so

made as not unnecessarily to prolong the trial, or to prejudice the plain-

tiff in proving his case. When the application is not made until after

the close of the plaintiff's evidence in chief, and the commencement of

the introduetion.of the defendant's evidence, and no reason is shown for

the delay in the application, it may be refused on that ground.

And it is not error to refuse to charge the jury that the refusal of the

plaintiff " at any time after the close of the testimony on his behalf '" to sub-

mit to an examination, affords a presumption against him. The refusal

of the trial court to order an examination will not be presumed to have

been made on the ground of a want of power to make the order, but in

the absence of a showing to the -contrary, on the ground that, under the

circumstances, the order ought not to have been granted. (Turnpike

Co. v. Baily, 37 Ohio St. 104.)

31. A question calling for the opinion of a physician as to whether

certain specified symptoms in connection with other testimony (not speci-

fied), indicated unsound mind, is held improper as referring to other

testimony without specifying what the other testimony was. (Storer's

Will, 28 Minn. 9.)

48. The opinion of an expert physician derived from statements of

the patient of present feelings and pains, and of present bodily condition

is held admissible, and he may give in evidence such statements. But

his opinion based upon the patient's past experience er history of the case

is inadmissible, and he cannot give such past statements in evidence.

(Railroad Company v. Frazier. tl Kans. 463.)

which wa s found on a wheelbarrow and that taken from the skull of the
decP,ased, was from the head of the same pergon . His concln ion was
reached not from any scientific te ts, but from the length, magnitude
a.nd color. It was held that the comparison made required no peculiar
s kill nor scientific knowledge. "It was no more in the province of an
expert than of an ordinary person to make it. It related to a matter of
common observation," arnl the opinion 'va ~ inadmissible. (Sup . Ct. of
·w isconsin, June, 1 82, Knoll v. State, H 'l'he Reporter, 3 1.)
§ 75. In an action to recover for per onal injuries cau eel by the
negligence of the defendant, the court has power to require the plaintiff
to ubmit his person to an examination by physicians and surgeons. On
his refusal to comply with the order, the court may dismis · the action,
or refuse to allow him to give evidence to establish the injury. The application for an order to submit to uch an examination ought to be i::o
m~ule as not unneces arily to prolong the trial, or to prejudice the plaintiff in proving his case. ·when the application is not made until after
the close of the plaintiff's evidence in chief, antl the commencement of
the introduction.of the defendant's evidence, and no rea on is hown for
the delay in the application, it may be refn ed on that ground.
Aud it is not error to refuse to charge the jury thn.t the refusal of the
plaintiff "at any time afte1· the close of the testimony on his behalf" to sub mit to an examination, afford a presumption again t him. The refusal
of the trial cou rt to order an examination will not be presumed to have
been made on the ground of a want of power to make the order, but in
the abse nce of a bowing to the contrary, on the ground that, under the
circumstances, the order ought not to have been granted.
(Turnpike
. Co. v. Baily, 37 Ohio St. 10-!.)
§ 31. A que ' tion calling for the opinion of a pby ician as to whether
certain specified symptoms in connection with other te timony (not speci fied), indicated unsound mind, i held improper a referring to other
te timony v.·ithout specifying what the other testimony wav. (Storer'
Will, 28 :Minn. 9.)
§ 48 . The opinion of an expert phriciau derived from tatement°' of
the patient of present feelin,g s and pain ~ , and of present bodily condition
is h eld admissible, and he may giye in evidence such statements. But
his opinion based upon the patient's pa t e:x:perience <:>r hi ' tory of the ca e
i s inadmi sible, and he cannot give such pa t ~ tatement in evidence.
(Railroad Company v. Frazier. '27 Kan . 463.)
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127. The opinions of witnesses who kad been in the ice business for

several years, were held admissible to show what per cent, of waste from

melting, etc., there would be, the ice being properly handled and man-

aged. (Sexton v. Lamb, 27 Kans. 426.)

38. The jury are to exercise an independent judgment, and give such

weight to the expert testimony as they deem it worth. And in an action

for legal services, the opinions of attorneys as to their value is not to

preclude the jury from exercising their own ideas and knowledge upon

the subject. (Knapp v. Monell, (N. Y. Sup. Ct.), 15 Cent. Law J., 281;.

155. A dealer in clocks may testify as to the value of a clock which

he has not seen, but has heard described. The fact that he has not seen

the clock does not go to his competency, but only to the weight to be
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attached to his testimony. (Whiton v. Snyder, 88 N. Y. 299, 308).

§ 127. The opinions of witne~ses who had been in the ice business fo1~
several years,, were held admissible to show what per cent. of waste from
melting, etc., there would be, the ice being properly handled and managed. (Sexton v. Lamb, 27 Kans. 426.)
§ 38. The jury are to exercise an independent judgment, aad give such
weight to the expert testimony as they deem it worth. And in an action
for legal services, the opinions of attorneys as to their value is not to
preclude the jury from exercising their own ideas and knowledge upon
the subject. (Knapp v. Monell, (N. Y. Sup. Ct.), 15 Cent. Law J., 281) ..
§ 155. A dealerin clocks may testify as to the value of a clock which
he has not seen, but has heard described. The fact that he has not seen
the clock does not go to his competency, but only to the weight to beattached to his testimony. (Whiton v. Snyder, 88 N. Y. 299, 308).

INDEX-

figures refer to the pages.

ABORTION.

opinions of medical experts as to, 95.

ABSTRACT QUESTIONS OP SCIENCE.

when opinions as to are inadmissible, 19.

ACCIDENT.

whether anything could have been done to prevent, 48. 142, 14C.

opinion as to severity of injury by a railroad, 71, n. 2.

whether wound was inflicted by, 84.

ACCOUNTANT.

computations made by, 172.

opinion as to compensation for services of, 22G.

opinion of as to average duration of life, 231.

ACTUARIES.

opinion of as to value of an annuity, 230.

ADMLSSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY. See INAUMISSIBIL-

ITY OF OPINIONS.

the practice of admitting expert testimony an ancient one, 3.

\\hen such testimony is admissible, 8, 12.

inadmissible, 12-21.
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when admissible on questions of medical science, 68, 117.

of legal science, 118, 140.

relating to the trades and arts, 141.

relating to handwriting, 176.

to the value of property, 208.

ADULTERATION OF MILK.

opinion as to, 154.

AGE.

opinion as to by non-professional witnesses. 6.

opinion as to by professional witnesses, 155.

udmissibility of stand.ird tables ol mortality to show expectation of

life at a particular age, 231.

(18)
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ALABAMA.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 129.

ALMANACS.

admissibility of, in evidence, 236.

ANIMALS.

who are qualified to testify as to diseases in. 116.

ANNUITIES.

testimony as to the value of, 230.

AECHITECT.

opinion as to the employment of, 162.

work done on a buildiBg, 173.

value of houses, 220, 221.

ARGUMENT.

reading from scientific books in, 248, 251.

ARKANSAS.

statutory provision as to verification of written law. 129.

ART.

definition of the term, 12.

ART AND SKILL.

opinions of experts received on questions of, 12.
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ARTIST.

opinion of as to genuineness of painting, 163.

as to the value of a portrait, 218.

ASSUMING THE EXISTENCE OF FACTS.

right of counsel as to, in framing the hypothetical question, 39.

when the opinion of the expert must be asked on assumed stute of

facts, 39.

when it need not be, 43.

doctrine as to, on the cross-examination, 46.

ATTORNEY. See LAWYERS.

AUTHOR.

opinion as to the value of a literary production, 218.

13.

BANKERS.

opinion of as to genuineness of bank notes, 205.

an inadmissible opinion of, 15.

testimony of as to usage, 170.

BANK NOTES.

detection of counterfeits, 205.

statutory provisions as to proof of genuineness, 206.

BANK NOTE DETECTORS.

such books are inadmissible in evidence. 205.

ALABAMA.
statutory provision ns to verification of written law, 129.
ALMANACS.
admissibility of, in evidence, 236.
ANIMALS.
who are qualified to testify as to dise~es in, 116.
ANXUITIES.
testimony as to the value of, 230.
ARCHITECT.
opinion as to the employment of, 162.
work done on a buildisg, 173.
value of houses, 220, 221.
ARGUMENT.
rPading from scientific books in, 248, 251.
ARKANSAS.
statutory provision as to verification of written law, 129.
ART.
~ definition of the term, 12.
ART AND SKILL.
opinions of expert received on question of, 12.
ARTIST.
opinion of as to genuineness of painting, 163.
as to the value of a porti·_a it, 218.
ASSUMING THE EXISTENCE OF FACTS.
right of counsel as to, in framing the hypothetical question, 39.
when the opinion of the expert must be asked on assumed stute of
facts, 39.
when it need not be, 43.
doctrine as to, on the cross-examination, 46.
· ATTORNEY. See LAWYERS .
AUTHOR.
opinion as to the value of a literary production, 21

B.

, .

BANKERS.
opinion of as to genuineness of bank notes, 205.
an inadmissible opinion of, 15.
testimony of as to usage, 170.
BANK NOTES.
detection of counterfeits, 205.
statutory provisions as to proof of genuineness, 206.
BANK NOTE DETECTORS.
such books are inadmis ible in

evide nce~

205.

!~DEX .
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BLOOD STAINS.

expert testimony as to, 111-113.

testimony of non-professional witnesses as to, 113.

proper questions to experts concerning, 114.

BOOKS OF SCIENCE.

their relation to expert testimonj-, 234.

their admissibility in evidence, 236.

medical treatises inadmissible as evidence, 237.

whether a witness is qualified as an expert by a st udy of, 28.

the admissibility of opinions based on, 29.

BRAKE MAX.

inadmissible opinion of, as to switching cars. 14.

opinion as to proper place of, 147.

BRASS FINISHERS.-

opinion of, 161.

BRICK-MAKER.

opinion of as to mode of burning tiles, 173.

BRICK MASON".

opinion of, 1G2.

BROKERS.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 20:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t71v5cx5m
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

an inadmissible opinion of, 15.

opinion of, as. to course of business, 109.

opinion of, as to counterfeit bank notes, 206.

opinion of, as to the value of stocks, 222, 230, 232.

BUILDERS.

opinions of, 161, 1G2.

CALIFORNIA.

statutory provision as to comparison of handwriting, 191.

CANAL BOATMAN.

opinion of, as to seamanlike acts, 3S.,

CARLISLE TABLES.

admissibility of to show expectation of life, 231.

CARPENTER. See MECHANICS.

BLOOD STAIXS.
expert testimony a. to, 111-113.
testimony of non-profe _ ional witne es a to, l i:J.
proper questions to experts concerning, 114.
BOOKS OF SCIE~CE .
their relation to expert te timony, 234.
their admissibility in evidence, 236.
medical treatises inaumissible as evidence, 237.
whether a witness is qnalifiecl as an expert by a study of, 2
the admissibility of opiLlions based on, 20.
BRAKE:llA"N".
inadmissible opinion of, as to switching cars, 14.
opinion as to proper place of, 147.
BRASS FINISHERS . ·
opinion of, 161.
BRICK -~IAKER .

opinion of as to mode of burning tiles, 173.
BRICK MASON.
opinion of, 1G2.
BROKERS.
an inaclmissil>le opinion of, 15.
opinion of, as. to course of business, 1G0.
opinion of, as to counterfeit bank notes, 20G.
opinion of, as to the value of stocks, 222, 230, 232.
BUILDERS .
opinions of, 1Gl, 1G2.

opinion of, 220, 221 .

CASHIER.

c.

opinions of, 205.

CATTLE. See GUAZIEH.

CHEMISTS.

detection of poisons by, 108.

chemical analysis of poison, whether necessary, 109.

examination of blood and blood stains, 111.

opinions of in some miscellaneous cases, 115.

opinion as to the nature of the ink used in writing, 186.

CALIFORXIA.
statutory provision as to comparison of h:i.nclwriting, 191.
CAXAL BOATMAN.
opinion of, as to seamanlike acts, 3S ..
CARLISLE TABLES.
admissibility of to show expectation of life, 2:n .
C.ARPE.N"TER. See MECHANICS.
opinion of, 220, 221.
CASHIER.
opinions of, 203 .
CATTLE. See GRAZIER.
CHE ~HSTS.

detection of poisons by, 10
chemical analysis of poison, whether nece ary, 109.
examination of blood and blood stains, 111.
opinions of in some mi cellaneou case , 115.
opinion as to the natnre of the ink used in writing, 186.
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CIVIL ENGINEER.

opinion of, as to construction of embankments. 29, 158.

construction and safety of bridge, 158.

amount of ground overflowed, 158.

cause of choking up of harbor, 150.

what certain land was suited for, 159.

construction of highway, 159;

CLEAEING LAND.

CIVIL EXGINEER.
opinion of, as to constrnction of emba11kment . 29, 15
construction and safety of bridge, 158.
amount of ground overflowed, 158.
cause of choking up of harbor, 159.
what certain land 'vas suited for, 159.
construction of highway, 159:

opinion as to proper time for, }7.

COLORADO.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 130.

COMPARISON OF HANDWRITING. See HANDWRITING.

COMPENSATION OF EXPERTS.

husband must defray in examinations for structural defect, 103.

statutory provisions concerning, 252.

the effect of making extra compensation to experts, 253.

experts need not make preliminary examination without extra com-

pensation, 254.

whether special compensation must be made, 254.

opinions of writers on medical jurisprudence on, 255.
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paid out of the public treasury, 203.

COMPETENCY OF EXPERTS.

must be shown before they can testify, 22.

is a question addressed to the court, 23.

when decision of trial court on, is deemed conclusive, 24, 25.

rule by which the question of, is determined, 24.

preliminary examination, to determine, 25.

whether the witness must be actually engaged in the trade or art at

the time of testifying, 26.

whether he must possess the highest degree of skill, 27.

mere opportunities for observation not sufficient, 27.

when their knowledge is derived from the study of standard author-

ities only, 28 -33.

question of, is sometimes dependent on whether expert has heard

the testimony, 33.

when testifying as physicians, 68.

statutory provision in Wisconsin, as to, 69, 71.

statutory provisions in other States, 72.

who are competent to testify to the nature and prevalence of a dis-

ease, SO.

when testifying as to character of instrument producing a wound,

84.

when testifying to mental condition, 85.

when testifying concerning poisons, 108.

when testifying concerning blood and blood-stains, 111, 113.

when testifying concerning disease in animals, 116.

when testifying as to foreign law, 132-137.

\\hen testifying as nautical experts, 141-145.

CI.EARING LAND .
opinion as to proper time for, F·
COLORADO.
statutory provision as to verification of written law, 130.
CO}IPARISON OF HA.~"1\[DWRITI~G. See HANDWRITING .
COMPENSATION OF EXPERTS.
husband must defra.y in examinations for stmctural defect, 103.
statutory provisions concerning, 252.
the effect of making extra compensation to experts, 253 .
experts need not make preliminary examination without extra compe.Bsation, 254.
whether i::pecial compensation mu t be made, 254.
opinions of writers on medical juri pruclrnce on, 255.
paid out of the public treasury, 263.
COMPETENCY OF EXPERTS.
must be. shown before they can testify, 22.
is a question adclressed to the court, 23.
when decision of trial court on, is deemed conclu ~ ive, 24, 25.
rule by which the question of, is determined, 2-1.
preliminary examination, to determine, 25.
·w hether the witness must be actually engaged in the trade or art at
the time of testifying, 26.
whether he must possess the highest degree of skill, 27.
mere opportunities for observat.ion not sufficient, 27.
"·hen their knowledge is derived from the study of sta11dard authorities only, 28-33.
question of, is sometimes dependent on " ·hether expert ha heard
the testimony, 33.
when testifying as pby icians, 68.
statutory provision in "Wisconsin, as to, 69, 71.
statutory provisions in other States, 72.
who are competent to testify to the nature and prevalence of a disease, 80.
" ·hen testifJing as to character of in ·trument producing a wound,
84.
" ·hen teEtifying to mental condition, 85.
when testifying concerning poisons, 108.
when te tifying concerning blood and blood -stains, 111, 113.
when t tifying concerning di ease in animals, 116.
when testifying as to foreign law, 132-137.
"hen te tifying as uautical experts, 141 -145.
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COMPETENCY OF EXPERTS Continued.

railroad experts, 145-148.

experts in insurance. 148-152.

gardeners, farmers and stock raisers, 153.

millers and millwrights, 155, 156.

surveyors and civil engineers, 157-159.

machinists, 160.

mechanics, masons and master builders, 161.

painters and photographers, 163.

lumbermen, 164.

to technical terms and usage, 165, 170.

in miscellaneous cases, 170-175.

to handwriting, 178-182.

to the nature and character of ink, 186.

to value, 214-222.

to the value of legal services, 222.

to the value of medical services, 224.

10 the value of other services, 226.

to the value of real estate, 227.

to the value of annuities, 230.
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CONCLUSIONS OF FACT.

are to be drawn by the jury, 5.

expert cannot draw from the evidence. 37.

CONCLUSIONS OF EXPERTS.

jury not bound to accept, 59 et seq.

CONDUCTOR (RAILROAD.)

an inadmissible opinion of, 14, 147.

an admissible opinion of, 146.

CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

opinions based on, when made in professional confidence, 71.

statutory provisions on this subject considered, 72-74.

CONNECTICUT.

verification of written law, statutory provision, 130.

CONSTRUCTION.

given to a foreign statute by a foreign tribunal, 124.

to be given to a survey, surveyor cannot express an opinion on, 157.

of machinery, opinion as to, 160.

of writings, expert cannot express an opinion on, 165.

COPYRIGHT.

opinions of experts, in questions of, 162.

COUNTERFEITS.
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CO)IPETENCY 011 ' EXPERT -Continued.
railroad experL, 145-1-1 .
experts in insurance~ 1-18- 152.
gardeners, farmers and tock rai ers, 153.
millers and millwright , 155, 156.
surveyors and civil engineers, 157-159.
machinists, IGO.
mechanics, masons and ma. ter builders, 161.
painters and photographers, 1G3.
lumbermen, IGJ.
to technical terms and rn:uge, 1G5, 170.
in miscellaneous ca. es, 170-175.
to handwriting, 178-182.
to the natme and character of ink, 186.
to value, 214-222 .
to the value of legal services, 222.
to the yaJue of medical services, 224.
to the value of other services, 226.
to the vnlue of real estate, 227 .
to the value of annuities, 2~0 .
CONCLUSIONS OF FACT.
are to be drawn by the jury, 5.
expert cannot draw from the eYiuencc, 37.
CONCLURIOXS OF EXPERTS .
jury not bound to aceept, 59 et seq.
CONDUCTOR (RAILROAD.)
an inadmissible opinion of, 1-1, 1-:17.
an admissible opinion of, 14().
CONFIDENTIAL COilillUNICATIO~S .
opinions based on, when made in professional confitlenee, ';"l.
statntory provisions on this subject considered , 72-74.
CONNECTICUT.
verification of 'nitten la"·, statutory provision, 130.

opinions of experts in the detection of, 205.

COURT.

must determine competency of witnesses, 23.

discretion of, in passing on questions of competency, 3?

right of, to examine witnesses, 25.

light to exclude experts from court room, 53.

CO~STRUCTIO~ .

given to a foreign statute by a foreign tribunal, 12-J-.
to be given to a survey, surveyor cannot express an 0pi11ion on, 157.
of machinery, opinion as to, 160.
of writings, expert cunnot express an opinion on, 1G5.
COPYRIGHT.
opinions of experts, in questions of, 162.
COUNTERFEITS.
opinions of experts iu the detection of, 20u.
COURT.
must determine competeney of \dtnes, e , 23.
discretion of, in passing 011 que ti on of competency' rn~
rig-ht of, to examine witnes e, , 25.
1 ight to exc1ude experts from court room, 53 .
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COURT Continued.

right of, to limit number of witnesses, 54.

selection of experts by, 56.

instructions of, as to weight of testimony, Gl-65.

right of, to order an examination of the person, 99-103.

takes judicial notice of what, 119-122.

construction of writings, a question for, 1G5.

CREDIBILITY OF EXPERTS.

is a question for the jury, 58.

what it depends upon, 59.

right of jury to exercise an independent judgment on. GO.

instructions as to 61-65.

CROSS-EXAMINATION .

what is a proper, 46.

refusal to allow on preliminary examination no error, 50.

right to reasons of expert on, 50, 51.

general rules as to, 52, 53.

what is improper in the investigation of handwriting, 204.

what is proper, on value of real estate, 220.

legal services, 223.
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testing knowledge of experts on, by scientific books, 245.

CURRENCY.

value of, 232.

CUSTOM AND USAGE.

opinions as to, 168.

1).

DAMAGES.

the opinions Of witnesses as to amount of, 211.

compulsory examination of the person, in actions for, 106.

DEATH.

opinions of experts as to cause of, 21, 77, 98, 81.

opinion of non-professional witness that a person was going to die,

COURT-Continued .
right of, to limit number of witnesses, 5-1.
selection of experts by, 56.
instructio11s of, as to weight of testimony, Gl - 65 .
right of, to order an exarr..ination of the person, 09-lOS.
takes judicial notice of what, 119- 122 .
constrnction of writings, a question for, 1G5.
CBEDIBIL11'Y OF EXPERTS.
is n. question for the jury, 58.
what it depends upon, 59.
right of jury to exercise an independent judgment on~ 60.
instructions as to 61-65 .
CROSS -EXAMINATIO:N.
wlrnt is a proper, 46 .
refusal to allow on preliminary examination no error, 50.
right to reasons of expert on, 50, 51.
general rules as to, 52, 53 .
what is improper in the investigation of h a ndwriting, 20-!.
what is proper, on value of real estate , 220 .
legal services, 223.
testing knowledge of experts on, by . de ntific books, 2±5.
ClJRRENCY.
value of, 232 .
CU TOM AND US_.\GE .
opinions as to, 168.

inadmissible, SO.

DEFINITIONS.

of the term "expert." 1-3.

D.

of the terms " science " and " art," 12.

of the meaning of words is given by the court to the jury, 163.

DELAWARE.

statutory provision as to proof of foreign law, 125.

verification of the written law, 129.

DETECTIVES.

opinion of, 15.

DIMENSION.

opinion as to, 5.

DAillAGES .
the opinions of witnesses as to amount of, 211.
compulsory examiri ation of the person, in actions for, 106.
DEA['H.
opinion ~ of experts as to cause of, 21, 77, 98, 81.
opinion of non -profossional witnes that a per on was going to die,
inadmissible, SO.
DEFINITIONS.
of the term "expert," 1-3.
of the terms " science " and " art," 12.
of the meaning of words is given by the court to the jury, 16:>.
DELAWARE .
statutory provision as to proof of foreign la.w, 1~3 .
verification of the w ri tten law, 120.
Dl!;TECTI VES .
opinio n of, 15.
D I ME~SION .

opinion as to, 5.

INDEX. 279

DISCRETION OF COURT.

much is left to, in passing on competency of experts, 23.

DISEASE.

opinions of experts as to nature and symptoms of, 79.

non -professional witnesses, as to, SO.

as to, in animals, 11G.

DISTANCE.

opinions as to, 5.

DIVORCE.

for impotency, examination of the person by experts in cases of, 99,

103.

DOWER.

admissibility of tables for computing potential right of, 231.

DURATION OF TIME.

opinion as to, 5.

E.

ENGINEER. See CIVIL ENGINEER AND SURVEYOR.

an inadmissible opinion, 38.

railroad, opinions of, 146, 148.

ENGRAVER.
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opinions of, in handwriting, 178, 183, 184.

ETHICS.

opinions founded on a theory of, are inadmissible, 18.'

ETHNOLOGIST.

opinion of, as to race, 170.

EVIDENCE. See TESTIMONY.

expert cannot draw conclusions from, nor pass on the weight of the,

37 et seq.

of collateral facts admissible when, 52.

EXAMINATION OF EXPERT WITNESSES. See CROSS-EXAMINA-

TION.

preliminary to their testifying as experts, 25.

mode of their examination, 36.

by the hypothetical question, 39-43.

when it need not be by a hypothetical question, 43-46.

not to be asked questions of law, 47.

as to particular cases, 47.

on facts not stated by them, 48.

latitude of inquiry in, 49.

as to the reasons for their opinions, 51.

general rules as to examination of witnesses, 51-53.

excluding witnesses from court room, during, 53.

as to sanity, 87.

as to blood stains, 114.

whether it should be conducted by the court, 58.

280 INDEX.

EXAMINATION OF THE PERSON.

right of court to order a compulsory one, in case of impotency, 99.

in criminal cases, 104.

in actions for damages, 106.

EX PARTE INVESTIGATIONS.

opinions based on, 20.

EXPERIENCE.

degree of, required in experts, 27.

EXPERTS. See ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, COMPENSA-

TION OF EXPERTS, COMPETENCY OF EXPERTS, CREDIBILITY OF

EXPERTS, CROSS-EXAMINATION, DEFINITIONS, EXAMINATION

OF.

who canaot be considered as such, 3.

opinions as to reputation and skill of, 49, 50.

EYE.

expert testimony as to, 71, 99, 116.

F.

FARMERS.

opinion of, as to spreading of fire in clearing land, 17, 154.

condition of land for cropping, 153.
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safety of wagon loaded with hay, 153.

yield of land to the acre, 153.

adulteration of milk, 154.

sufficiency of fence, 175.

value of cattle, 220.

value of real estate, 229.

FARRIER.

opinion of, 116.

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

State courts take judicial notice of, 120.

FEDERAL COURTS.

State statutes as to comparison of handwriting of no effect in, 193.

take judicial notice of State statutes, 120.

FEDEKAL STATUTES.

State courts judicially notice, 120.

FENCE.

opinion as to sufficiency of, 175.

FIRE.

opinion as to proper time to set, 17.

FIRE ARMS.

opinion as to wadding, 16.

length of time since weapon was discharged, 173.

opinion as to which barrels had been discharged, 173.

opinion as to value of, 222.

2 1
INDEX. 281

FISH.

opinion as to agility of, 173

FLORIDA.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 129.

FOREIGN LAW. See LAW.

as a subject for the testimony of experts, 121.

mode of proof, by experts in, 123.

presumed to be unwritten, 124.

statutory provisions as to verification of, 129.

certification of questions of, to courts of foreign country. l;!G.

qualifications of experts in, 132-138.

right of expert in, to cite books, 138.

FRANCE.

how experts are selected in, 55.

submission to experts of disputed writings for comparison, 189.

G.

GARDENER.

opinion as to method of using fertilizers, 153.

FISH.
opinion as to agiliry of, 173
FLORIDA.
statutory provision a to verification of written law 129.
FOREIGN J,AW. See LAW.
a a ubject for the te timony of expert , 121.
mode of proof, by experts in, 123.
presumed to be unwritten, 124.
statutory provisions a to verification of, 129.
certification of questions of, to courts of foreign country. 13G.
qualifications of experts in, 132-138.
right of expert in, to cite books, 138.
FRAXCR.
how experts are elected in, 55.
ubmis ion to experts of disputed writings for eompari on, 1 9.

condition of land for cropping, 153.

damage to garden by smoke, 153.

G.
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what certain land was suitable for, 15G.

GAS-FITTER.

opinion of, 167.

GEOLOGIST.

opinion of, as to existence of coal seams, 170.

settling and cracking of the earth, 171.

GEORGIA.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 130.

comparison of handwriting, 11)1.

GERMANY.

how experts are selected in, 56.

GIN.

opinion as to whether certain liquor was, 5.

GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS.

a system of, considered, 56.

GRAZIER.

opinion as to number of stock running in a range, 155,

condition of cattle and causes affecting their health, 1V>.

weight of cattle, 155.

damage to cattle, 155.

the value of cattle. 220.

GUN AND GUNSMITH. See FIRE-AUMS.

GUN-SHOT WOUNDS.

who may testify as to, 83-S5.

(10)

GARDE:NER .
opinion a to method of using fertilizers, 153.
condition of land for cropping ] 53.
damage to garden by smoke, 153 .
what certain lnnd wa uitable for, 15S.
GAS-FIT'I'ER .
opinion of, 1G7.
GEOLOGIST.
opinion of, a to existence of coal seams, HO.
settling and crackinp; of th1..' earth, 171.
GEORGIA.
statutory pro>ision as to verification of written law, 130.
comparison of hat!dwriting, JUI.
GER11ANY.
llow experts are selected in 56.
GL.~.

opinion as to whether certain liqnor was 5.
GOVER~MEXTAT~ EXPERTS.
a system of, considered 56.
GRAZIER.
opinion as to number of tock runuin~ in a range, 155,
condition of cattle aud cau..,es affecting their health, i;;:>.
weight of cattle, 155.
damage to cattle, 155.
the value of cattle. 220.
GUN AND GUS 'M ITH. See FIRE-Ami._.
GUN- HOT WOUNDS.
who may testify a to , 83- 5.
(19)
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H.

H.

HAIR.

opinion as to whether human or not, 6.

HANDWRITING. See WRITINGS.

the scientific investigation of , 177.

who are experts in, 178-182.

what they may testify to, 1S2-1S4.

testimony as to nature and quality of inks, 185.

who are qualified to testify as to the nature of ink, 18G-1S8.

comparison of writings, 188.

statutory provision as to, 190.

in the absence of statutory provision, 192-19.").

with those admitted to be genuine, li)5.

with photographic copies, 199-202.

with writings made on the trial, 203.

in questions of orthography, 203.

proof of genuineness of writing compared, 197.

expert should have the writing before him, 198.

testing accuracy of expert in, 204.

HIGHWAY.
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whether experts may testify as to sufficiency of. 17.

HORSES.

opinion as to health and disposition of, 6.

objects calculated to frighten, 6, 172.

HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION.

opinions of experts should be asked by means of, 3:3.

wiien the question need not be hypothetical, 43-46.

how it is to be framed, 39-43.

form of, on cross-examination, 46.

where jury may disregard opinion based on, 40.

should be submitted before rebutting evidence is heard. 4G.

I.

IDENTITY.

opinions, as to, 5.

evidence of, 8.

ILLINOIS.

statutory provision as to verification of written law. 129.

statutory provision as to competency of experts in detection of coun-

terfeits, 206.

IMPOTENCY.

right to order an examination of the person in cases of, 99.

HAIR .
opinion as to whether human or not, 6.
IIAl~DWRfTING . See WRITINGS.
the scientific investigation of, 177.
who are experts in, 17 -1 2.
what they may testify to, 1 2-1 4..
testimony as to nature and qnality of inli , 1 5.
who are qualified to testify as to the .nature of ink 1 6-1 ... .
comparison of writings, 1 .
statutory provision a to 190.
in the absence of tatutory provi ion, 192-195.
with those admitted to be genuine, 1:)5.
with photographic copie , 199- 202.
" ·itb writings made on the trial, 203 .
in que tions of orthography, 203.
proof of genuineness of writing compared, 197.
expert should have the writing before him, 19
testing accuracy of expert in, 20J.

HIGHWAY.
whether experts may testify a~ to ufllcieucy of~ 17.
HORSES .
opinion as to health and disposition of, 6.
objects calculated to frighten. 6 172.
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION.
opinions of expert s"Qould be a ked by mean" of, 39.
w~1en the question ueed not be hypothetical 43 -±6.
how it is to be framed, 39-43.
form of, on cross-examination, 46.
where jury may disregard opinion ba ed on 40,
should be snb,mitted before rebutting; evidence i heard ±G.

who should be appointed to make an examination in cases of, 100.

when an examination will not be ordered in cases of, 101.

I.

testimony in cases of, received .with caution, 103.

1DE~TITY .

opinions, as to , 5.
evidence of, 8.
ILLINOIS.
statutory proYision a to verification of written law . 129.
statutory provjsion as to competeuey of expert in detection of coun terfeits, 206.
DIPOTE ~ CY .

right to order :rn examination of the per on in ca e~ of, 99.
who should be appointed to make an e:x.aminatiou i n en e of, 100.
" ·hen an examination will not be ordered in case of, 101.
t estimony in ca~es of, receiYed ;with cautiou~ 103.
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INADMISSIBILITY OF BOOKS OF SCIENCE,

as evidence, 234.

INADMISSIBILITY OF OPINIONS. See AUMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT

TESTIMONY.

opinions of witnesses in general inadmissible, 4.

opinions of non-professional witnesses inadmissible on questions of

science, art, or trade, G.

when opinions of experts are inadmissible, 12.

opinions founded on a theory of morals or ethics?, 18.

opinions based on speculative data, 19.

opinions of experts who have made ex parte investigations, 20.

based on part of the testimony, 43.

based on facts heard outside, 48.

INDIANA.

statutory provision as to disclosure of professional communications

by physicians, 72.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 129.

extra compensation of experts, 253.

INK.

whether two documents were written with the same, 183, 185.
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micro-chemical examination of, 185.

qualifications of experts in, 186.

INSANITY.

form of question as to, 38, 44, 87.

opinions of medical experts on, 85.

who are competent to testify as experts, 85-87.

evidence bearing on questions of, 88-90.

opinions of non-professional witnesses, 90, 94.

INSPECTION OF THE PERSON. See EXAMINATION OF THE PER-

SON.

INSTRUCTIONS.

as to the nature and weight of expert testimony, 61-65.

INSTRUMENT.

by which wounds were inflicted, opinion as to character of, 84, 85.

INSURANCE EXPERTS.

whether they may testify as to the materiality of concealed facts,.

148-150.

who are competent to testify to such materiality, 150.

what they may testify to, 151-153.

INTERROGATORIES.

summoning experts to determine in cases of impotency, 101.

INTOXICATIOX.

opinion as to whether a person is under, 5.

IOWA.

statutory provision as to disclosure by physician of professional

communications. 72.

284 INDEX.

IOWA Continued.

statutory provision as to comparison of handwriting by experts, 191.

verification of written law, 129.

compensation of experts, 252.

J.

JETTISON.

opinion as to necessity of, 144.

JUDICIAL NOTICE.

is taken of what laws, 119.

is not taken of what laws, 121.

of the meaning of words and idioms, 1G3.

JURY.

province of jnry to draw inferences from the facts, 5.

is not selected with a view to its knowledge of science} art, or

trade, 9.

competency of experts cannot be referred to, 23.

weight of expert testimony is to be determined by, 58.

right of, to exercise an independent judgment in passing on the

weight of expert testimony, 59-61.

instructions to, on the nature and weight of expert testimony,
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Gl-65.

reading scientific books to, as evidence, 237.

as argument, 248.

inspection of the person by, 104.

K.

KANSAS.

statutory provision as to competency of experts in detection of coun-

terfeits, 207.

KENTUCKY.

statutory provision as to verification of written laws, 130.

proof of foreign law, 126.

L.

LAW. See FOREIGN LAW; JUDICIAL NOTICE; LAWYERS.

as a subject for expert testimony, 118.

distinction between written and unwritten as so mode of proof, 123.

LAWYERS.

as experts in the science of law, 119.

whether witnesses must be, to testify to foreign law, 132-136.

where knowledge of the law must have been acquired, 137.

right of to cite text books, decisions and codes, 138.

testimony of , as to usage and practice of the courts, 139,

powers and obligations of an attorney, 140.

value of their services, 222.

whether they may read from scientific books in argument, 248.
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LIQUOR.

LIQUOR .

non-professional witness may testify as to character of certain, 5.

non-profe ~sional wi t ne.s~
LOUISIANA.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 130.

LUMBERMEN.

opinion as to amount, of logs could be delivered per day, 161.

proper manner of floating logs, 164.

quality of lumber, 164.

whether a raft was properly moored, 104.

M.

MACHINERY.

who can testify as to construction of mill machinery, 23.

m'.l.y te.stify

a~

to character of certain, 5.

LOUISIA~A.

statutory provision as to verification of \Vritten law 130 .
J,U.MBER.ME:N".
opinion as to amonnt of log~ could be d6livered per day, 161.
proper manner of floating log , lG-!.
quality of lumber, 164.
whether a raft wa properl.f moored, lG-! .

opinion that machine was constructed in workmanlike m inner. 44.

opinion as to the merits of, 160.

need not be a machinest to testify as an expert in, 160.

opinion as to how much work a machine could do, 161.

opinions as to the value of, 218, 219.

MAINE.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 129.

proof of foreign law, 125.
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opinion of witnesses in the detection of counterfeits, 207.

MALPRACTICE.

testimony of medical experts in cases of, 07.

MARINE SURVEYOR.

opinion as to seaworthiness, 142, n. 2.

MARYLAND.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 129.

MASONS AND MASTER BUILDERS.

opinions of, 161, 162.

MASSACHUSETTS.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 129.

proof of foreign law, 125.

MECHANICS.

opinions of. 161.

:JL\.CHIXERY.
,,·ho can testify as to con.struction of mill m:tchinerr, 2
opinion that maehine was constructed in workmanlike m inner, 4!.
op inion a to the m erits of, 160.
need not be a machinest tote tify a,.; an e:xpe1·t in, 160.
opinion as to how much work a machine could do 161.
opinions ai' to the valnc of, 218, 21 9.
ilIAI~E.

statutory prnvi. ion as to verification of written law, 120.
proof of foreign law, 125.
opinion of witnesses in the detection of counterfeit , 207.
MALPRACTICE .
testimony of medical experts in cases of, Oi.
MARINE S GRVEYOR.
opinion as to seaworthine s, 142, n. 2.

MEDICAL EXPERTS.

who are qualified to testify as such, 68-71, 80, 86.

opinion as to physical condition, 42, 77, 04.

cause of death, 44, 45, 77, OS, 100.

nature and symptoms of disease, 79, 80.

nature and effect of wounds, 81-85, 107.

character of instrument used in inflicting, 84-85.

mental condition, 85.

whether a rape has been committed, and effect of, 94.

whether an abortion has been performed, 95.

pregnancy, 95.

~IARYLA...~D.

statutory provh;ion a to verification of written law, 121).
~IASO:XS

AXD MASTER BClLDERS.
opinions of, 161, 162.
:JIASSACHL"SETTS.
statutory proyision as to veritkation of written law, 120.
proof of foreign law, 12.5.
~E CHAXI C:3 .

opinions of, 161.
MEDICAL EXPERTS.
who are qualified to testifr as sneh, GS-71. O, 6.
opinion as to physical condition, 42 Ii, D..J. .
cause of death, 4!, 43, 77 , 9 ', 109.
nature and symptoms of di ease, 79, 0.
nature and effect of wounds, 81 - 5, 107.
character of instrument used in inflicting, 4- 5.
mental condition, 85.
whether a rape has been committed, and effect of, 9-!.
whether an abortion has been performed, 95.
pregnancy , 95.
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MEDICAL EXPEETS Continued.

permanency of loss of vision, 96.

questions of medical practice, 96-98.

condition of remains after burial, 96.

premature births, 97.

sex of a skeleton, 97.

miscellaneous cases, 96-97.

curability of a disease, 97.

skill of physician on trial, 97.

nature and properties of medicine, 98.

impotency, 99-102.

effect of poisons, 108.

diseases in animals, 116-117.

opinions based on declarations of patients, 49, 75-77.

statements out of court, 74.

disclosure of confidential communications, 71.

examination of the person by, in cases of impotency, 99.

in criminal cases, 104-106.

in actions for damages, 106-108.

testimony of, as to the value of the services of physicians and
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nurses, 224.

MEDICAL TKEATISES.

their general inadmissibility in evidence, 237-243.

when admissible for purpose of contradicting a medical expert, 244.

testing knowledge of expert by means of, on the cross-examination,

245.

MEDICAL EXPERTS-Continued.
permanency of los of vision, 96.
que tions of medical practice, 96-98.
condition of remains after bmial, 96.
premature births, 97.
sex of a skeleton, 97.
miscellaneous ca e 96-97.
curability of a di ease, 97.
skill of physician on trial 97.
;iature and propertie of medicine, 9 .
impoten cy, 99-102.
effect of poisons, 108.
diseases in animal 116-117.
opinions ba ed on declaration of patients 49 'iU-77.
statements out o! court 74.
disclosure of confidential communication 71.
examination of the per ~ on by, in ca e ~ of impoteney 99.
in criminal ca es, 104-106.
in action for damage , 106-10
testimony of, as to the value of the ervice of phy ician
nurses, 224.

and

views of writers on medical jurisprudence as to their exclusion, 246.

reading from, in arguing to the jury, 248.

MENTAL CONDITION. SEE INSANITY.

MICHIGAN.

statutory provision as to disclosure by physicians of professional

communications, 72.

statutory provision as to verification of written law. 129.

MICROSCOPIST.

opinion of, in handwriting, 184.

MEDICAL TREATISE
their general inadmissibility in eviuence 23--2-13.
when admi ible for purpo e of contradicting a medical expert 2-!4.
testing knowledge of expert by mean of on the cro- -examination,
245.
views of writers on medical jnri prudence a to their exclusion 2-16.
reading from in arguing t~ the jury 2!

as to blood stains, 111.

MIDWIFE.

MENTAL

CO~ITION .

SEE INSANITY.

inspection of the person by. 100.

MILLERS AND MILLWRIGHTS.

opinion as to quantity of grain a mill could grind, 155.

value of water power for mill purposes, 155.

fitness of mill site, 156.

MICHIGAN .
statutory provision a to di-clo ure by pby icians of profe ional
communication , 72 .
statutory provision as to verification of written law 129.

identity of wheat, 156.

anchor ice. 156.

skilfulness of work on a mill, 156.

necessity of repairing mill, 157.

capacity of millwright, 157.

MICRO COPIST.
opinion of in hand writing, 1 !.
a to blood stains, 111.
MIDWIFE.
in pection of the per on by 100.
MILLERS AN D MILLWRIGHT .
opinion a to quantity of grain a mill could grind , 155.
value of water power for mill pnrpo es, 155.
fitne of mill ite, 156.
identity of wheat 156.
anchor ice, 156.
skilfulne of work on a mill 156.
neces ity of repairing mill 157.
capacity of millwright 157.

287

INDEX .
INDEX. 287

MILLERS AND MILLWRIGHTS Continued,

technical terms, 168.

value of a mill, 217, 218.

who can testify as to construction of mill machinery, 28.

MINER.

opinion of, 170.

MINNESOTA.

MlLLERS A~D MILLWRlGHTS-Continued .
technical term , 168.
value of a mill, 217, 218.
who can testify as to con truction of mill machinery, 2
.i\HNER.
opinio:p. of, 170.

statutory provision as to disclosure by physicians of professional

communications, 72.

statutory provision as to verification of written laws, 129.

MISSOURI.

statutory provision as to disclosure by physicians of professional

communications, 72.

:\U:N~E S OTA.

statutory provision as to disclosure by physicians of professional
communications, 72.
statutory provision as to verification of written lMvs, 129.
/

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 130, n. 2.

MORALS.

opinions based on a theory of, are inadmissible, 18.

MORTALITY TABLES.

their admissibility in evidence, 231.

)HSSOURI.
:-tatutorr provision as to disclosure by physicians of profe sional
communicatio ns, 72.
statutory provision as to verification of written law, 130, n. 2.

NATIONALITY.

opinion as to a persons, 6.
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NAUTICAL EXPERTS.

~IORALS.

opicions baseu on a theory of, are inadmissible, 18.

their opinion as to seaworthiness of vessels, 142, 145.

cause of a leak in a ship, 142.

the soundness of a chain cable, 142.

MORTALITY TABLES.
their adu1issibility in eviclence, 231.

the collision of vessels, 142, 143.

the management of ships, 142, 143.

N.

the method of towing boats, 142.

effect of cross-seas, 142.

cause of the loss of a vessel, 143.

what cargo can be safely carried. 143.

~ATTOXALITY .

opinion as to a persons, 6.

negligence in mooring vessel, 143.

the necessity of a jettison, 144.

what would be the expense of raising and repairing a vessel,

144.

sailing rules and regulations, 144.

safe place for carrying cargo, 144.

competency of crew, 145.

piloting of a boat, 145.

^NAVIGATION. See NAUTICAL EXPERTS.

.NEBRASKA.

statutory provision as to disclosure by physicians of professional

communications, 72.

statutory provision as to comparison of handwriting, 191.

XAGT[CAL EXPERTS.
their opinion as to seaworthiness of vessels, 1±2, 1±5.
cause of a leak in a ship, 142.
thE: oundness of a chain cable, 142.
tlte collisio n of vessels, 142, 143.
the management of ships, 142, 143.
the method of towing boats, 142.
effect of cross-seas, 142.
cause of the loss of a vessel, 143.
'"hat cargo can be safely carried, 1-±3.
negligence in mooring vessel, 143.
the necessity of a jettison, 14-L
\Yhat would be tbe expen e of raising and repairing a vessel,
1-14.
sailing rules and regulations, 1-:W.
~ afe place for carrying carg-o, 144.
eompetency of crew, 145.
piloting of a boat, 145.
");'A VIGATION.

Sec

NAUTICAL EXPERTS.

XE lrn.ASKA.
Hatutory provision as to disclo ure by physidaw of professional
communications, 72.
s tatutory provision as to compari on of handwriting, 191.

288
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NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES.

value of, 232.

NEGOTIABLE SE CURITIES.
valne of, 232.

NEW HAMPSHIRE.

statutory provision as to opinion evidence on the value of property T

209.

NEW JERSEY.

~EW

HAl\fPSHIRE.
statutory provision as to opinion evidence on the value of property,
209.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 130.

comparison of handwriting, 191.

NEW YORK.

statutory provision as to disclosure by physicians of professiona

communications, 72.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 129.

comparison of handwriting, 192.

NON-PROFESSIONAL WITNESSES.

are not in general allowed to express opinions, 4.

when they may express opinions, 5.

cannot express opinions on questions of science, skill or trade, 7.

NEW JERSEY.
statutory provi sion as to verification of written law, 130.
compari son of handwriting, 191.
NEW YORK.
statutory provision a to disclosure by physician of professionn.
communications, 72.
statutory provision as to verification of written law, 129.
comparison of handwriting, 192.

cannot testify us to prevalence of disease in a certain locality, 80.

may testify whether a person appears sick or well, 80.

may express an opinion as to necessity of medical services, SO.
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cannot testify as to the character of a disease, SO, 81.

may describe the appearance of a wound, 82.

may testify as to a person's mental condition, 30-94.

cannot express opinion as to pregnancy, 95.

whether they may testify as to blood stains, 113.

whether they may testify as to diseases in animals, 116.

whether they may testify as to foreign law, 132-136.

cannot express an opinion based on a comparison of handwriting,

196.

opinions of, in questions relating to value, 213.

whether they may testify as to the value of an attorney's services,

223.

whether they may testify to the value of medical services, 224.

their opinions of the value of real estate, 227.

NORTH CAROLINA.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 129.

statutory provision as to additional compensation to experts, 253.

NORTHAMPTON TABLES.

admissibility of, to show expectation of life, 231.

NURSE.

who may testify as to the value of their services, 225.

opinion of, as to a premature birth, 96.

opinion of physician founded on declarations of, 74.

NURSERYMAN.

NO~ -PROFESSION AL

WITNESSES.
are not in µ:eneral allowed to express opinions, 4.
when they may express opinions, 5.
cannot express opinions on que tions of science, skill or trad e 'i.
cannot testify as to prevalence of disease in a certain locality , 0.
may testify whether a person appears sick or well, 80.
may express an opiaion as to nece"sity of medical servi ces, O.
cannot testify as to the character of a disease, 80, 81.
may describe the appearance of a wound, 82.
may testify as to a person 's mental condition, 9'0-94.
cannot express opinion as to pregnancy 95.
whether they may testify as to blood stains, 113.
whether they may testify as to di eases in animals, 116.
·whether they may testify as to foreign law, 132-136.
cannot express an opinion ba ed ou a compari on of handwri ting,.
196.
opinions of, in questions relating to value, 213.
whether they may testify as to the value of an attorney's seniee ,.
223.
whetli'3 r they may testify to the valne of medical service , 224.
their opinion s of the value of real e"tate, 227.

opinion of, as to the value of trees, 217.

NORTH CAROLIN A.
statutory provision as to verification of written law, 129.
statutory provision as to additional compensation to ex perts. 2G3.
XORTHAMPTON TABLES.
admissibility of, to show expectation of life, 231.
NURSE.
who may testify as to the value of their service , 225.
opinion of, as to a premature birth, 96.
opinion of physician founded on declaration of 74.
NURSERYMAN.
op in ion of, as to the value ?f trees, 217.

INDEX.

O.

OBJECTION.

to expert testimony may be general when. 23.

OCULIST.

whether a physician must be, to testify in relation to the eyes, 71.

OHIO.

statutory provision as to disclosure by physicians of profess! on :t>

communications, 72.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 129.

OPINION. See ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY INADMISSI-

BILITY OF OPINIONS NON-PROFESSIONAL WITNESSES.

OREGON.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 130.

comparison of handwriting. 192.

OVERSEER.

opinion of, 154.

P.

PAINTER. See ARTIST.

opinion of, 27.

PAPER. See WRITINGS.
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how made to appear old, 187, n.

whether it had been used as gun wadding, 16.

PATENTS. .

opinions of experts in, 162.

PAVER.

opinion of, 170.

PENNSYLVANIA.

statutory provision as to admissibility of expert testimony in detec-

tion of counterfeits. 207.

PHOTOGRAPHS.

comparison of handwriting should be with the original and not a

photographic copy, 199.

when a comparison of writings may be made with photographic:

copy, 202.

opinions of experts as to, 163.

PHYSICIAN. See MEDICAL EXPERTS PRIVILEGED COMMUNICA-

TIONS.

is an expert as to matters relating to his profession, 68.

need not be a graduate or have a license, to testify as an expert.. x

whether he must be engaged in practice, 69.

need not be a specialist to testify as an expert, 70.

when not competent to testify as to sanity, 70, 86.

need not be an oculist to testify as to the eye, 71.

whether he may be asked for his impressions, 71.

testimony of, on question of mental condition, 85.

(20J

2i)0 INDEX.

PHYSICIAN. See MEDICAL EXPERTS PRIVILEGED COMMUNICA-

TIONS Conti n ued .

testimony of, in poison cases, 108.

value of services of. how shown, 224.

medical treatises cannot be cited in general to sustain or contradict

the testimony of, 237-247.

cannot be compelled to make a post mortem examination without

special compensation, 254.

extra compensation of, when testifying as an expert, 256.

opinion inadmissible as to whether he faithfully discharged his duty

to his professional brethren, 19.

PILOT.

opinion of, 145.

POISONS.

detection of, by chemists, 108.

a chemist need not be a physician to testify as to the effects of, 108.

n physician may testify as to symptoms appearing on the adminis-

tration of, 109.

when a chemical analysis of, is not necessary, 109.

order of research in analysis for, 110.
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POST-MAEK.

genuineness of, how shown, 172.

POST MORTEM EXAMINATIONS.

what is sufficient time in which to make, 19, 20. /

admissibility of testimony of physicians makiag, does not depend

upon their thoroughness, 21, 81.

interrogation of physicians who made, 96.

.rules prescribed for making cannot be introduced in evidence, 239.

value of services in making, may be shown by whom, 225.

phj'sician need not make without extra compensation, 254.

PREGNANCY.

an inadmissible opinion as to, 20.

the testimony of medical experts on the question of, 95.

examination of the person with a speculum, 106.

PRESUMPTIONS.

persons are presumed to understand questions pertaining to their

own business or profession, 2.

that the law is unwritten, 124.

sthat the law remains unchanged, 132.

.that dealers are acquainted with value of articles dealt in, 221.

PRIEST.

a Roman Catholic, as an expert in questions of sanity, 86.

.an expert as to the matrimonial law, 133.

.law governing church records, 133.

INDEX. 291

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.

communications to physicians not privileged at common law, 71.

statutory provisions as to disclosure of information acquired bv

physicians in attending patients, 71, 72.

these statutory provisions construed, 72-74.

PROVINCE OF THE JURY. See JURY.

PROXIMATE CAUSE.

the question of, is not one of science, 17.

Q.

QUALIFICATIONS OF EXPERTS. See CONPETENCY OF EXPERTS

PHYSICIANS.

QUALITY.

who are qualified to testify to quality of railroad ties, 147, 172.

lumber, 164.

iron, 170.

expert testimony as to quality of steel for rails, 172.

QUESTIONS OF FACT.

whether a witness possesses the requisite qualifications of an expert,.

23-25.

QUESTIONS OF LAW.
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whether the subject-matter of inquiry is such that expert testimony

may be received, 18, 25.

what are the qualifications necessary to entitle a witness to testify

as an expert, 18, 25.

are not to be embraced in questions to experts, 47.

construction of written instruments are, 158, 1C5, 1G6.

QUESTIONS OF SCIENCE, ART AND TRADE.

experts may testify on, 8-11.

meaning of the terms u science " and " art," 12.

opinions of experts are inadmissible except in relation to, 12-14.

illustrations of what are not, 14-18, 114, 147, 152, 153, 154, 155, 162 r

175.

R.

RAILROAD EXPERTS.

opinions as to the management of trains, 145.

stoppage of trains, 146.

safe rate of speed, 146.

possibility of avoiding injury, 146.

effect of leaky throttle-valve, 140.

why train was thrown from track, 146.

whether brakemen were in their proper place, 147.

quality of railroad ties, 147.

whether rail was laid properly, 148.

questions upon which their testimony was inadmissible, 14, 147-145

2H2

lNDEX.

2<)2 INDEX.

HAPE.

opinions of medical experts on questions relating to, 94.

HEAL ESTATE AGENTS.

value of their services shown how, 226, 227.

opinions of, on value of real estate, 219.

HEAL ESTATE.

who are competent to testify as to the value of, 227-230.

RELIGION.

opinions founded on a theory of are ..inadmissible, 18.

REPUTATION OF EXPERTS.

when it can be impeached, 49.

when other experts may testify to, 49, 50.

RHODE ISLAND.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 12P.

comparison of handwriting, 192.

special compensation of experts, 253.

ROAD-BUILDERS.

opinion of, 17.

ROBBERY.

opinion of detectives as to the manner, of, 15.
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ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIEST.

an expert as to sanity, 86.

ROMAN LAW.

practice of receiving expert testi 1110113" under. 3.

JJUPTURE.

who may testify to fact of. 81.

SANITY. See INSANITY.

SEAWORTHINESS.

opinions as to, 142, 145.

SCIENCE.

the term defined, 12.

questions to experts must partake of the nature of, 13.

expert must have experience in, 2, 3.

SCIENTIFIC BOOKS. See BOOKS OF SCIENCE.

SHEPHERD.

!!APE.
opinions of medical experts on questions relating to, f>-1-.
UEAL ESTATE AGENTS.
value of their services shown how, 226, 227.
opinions of, on value of real estate, 219.
REAL ESTATE.
\vho are competent to testify as to tlle value of, 227-23\'.
HELIGION.
opinions founded on a theory of areJnadmissible, 18.
REPUTATIO~ OF EXPERTS.
when it can be impeached, 49.
when other experts may testify to, 49, 50.
RHODE ISLAND.
statutory provision as to verification of written law, 12f.l.
comparison of handwriting, Hl2 .
special compensation of experts, 253.
ROAD-BUILDERS.
opinion of, 17.
ROBBERY.
'
opinion of detectives as to the manner~ of, 15.
ROMAN CATHOLIC .PHIEST. ·
an expert as to sanity, 86.
RO~IAN LAW.
practice of receiving expert testimony nuder, 3 .
.RUPTURE.
who may testify to fa ct of, 81.
I

opinion as to age of sheep, 155.

s.

SHIPWRIGHT.

opinion of, 143.

SKILL.

expert must be possessed of peculiar, 2, 8, 22.

much is left to discretion of court in determining whether a witness

is. possessed of, 23.

whether a witness has peculiar skill, a question of fact, 24.

'S A~ITY.

See INSANITY.
:SEA WORTHINESS .
opinions as to, 142, 145.
~CI ENCE.
the term defined, 12.
questions to experts mu st partake of the nature of, 13.
expert must have expei·ience in, 2, 3.
'SCIENTH'IC BOOKS. See BOOKS OF SCIENCE.
SHEPHERD.
opinion as to age of sheep, 155.
'SlIIPWRIGH'l'.
opinion of, 143.
:SKILL.
expert mu st be po ss e s~ed of peculiar, 2, 8, 22.
much is left to discretion of court in determining whether a witness
is. possessed of, 23.
·wheth er a witness bas peculiar skill, a question of fact, 2-t..

IXDEX.
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SKILL Continued.

expert need not possess the highest degree of, 27.

opinions of witnesses as to whether an expert has, 49.

value of opinion of expert does not depend on degree of skill pro-

fessed, 59.

of phj'sician, testimony as to in malpractice cases, 97.

SOBER.

' KILL-Continued.
expert need not po se s the highe~t degree of, 2i.
opinions of witne , es a to whether an expert ha , 49.
value of opinion of expert doe not depend on d gree of
fe ed, 59.
of physician, te timony a to in mn.lpractice case 97.

kill pro-

opinion to as to whether a person was, 5.

SOCIETY.

whether a physician to testify as an expert should be a member of a

SOBER.
opinion to as to whether a person wa , 5.

medical, 68, 69.

SPECULATIVE DATA.

the admis.sibility of opinions based on, 19.

SPIRITS.

opinion a.s to evaporation of, 115.

STATUTES.

of a State are taken judicial notice of by Federal courts, 120.

of the Federal Government are taked judicial notice of by State

courts, 120.

of a State providing for a comparison of handwriting are not bind-
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ing in a Federal court. 193.

of Wisconsin providing for qualifications of physicians, 69.

providing against the disclosure by physicians of information ac-

quired while attending a patient, 71.

providing as to proof of foreign law, 125.

verification of written law. 129.

comparison of handwriting, 190.

detection of counterfeit notes, etc, 206.

additional compensation to experts, 253.

of New Hampshire providing for expert testimony in cases of value.

209.

STOCKBROKER.

testifying as an expert as to the law of promissory notes, 133.

opinion of as to technical terms, 107.

the course of business, 169.

STOCK-RAISER.

opinions of, 155.

STREET.

whether experts may testify as to the sufficiency of, 17, IS.

SUICIDE.

inadmissible opinion as to, 18.

SURVEYOR. See CIVIL ENGINEER.

opinion inadmissible as the highest part of a hill, 15.

opinion as to boundary marks, 157.

cannot give a construction to a survey, 157.

cannot testify as to safety of a highway, 158.

-SOCIETY.
whether a pbysicia.n to testify as an expert should be a mcmb r of a.
medical, 68, 69 .
.. PECULATIVE DATA.
the admissibility of opinion ba3e(l on, 19.
SPIRCTS .
opinion a"3 to evaporll.tion of, IV>.
TATUTE .
of a State are taken jmlieial notice of by :Federal courts 120.
of the Federal Government are taked judicial notice of by tate
courts, 120.
of a State providing for a <'Omparison of handwriting are not binding in a Federal court, 1!>3.
·of Wi cousin providing for qualification · of phy icians 69.
providing against the disclo ure by phy ician of information acquired while attending a patient, 71.
providing a to proof of foreign law, 125.
verification of \\Titten law, 129.
comparison of handwriting, mo.
detection of counterfeit notes etc, 206.
additional compensation to experts, 253.
of X ew Hampsllire providing for expert te timony in ca e of value,
209.
' TOCKBROKER.
testifying as an expert as to the law of promi ory note ; 133.
opinion of as to technical term , 167.
the comse o'f business, 169.
STOCK-RAIS EH.
opinion of. 155.
STREET.
whether experts m:1y testify a to the ufticiency of, 17 J... .
SUICIDE.
inadmi~ s ibl e opinion as to, 1 .
SURVEYOR. See CIVIL ENGDl'EER.
opinion inadmissible a the hiO'be ~ t part of a hill, l ;j .
opinion a to boundary mark , 157.
cannot gi\·e a con , trnetion to a urvey 157.
cannot testify :ll' to rnfcty of a h\ghway, U .

294 INDEX.

SYMPTOMS.

opinion of medical experts based on patient's declaration of, 7->.

testimony of experts based on evidence of symptoms, 77, 78.

of disease, medical testimony as to, 79.

of poisoning, chemists and physicians may testify to, 108, 109.'

unreliability of, in cases of poisoning, 109.

of disease in animals, who may testify to, 116.

T.

TAILOR.

opinion of, 172.

TECHNICAL TERMS.

testimony of experts as to. 165-168.

TELLERS.

testify as experts in handwriting, 179.

the detection of counterfeit bank notes, 203.

TENNESSEE.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 129.

TESTIMONY. See ADMISSIBIMTT OF EXPERT TESTIMONY; INADMIS-

SIBILITY OF OPINION; VALUE OF EXPETIT TESTIMONY; WEIGHT

OF EXPERT TESTIMONY.
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questions should not call for a critical review of, 37.

expert not to reconcile conflicting, 38.

whether an expert must hear all the, 39.

should tend to establish every fact embraced in a hypothetical ques-

tion, 39, 40.

expert cannot express opinion as to value of testimony of other ex-

perts, 50.

weight of, a question for the jury, 58.

of experts, to be considered like any other testimony, 59.

right of jury to exercise an independent judgment, 60.

expressions of opinion by the court as to the weight of, 61.

instructions as to the nature and weight of, 62-65.

the value and weight of, 65.

reference to a master to take, in cases of alleged hnpotency, 101.

testimony of medical experts in cases of alleged impotency to be

received with caution, 103.

illustration of, by the use of diagrams, 83, 112.

of experts as found in the reports, reading from, 251.

relation of scientific books to expert testimony, 234.

TEXAS.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 129.

to comparison of handwriting, 192.

TEXT BOOKS. See BOOKS OF SCIENCE.

right of experts in legal science to cite, 138.

INDEX.

2U5

INDEX. 2i5

TRADE.

one experienced in, an expert, 1.

as an '-art," 12.

expert testimony admissible in questions of, 8.

the testimony of experts in the various trades, 141-175.

TRADE MARKS.

opinions of experts in, 162, 163.

TOBACCO.

TRADE.
one experienced in, an expert, 1.
a an '·art ' 12.
expert te timony ad mi i ble in q ue ti on of, .
the te timony of expert in the variou trade , 1-H-175.
TRADE MARK '.
opinions of expert:~ in, 162, 163.

opinion of an expert in, 171.

TRANSLATION OF WRITINGS.

by persons of skill, 164.

U.

UNDERWRITERS.

when they may testify to the materiality of concealed facts, US, 150,

TOBACCO.
opinion of an expert in, 171 .
TRANSLATION OF WRCTINGS.
by per on~ of kill, 16-!.

151.

opinion of, as to increase of risk, 149, 151.

r.

USAGE OF COURTS.

as shown by testimony of lawyers, 139.

USAGE OF TRADE.

evidence as to, is inadmissible when. 163.
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who are competent to testify as to, 169.

VALUE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY.

is a question for the jury, 58, 65.

upon what it depends, 59, 66.

instructions as to the, 61-65.

expressions of judicial opinion as to, in miscellaneous cases of ap-

pendix, "A."

expressions of judicial opinion as to, in the investigation of hand-

writing, appendix " B.''

U~DERWRlTERS .

when they may testify to the materiality of concealed fact , U
151.
opinion of a to increase of lisk 149 151.
USAGE OF COURT .
a shown by te timony of lawyers, 139.
USAGE OF TRADE.
.
evidence as to, i inadmi sible when. 16
who are competent to testify as to, 1G9.

UO,

expressions of judicial opinion as to, in the case of medical experts,

appendix. ' C."

v.

VALUE.

as a subject for expert testimony, 208.

the doctrine in New Hampshire, 209.

when the opinion of experts are inadmissible on questions of. 210.

opinions as to the amount of damages, 211-213.

the admissibility of the opinions of non-professional witnesses on

questions of, 213.

qualifications of experts in value, 214-216.

whether the expert should see the property, 216-218.

time of examination of the property by the expert, 218.

competency in particular cases, 218-222.

VALL~

OF EXPERT TESTIMO~Y.
i a que tiou for the jury, 5, , 65.
upon what it depend , 59, 66.
instruction a to the, 61-65.
expression of judicial opinion a to, in mi cellaneou ca e of ap pendix, ''A. '
expressions of judic ial opinion as to in the inve tigation of handwriting, appendix '' B."
expression ~ of judicial opinioa as to, in the case of medical expert
appendix. '• C .. ,

YALUE.
a ~ a subject for expert testimony, 20
the doctrine in New Hampshire, 209.
when the opinion of expert are inadmi ible on que tion of 210.
opinions a~ to the amount of damage , 211-213.
the admis ibility of the opinion of non-profe ional witne se on
que tions of, 213.
qualification of expert in value, 214 -216.
whether the expert hould see the property, 216-21
time of examination of the property by the expert 21 •
competency in particular ca ~e , 218-222.
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VALUE Continued.

value of legal services, 222.

value of services of physicians and nurses, 224.

value of services in other callings, 226.

opinions as to the value of real estate, 227.

the value of annuities, 230.

the value of foreign currency and negotiable securities, 232.

VETEEINARY SURGEON.

testimony as to disease in animals, 116.

VIOLENCE.

opinion as to whether death was caused by, 21.

VOICE.

identification by means of, 5, n. 2.

WEIGHING TESTIMONY.

is the province of the jury, 58.

right of jury to exercise an independent judgment in, 60.

WEIGHT OF EXPERT TESTIMONY.

depends on what, 59.

instructions as'to, 61-65.

WISCONSIN.
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statutory requirements as to the qualifications of physicians, 69.

statutory provision as to disclosure by physicians of information/

acquired while attending a patient, 71.

statutory provision as to verification of written law, 130.

pi-oof of foreign law, 125.

WITNESSES. See COMPETENCY OF EXPERTS CREDIBILITY OF EX-

PERTSEXAMINATION OF EXPERTS CROSS-EXAMINATION.

exclusion of, from court room, 53.

right to limit number of, 54.

selection of expert, 55.

may be examined to determine the qualification of experts, 25.

WORDS.

defining technical words to jurv, 165.

expert testimony as to technical words, 166-168.

WOUNDS.

opinions as to the natural and probable results of, 81.

which of two, caused death, 82.

that a wound was inflicted after death, 82.

opinion as to position of body when struck, S3.

experiments upon a dynamometer, 84.

by what instrument produced, opinion as to, 84.

whether they were produced accidentally. 84.

who are competent to express opinions as to instrument used. 8r_

opinions of non-professional witnesses as to. 82.

L~DEX.
INDEX. 21)7

WRITERS ON MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE.

views of, on exclusion of medical treatises from evidence. 240.

views of, as to additional compensation to experts. 255.

WRITINGS. See HANDWRITING

translation of. 164.

expert cannot give construction to. 1(55, 166.

whether in a simulated hand. 182.

whether touched with a pen a second time. 1S2.

whether made with a pen. 1S3.

whether made by the same person and at same time. 183.

which was written first, 183,

opinion as to the alternation of, 1S4.

opinions as to illegible. 184.

whether of ancient or recent date. 185.

who may testify to the age of. 186.

WRITTEN LAWS. See FOREIGN LAWS.

distinction between written and unwritten law as to mode of proof.

123.

law presumed to be unwritten, 124.

expert testimony in connection with, 124.
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statutory provision as to, 125.

rule in England as to proof of. 126-129.

statutory provision as to verification of, 129.

WRITER OX MEDICAL JURI PRLl)E::\ CE.
news of 1 on exclusion of medical treatises from evidence. 2-Hi.
view of, a- to additional compe11sation to e'.l..perts. :255.
WRITIXGS. See H.L~DWRITL'"G
translation of. 16-1.
expert cannot give con-trnction to. lti5. lGG.
whether in a simulated hand. l 2.
whether touched with a pen a second time. 1S2.
whether made mth a pen . 1S3 .
whether made by tbe ~ame person and at 'am e time. L':3.
which was written first. 183,
opinion as to the alternation of, IS-!.
opinions as to illej!ible. 184.
whether of ancient or recent date. 1 5.
who may testify to the age of. l 6.
WRITTEN LAWS. "ee FOREIGN LA ws.
distinction between \Vritten and unwritten law as to mode of proof.
123.
law presumed to be unwritten 124.
expert testimony in connection with, 124.
~ tatutory provision as to 125.
rule in England as to proof of 1 1:26-129.
~tatutory provision as to verification of. 129.

